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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the research problem of"what are the key underpinning assets
or drivers of technological innovation, and how can they be harnessed to create
competitive advantage?"
Technological change is an evolutionary process. Research and technological
innovation creates knowledge and technology that is irreversible in the sense that
inventions can be superseded but not "uninvented". Technological innovation creates
knowledge and technology that is cumulative because it lays a platform for further
knowledge creation, or sets in place another rung in an ascending ladder of new
performance characteristics or properties which are demonstrably superior to their
antecedents. In turn, the asset specificity and irreversibility of technology and its
cumulativeness create barriers to competitive entry. This allows a firm to earn the
premiums that create market power and allow further innovation to be financed.
The model of technological innovation advanced in this thesis has at its core the
strategic governance framework of a firm, within which the dynamics of significant
new technology, human capital and social processes are catalysed and made
productive by differentiated technological learning processes. No one type of
technological learning applies universally, but rather learning is differentiated by
variables such as firm size and structure, the past experience and core competencies of
the firm, its human capital stocks, social processes, interactions with the external
environment, and a host of market, institutional and technological factors.
It is argued that the dynamics of significant new technology, human capital and social
processes are fundamental and necessary conditions of technological innovation.
Technological learning processes underly and provide a connecting thread that
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integrates these necessary conditions into a model of technological innovation that can
be applied by managers to create and sustain competitive advantage.
Technological learning both shapes and is shaped by the human capital stocks and
social processes of a firm. Learning processes give rise to significant new technology,
and the dynamics of that technology in turn helps catalyse and gives rise to further
learning. The rate and direction of learning and of technological innovation is also
driven by the firm's interaction with external sources of ideas and technology.
To create competitive advantage through technological innovation business managers
must address a flrm's strategy, human capital-related assets, social processes and
technological learning abilities. Policy managers must ensure that the public
technostructure is in place to foster human capital creation within an economy and to
facilitate access to new ideas and sources of stimulus.
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INTRODUCTION
It is increasingly accepted that technological innovation is at the heart of the
competitive performance of both the business enterprise and the national economy. In
his ten-nation study Mchael Porter found that firms gain and sustain competitive
advantage in international competition through improvement, innovation and
upgrading @orter, 1990). A major study of New Zealand's industry competitiveness
concluded that:
Innovation, in the broadest sense of the term, has become vital to success in international
competition...the essential character and source of competitive advantage is innovation and
change.
(Crocombe et al, 1991, p.27)
However, very little is known in New Zealand about how technological innovation
can be used by managers to create competitive advantage, and about how learning
processes underpin and catalyse technological innovation. This thesis therefore seeks
to increase understanding of the technological innovation process, to assist managers,
and to help them make technological innovation a core part of business strategy.
The thesis focuses on technological innovation in New Zealand over the period l98l-
1993. Technological innovation is seen as a dynamic process undertaken within the
strategic governance framework of a firm. It is argued that human capital, the
dynamics of significant new technology, and social processes are fundamental and
necessary conditions of technological innovation^ Technological learning processes
underly and provide a connecting thread that integrates these necessary conditions
into a model of technological innovation that can be applied by managers to create
competitive advantage.
Technological innovation is catalysed by learning processes through which firms
search for, select or create the intangible assets of human capital and knowledge and
apply them to economic opportunities. No one type of technological learning applies
universally, but rather it is differentiated by variables such as firm size and structure,
the past experience and core competencies of the firm, its human capital stocks and
social processes, its interactions with the external environment, and a host of market,
institutional and technological factors.
Technological learning both shapes and is shaped by the human capital stocks and
social and organisational processes of a firm. Learning processes give rise to
significant new technology, and the dynamics of that technolory in turn help catalyse
and give rise to further learning.
Background and Justification for Research
Technological change and innovation is at the heart of economic gowth (see Romer,
1986; 1990) and can also be a key strategy that allows managers to create a long-term
and sustainable competitive advantage. However, Johnston (1991) and Frater et al
(1995) highlight the lack of understanding and commitment by New Zealand
managers to the role of technology strategy and technological innovation to their
business enterprises. A great deal of the research that has been undertaken on
technological innovation internationally is of little relevance or is difficult to apply to
New Zealand firms. Research to date has generally focused on larger economies, and
technological innovation has not been extensively studied in New Zealand, or indeed
in many other smaller economies.
Very small economies such as New Zealand's are not "little big countries", but have
economic and market structures different in key respects to larger economies. While
New Zealand is now an independent and open economy, its industry structure,
technological level and patterns of innovative activity reflect its history as a semi-
peripheral "Dominion capitalist" (see Ehrensaft & Armstrong, 1978), which later
evolved into a highly protectionist economy (see Crocombe et al, l99L). From the
lgth century New Zealand developed as a supplier of agricultural commodities to
Britain. Up to 1940 Britain bought around 80% of New Zealand's exports, over 500/o
to the 1960s, and as much as a third by the early 1970s (Frater et al, 1995). Only
from 1980 did other countries overtake Britain as the top export market.
New Zealand had a highly regulated and protectionist economy until the economic
reforms of the 1980s (see Frater et al, 1995). Many firms had been established under
a regime of import substitutio4 and lacked the scale economies and markets to
compete internationally. Much of the manufacturing industry that has developed in
New Zealand focuses on the processing of meat, wool, dairy and forestry products
rather than on competing directly in the export market. Most industry sectors are
dominated by small firms. In the non-farm enterprise sector, 92Yo of firms employ
fewer than l0 staff Enterprises employing fewer than 50 staffaccount for about two-
thirds of total non-farm employment. In New Zealand as a whole, only 340
enterprises employ more than 100 people. In the manufacturing sector, enterprises
employing fewer than 50 people account for 96Yo of enterprises and 42Yo of
employment (Frater et al,1995).
New Zealand Studies of Technoloeical Innovation
New Zealand studies relating to technological innovation and technical change include
technology or sector-specific studies, studies of the business or industry environment,
of firm management and behaviour, of social aspects of innovation, and studies of the
technological innovation process itself Most of these studies do not adequately
accommodate the role of intangible assets such as knowledge or human capital, or
conceive of innovation as a dynamic learning process.
Research aimed at elucidating the contribution of technology to industry performance
has tended to focus at the level of an industry sector or technology, eg. Cullwick &
Thirkell (1977), the New Zealand Communications Advisory Council (1985), Bowie
& Bollard (1987), Dordick (1987), and Slade (1994). None of these studies looked at
the social, organisational, motivational and dynamic aspects of the technological
innovation process itself.
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The most influential recent study of the broader industry environment in New Zealand
was Upgrading New Zealand's Compelitive Advantage (Crocombe et al, l99l)
which applied Michael Porter's analytical framework (Porter, 1990) to the New
Zealand economy and its competitive performance. This study emphasised the
importance to firms of innovation, and of investment in human resource development,
but it did not look at the more dynamic aspects of human capital creation and
technological learning. Nor did it address organisational and social aspects of
innovation.
The Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST) has supported research
on firm management and behaviour and the innovation environment in New Zealand,
for examplethe Technologt Strategt in New Zealand Indus@ study (Johnston, l99l)
and a joint study with BERL on the New Zealand Innovation Environment (Frater et
al, 1995). Johnston (1991), inter alia, concluded that New Zealand R&D-spending
firms had a limited understanding of the role of technology and learning strategies in
their businesses, and suggested that public research institutes were poorly rated by
firms as sources of new technology. The study did not however analyse the origins of
innovation, the social and organisational processes involved, or the dynamic and
learning aspects of technological innovation.
The "BERL Report" (Frater et al, 1995) has been the major study of New Zealand's
innovation environment. It sought to identify the important sources of information
and ideas for new innovations over a wide spectrum of industry. It rated sources such
as senior managers, customers, marketing and internal R&D personnel highly, and
external research institutes and consultants at the bottom as sources of new ideas.
However, the Report did not look at the dynamic, interactive and differentiated nature
oftechnological learning. The BERL Report's major limitations included its emphasis
on the environment for innovation rather than the technological innovation process
itself It did not address the origins, nature and dynamics of significant new
technology. It placed little emphasis on the social and institutional side of innovation,
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and it lacked a rigorous framework through which the data could be analysed and the
insights and conclusions generalised.
Although technological innovation is a social process, few New Zealand studies have
focused primarily on the social, organisational and managerial aspects of innovation.
Some studies have looked at the interaction between government and social change
(Couchmaq 1984; 1989), while Couchman et al (1988) looked at the implications of
technological change on social policy. The work of Inkson & Cammock (1984) and
some of Couchman's work has been informed by such work as Braverman (1974),
and a plethora of associated research that addresses the relationships between
technical change and social control.
Hill & Gidlow (1988), in their study of technical change in the printing industry,
addressed social choices and processes of negotiation, conflict and compromise that
influence the pace and pervasiveness oftechnical change, and elucidated how people's
perceptions of technical change influence their social, political and economic
strategies. While Hill & Gdlow confine themselves to the adoption of existing
technology in one sector rather than looking at technological innovation per se, the
importance of the interaction of individuals with their institutional environment is an
important theme in this and other social sciences research undertaken in the DSIR.
Most New Zealand studies of the technological innovation process itself have been
"gref' or "popular" literature, in-house reports, or masterateJevel academic projects
(eg. Hamilton, l99l). Such studies tend to be based on overseas theoretical
frameworks and methodologies which are then adapted and applied to or tested in the
New Zealand scene. They are often based on limited survey data, designed as in-
house discussion papers to build awareness on issues related to technological
innovation (see for example Stuart, 1980; Stuart & McCulloch, 1980), or are popular
summaries of interesting local inventions or innovations (see Harman, 1978; Riley,
lees).
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Winsley (1991) analysed the process of technological innovatiorq drawing on
evolutionary perspectives on technical change and addressing social and management
processes associated with technological innovation. Glbertson & Knight (1992) and
Gilbertson & Gilbertson (1995) published a series of case studies in innovation and
management. Key strengths of these studies included the elucidation of the "people
side" of the innovation process. The cases were mainly based on firms or
entrepreneurs rather than technological innovations. However, the cases included
technology-based firms such as Trigon, Cadac Holdings, Gough Technology,
Interlock and Power Beat international.
However, these cases did not all draw on the multiple sources of data and levels of
analysis needed to provide the rich insight into technological innovation that is
achievable in a more focused study. Nor did the cases explore innovation as a
learning process. The cases used a very wide definition of innovation, emphasising
that innovation does not have to involve technology, and that many innovation skills
or variables are generic and as applicable to starting a fashion business as they are to
the management of complex technological innovations. However, as is shown in this
thesis, there are aspects of technological lnnovation that involve quite specific
management challenges, and which have never been closely examined in New
Zealand. These include the nature and dynamics of significant new technology,
technological learning, and the role of human capital.
This thesis focuses on innovations that have been commercialised and uses them as
"windows" or entry points through which the technological innovation process can be
understood in its wider complexity. Other New Zealand studies have tended to look
more narrowly at technological inventions. Bray & Perry Q994) briefly summarised
104 recent DSIR inventions, looking in depth at 20 of them. As with Leary Q992),
the Bray & Perry study was imbued with a linear view of scientific research leading in
a serial way to invention and innovation. Its major limitations included its dependence
on superficial interviews, rather than exploiting multiple sources of information and
levels of analysis. It lacked a conceptual or theoretical framework to give focus to the
research and an adequate framework for analysis of the data.
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The above studies come from different perspectives and address different issues, and
generally do not explore the process of technological innovation per se. We are
therefore left with some major "knowledge gaps" in our understanding of
technological innovation in New Zealand. These gaps include the nature and
dynamics of significant new technology, the sources of key ideas and stimulus and the
external influences impacting on technological innovation, human and social aspects
of innovatiorq human capital creation and learning proc€sses.
Research Problem and Thesis Proposition
This thesis addresses the research problem of"what are the key underpinning assets
or drivers of technological innovation, and how are they harnessed to create
competitive advantage?" The central proposition underlying this thesis is that
technological innovation is a learning process whereby firms search for, create or
acquire the intangible assets of knowledge and human capital, and make them
economically productive.
It is argued that learning is shaped by knowledge and competencies in a firm that are
built up cumulatively over time. Learning occurs at many levels, and a firm's external
interactions and search and selection processes are a key element in its learning
strategy. These external interactions include networking and interactions with
customers, suppliers, users, and with other sources of new ideas and technology.
Learning requires people to interact together in trusting social relationships, both
internally within a firm and externally. These social relationships are important in
enhancing learning and the absorption of new ideas and technologies.
The thesis proposition is that differentiated technological learning and social processes
catalyse and make productive human capital-related assets within the strategic
governance framework of a firm. The dynamics associated with significant new
technological innovations can then be managed to create a sustainable competitive
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advantage, with the dynamics of technical change over time providing further sources
of technological learning for the firm.
Methodolory
This thesis is case study-based qualitative research that uses inductive, grounded
research techniques to gather and analyse data. It is explicitly interdisciplinary
research. The methodology involves participants in technological innovation in the
process of creating the data for the researc[ data that is then analysed. The aim is to
create theory from data, and to develop more focused research questions which are
then examined in detail, rather than to begin with a very specific hypothesis which is
then tested against data.
Essentially, the research began with the scoping of the field and a literature review,
together with the preparation of a database of every identifiable technological
innovation within New Zealand over the period 198l-1993. Written material such as
trade and technical literature was the major source of this database. The database,
together with the criteria used in its preparation and other relevant material, is
summarised in Annex l.
Eleven innovations were then selected for case study, with details of the selection
criteria and ofthe case research procedures being set out in the Methodology chapter.
Five broad areas of research enquiry were used to give focus to the case research.
The primary data generated by the case study research, together with secondary data
arising from such sources as the literature review, was then analysed through opeq
axial and selective coding, to derive core categories ofrelated variables that appeared
to lie at the heart of an understanding of technological innovation in New Zealand's
small, open economy. The core categories were the Dynamics of Significant New
Technologt, Human Capital, and Social Processes.
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Further data analysis then led to the key proposition emerging of technological
innovation as being underpinned by technological learning processes that catalyse the
other core categories ofvariables. This key proposition began to appear in embryonic
form early in the case study data collection process, but only began to crystallise
during the data coding process, essentially from axial coding stage on.
The proposition of technological innovation catalysed by learning processes was then
further tested by reference to the literature, to the case study results, and through
further analysis at more selective and advanced coding stages that elucidated the
relationships, causations and dependencies between the core categories of variables.
Progressively, learning processes emerged as the unifying thread across all core
categories of variables. The literature review was then revisited, to help test the key
proposition in the thesis against the theoretical work and empirical evidence of others.
This helped verify that the picture generated by the case study and grounded research
procedures approximated to reality.
The core categories generated through axial and selective coding and the
differentiated learning thesis were then integrated into a unified model of
technological innovation. This hinged around innovation as a differentiated leaming
process that catalysed other core variables, with the links between learning and other
variables and categories of variables being elucidated. The results of this
methodology and set of procedures was then given expression to in the conclusions.
A detailed outline of the methodology is set out in the Methodology chapter.
Outline of the Thesis
The "Technological Innovation: An Overview of the Literature" chapter provides an
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on technological innovation that
relates to the research problem and thesis proposition. The Methodology chapter
explains and justifies the methodology to be used, sets out the units of analysis and the
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sources of data, the methods of data collection, and the detailed data analysis
procedures that were used in the research.
The Case Study chapter encompasses the eleven completed case studies, all of which
have been verified by those involved in the innovations. Further details of the case
study research and copies of relevant documentation are in Annex 2. The Analysis of
Data chapter summarises the data generated by the research and gives expression to
the results in the form of core categories of variables. The Conclusions and
Implications chapter then weaves the core categories of variables into a model of
technological innovation that has at its core a view of technological innovation as a
process that is catalysed by technological learning. The implications of the research to
the theory relating to technological innovation are then set out. Finally, the practical
implications for business and policy managers are surnmarised and suggestions are
made for further research.
Definitions and Delimitations of Scope
For the purposes of this thesis, technological innovations are defined as "new
products, processes or services that embody significant new functional properties or
technical performance characteristics or inventive features that are substantive and
objectively measurable." The research is concerned only with innovations that are
substantially New Zealand in origin. The detailed criteria, exclusions and protocols
governing what is defined as a technological innovation are listed in the Methodology
chapter.
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TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter outlines the major schools of thought on technological innovation as they
relate to the research problem and thesis propositioq and identifies gaps in the
understanding of key aspects of the technological innovation process. A range of
multidisciplinary and theoretical perspectives are canvassed to shed light on
technological innovation as a dynamic and social process, and as a process through
which learning creates value from the intangible assets of human capital, technological
knowledge and information.
The "domain of enquiqf' for the thesis is then identified, and within this domain the
"broad areas" that encompass the major knowledge gaps this thesis addresses are
identified.
Early Writers on Technology, Economics and Innovation
While early writers such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo understood technology as
a factor of productiorq Karl Marx was the first major theorist to provide rich insights
into the relationships between technological change as a dynamic process and social
and economic behaviour.
According to Marx and his colleague Engels:
The bourgeois cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production
and thereby the relationships of production, and with them the whole relations of society.
Marx & Engels, 1963)
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Enduring contributions by Manr include the recognition that "artefacts have politics",
and that technological change is inextricably bound up with workplace organisatioq
social dynamics and social control. Marxist thinking both drew from and contributed
to evolutionary theory. Shortly after Darwin published the Origin of the Species,
Marx called for a critical history of technology to be written along evolutionary lines
(see Basalla" 1988, p. 2l). Technological innovation as a social and an evolutionary
process provides an important backdrop to the issues this thesis addresses.
Neoclassical Economics
Neoclassical literature acknowledges the importance of and the high returns from
R&D and technological innovation (eg. Mansfield et al, 1977; Mansfield, l98l;
Dempster, 1994). At a macroeconomic level the growth theory of Abramowitz
(1956), Solow (1957) and Denison (1967) demonstrates that a great part of economic
growth comes from factors other than labour and capital inputs. This "residual"
underlying growth encompasses R&D, human capital, knowledge and technology.
These intangible assets are seen in this thesis as central to innovation and economic
growth. However, the social and learning processes that generate "the growth
residual" have not been addressed in the traditional neoclassical literature.
Traditional neoclassical economics tends to see technology as codified and exogenous
knowledge that is easily transferable, often without cost (see McKelvey, l99l). It
takes little account of the "unteachable" (Penrose, 1959) or tacit @olanfl, 1967)
nature of much knowledge, the fact that knowledge is often embedded in firm
routines, and that only information that is easily codified is well suited to market
trading (Boisot, 1995). Traditional neoclassical theory has tended towards a
mechanistic view of the firnr, with managers making rational decisions based on
perfect knowledge, rather than seeing firms as learning organisations that are bounded
by their core competencies, routines, tacit knowledge, and by the technology
embedded in their social relations.
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Most neoclassical economics is based around static rather than dynamic models.
These models have little explanatory power in a world of shifting technological
frontiers, irreversible and cumulative technical change, and interactive technological
learning. Hayek and others in the Austrian school argue that the market is the most
efficient mechanism of discovering and acquiring dispersed information and that
public interventions cannot improve on this (Hayek, 1975). However, the Austrian
school treats learning as a subset of market allocation processes rather than as
encompassing the creative, social and dynamic processes of technological innovation.
Some branches of neoclassical theory have however tried to gain insight into "real
world" innovation processes at a firm behavioural level. Transaction cost economics
(see Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) includes some concepts that provide insights
into the technological innovation process. These include asset specificr$, bounded
rationality (see March & Simon, 1958) and information asymmetry. Asset specificity
refers to specialised assets whose value is higher in their dedicated use than in
alternative uses. These assets can be human capital, skills, methods or embodied
technology. Because specialised assets are of very low value in other markets and
applications, investment in them constitutes a sunk cost and is subject to "fire sale"
prices when investment is withdrawn from these specialised uses. Asset specfficity is
an important concept when we later grapple with the nature and dynamics of
significant new technology, and with the irreversibility and cumulativeness of
technological change.
Bounded rationality refers to the imperfect ability of individuals to process and
interpret vast amounts of information (see Mokyr, 1990, pp. 158-9). Bounded
rationality acts as a major constraint on decisions to invest in and manage
technological change (see Dosi et al, l99O). Information asymmetry is also helpful in
explaining differences in the rate and direction of technological learning. Because
information, and the ability to interpret it, is not distributed evenly among firms, the
ability to embody new information in significant new technology differs substantially
(see Silbertson ed., 1989, p. 62). Bounded rationality and information asymmetry
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help account for radical divergencies in technological trajectories, and in the rate and
direction of technological accumulation among firms.
However, there are real limits on the insight transaction cost theory provides into the
learning aspects of technological innovation. Transaction cost theory sees
organisational structure and external interactions as being primarily shaped by the
need to reduce transaction costs. However, firms often network together to access
external ideas and technologies rather than to reduce transaction costs. This
networking depends on trust and cooperative action, while transaction cost theory
sees economic relationships as partly driven by opportunism, deceit and guile
(Johanson & Mattsson, 1987). Transaction cost economics is inherently static in its
view of institutions, it fails to take adequate account of people's nature, motivations
and working relationships, and does not address interactive and externally-driven
learning processes.
Research, Science and Technology-Push and Demand-Pull
Innovation Models
The immediate post-World War I I period was a time of enornous confidence in
science, finding expression in such polemics as Vannevar Bush's Seience the Endless
Frontier (1945). However, researchers progressively began to question the
assumption that basic research and science were the key drivers of technological
learning, change and innovation.
Relationships Between Scientifi c Research and Technological Innovation
Schmookler (1966) challenged the linear model of basic research leading inevitably to
innovatioq seeing invention/innovation instead as a needs or demand-driven
phenomenon. The Hindsighl study (see Isenson, 1969), and Langrish et al (1972)
found that basic scientific research was responsible for very few of the key events
leading to the technological innovations studied. However, these studies were partly
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countered by the 1968 TMCES (Technology in Retrospect and Critical Events in
Science) analysis and by Freeman (1982), both of which placed rather more weighting
on the role of scientific research in leading to or underpinning innovation.
A limitation of many studies in the management of technological innovation is that
they focus excessively on the role of R&D, or examine specific aspects of innovation
in a narrow and segmented way, without looking at the overall process, Many studies
treat the management of R&D as quite separate from the wider process of innovation
management. Key features of technological learning explored later in this thesis are
its systemic and holistic nature, and its dependence on integrating R&D with the
wider learning processes associated with innovation.
Linear models of research leading to innovation have now largely been superseded by
models based on interactive processes where formal scientific research is simply one
of many different forms and sources of technological learning (see Kline, 1985;
Rothwell, 1992). Technological innovation tends now to be likened to a continuous
fermentation process in which old ideas endlessly seed new developments, and
"learning by doing" effects feed into new ideas for the production and the innovation
processes. However, even literature that treats the relationship between scientific
research and innovation as a non-linear, interactive and cumulative process still does
not adequately address the social and differentiated learning processes that catalyse
and make productive the human capital assets of a firm.
Technology-Push Versus Demand-Pull Theories of Innovation
Associated with research on the role of science and basic research in stimulating
technological change, many studies have addressed technology-push versus demand-
pull as sources of stimulus for innovation (eg. Myers & Marquis, 1969; Freemarq
1974; Rothwell et al,1974; Parker, 1978; Stern ed., 1982). These studies have some
methodological limitations (see Chidamber & Kon, 1994). However, they do
highlight the importance in innovation of new information inputs and of external
communication, and they confirm the importance of external sources of scientific
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expertise and advice. Some of these studies also look at the differentiation in the
sources of new ideas and learning processes (eg. von Hippel, 1988), but this
differentiation is not explored in any depth.
Research has progressively moved beyond simplistic demand-pull studies and sought
deeper insights into the effects of the external and internal environment on innovation
in firms. Ackerman & Harrop (1985) concluded that the most significant sources of
stimuli for innovation were competition, customer requirements, internal R&D and
technological trends, profit incentives, and public grants. Rothwell & Zegteld (1985)
listed as key success factors for technological innovation the understanding of user
needs, effective coupling with the marketplace and with external sources of scientific
and technological expertise, and internal coupling. However, this research failed to
rigorously address sources of new ideas, human capital issues, social processes, or the
dynamic nature of external interactions and of technological learning.
Overall, a limitation of research relating to the demand-pull stimulus for innovation is
its overly narrow focus on market influences and one-way communication flows. The
results of such research are often ambiguous, or too "coarse grained" to be useful.
Chidamber & Kon (1994) point out that firm or project-level studies judge market
stimulus as more important to innovation than technology-push factors, but research
using high-level units of analysis produces mixed results Much of the research cited
above addresses the motivational stimulus to innovate, but does not examine this
external stimulus as part of a more interactive and differentiated search, selection and
learning process. Nor does it adequately address the role of human capital, of social
processes, or ofthe dynamics oftechnical change.
Schumpeter
Joseph Schumpeter shared with Karl Marx a view of economic change as a dynamic
process rather than as an adjustment towards an equilibrium (see Schumpeter, 1942;
Macleod ed., 1986). While great neoclassical economists such as Keynes addressed
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the failure of macroeconomic policy to use existing assets, Schumpeter focused on the
creation over time of new technological assets through an innovation process that he
termed "the carrying out of new combinations".
Schumpeter saw innovations emerging in waves, associated with investment booms
and gales of "creative destruction" (Schumpeter, l94Z). This thinking is aligned to
that of the "long wave" theorists (see Mensch,1979; Graham & Senge, 1980). Long
wave theories of technical change lack rigorous support in the empirical literature, but
are broadly consistent with the observation that innovations do stimulate other
innovations and form clusters (see Haustein & Maier, 1980; Marchetti,lg80).
Schumpeterianism and associated long wave theory contain strands of evolutionary
thinking. Biological evolution is characterised by long periods of stasis, with
incremental adaptation punctuated by disequilibriums and sudden bursts of rapid
change ("punctuated equilibrium"). This is analogous to Schumpeterian thinking
about creative waves of innovation, and parallels the economic phenomenon of bursts
of technological innovation, for example as exemplified in the "information
technology revolution".
There are "fuzzy boundaries" between neo-Schumpeterian literature and work
associated with the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRLI) at Sussex University, work
that includes researchers such as Freeman and Dosi. Very broadly, the works of
Jewkes et al (1969), Langrish et al (1972), Freeman (1982), Rosenberg (1982,1994),
Scherer (1984) and Dosi et al (1988) can be labelled "neo-Schumpeterian". These
researchers have addressed the dynamic and the "big picture" aspects of technological
innovation, as well as some of the commoner research questions referred to above.
Neo-Schumpeterian literature increasingly emphasises firm-specific technological
knowledge accumulation (see Granstrand, 1982; Dosi, 1984; Stiglitz, 1987a;
Amendola & Gaffard, 1988; Swan ed., 1992). As we shall see later, this work is
closely intertwined with that of evolutionary economics, and more obliquely to
"information theoretics" and new growth theory.
Social, Managerial and Organisational Aspects of Technological
Innovation
Research on the social, managerial and organisational aspects of technological
innovation encompasses a range of major themes and problems. These have included:
Socioloey of Technologl,
Social theory relating to technological innovation ranges from Veblen and institutional
economics, social constructionism (see Bijker et al eds., 1987, Bijker & Law eds.,
1992; Mackenzie & Wajcman eds., 1985) through to works such as Shapin (1994)
which have an ethical and moral dimension. Mackenzie & Wajcman eds. (1985),
Bijker et al eds. (1987), Hodgson (1988), Bijker & Law eds. (1992) and Mackenzie
(1990) provide insights into how information and technology is socially and culturally
processed and shaped within organisations, and also into how technology shapes
organisations. There is now a wide acceptance that innovation is a social process that
is shaped by interest groups within organisations and society, and by the interplay
between individuals and institutions. This thesis sees social processes as being
integral to a view of technological innovation as a team-based and interactive learning
process.
Neo-Marxist and some "sociology of technology'' views of technology as a
manipulative tool of social control have in recent times been largely superseded by a
recognition of the performance gains that flow from staffempowerment, team-based
workplace reform and cross-functional management. Modern management thinking
increasingly focuses on unlocking the performance gains that come from harnessing
the innovation and the new ideas of workers at all levels in an organisation. The
literature on the sociology of technology encompasses social processes in innovatiorL
but does not integrate this with an understanding of human capital, or adequately
address the catalytic role of differentiated learning in technological innovation. Nor
does it effectively accommodate some of the economic aspects of technological
25
dynamics such as irreversibility, cumulativeness and technical platform effects, and the
related management implications.
Orsanisational Strates.v and Structure
There are important relationships between organisational strategy and structure and
the performance of firms in innovation.
Significant research effort has focused on the influence of a firm's strategy on the
management of technological innovation (see Rothberg ed., l98l; Steele, 1989;
Burgelman & Sayles, 1986). Much of this work highlights the need for research and
technological innovation to form an integral part of strategic corporate management,
rather than being an activity that is divorced from wider corporate goals (see Gobeli
& Rudelius, 1985). Richardson (1985) identifies among key "failure factors" in
innovation the poor linkage between R&D and corporate stratery. Jelinek &
Schoonhoven (1990) stress the need for an innovative firm to articulate and diffirse its
corporate strategy internally. Dodgson ed. (1989) and Johnston (1991) highlight the
complex and quite specialised strategic demands of managing technology, and focus
on the use of technology strategies as an integral part of the strategic management of
firms. Such work acknowledges that the strategic management of technological
change involves its own specialised challenges, and is not simply a subset of other
business management practices.
Much early management literature (eg. Taylor, 1947) conceived of the firm in a
mechanistic rather than a more organic and dynamic context, and focused on
organising work to achieve the maximum efticiency within a fixed state of technology
and set of production processes. However, mechanistic views of innovation fail to
take account of social processes in the firm, and of the relationships between
innovation as a learning process and the organisational structures that are suited to
learning. Mechanistic models do not acknowledge the importance in innovation of
such factors highlighted by Gobeli &. Brown (1993) as continuous process
improvement and total employee involvement.
The organisational structure required for technological innovation must facilitate its
management as a systemic, non-linear and dynamic process (Rickards, 1985).
Innovation is fostered by organic and flexible organisational forms rather than by
formal and mechanistic structures (see Greson, 1984; Shane, 1990). Organisations
that focus on dynamic innovation rather than static efficiency gains have to vest trust
in people to perform in conditions of uncertainty, and where the performance of
people is difficult to monitor and measure, rather than to rely on Taylorist
management techniques (Blandy et al, 1985, p. ll2). The Japanese lcaisen
(continuous improvement) work method, and the concept of reinnovation based on
robust design configurations (Rothwell & Gardiner, 1988; 1989), are all consistent
with the view in this thesis that innovation is a process of dynamic, ongoing and
evolutionary change rather than a process that tends towards a market equilibrium.
Some studies highlight the relationships between a firm's organisational structure and
its communication flows and learning processes (see Hage & Aiken, 1970; Maidique,
1980; Cohn, 1980; Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1990; Rothwell, 1992). Authoritarian and
hierarchal structures stifle innovation because they hamper organisational learning by
impeding flows of communication. They also fail to access and exploit tacit and
uncodified information generated at all levels in an organisation (see Child & Bate,
1987, pp. 60-61).
Organisational Culture and Social Processes
Organisational culture has significant impacts on productivity, creativity, idea
generation and learning processes (see Akin & Hopelain, 1986; Horwitch ed., 1986;
Twiss & Goodridge, 1989; Senge, 1990, p. 249\. The culture of a firm can be defined
as that part of its knowledge stock which is shared by the firm's staffbut not by the
general population (Cremer, 1993, p. 354). It therefore has a localised and a tacit
dimension, and includes shared meanings and communication modes. Firm culture is
therefore likely to influence organisational communication and learning.
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The willingness of organisations to allow incumbent interests and the accepted
wisdom to be challenged is often crucial in technological learning (see Maidique,
1980; Twiss & Goodridge, 1989; Senge, 1990). Myers & Marquis (1969) identified
among key baniers to innovation such cultural factors as a resistance to new ideas,
and poor cooperation or communication. Twiss (1980) reported that learning and
innovation processes are enhanced by an organisational culture that fosters a
receptivity to new ideas, porous organisational boundaries, and openness and
allowance of conflict. These studies identified but did not explore in depth some
aspects of learning, such as the benefits from immediate feedbaclg and from cross-
fertilisation of ideas resulting from a mix of specialisations.
It is important to understand how people work together and complement each other
in both a formally structured and an informal sense in the technological innovation
process. There is an extensive literature on the key formal roles played by people in
innovation (see Maidique, 1980; Smith et al, 1984; Knight, 1987; Freedman, 1988;
Tushman & Moore, 1988; Steele, 1989; Twiss & Goodridge, 1989; Jelinek &
Schoonhoven, 1990). However, in many cases technological innovation will be far
more dependent on the informal relationships in a firm and on the role of the team
(see White et al,1988; Kash, 1989).
Case studies later in this thesis show that the cultural foundations must be in place
before firms can develop the "social architecture" and informal social processes
needed in innovation. In many cases, innovation in social processes, teamwork or
workplace organisation is necessary to catalyse technological innovation (see Boddy
& Buchanag 1986; Tushman & Moore, 1988). For example, Takeuchi & Nonaka
(1986), Johne & Snelson (1988) and Florida & Kenney (1990) promote the Japanese
"rugby approach" to innovation that involves a marshalling and interweaving of
complementary skills and ideas in an integrated and team-based way.
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National Systems of Innovation
Many studies of national innovation systems (see Dertouzos et al, 1989; Lundvall ed.,
1992; Nelson ed., 1993) tend to be policy summaries or descriptive papers, rather
than empirical studies. However, there is significant empirical evidence relating to the
varying influence national systems of innovation have on different countries. The
social and cultural environment of a country influences innovation (see Wallace,l97Q;
Dore, 1983; Shane, 1990; Mokyr, 1990). Historical contingencies and natural
resource endowments have also shaped different national innovation systems (see
Pavitt ed.; 1980; Florida & Kenney, 1990). For example Japan, as a resource-poor
country, is very strong in resource-saving or augmenting technologies, ranging from
time-saving techniques to energy-efticient automobiles.
The national systems of innovation literature emphasises that strategic management is
a key element in innovation. Studies of national innovation systems suggest that
strong and innovative technology-based firms can be based in small countries. Such
firms don't have to be major investors in formally-organised R&D, but direct links
between firms and public research institutes are important. Nelson ed. (1993) stresses
that public policy, including Government funding of basic research and education and
the legal and regulatory framework, exercises a major influence on innovation. Public
scientific and technical institutions within a country are fundamental to the search and
selection process, since they affect the bridging mechanisms between pure science and
technological development, and the capabilities that firms can bring to bear on the
search process (Dosi et al, 1990, p. 244)
Research on national systems of innovation takes an holistic view, and has links with
the management of innovation literature and with research relating to innovation as a
learning process. The importance of users as a source of learning in innovation is, for
example, a strong feature of the national systems of innovation as well as of the
management literature (see Slaughter, 1993; Nelson ed., 1993). Fagerberg (1995)
places learning processes in a national systems of innovation frameworlg and argues
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that a country's long-run comparative advantage will be in areas where its rate of
learning is higher than that of competing countries.
The national systems of innovation construct forms a backdrop to rather than a central
focus for this thesis, though the thesis results will create a body of knowledge that
includes some unique New Zealand elements, and will provide insight into specific
features of the national system of innovation in New Zealand.
Evolutionary Economics
While neoclassical economics treats technology as exogenous "manna from heaven",
evolutionary economics accepts that technological evolution is not an isolated event
but depends on past research and the foundation provided by earlier innovators
(Scotchmer, 1991). It argues that technological developments are shaped by innate
characteristics that are transmitted through time, by social forces, and by interaction
with and adaptation to the external environment (see Nelson & Winter, 1982; Nelsoq
1987). While the rate of evolutionary biological change is related to biological
diversity and to possible mutations, the rate of technological change is linked to the
diversity and vitality of new ideas that a firm is subject to.
Key concepts in evolutionary economics include:
Irreversibility. Technolosical Trajectories and Cumulativeness
Technical change is irreversible in the sense that inventions cannot be "uninvented".
Richard Dawkins coined the term 'meme' to describe those ideas that propagate
themselves through time like self-replicating viruses. The idea of the wheel, DNA or
the basic principles of software engineering are immortal, flowing like a river through
a series of disposable vesselg whether those vessels be minds, bodies, or microchips.
Ideas and technologies, like genes, compete and are subject to natural selection. New
technological products must offer a customer a tangible (rather than cosmetic) benefit
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to survive (O'Hare, 1988, p. l3), so that the long-term survival of a technology, as of
a gene, depends on its "fitness for purpose".
As foreshadowed in the earlier discussion of transaction cost theory, asset specificity
is a key mechanism in the irreversibilify of technical change. The irreversibility of
specialised technological investments can discourage competitive entry, allowing an
innovative firm to earn premiums from a quasi-monopoly position in the market that is
based on its cumulative, specialised assets. This position in the market is reinforced
by increasing returns from specialisation (see Romer, 1987).
The directions taken by a technology over time constitute its technological trajectory.
These trajectories are linked with the development of specific infrastructures, system-
scale economies, complementary technologies, cumulative learning processes,
standardisation requirements and network e>rCernalities (Dosi, 1988, p. l146; Dosi e/
al, 1994, p. 26). The emergence of major new technological developments is often
charaoterised by widespread experimentation and "learning from diversity". This
leads to the range of possible variants being narrowed down to limited trajectories of
development, until one technological variant becomes a standard (see Cowan &
Foray, 1995). However, technological trajectories can involve a narrowing of focus,
and "Wolfs Lau/' holds that there will be diminishing returns to technical advances
along existing trajectories.
While Schumpeter saw innovation as a process of "creative destruction", evolutionary
economics also focuses on the process of incremental technological accumulation.
Small advantages can accumulate, as small events become locked in and determine
long-run outcomes. The cumulativeness of technical know-how can also encourage
economies of scope through the transferability of learning, which enables generic
technology to underpin a wide range of new products (see Dodgson & Rothwell eds.,
ree4).
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Genotypes of Firms. Oreanisational Routines and Technological Regimes
The internal skill base, core competencies and culture of a firm can be likened to a
genotype, and their embodiment in the firm, and the firm's behaviour, performance
and strategy, to the resulting phenotype.
Evolutionary economics sees a firm's organisational procedures, decision rules, and
way of doing things as making up its "organisational routine" (see Nelson & Winter,
1982). Routines embody firm-specific competencies and tacit knowledge, and they
adapt and change in accord with learning experiences. Routines can help focus the
efforts of individuals on the higher purpose of the group or the value system that the
group embodies (see Postrel & Rumelt, 1992). However, routines can also imply
rote-learned behaviour, and can stifle creativity and the rate of learning. Significantly,
Lundvall ed. (1992) argues that "organisational forgetting" can be an important form
of learning in firms.
A firm's technological competencies and knowledge base and its operating procedures
collectively make up a "technological regime". The technological regime embodied in
a firm sets boundaries around its productive activities @osenbloom & Burgelman
eds., 1989). A technological regime reflects what is scientifically feasible, while the
actual trajectory followed by a technology reflects how social and environmental
factors impact on it, that is, what is socially possible (see Slade, 1994, p.65). Where
a firm lacks the internal competencies required to diversify into a new technological
regime, it will rely on external sources of knowledge and technology for the learning
needed to do so (Senker & Faulkner, 1992, p. I 58).
Phenot],pes of Firms and Search and Selection Processes
While a firm's genotype embodies its core technologies and organisational routines, a
firm's phenotype reflects how it has interacted with, shaped and been shaped by
external sources of technology and of learning.
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Firms scan the external environment and make search and selection decisions. This
search and selection is focused within "neighbourhoods" of technological oppornrnity
that are bounded by the firm's technological regimes and its external interactions, and
which are also shaped by cultural, social and economic factors. Some of this
technological learning is generic, but much is localised and specific to firms (Pavitt,
le84).
A firm's search and selection activities are interactive, with selection also driving
search activities, and with the condition of a firm at any time laying the seeds for its
future development. Search and selection encompasses active learning strategies,
networking, and exploiting external sources of ideas to foster technological learning in
a firm. The greater the pluralism and ferment of new ideas, and the more outward-
looking and global the firm or country, the wider the base from which mutations and
new selections may flow.
Economic evolution is therefore to a substantial extent dependent on learning
processes. At the level of a firm, learning is driven by informal processes of
technological accumulation, for example, through learning by doing and learning by
using, as well as by formal R&D. At the level of an industry, learning processes occur
through the development of intra and inter-industry relationships, which include
diffi.rsion of information and expertise, inter-firm mobility of personpower, and the
growth of specialised services (Silverberg et al, 1988).
Conclusion
Evolutionary perspectives on economic and technical change have much explanatory
but rather less obvious predictive power. Evolutionary theory explains much about
the "how and why" of things that happen without active human volitiorq but is rather
less helpful in explaining the decision making and social behaviour of people. In
evolutionary biology the environment selects those fittest to sunrive, while in
economics firms can influence and shape the external environment, or actively search
for niches within it. Evolutionary concepts can therefore be used to gain insight into
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technological innovation, but cannot be used as exact metaphors of the technological
innovation process.
New Growth Theory
New growth theory explicitly incorporates knowledge accumulation, human capital
creation and technological change at the heart of economic gowth (see Romer,
1990). This leads to powerful arguments for the pre-eminent role of researclq
technological innovation and human capital creation in the economy.
New growth theory has challenged more traditional neoclassical theory that predicts
diminishing returns to investment and the convergence of economies and of growth
rates (see Lucas, 1990). Basic propositions in new growth theory are that human
capital and technological change are at the heart of economic growttq and that
knowledge is the basic form of productive capital and is associated with an increasing
rather than decreasing marginal product (see Romer, 1986, 1987, 1990). These
increasing returns can be partly attributed to specialisation, but are primarily driven by
the creation of non-rival goods.
Non-rival goods are those goods or ideas, such as the fundamental principles of
physics or of software engineering, where the costs of dissemination and utilisation
are very low in relation to their initial cost of production. For example, major
technological innovations such as the semiconductor created a building block for
revolutionary economic advances far beyond the returns directly attributable to the
original innovation. A semiconductor itself is a rival good in that only one person can
use it at a time. But the idea or technological knowledge embodied in the
semiconductor is widely useable by many economic agents, and forms a building
block for future technological innovations. A technology that is a "technical
platform" for later innovations survives over time not in an unchanged and
autonomous form, but through informing, underpinning and being conveyed by other
and future technologies.
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This technical platform effect is associated with the evolutionary concept of
irreversibility, and can be represented as a "quality ladder'', where R&D embodies in
new products improved functional properties, quality or performance characteristics.
Innovations build on those that came before, so the quality or functionality of a new
product is higher than its antecedents (see Grossman & Helpman, l99lb). While it is
not explicit in the new growth literature, it can be argued that the ineversibility of
technology and of fundamental technological breakthroughs, and the low marginal
costs of each additional application of non-rival goods, combine to form an ascending
"escalatof' of technical platforms driving economic performance beyond the fixed
limits of capital and labour inputs. It could be argued that these non-rival goods and
associated technical platforms will be processes and systemic and networking
technologies, rather than products or consumer goods.
Coe & Helpman (1993) and other new growth theorists argue that there is a positive
correlation between an open trade policy, links with foreign R&D and human capital,
the extent of a country's engagement in outward-looking international trade, and a
country's rate of technical advance and growth in domestic total factor productivity.
Open trade policies effectively improve access to international technologies and can
therefore accelerate the rate of technological learning. There is therefore some
convergence in thinking between researchers in new growth theory, national systems
of innovation, and in technological learning theory.
While new growth theory accommodates the non-rival nature of significant new
technology, it does not encompass the role of social processes and organisational
behaviour in technical change, nor does it address sources of learning. New growth
theory has not yet fully broken with some of the more limiting assumptions of
neoclassical economics, such as the achievement of a market-clearing equilibrium.
This thesis encompasses new growth theory, especially as it relates to specific features
of technical change and growttq but moves beyond it by applying some of its concepts
to explore learning processes, human capital, and the dynamics of technical change in
the context of the management of technological innovation.
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Technological and Organisational Learning
Arrow (1962b, p. 155) said:
I do not think that the picture of technical change as a vast and prolonged procass of
learning about the environment in which we operate is in any way a far-fetched analogt...
A view of technological innovation as a learning process is linked with work on the
economics of information, human capital, intangible assets and technology strategy
(see Arrow I962b; 1984; Lamberton, 1986; Stiglitz, 1987a; Dodgson, 1990).
Lamberton (1936) notes that the cost of producing information is independent of the
scale on which it is used and argues that information is a form of capital that is
differentiated in terms of its possession and in the capacity to use it. The unoertainty
and indivisibility of information means that it behaves differently to other economic
goods, and that it does not fit easily into a traditional production function mode of
analysis. Significantly, learning only occurs when information is absorbed and
understood. Cohen & Levinthal (1990) argue that the ability to understand and apply
new ideas is a function of the firm's level of prior related knowledgg that learning is
cumulative, and that learning performance is greatest when the object of learning is
related to what is already known.
Learning has both tactical and strategic elements. At a tactical level within an existing
technological regime it may encompass short-term, event-driven, adaptive or survival
learning, as well as maintenance learning and transitional learning (see Bowonder &
Miyake, 1993). However, major new innovations and the exploitation of new
technological paradigms requires strategic, systems-based thinking and learning.
Senge (1990) emphasises that it is generative learning that underpins the ability to
create, and that generative learning requires strategic and systems-based thinking.
Rickards (1985) sees innovation as "whole systems" in nature, encompassing social
processes and participation by various communities of interest. It is also a matching
process, where 'fit' must be achieved between technology, organisation and market
needs.
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This thesis argues that technological learning, rather than being confined to one
model, is a highly differentiated process, depending on variables such as firm size,
industry structure, nature of the technology and of the market, and a host of internal
and external relationships. To better understand the differentiated nature of learning,
it is necessary to examine the information stocks and flows involved in a firm's
operations, encompassing the generation and acquisition of informatioq and the
learning processes through which information is processed and utilised (see Malerb4
1992). The capability or likelihood of productively using information is very
differentiated, encompassing perceptions of its value, the effect of channels of
communicatiorg and the relationship between human capital and the absorptive
capacity in a firm. Learning occurs both internally and externally. While the precise
pattern of internal and external learning varies with such factors as firm size and
industry sector, all firms make use of external sources (see Foray, 1991; Kleinkneoht
& Reijnen, 1992).
It is useful to distinguish between major forms of learning, such as from systematic
R&D, organisational and team learning, learning by doing and learning from
interacting and networking.
Learnine from R&D
Traditional models of technological innovation see it as the result of systematic
scientific research and development. Systematically-organised R&D encompasses
"learning from searching" or technological scanning. R&D is best seen as a process
of both creating information and enhancing the ability to assimilate and exploit
existing information (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). Lamberton (1992) replaces a
narrow view of R&D as a formalised and separately-structured learning activity with a
wider view of R&D as part of the exploratory behaviour of firms. More importantly,
R&D should be seen as only one of many forms of learning.
37
Orsanisational and Team Learnine
Generally, learning must happen at both an individual and a team level if
organisational learning is to occur. Learning tends to be context-dependent, ild
bound up with wider organisational processes. Dodgson (1990) argues that strategies
for technological learning are inseparable from considerations of organisational
structure and human resource management. Senge (1990) sees organisational
learning revolving around long-tenq systems and team-based learning. Team learning
requires thinking insightfully about complex issues, with the team's collective learning
being more than the sum of the individual learning of team members. A team also
fosters the learning of other teams it interacts with.
Team learning and technology transfer depends on effective relationships between
people, and on operational trust (see Polanyi, 1958; Senge, 1990). Trust is a key
element in learning, since people are more likely to accept information from people
they have contact with and trust than from strangers (see Arrow, l97l). The
dependence on personal communication and relationships in the building of trust has
significant implications for small economies such as New Zealand. Personal
contacts across national boundaries are less frequent than withiq while international
communication channels are more expensive and have fewer purposes to serve.
Coupled with translation problems, these factors slow down and increase the costs
of technological adoption for small countries which depend on overseas technology
proportionately to a higher degree than is the case for larger countries.
Learnins by Doins
Arrow (1962b) argues that learning is the product of experience, and can only take
place through attempting to solve problems, and therefore only takes place during
activity. Senge (1990) also stresses that learning must be grounded in reality.
Learning associated with repetition of essentially the same problem is subject to
sharply diminishing returns. To have steadily increasing performance in learning
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therefore implies that the stimulus situations must themselves be steadily evolving
rather than merely repeating (Arrow, 1962b, pp. 155-6).
Arrow cites as empirical support a study of the Horndal iron works in Sweden that
had no new investment or significant changes in its methods of production for a
period of 15 years, yet productivity (output per person-hour) rose on the average at
close to TYo per annum. Learning by doing is lent further support by the extensive
literature on "learning curve" effects (see Maidique & Zirger, 1985, p. 305). Later
work on learning by doing has associated it with production and information-intensive
industries (see Dodgson & Rothwell eds., 1994).
A limit to learning by doing is that it is most effective when there is rapid and
unambiguous feedback from actions. It is less effective when the consequences of
actions are not immediately obvious, where they are dependent on the unpredictable
responses of others, or where they have long-term systemic impacts. Learning by
doing is most effective in production processes undergoing incremental technical
change. It is less appropriate for systems-based innovatioq or in technological
paradigms where the knowledge base is rapidly changing due to external scientific and
technological dynamics, and where the knowledge base depends for its development
on external and more interactive learning processes.
Other forms of learning are associated with learning by doing. Nathan Rosenberg (see
Maidique & Zirger, 1985, pp. 305-6) highlights learning from using. Dodgson &
Rothwell (1994) associate learning by using with specialised suppliers of capital and
intermediate goods. While learning by doing is internal to a production process,
learning by using is external and results from users gaining experience with a new
product or process. This external learning by using creates two qpes of useful
knowledge. Firstly, learning is embodied in design modifications that improve
performance, useability or reliability. Secondly, disembodied learning results in
improved operation of the modified product. Maidique & Zirger (1985) and Freeman
ed. (1990) also highlight learning from failing, citing IBM's Stretch computer as the
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"failure" that formed part of the learning leading to the successful 360 series. This
form of learning is often associated with new product launches.
Learning by Interacting and Networkine
Numerous studies lend support to a view of innovation in firms as a process of
continuous, interactive learning (Stiglitz, 1987a; Freeman & Lundvall ed., 1988;
Lundvall ed,., 1992, Freemaq 1994). Interactive learning includes learning resulting
from external interactions with customers and suppliers. Dodgson & Rothwell (199a)
highlight interactive learning from competitors. Freeman (1994) explores the
cumulativeness of interactive learning, while Lundvall ed. (1992) argues that
innovation and growth in firms is a process of continuous, interactive learning that
also draws on routine activities.
Interactive learning has strong external systemic and networking elements, as firms
build external relationships as part of the information search and selection processes.
Networking technologies, as well as being subject to declining marginal costs, share
some of the economic traits of non-rival goods. Network technologies may form
technical platforms for other innovative advances, characterised by high indivisibility
and social benefits that may vastly exceed private returns. Associated with this,
increasing returns sometimes arise from coordination externalities, an example being
standardisation of the (allegedly sub-optimal) QWERTY keyboard (see Arthur, 1989,
p. 126).
While transaction cost theory argues that organisational form is driven by a need to
reduce transaction costs, networking aims not to reduce costs but to access new ideas
and sources of external technology and complementarities. Sako (1992) and Sabel
(1993) emphasise the importance of trust in networking relationships, and therefore in
learning through networking. The growth of networking as a firm strategy is starting
to supersede market/hierarchic forms of organisation. Some of this networking may
take the form of intra and inter-firm learning, clusters of related industries and
interlinked firms (see Debresson, 1989; Porter, 1990). Networking also has strategic
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policy implications. The work of Van den Ven et al eds. (1989), Rothwell (1991;
1992) and Dodgson (1991; 1993) illustrates the importance of corporate strategy and
government policy in developing networking relationships with external sources of
information, knowledge and advice.
The specific nature of networking varies across industries, technologies and firm sizes
(see Foray, 1991; Foray & Freeman eds., 1993). Freeman (1994) argues that external
networks are growing in importance for such new technologies as materials,
biotechnology and information technology that are increasingly dependent on science.
Related to this, the discontinuity associated with rapid technical change in information
technology and biotechnology is leading to new sources of learning, such as learning
by recruiting new stafl and learning by networking with other firms and with
universities.
Conclusion
Recent theoretical work on technological learning and innovation draws on
evolutionary economics, neo-Schumpeterianisnq and related work such as that of
Christopher Freeman and colleagues at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at
Sussex University. The learning at the heart of technological innovation reflects
accumulations of past experiences, where technology and knowledge is weeded out or
selected in terms of its fitness for purpose (or fitness to survive). Technological
knowledge that survives over time creates robust technical platforms and improved
functional properties or performance characteristics which feed into future
technological advances and learning dynamics.
Learning processes seem to be at the core of many innovation-related phenomena.
However, the studies cited above lack sufEcient breadth to examine learning over a
broad range of industry sectors and firm types, and they do not fully integrate learning
with examination of human capital, social processes, and with the dynamic aspects of
technological change. However, the holistic nature of learning, and its relationships
with so many wider aspects of technical change, suggests that further understanding
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of learning processes will provide considerable insight into the management of
technological innovation.
Domain of Enquiry and Broad Areas for Research
This thesis endeavours to define the key underpinning assets or drivers of
technological innovation, and the processes through which they can be harnessed to
create competitive advantage. In studies of technological innovation organisational
researchers have tended to focus on the firm-level management and organisational
aspects of innovation without linking them to external economic stimuli, while
economists have focused on technology mainly as part of the market behaviour of
fi.rms, and have stopped short of exploring the organisational context of change
(Freeman & Soete eds., 1990, p. 62). In contrast, this thesis is explicitly
interdisciplinary and aims to integrate varying schools of thought relating to the
technological innovation process.
Some schools of thought relating to technological innovation have developed in
isolation, but connecting threads between them allow more integrated research
approaches. For example, while explicit links between evolutionary economics and
new growth theory do not appear to have emerged in the literature, the two fields are
likely to be intertwined in future. The irreversibility and cumulativeness of technical
change, the tacit and generic nature of much knowledge, and its non-rival nature,
must surely be major explanatory factors in understanding the increasing returns to
knowledge and human capital proposed in the new growth literature.
The schools of thought reviewed in this chapter have set the scene for defining broad
areas for empirical research to focus on. The broad areas aim to cast a wide net in the
search for grounded insights into the technological innovation process. The broad
areas have to be open ended enough to allow grounded research to generate theory
and insights from data" without overly restricting the focus of the research too early in
the research process. At the same time, the broad areas must provide sufficient focus
42
l.
to allow the major knowledge gaps relating to technological learning processes, the
role of human capital, social processes, and the evolutionary and dynamic aspects of
technological innovation and change to be explored in depth.
The broad areas are:
The Origins of Technological Innovation
While evolutionary theory places emphasis on "where things have come from"
and how they got there, evolutionary perspectives on technological innovation
have not been widely subjected to rigorous empirical analysis. The Origins of
Technological Innovation broad area encompasses the initial idea, "trigger
event" or stimulus, as well as the sources of the key knowledge and
technologies leading up to an innovation. It encompasses aspects of learning
processes and seeks to draw on evolutionary and other perspectives.
Background, Experience and Mucation of Key Players
This broad area encompasses all those past and historical factors, learning and
personal experiences that have created human capital in firms, especially that
embodied in the key innovators. It is informed by the management of
innovation literature and, to a lesser extent, by evolutionary theory.
External Influences
Evolutionary economics and the work of neo-Schumpeterian writers such as
Freeman and Dosi addresses how firms operate within, respond to, and seek
to influence a dynamic external selection environment. Change and innovation
is substantially driven by the ability to look externally and adopt new ideas,
insights or sources of technology. The External Influence,s broad area





with research institutes, market influences, changes in economic conditions or
govemment policy, external joint ventures and networking.
Motivations of Key Players
Theoretical and empirical work on the management of technological
innovation leaves many unanswered questions about innovation as a people-
oriented and social process. While many studies identify the key roles played
by people in innovation, very few look at the motivations of those involved, or
seek to understand why people acted in a certain way. The interrelationships
between people are not conceptualised or explored as social and as learning
processes.
Neoclassical economics and transaction cost theory sees a world populated by
self-seeking, profit-motivated individuals, whose innate guile, opportunism
and self-centeredness is constrained only by the legal framework and by
rigorous monitoring and accountability structures. An alternative view could
be that technological innovation harnesses motivations and social relationships
that are different in significant respects to those driving a narrowly
neoclassical paradigm, and which need to be better understood. Related to
this, the way people relate together and are motivated provides insights into
team-based and interactive learning processes.
Dynamic Processes Over Time
Theoretical work on the management of technological innovation and the
dynamic processes associated with it lacks a rigorous empirical underpinning
in New Zealand. It is important to address major knowledge gaps in our
understanding of dynamic innovation processes over time, The Dynamic
Processes over Time broad area includes, inter alia, the roles and
interrelationships between the key players in innovation as they relate to
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This chapter sets out the justification for and limitations of the grounded, case-based
methodology used in this thesis, the units of analysis and sources of dat4 and the
methods and procedures used in the collection and analysis of data.
Justification for the Methodology and Limitations
Innovation is a complex, dynamic and multi-dimensional process. This thesis uses
qualitative and inductive case study research methods and draws on grounded theory
methodology and multiple levels of analysis to better understand the innovation
process. This methodology allows deeper insights into the processes and critical
events in innovation, and as far as possible minimises prior biases and value-driven
assumptions. By developing theory and propositions from structured observation and
analysis, the methodology avoids tendencies in much deductive research to impose
theory on reality, thereby excluding relevant and often unexpected variables and
patterns of variables. By using grounded theory data analysis methods, the thesis uses
a structured and systematic means of analysing data to derive insight and meaning
from it.
It is helpful to review case study research and grounded theory methodologies in
some detail.
Case Study Research
Case study research has been defined as "an empirical enquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of
evidence are used" (Yin, 1989, p. 23). Case study analysis is most appropriate for
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"how and why" questions relating to dynamic processes, where the researcher has no
control over events, organisational context is important, and where no one data
source, by itseffi, is likely to be sufficient. It allows the holistic and meaningful
characterisation of realJife phenomena.
Case study analysis is sometimes criticised for being unsystematic and non-scientific.
Concerns have focused on its alleged lack of rigour, the danger of biased views or
equivocal evidence, and the inadequate base it provides for generalisable results.
These concerns are addressed in this thesis through several methodological
safeguards, viz:
The use of multiple case studies and of multiple sources of data and levels of
analysis (though Yin (1989) argues that analytical generalisation is
theoretically possible from a single case if the data are rich enough);
A qualitative rather than quantitative research methodology that aims for
richness of insight and analytical generalisation rather than the enumeration
of frequencies and statistical generalisation, and;
Use of grounded theory techniques as part of a carefully constructed and
executed methodology for data collection and analysis.
Grounded Theory
Grounded theory depends on a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set
of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a
phenomenon (Stewart, 1991, p. 79). It involves multiple levels of analysis and
interactive comparison. The processes and analytical procedures used in grounded
theory are designed to build theory from data, rather than to construct a theory and







Grounded theory research procedures aim to ensure that the research process has the
rigour needed to make the theory well grounded in reality, and to avoid biases,
artefacts and poorly framed assumptions. Grounded theory research aims to use data
to build explanatory theory that is sensitive and integrated enough to closely
approximate the reality it seeks to represent (see Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 57).
In more detail, grounded theory is developed through the following process:
The general field of enquiry or topic is selected for study.
A very tentative framework consisting of a few potential concepts and
processes may guide the initial collection of data.
All through the research process the researcher undertakes continuous
memoing of notes relating to the variables and categories of variables that are
generated, and to the processes associated with them. This may include
theoretical memos and operational memos recording details of the research
process, as well as diagramming that allows the visual representation of
qualitative data.
As much data as possible are assembled, using multiple sources. This initial
data collection begins with a small sample, and as many variables as possible
are recorded. After data collection has begun on a small sample, the next step
is to progressively widen the data collection, and to begin to classify it.
Data are classified through "open coding", asking questions and making
comparisons. Open coding is essentially the naming and basic description of
variables through close examination of the data. A variable can be a
phenomenorq a central idea, event, motivation or process that is observed.
The observed open coded data are then organised into categories of related






alternate flexibly between open and axial coding, though the two are distinct
analytical procedures. Axial coding starts by making connections between
variables. It then organises related variables into categories. Axial coding
then aims to achieve focus by identifying and validating relationships between
variables within a category. It elucidates the causal conditions that give rise
to the category, the specific properties of the category, the context, and
associated dynamic proce sse s and relationships.
In detail, causal conditions are the events/incidents etc. that lead to the
occurrence or development of a category of variables or set of phenomena.
Properties are the attributes or characteristics of a category of variables. The
context is the specific set of properties, locations of events or incidents
pertaining to a category of variables or phenomena. Dynamic processes and
relationships may relate to process over time, or interactions between
phenomena.
The axial coding process continues with the elucidation of links and
relationships within categories, including conditions under which the links or
relationships hold. The discovery and specification of differences and
similarities within, and to an extent between categories, allows patterns of
variables to emerge at axial coding stage and be further developed.
Tentative links and connections with the existing theory and body of
knowledge may begin to emerge by steps 6 and 7 above, and can be used to
make comparisons with or provide insights into categorised data.
"selective coding" is then undertaken. Selective coding is the process of
selecting the core category or categories (central phenomena), systematically
relating it or them to other categories, validating these relationships, and filling




10. Selective coding includes elucidating the "story-line" - that is, conceptualising
the nature, key features and processes associated with the core categories at
the heart of the study. It is at selective coding stage that existing theory and
knowledge about the subject of the research starts to be explicitly woven in
and used as a basis of comparison, but not in a way that biases the
construction of a model or theory based on the grounded data. Selective
coding identifies core categories of variables and then relates subsidiary
categories around the core category(ries). These relationships between
categories are elucidated and then validated against the data. Any further
categories that need refinement or further development are then "filled in".
Towards the end of the process, "data saturation" has occurred and this allows
"thick description". The data has been organised into categories and the
conditions and relationships within and befween categories will have been
clearly elucidated. It is at this point that the framework for a model or theory
will be in place, based on the results of the open, orial and selective coding
processes, and where appropriate on the "weaving in" of existing knowledge
and theory.
Units of Analysis and Sources of Data
The units of analysis in this thesis are those of technological innovations.
Technological innovations selected for case study are used as "windows" into a wider
understanding of the technological innovation process.
The case studies draw on multiple sources of data and analysis, including a
marshalling of available literature relating to the innovation, interviews, corroborating
interviews, in-house firm documentation, publicly-available information including firm
reports, intellectual property documentation and technical literature. The use of
multiple sources of data and methods of data collection allows more perspectives to
be brought to bear on the phenomena being studied (see Easterby-Smith et al, 1991,
I l.
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p. 3l). Multiple sources of data also assist in the verification of findings by allowing
"triangulation" and the convergence of lines of enquiry.
Multiple sources of data also help to counter potential biases in, for example, too
much reliance on one specific source of information. For example, in interviews
individual biases can take the form of egocentrism, selective remembering of
favourable events, a premium placed on recent experience, over-confidence by
individuals in their own judgement, and a tendency to ignore new evidence. Biases
that can emerge from group interviews include the unconscious convergence of views,
deference to higher, authority figures, and defensive or territorial behaviour.
The key sources of primary data in this thesis are a comprehensive database that the
author developed of New Zealand technological innovations that were successfully
commercialised from l98l to 1993, and far more importantly, case study research.
The database of innovations is summarised in Annex l, whilethe case studies are in
the body of the thesis text. The secondary sources of data woven into this thesis
consists of the wider body of theory and knowledge on the technological innovation
process, much of which is summarised in the Technological Innovation: An Ovenriew
of the Literature chapter.
Procedures Used to Collect Data
The database ofNew Zealand innovations from 1981-1993 was prepared by scanning
technical literature, journals and periodicals covering the l98l-1993 period. The key
publications scanned are listed in Annex l. The libraries and repositories used were
those of Victoria, Canterbury and Massey Universities, the Wellington Public Library,
the National Library, the Alexander Turnbull Library, the Patents Office and the
Companies Office.
The innovations database includes both products and processes, and producer and
consumer goods. A significant methodological question was whether published
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literature records all, or at least most significant innovations. It was initially unclear
whether commercially confidential innovations and process and producer good
innovations were likely to be covered in the publicly-available literature. Commercial
confidentiality in consumer good and product innovations was found not to be a
major issue, because firms have to advertise their innovations in order to market them.
Specific technical details may be kept confidential, but not the existence of the
innovation. Technical literature such as Demm, Automation and Control, and
Industrial Equipment News recorded producer good and process innovations. There
was, for example, wide coverage of very specialised innovations such as serpentine
coil benders, prograrnmable state controllers etc. that may not rate a mention in more
mainstream trade and business literature.
Criteria to Define Technoloeical Innovations for Database
The innovations included in the database had to meet the following criteria:
They must involve significant new technology, defined as significant new
functional properties or technical performance characteristics or inventive
features that are substantive and objectively measurable.
The innovations must be substantially New Zealand in origin.
The innovations must have been successfully launched on the market, or in the
case of process innovations in firms, they must have been successfully adopted
and applied in productive activity in the firm.
They must have been launched on the market in the period 1981-1993.
It is important that the above criteria exclude inventions that have never been fully
commercialised. However, study of the dynamic processes underlying technological
innovations does provide insight within firms on inventions or technical approaches to







commercial impact of the innovations. This is because the thesis addresses the key
drivers and dynamic processes of technological innovatioq not the size or the
magnitude of the outcomes or commercial returns from specific innovations.
The focus of this thesis is technological innovation, but it is fully acknowledged that
many of the most important advances for society result from organisational and social
innovation. Many technological innovations require complementary social or
organisational innovation, for example through workplace reform. The study of the
social or organisational processes associated with technological innovation is an
integral part of this thesis.
Exclusions. Protocols and Limitations
A number of exclusions and protocols were applied while developing the database:
"Reinnovations", new marks of a produc't, and design variations were
excluded, except where they involved significant new technology.
Basic scientific discoveries were excluded.
The discovery or exploration of natural resources, eg. a new fishing ground or
a geological deposit was excluded.
Scientific instrumentation inventions used for research but not sold
commercially were excluded.
New machinery that was ancillary to or an input into an innovation was
generally excluded, except where it involved significant new technology, or
was sold separately as an innovation in its own right.
Most software development was excluded, since it was generally seen as a








technology in its own right. However, where significant new software
technology was identified, for example generic applications platforms, it was
included.
Systemic innovations where the individual elements are established
technology, but where the system itself is a new innovation" were treated on a
case by case basis. Generally, systemic innovations had to involve a significant
new creative step, or deliver a level of technical performance that was more
than the sum of its component parts in order to be included.
Plant breeding presented some difficulties in relation to whether it involved
"significant new technology", and also whether a plant breeding innovation
was judged to be of New Zealand origin. Breeding that simply selected from
existing cultivars and trialed them in New Zealand conditions was excluded.
However, plant breeding that created a new plant variety embodying
signfficant new characteristics as a result of New Zealand breeding was
included in the database.
Organisational and managerial innovations per se were excluded from the
database. However, the technological innovation case studies provided an
entry point to understand wider organisational and social processes.
Selectins Innovations for Case Studv
From the database summarised in Annex I an initial sample of 14 innovations was
selected for detailed case study analysis. This selection was made on the following
basis:
L lnnovations that seemed most significant in technological performance and
commercial impact were favoured. The selection of such innovations was a









Innovations were selected from a wide range of industry sectors to ensure the
maximum breadth and to increase the likely generalisability of the research
findings.
Innovations were selected from firms of a range of different sizes and
corporate forms, to provide the richest contrasts and insights, and to facilitate
the grounded research technique of "extreme comparison". These included
public and private firms, and ranged from a firm with 6 staffto a multi-billion
dollar business.
The selection was weighted towards innovations where the key players were
still available to be interviewed. In practice, this meant a slight bias towards
innovations that were developed from the mid-late 1980s on.
A number of innovations that the author had studied as part of MBA work
were excluded. These were the Hennessey Grading Probe, the Phoebe non-
invasive fat measurement innovation, and innovations from Tait Electronics,
Fisher and Paykel, and Marine-Air-Systems.
The samples covered both product and process innovations,
The samples covered a range of technologies.
It is stressed that the technological innovations chosen for case study research were
selected not for their own sake but as "windows" through which a wider




Application of Data Collection Procedures
After innovations had been selected for case study, senior figures in the innovating
firms or organisations were approached by phone and/or letter and asked to
participate in the research. An outline of the research method was giverl the
provisions governing confidentiality were explained, as was a willingness on the part
of the researcher to offer a workshop/seminar or written critique of the innovation
environment in the firm as an act of reciprocity for participation. Permission was
sought for "first round" in-depth, taped interviews with the key innovator(s), and
detailed interviews with other key players associated with the innovation. Samples of
relevant documentation are included in Annex 2.
Of the 14 innovations initially selected, I I firms agreed to participate in the research.
The 3 firms that did not respond to the request for their participation in case studies
of their innovations were Pulse Data International (the Viewpoint visual aid system),
Tru-Test Ltd (the MP400 printer) and Switchtec Ltd (a switch mode power supplies
innovation).
Work on the case studies began with the marshalling of all available written material,
including technical and business literature, patent documentation, and all other
available information. In-house documentation was requested from and provided by
the firms involved throughout the research process.
The field research proceeded with a consistently structured but open ended interview
with the key people involved in the innovation. The format of the interview was
determined by the conceptual focus and broad areas derived from the preparatory,
literature-based work outlined in the Technology Innovation: An Overview of the
Literature chapter. In accord with grounded theory methodology, the broad areas to
explore were used only as a set of headings and as prompts; essentially to "get people
talking". The intent of this was to avoid distorting or biasing the data collection
process.
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In most cases people were interviewed individually. However, for the convenience of
participants, group interviews were held with key people involved in the Alatal 821
and the Greenweld innovations. [n no case was interview data entirely dependent on
a group interview. In only one case did the interview-based data depend largely on
one major interview source. However, in this case details were corroborated by
phone with one other senior figure in the firrq and also by reference to extensive
written documentation. All interviews were openly taped and the tapes transcribed
verbatim. Interview durations varied, but almost invariably exceeded the planned
time. Two hour duration interviews were typical. Interviewees were thanked in
writing.
Case studies were written up drawing on all sources of data and the first drafts were
returned to the interviewees for their verification. Minor details were discussed by
phone, but in most cases participants responded to case studies in writing. The draft
case studies were finalised based on the comments of interviewees, and h all cases
were verified by participants as full and accurate accounts.
Analysis of Data
After the case studies had been verified by the participants in the research" analysis of
data was undertaken through a process of open, axial and selective coding as
explained above. Identifying phenomena, categorising thenq establishing their
similarities and differences, and critical questioning from different angles was critical
to the data analysis process.
It is stressed that the research and data analysis process used was not rigidly
sequential, and that the research moved flexibly betweeq for example, interviewing
and study of written case material, coding, and critical questioning. Throughout the
research process, operational and theoretical memos were separately written up with
dated headings within a research diary. Operational memos recorded the overall
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process of the research undertaken; essentially the mechanics of the research.
Theoretical memos recorded detaited aspects of specific variables and categories of
variables, as well as wider insights and theoretical approaches emerging from the
research as a whole.
The practical analysis of the data took place as follows:
Open Codine
The primary data generated by case studies was scanned and variables identified. An
open coded card was prepared for each variable. Each card listed the title of the
variable, where it occurred, a brief description ("taxonomic description"), and a
comment which covered issues such as its relationship with other variables.
After the primary data had been open coded, secondary data generated through the
literature review was also open coded. By the time open coding was completed a
total of 797 open coded variables had been identified. These variables, most of them
primary data, are listed in Annex 3. Annex 3.1 provides an example of the
information recorded on an open coded card.
Open coded cards were then grouped initially under the five broad areas. This was
done for convenience, to organise a mass of variables, and to facilitate a"rial coding.
Variables that did not fit neatly within a specific broad area were assigned to the
broad area that seemed most appropriate. For example, variables relating to the
innate nature of people and people-related variables were loosely grouped within the
Motivations broad area, and variables relating to market dynamics and competitive
behaviour were grouped in the External Influences area. AII dynamic aspects of
innovation, and technology management variables, were grouped in the Dynamic
Processes over Time broad area, as were organisational, structural and social
variables, including those relating to the key roles played by people and how people
relate and work together in the innovation process.
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Axial Codine
Axial coding was then undertaken. Since a:rial coding is complex, operational memos
recorded the detailed research process and procedures followed. Axial coding aimed
at grouping all open coded variables into axial categories made up of linked or
associated variables. To begin witll open coded cards were organised in an interim
way into named categories within the broad areas. These categories were given an
overarching name that was broad enough to encompass all the variables, with these
categories still being loosely grouped for convenience into the broad areas. It is
stressed that the categories of open coded variables were preliminary at this stage, and
axial categories in a true sense only emerged during the next stage of the data analysis
process.
Axial coding then proceeded with a more detailed study of the variables within each
interim category. Determining relationships between variables was done at this stage
by contents analysis, by observation of variables that were linked, by identification of
variables that occurred across a range of case studies, and by observations of
causations between variables.
In some cases, interim categories were later revised, merged with other categories, or
abandoned as more detailed analysis better crystallised the relationships between
variables. The axial categories that finally emerged essentially replaced the broad
areas and the interim categories as the framework within which open coded variables
were organised. A total of 50 axial categories were developed, covering all797 open
coded variables. These categories each covered a discrete grouping ofvariables that
were related by their nature, purpose or interrelationships. The axial categories are
listed in Annex 3. Annex 3.2 provides an example of the information recorded on an
axial category card.
It was during axial coding, (and less intensively at open coding stage), that more
detailed theoretical memos began to be made recording possible conceptual and
theoretical insights and approaches. These memos interacted with or reflected back
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on the "conceptual focus" or broad areas for the research explained above. Merno
taking on all pertinent aspects of the data was important all through the a,xial coding
process. With the axial categories in place, the make up, characteristics and
relationships between variables in each axial category were then elucidated, as set out
below:
For each axial category a large card was labelled with the name of the a:rial category
and the cards listing open coded variables that were associated with it were grouped
with this card. The large card recorded for each axial category the following:
Causal Conditions
These set out the nature of an a:rial category in relation to the circumstanc,es, events,
incidents that gave rise to the category.
Properties
These properties were the attributeVcharacteristics etc. of a category of variables,
including any weighting given to the property.
Context
The context encompassed the specific set of properties, locations of events or
incidents pertaining to a category.
Dyrwmic Processes
The dynamic processes included processes over time and dynamic interactions
between variables within a category.
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Linlcs and Relationships w ithin Categories
This involved the discovery and specification of differences and similarities within
categories, and to a lesser extent between categories.
Tentative Linkswith Existing Theory, Other Knov,ledge or Data
This noted any tentative links made at adal coding stage with existing theory and
other knowledge and data. At axial coding stage, existing theory and knowledge
about technological innovation was tentatively beginning to be "woven in".
The process continued with more advanced anial coding that essentially aimed to
further elucidate the nature of the variables and their relationships within and to an
extent between categories (more advanced analysis of the relationships between
categories was undertaken through selective coding).
Selective Codins
The axial categories became the building blocks for selective coding. Selective coding
compared axial categories in depth and elucidated relationships between categories.
Core categories of variables were then identified by testing each axial category against
the following criteria:
l. Is the category specifically or largely to do with technological innovation?
2. Is the category a major and key driver of variables?
3. Is the category a necessary (rather than just a desirable) condition of
technological innovation?
These criteria were applied by closely examining all the axial coding cards and noting
the nature of the axial coded dat4 and the relationships between axial categories of
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variables. Criterion (ii) above turned out in some respects to be the most important,
since it required careful examination of the relationships between categories and
variables, including the nature and direction of the causations. Large selective coding
cards were used to record the application of the 3 criteria above to each of the orial
coded categories.
After this initial selective coding, the axial categories that seemed to fuIfil, or partly to
fulfil the criteria were examined in more depth against the above criteria. This process
allowed core categories to be progressively created, in some cases involving the
merging of several a,xial categories, or extending an axial category by including
variables from other categories.
A separate series of large core category cards was then used to record details of the
core categories, to allow more advanced selective coding to be undertaken. The
information recorded on these core category cards consisted of the:
Name and brief description of the core category.
Detailed listing of the variables and/or categories of variables that made up
each core category.
Observations/Descriptions/Discussion of the nature of the datawithin the core
category. This included comparisons, relationships, discussion of the nature of
the data and how it fits together.
ObservationslDescriptions/Discussion of nature of the data and relationships
between the core category and other categories (core or otherwise).
In parallel with the above systematic and formalised selective coding the traits of
reflective thinking and theoretical sensitivity were exercised. This took the form of
observations on the holistic and meta-framework aspects of innovation, "thoughts






Theoretical memoing included the researcher, immersed in the data, sketching out
what was felt tacitly and conceptually as being the phenomena at the heart of the
technological innovation process. These theoretical memos were written up in parallel
with, and at the same time as more mechanical aspects of selective coding. These
theoretical memos provided a parallel, more conceptual and imaginative counterpoint
to, and basis for, comparison with the theory and model development undertaken
through the more rule-based and formal selective coding procedures.
The theoretical memos and the results of formalised selective coding were then
compared, and it was found that the parallel memoing process produced similar
results and insights as the selective coding.
Core categories that were initially developed through formalised selective coding
were the Nature and Dynamics of Signrfcant New Technologt, People Interacting
with and Relating to each Other, the Nature of People, and Human Capital. The title
of the first of these categories was changed to Dynamics of Significant New
Technologt, since the unique nature of significant new technolory was heavily bound
up with its dynamic behaviour. The title of the second of these core categories was
paraphrased to Social Processes. Closer examination of the variables within the core
categories showed that the Nature of Innovators category was really a subset of
Social Processes, because even the most outstandingly creative or charismatic person
is normally only successful in technological innovation when he forms part of a team,
and operates in an organisational and social rather than an individualistic context. The
Nature of Innovators category was therefore absorbed into Social Processes. Annex
4 lists the core categories and the variables included within them. Annex 4.1 provides
an example of the information recorded on a core category card resulting from the
selective coding process.
Advanced Analysis
After the core categories had been generated and refined by selective coding,
advanced analysis sought to identiff the key thread or common theme across all core
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categories. This theme had to be an enabling condition that would make productive
the variables in all the core categories.
The advanced analysis involved careful examination of variables within each core
category and conceptual representation of the relationships between core categories.
Frequent reference was made to theoretical memos. Links with the conceptud focus
background to the research started to crystallise at this point, and existing theory and
knowledge was more explicitly integrated, or used as a basis for comparison. As
differentiated learning emerged as a catalytic variable across the core categories, the
research results were further compared and integrated with existing knowledge and
theory. Where major anomalies, inconsistencies or unexpected discoveries occurred,
further comparison" analysis and validation of conclusions against the data was
undertaken. This continued until the explanatory power and richness of insights from
the research came to be convincing.
The results of selective coding and advanced analysis were then drawn together and
written up as the model set out in the Conclusions and Implications chapter. This
model embodied the results of operq axial and selective coding and advanced analysis,
existing theory and knowledge, insights resulting from reflective thinking, "thoughts
about facts", theoretical sensitivity and discovering process through data.
Ethical Issues
The only ethical issue encountered w:rs commercial confidentiality, which
carefully observed by the signing of and adherence to confidentiality agreements.
Conclusion
This chapter set out and justified the choice of the methodology used in this thesis. It
then outlined the units of analysis and sources of data, the procedures used to collect
data, the application of data collection procedures, and the procedures followed in the
practical analysis ofthe data. The next chapter sets out the case studies.
CASE STUDIES OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION IN NEW
ZEALAND: 1981-1993
Introduction
This chapter contains the case studies of technological innovations. The case research
was undertaken in accord with the methodological approach set out in the
Methodology chapter. The cases all follow the same general format and major
sections, with variations within sections tailored to accommodate the different nature
of the various cases. For example, a postscript has been added where significant new
events relating to the case occurred after the case research was completed. The major
standard sections in the cases are the Introduction, Background, The Innovation,
Background of Key People, and Conclusions. All the broad research areas are
addressed pervasively within the case study accounts, except for the Background
F.xperience and Mucation of Key Players (paraphrased as "Background of Key
People") broad area which is written as a stand-alone section. The Conclusions
section seryes as an overview and discussion of the key themes, as well as being a
summary ofthe conclusions.
The cases are the completed versions that have been verified by the research
participants, with the exception of minor editing and formatting. References within
the cases are included in the Bibliography at the end of the thesis rather than at the
end of the case studies.
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CASE I: ASDi VARIABLE SPEED DRIVE
Introduction
The ASDi is a variable speed drive developed by PDL Electronics in association with
the Auckland University's Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering.
The ASDi Variable Speed Drive
The ASDi was launched in 1988, won the 1989 National Electronics Development
Association (NEDA) award, and created a world-class competitive edge for PDL
Electronics in variable speed controllers.
The ASDi was PDL's first drive that combined digitd electronics and microprocessor
control. This gave it a major competitive advantage. The ASDi has a dedicated
computer linked to a sophisticated high power waveform generator supplying a
customised electrical supply to the motor. The ASDi allows the controller to set
performance parameters for the motor. It can interface with existing standard voltage
and current control systems. A major advantage of the ASDi is its communication
capabilities. The computer and drive system communicate through an RS 485 serial
interface, making it easy to link the drive to a central plant computer or to other
digital devices.
The ASDi incorporates "Dynaflux" control. Dynaflux control (from dynamic flux
control) is an active flux optimisation process that obeys a clear mathematical
strategy. The Dynaflux control allows measurement of the load on the motor and
adjustment of the voltage to whatever is required by maintaining constant flux in the
motor air gap. Dynaflux control leads to some technical advantages, including
maintaining constant shaft speed over a wide load range, allowing the ASDi to be
operated with torque control, torque limiting or shearpin action. Because motor flux
66
is reduced, noise is reduced. However, the major advantage of Dynaflux control was
probably as a differentiating feature in the marketing of the ASDi.
The ASDi includes a full diagnostic capability to display the source of any fault which
may cause the system to shut down, advance warning capability which can be used to
predict the onset of downstream problems in the driven plant before they reach
serious proportions, and thermal modelling of motor behaviour for real-time close
protection of the motor. This latter feature eliminates the 'Just in case" factor in
motor sizing, thereby often allowing the selection of smaller motors for a particular
service.
Later versions of the ASDi incorporated a software development known as space
vector modulation.
Background
PDL Electronics is a Napier-based company specialising in industrial motor control
technology. Although owned by PDL Holdings it has a high degree of business
autonomy over its commercial operation, R&D investment and business strategy. The
company in 1994 had over 100 stafi with about a third having technical
qualifications. It spends between 5-7% of its turnover on R&D. As at 1993 it had
around TOYo of the New Zealand market in industrial drives.
Orieins and History ofPDL Electronics
In 1973, two Napier electricians established lndustrial Electronics and Automation
(EA) to make and service electrical and electronic equipment. The company began
marketing inverters in the early 1970s.
In 1974IEA was bought by the cigarette giant Rothmans, which wanted a company
to manufacture cigarette vending machines. A very entrepreneurial and visionary
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managing director, Bruce Lindermanrq took a long-term view of company stratery,
and also struck up a relationship with David Byers, a senior lecturer at Canterbury
University.
While owned by Rothmans IEA had developed a "technology culture" which
positioned R&D as a core part of business strategy. This corporate culture was
established very early in the company's history, survived changes of ownership, and
was crucial to the later success with the ASDi.
In the late 1970s Keith Valentine, IEA's General Manager, reached agreement with
Canterbury University for the development of AC motor controllers. At this time
David Byers, a senior lecturer at Canterbury University, was working with a series of
very able students in fields related to motor control. Byers provided the inspiration
and ideas to students and also worked closely with companies on the application of
the technology.
In 1976 IEA introduced one of the first production Pulse Width Modulated (PWM)
solid state variable frequency drives in the world and the first in New Zealand. This
was a three phase variable speed AC motor controller using new solid state switching
devices and patented waveform generation techniques.
Between the earlier boom in vending machines and the growth in the motor control
business, IEA suffered a slump in sales and staffhalved to 20. However, in 1978 IEA
introduced the DJB series (named after David John Byers) based on "inverter grade"
Silicon Controlled Rectifiers (SCRs). Things improved further with the 1979 NEDA
award for the DJB Series, and with the establishment of an agency in Australia in
t982.
By 1980, IEA had established an AC motor speed control market in Australia and
New Zealand based on two types of inverters using SCRs as the basic switching
element. Keith Valentine in the early 1980s made contact during a US conference
with semiconductor manufacturers who were leading in the fields of power transistor
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and waveform generation technologies. In 1982 IEA launched the Mcrodrive, a low
cost range of drives that incorporated the latest commercially available transistors
from Fuji Electric. This amounted to a significant technical step forward. Since then"
the company has maintained its relationship with Fuji Electric, and this link with a
component supplier proved invaluable in later years.
In 1983 an IEA engineer, Murray Porteous, won the NEDA award for the Microdrive
controller, and in the following year the Microdrive received the Design Mark award.
Experience gained with the Microdrive series was then employed in the successful
application of power transistor blocks in the ASD series.
The ASD series launched in 1984 incorporated the control features offered in the DJB
series, as well as offering new features such as industrial reliability protection circuits
for operation in a harsh industrial environment. The ASD series developed by
Porteous was runner-up in the 1984 NEDA award. With this range of drives as a
building bloclq PDL was able to capture the major share of the New Zealand market
and a significant share of the Australian one.
As motor controllers began to set the company's future direction, Rothmans accepted
the lack of affinity with the multinational's core business, and in 1984 it sold the
company to PDL Holdings. Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, PDL
maintained its links with the university sector. From about 1980, the focus of external
influence began to switch from Canterbury to Auckland University. This was partly
because IEA had developed its technology to the point where it was ahead of
Canterbury University, and also because John Boys' work at Auckland University
placed it on the leading edge of AC motor control in New Zealand. Boys had a good
feel for the commercial side of innovation and was able to achieve an excellent
working relationship with PDL. By 1985 a well-developed working relationship had
been forged between PDL and Auckland University, and this laid the basis for the
ASDi.
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For sources of ideas and stimulus the company also drew heavily on conferences,
including those with a strong academic presence, and on technical journals to keep up
to date with external sources of technology. Participation in trade fairs was also an
important stimulus, and technical links with New Zealand companies in non-
competing industries and with key component suppliers were valuable to the
company. There was little substantive contact with the DSIR or other parts of the
publicly funded technical ffiastructure, but the Development Finance Corporation
(DFC) and its predecessor the Inventions Development Authority (IDA) provided
some financial support for PDL in its earlier years. In fact, in the judgement of its
former General Manager, Keith Valentine, the company may not have survived its
early growth stages without the support of the DFC and the IDA.
Technical Background of the Innovation
Technological innovations do not exist in isolation but rather build on what has gone
before.
Technical Orieins and Antecedent Technoloeies
The advent of the thyristor in 1957 meant that for the first time variable speed drives
controlled by power electronic devices could compete with the traditional Ward-
Leonard mechanical systems. DC motors were initially the first choice for controlled
drive systems but they then faced competition from Cage Induction Motors (CMs)
because of the low cost and weight, ruggedness and low maintenance requirements of
CIMs.
The CIM provides a near constant-speed source of power directly from a
conventional three-phase supply at high efficiency with no special starting
arrangements. Conventional DC machines are easily controlled by varyrng either the
armature voltage (or current) and/or the field current. However, CIM speed is fixed
by the supply frequency while torque is a complex function of the input voltage,
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curents and the shaft speed. As a result, optimal CIM perforrnance was only
achievable through complex electronics.
PWM inverters were first applied by PDL (then IEA) in its DJB series of drives. In
the 1970s, the PWM inverter used forced commutated SCRs. The SCR represented
the first generation of power switching devices. SCRs cannot switch themselves ofi,
and therefore require additional expensive power circuitry to switch off.
AC speed control was constrained by a number of factors, including the unreliability
of inverters. Inverters were "black boxes" that enabled variable speeds to be
achieved in the shaft rotation, but little sophistication could be achieved in the control
of the motor's torque/speed characteristics. Most design effort by inverter
manufacturers went into newer commutation circuits to reduce costs, rather than into
controloptions.
Technical constraints on AC control only started to be overcome with the
development of power Darlington transistors and Gate Turn Off (GTO) thyristors in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Darlington transistor and GTO technology
transformed AC motor control since they allowed turning on and of by gate control,
no commutation circuit was needed, and there was a potential 30% reduction in
manufacturing cost. Almost overnight, the high voltage PWM switches became
simple and reliable, with manufacturers competing to reduce costs and add improved
features.
From the late 1970s, the switching capacity of transistors roughly doubled each year.
Early in 1981 Fuji Electric of Japan introduced the power Darlington transistor
commercially and PDL introduced them into the Microdrive series of motor
controllers. The ASD series of drives introduced by PDL in 1984 used improved
waveform generation in concert with fast, efficient switching power transistor blocks,




In the mid-1980s PDL was planning a complete redesign of its ASD converters to
make them smaller, lighter and cheaper. Murray Porteous forecast some of the
technical goals in 1986, noting that:
The key to the zuccessfi.rl application of AC motor variable speed control is a clear
understanding of the load, motor and drive characteristics...the funrre trcnd is toward more
sophisticated drives...ofrering more intelligent control functions, including computer
interface and load analvsis...
(Automation and Control, 1986a, p. 54)
PDL understood that a small company in the specialised field of industrial control
could not grow substantially in New Zealand and Australia but needed to move
farther afield to bigger markets, thereby building turnover to the size where it could
support the level of R&D needed to compete internationally. [n effect, the company
had to get turnover up to justify the minimum critical mass of R&D needed. At the
same time, economic deregulation from the mid-1980s slowed the economy dowrU
providing even more of an incentive for an export focus.
The University Research
PDL was aware of the work of Professor John Boys in the Department of Electrical
and Electronics engineering at Auckland University and saw the opportunity to use
control algorithms to achieve intelligent control over a motor's operating conditions,
rather than simply attempting to maintain constant or set frequency. An agreement
between Auckland University and PDL was negotiated through the Applied Research
Office (later Uniservices Ltd), Auckland University's office that manages external
client research. PDL purchased an exclusive licence to use the technology and a
proportion of the royalties it paid was channelled back to the university department to
fund new projects.
72
The early links with John Boys focused on two major technological goals: moving
from analogue to digital electronics, and improving the control technology to allow
control over such variables as torque and speed.
One research possibility available was vector or angle controlled drive where a variety
ofexternal sensors (for flu4 angle speed etc.) are added to a drive and sophisticated
slgnal processing methods are then used to control the motor and give it performance
superior even to DC drives. However, the New Zealand and Australian market for
such drives is extremely small and John Boys focused instead on using a simple PWM
inverter with no external sensors to control the motor, and to make such control
interactive through a low cost personal computer. The technical approach was a
microprocessor-controlled drive with a serial interface, with the PWM waveforms
generated in real-time to control the transistor switching instant.
Boys' work at Auckland University integrated the new transistors with low cost
microprocessors and newly developed motor control algorithms to implement a new
form of intelligent AC drive control. A major objective was to avoid the need for
complex customisation when interfacing with other equipment in a plant, focusing
instead on the development of techniques for torque and speed control and/or
monitoring which would be simpler to interface and would allow user-friendly
information flows for the user.
Simon Walton, a student of John Boys, was undertaking masterate research in 1982
on SCR inverters, which by the early 1980s were rapidly becoming dated technology.
Walton then converted his masterate into a PhD. Walton's PhD work was initiatly
sponsored by Plessey, with part of the PhD focused on developing an inverter and
part on developing control methodologies.
Boys encouraged Simon Walton to focus his PhD on the development of what
became the Dynaflux algorithm technology. Walton also at this time became
interested in a precise control of induction motors known as vector control, which
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was commercialised in the early 1990s in later PDL products, such as the
Microvector. In parallel with Simon Walton's work, Graham Taylor at Auckland
University was undertaking his masterate research in software engineering. Boys
focused this research on microprocessor developments in a motor controller, to
underpin Walton's work. By the time Taylor had completed his masterate research a
working system was in place. Boys improved the software further to improve the
control aspects and computer interfacing.
The technology then essentially "stayed on the shelf' at Auckland University for some
time, until Boys organised a seminar for interested companies, includhg PDL, to
demonstrate the technolory. This led to the negotiation of an agreement for the
transfer to and further development of the technology in PDL.
The Innovation Process
The first major technology transfer task in developing the ASDi was the "bread-
boarding" of the Auckland University control algorithms onto a PDL drive to
demonstrate compatibility, and subjecting this drive to a series of tests. The
University and PDL freely exchanged data and documents and then entered into the
most crucial stage, which was the employment of Simon Walton at PDL. Walton was
able to finish his PhD in the company while still under the supervision of Boys.
Critical to the success of the university-company relationship was the open exchange
of informatioq the existence of trust, and the desire of John Boys to ensure that
things worked, rather than simply to achieve an academic understanding of why they
worked. Significantly, Boys also provided some follow-up support and innovatiorq
including a new waveform technology.
At the time, PDL Electronics was a small company with a high degree of interaction
between development, applications and marketing people. PDL provided an
environment that fostered creativity and in fact some significant innovations, such as a
parallel drive technique, were generated as a result of informal discussions and
"brainstorming" sessions among engineers. Walton emphasised the importance in
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innovation of that interaction, of the need to avoid the channelled thinking that comes
from "compartmentalising" stafi, and also that innovative ideas can only really be
generated as oFshoots from addressing real problems, rather than resulting from
desk-bound research in isolation from other parts of the industrial innovation process.
The ASDi was developed on a team basis, with a lot of interaction between the R&D
and the marketing side. At this time, engineering staffwere involved in servicing and
related work for customers in the field, and this enhanced the customer focus for the
innovation. However, in the later stages of the development of the ASDi, PDL was
starting to segment the R&D group, essentially to accommodate the growth of the
R&D group, and as a means of accelerating the development of advanced new
technology. This created some difficulties in maintaining an adequate, interactive
dialogue between the R&D staff and those more involved in the applications and
marketing side of it. However, the link between the R&D and the production staff
worked well, very much on the basis of the R&D effort creating the specifications for
and driving production.
PDL, in supporting Simon Walton's work, adopted the ideas and control algorithms
developed under Boys' supervisiorq but more significantly obtained the skills and
human capital embodied in Walton. Simon Walton essentially came as part of a
package made up of his skills, the software and the hardware. Walton injected new
ideas into a company eager to pick them up, while at the same time rapidly making the
adjustment from an academic to a customer-driven commercial environment.
Murray Porteous and Simon Walton significantly redesigned and rebuilt the Auckland
University system. The software was completely redeveloped, greatly increasing the
programme length. A single overworked 8 bit microprocessor was replaced with two
microprocessors, and a customer interface was added. Porteous and others provided
most of the know-how in the power electronic hardware development. Two
microprocessors were used in the drive - one acting as an intelligent user interface,
with the other controlling the motor and generating the PWM waveform. PDL also
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added a "personality module" - essentially a plug-in, battery backed-up RAM in which
all the drive presets were memorised.
In retrospect, the decision to move to two 8-bit rather than a single l6-bit
microprocessor reflected a desire to get as much value as possible out of the available
but inadequate hardware, rather than starting from scratch and developing more
appropriate teohnology.
Shortly after the earlier work on the ASDi was completed, John Boys became aware
of an improved switching strategy development called space vector modulation. This
was developed and transfered to PDL and it proved a major success, adding extra
processing capacity to the ASDi's microprocessors. Boys' team also developed the
original thermal modelling for the ASDi, while Walton at PDL refined this
considerably for use in the ASDi.
The ASDi took the equivalent of about l0 person years of PDL time to develop, with
the university contribution (including that of Simon Walton) not only being the key
ideas but the advanced technical input that would probably have been impossible for
PDL to obtain elsewhere.
Against a backdrop of great mutual respect and professional admiration, the key PDL
and Auckland University staffhad different perspectives over the value attributable to
the Dynaflux feature itself Uniservices Ltd sought to extract a substantial royalty for
the incorporation of the Dynaflux into the later Microdrive 3 (tlD 3) innovation. This
royalty seemed excessive in relation to the lean margins PDL could earn from the
product. After Uniservices declined a lower royalty offer, PDL modified the
algorithm to avoid payrng the royalty. This disagreement left no lasting ill feeling and
may well have reflected the difficulties Uniservices Ltd experienced in understanding
and placing a value on the technology in a commercial setting.
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Marketine and Commercial Aspects
PDL has always maintained a close relationship with the users of drives so that their
needs can be embodied in product development, and the company backs this up with
comprehensive product support services.
Marketing of the ASDi focused on its technical capabilities relating to torque, speed
measurement and regulation" and communication capabilities. PDL was also aware of
the need for at least one major differentiating feature or selling point, and this turned
out to be the Dynaflux algorithm.
The ASDi was launched by PDL at the School of Engineering in Auckland in
November 1988. In the subsequent 12 months, an extensive series of seminars and
service training schools promoted the drive to customers locally and internationally.
Major New Zealand users of the ASDi included the dairy and the pulp and paper
sectors. During this period, the product range was extended from 7.5 kW to 250kW,
and 200 units with a value of $NZ3M were sold.
In a very competitive industry with product life cycles of about 5 years, PDL did not
patent the innovatiorq prefening to get superior products to the market ahead of
competitors and earn a premium by staying ahead of the competition. Part of this
strategy involved upgrades and product improvement. The ASDi was uprated to 355
kW, and in March 1991 to 500kW. By 1989 440 amp controllers were achieved,
followed by 1040 amp controllers in 1991.
PDL's marketing effort had to overcome distance from markets, language
requirements, different standards, and a lack of recognition of New Zealand as a
source of high technology equipment. The ASDi was technologically advanced by
world standards, and this gave PDL the confidence to move aggressively into the
export market. Already by 1989 about 40o/o of PDL Electronics products were
exported.
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In April 1989, the ASDi was launched into the European market at the Hanover
Industrial Fair, generating over 100 enquiries over the 8 day period. The launch
included extensive displays and demonstrations of practical applications. This rapidly
led to a base of distributors and customers being established in Germany, Italy and the
UK. Subsequent visits to Hanover led to the appointment of distributors in Spain and
Denmark.
The ASDi was used in applications ranging from air conditioning fans in buildings in
London, Singapore and Auckland, town water supply pumps in Scotland, Queensland
and Whangarei, food processing in Korea, Victoria and Hastings, cement plants in
Israel and Australia, gantry crane control in New Zealand, ceramic ball mills in ltaly,
mining in Australia, and conveying mine ore at an altitude of over 3,000 metres in
Chile.
The ASDi by itself substantially expanded PDL's turnover and exports and allowed it
to expand into new markets against intense competition from Japanese, American and
European companies. By mid-1991 the ASDi represented about 4OYo of PDL
Electronics turnover. Building on the profile achieved through the Hanover trade fair,
a further breakthrough into the German and European market occurred when PDL
won a major fan motor drive tender for a Leipzig power station n 1992. Based on its
solution to a similar technical challenge with the installation of a 1040 amp drive at a
powdered milk plant in New Zealand, PDL won the contract with its ASDi 1040 amp
drive. Germany is now PDL's largest single export market.
The innovation and its later variants therefore provided a launching pad for significant
PDL inroads into international markets and laid a basis for the company's growth.
Technical Platform for Later Innovations
The ASDi was not only a major new product but represented a transition in
technologies, which in turn laid a technical platform for other products. In particular,
the ASDi allowed the company to build on its strengths in analogue-type circuitry and
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in power electronics hardware by adding advanced microprocessor control
algorithms. Microprocessor control also allowed more technical features to be built
in.
Especially through Simon Walton, the work associated with the ASDi gave PDL
advanced new competencies in motor control theory and capability and control
algorithms. The ASDi combined these new technologies and skills with the power
electronic strengths of PDL engineers such as Murray Porteous. Since the ASDi, all
of PDL's subsequent ranges of drives have built on its technical advances and been
microprocessor based.
Specific technical features in the ASDi laid the basis foq or were incorporated into
future innovative products developed by the company. Dynaflux was incorporated
with some software modifications into the third generation of the Microdrive, the
UD3, launched in May 1991. The Microvector introduced in 1993 embodied ideas
developed as spin-offs from the work of Walton and Boys in the mid-1980s.
Background of the Key People
Murray Porteous received his BE (Hons) degree n 1979 and his ME in electrical
engineering at Canterbury University under David Byers. After a period working with
Byers and the Canterbury University Electric Vehicle group developing high speed
transistor inverters, he joined IEA in 1981. In developing controllers in IEA Porteous
drew actively on the applications experience of other IEA engineers, the production
techniques of manufacturing stafi, and the feeding in to product development of
customer requirements from the IEA sales team.
Keith Valentine was PDL Electronics' General Manager at the time the ASDi was
developed. Valentine did a BE in electrical engineering at Canterbury University,
worked in broadcasting, and then joined BP. Later he completed a Diploma in
Business Administration. In his five years at BP he worked in marketing of non-
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electrical products such as fuels and lubricants, before moving to Cable Price and
moving back into the importing and selling of electrical products. During this time,
Valentine worked primarily in the administration and marketing side of the business,
and developed an intimate understanding of the connection between the product and
the application.
Valentine set up the agreements with Canterbury University and later with the Applied
Research Office (later Uniservices) at Auckland university leading up to the
development of the ASDi innovation. On acquiring IEA from Rothmans Industries,
PDL Holdings appointed him General Manager of the restructured company. Keith
Valentine has since left PDL and now runs a company that imports drives from
overseas.
PDL's involvement in variable speed drives really had its genesis in the work and
stimulus of David Byers, a senior lecturer and "larger than life" character at
Canterbury University. Byers joined the Department of Electrical Engineering at
Canterbury in 1964 after a varied and eventful career in the RNZAF as a technical
signals officer. After study leave in the UK in 1972, Byers moved into research
relating to AC motor control, especially focusing on variable frequencies and variable
voltage power supplies. Byers' main contribution was ideas and the development of
the "human capital" embodied in his students.
David Byers' early work at Canterbury University, including in waveform generation
techniques, provided both the technological base and the research supervisory focus
that led to the development of motor control drive technology in IEA and GEC (NZ)
David Byers essentially introduced the concept of AC motor control to New Zealand
and his students transferred his ideas and technology to companies they joined. These
externally generated sources of ideas, technology and trained people from Canterbury
were effectively exploited by IEA. IEA's link with Canterbury University was initially
made through the Inventions Development Authority (DA), and only later did IEA
work directly with Canterbury rather than through agencies such as the IDA. IEA
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sponsored students at Canterbury University to finish off their masterates. One ME
graduate at IEA Alan Cooper, was funded to transfer back to Canterbury University
for a year, adapt technology and transfer it back to the company. IEA paid for
research work at Canterbury University, for the use of university facilities, and for
David Byers' input as a consultant to the company and as a project supervisor.
An inspirational supervisor, Byers did not however attain the level of familiarity with
the realities of the commercial world that was later achieved by Boys. This was
primarily because, while Byers fostered the ideas and the development of research
skills in his students, he also sought to move beyond that and exert a high degree of
influence and direction over the applied engineering and product development work
within oompanies.
As a visionary with a strong personality, Byers attracted some of the most able
students around hirq including Murray Porteous and John Penny. fohn Penny's
masterate laid the basis for the Ranger drive commercialised by GEC. While widely
acclaimed as an outstanding innovative and technical achievement, the Ranger was
not a commercial success on the scale of the ASDi. After a period in GEC, Penny
moved to PDL Electronics and became a key member of its R&D and engineering
team from 1990.
Byers retired in 1987, and with Boys is remembered as one of the two academics who
laid the intellectual and the research supervisory base for New Zealand's exceptional
competencies in variable speed drive technology.
The driving force in motor controller development at Auckland University was John
Boys, a strong personality at Auckland University as David Byers had been at
Canterbury. Boys' reputation meant he was able to attract able students and provide
research leadership and links with applications, as well as the supervisory focus
needed to ensure PhDs didn't stray too far from their achievable goals.
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John Boys is most unusual in the university scene in providing intellectual leadership
for graduate students while achieving striking success in developing links with
industry. John Boys sees himself as an engineer rather than as an academic, having
spent an extended period in industry.
Boys did a PhD in radio science and worked for a software subsidiary of the Racal
goup in England. This company wrote computer-aided design prograrnmes and Boys
worked in the fields of printed circuit board layout and related areas. Boys then
accepted a job with a company that made "high strength fasteners" (bolts) for the
aerospace industry. Boys worked for this company for over 4 years and invented,
among other things, a method of counting metallic parts with a high degree of
accuracy, and a machine for the very precise tightening of bolts. The company set up
a business based on this, using the tightening technology for assembling aerospace and
automobile products. Boys' industrial experience included a strong grounding in
electronics applied to the mechanical engineering industry.
Boys then moved to Canterbury University for 3 years and worked in ultrasonics,
motor control and power electronics. This provided him with an intimate knowledge
of the latest work in this field. While Boys and David Byers were contemporaries and
had a good relationship at Canterbury University they did not work closely together,
with Byers at that particular time not really working in the field of motor controllers.
John Boys' motivation was very much to move beyond academic achievement and the
culrency of published literature and to see things work in a commercial setting. His
industrial background gave him the ability to see things through commercial eyes and
be motivated by achievements in embodied technology and successful commercial
innovation.
The scarcity and inadequacies in the allocation methods for universiry research
funding were also major factors for Boys, especially given the cost of power
electronics. Power electronics research is expensive, not only in the fixed equipment
that may be available in a university but in consumables such as transistors. The
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applied nature of the research also lent itself to commercial interaction with
companies such as PDL. In fact, by l99l about 25Yo of the Auckland University
Electrical and Electronic Engineering Department's budget came from industry
(Industrial Equipment News, l99lb, p. 7).
John Boys' PhD students included Ross Green who worked with modified inverters
and who now part owns a UK company called the Technology Partnership, and Mke
Forster who is now the technical director of Control Techniques, the largest
manufacturer of variable speed drives in the UK. By the time Simon Wdton began
his PhD, Boys had achieved an international reputation in his field and was attracting
very able post graduate students as a result. Boys generated new ideas and concepts
and students such as Simon Walton investigated them, often generating new ideas
themselves.
Simon Walton graduated with a BE from Auckland University in 1980 before
commencing a masterate, initially under Bruce Gatland, on a control problem
involving induction motors. The masterate took on a life of its own and then, under
the direction of John Boys, Walton focused his research on using power electronics to
improve the performance of induction motor control.
Walton's work at masterate and PhD level coincided with rapid advances in consumer
electronics and embodied multi-disciplinary approaches that allowed Walton to avoid
too much nanow specialisation too early in his work. This allowed him to build up a
broader base of expertise that allowed wider opportunities for application.
In the early stages he received some sponsorship from Plessey, until Plessey decided
to give up on the market for drives. Walton completed his PhD in 1986 in his first
year of employment at PDL Electronics. [n early 1989, Walton was promoted to
Senior Design Engineer. Walton had an exceptionally good understanding of the
induction motor and its control theory which, combined with his broader
understanding of electronics and control, were among the most critical factors in the
success of the ASDi.
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Simon Walton had a strong interest and aptitude in technology and power electronics
from childhood days. Walton says:
...I always had an interest in electronics, fiddling around, power electronics appealed to me
because of its capacity to do damage - as time went on t simply got more interested in it.
Walton was also driven by a desire to solve a problem and shift back the frontiers
rather than simply to fulfil academic degree requirements.
Conclusions
PDL Electronics was founded on technological innovation that gave it a competitive
edge in the market. Its motivations in developing the ASDi sprang from its strategic
need to use new technology as the core of its business strategy. The profits and
market share resulting from earlier research and technological innovation inspired by
Byers and his students gave PDL the confidence to invest heavily in the ASDi. The
engineering and electrical skills the company had built up through about 15 years of
work in AC speed control gave it the competencies to successfully commercialise the
innovation.
The growth of PDL Electronics and the focus of its innovative product development
has been driven by the vision of the key people involved in the company. The small
size of companies and of the total market in New Zealand has also been a major
factor. New Zealand companies in most sectors lack the economies of scale available
in other countries, relying instead for competitive advantage on economies of scope
and flexibility in production for niche markets. Variable speed drives with customised
control fitted the need for flexibility.
While New Zealand is a small country, its industrial plants in sectors such as
agricultural and forestry processing, metals and petrochemicals provide a microcosm
of the world market in these industries. PDL's engineers were always close to and
understood the market, and this paid off with PDL's enviable record of picking the
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right technical path when there were competing technological approaches to choose
from.
The high degree of technical competition in the industry, PDL's familiarity with the
market, and the need to expand internationally to achieve the economies of scale and
scope needed in the motor drive market were key motivations of PDL managers such
as Keith Valentine and Murrav Porteous.
The ASDi is a world-class development, and one of the major New Zealand
innovations in the 1980s. It is one of the very best examples of university'industry
relations in New Zealand. It illustrates the synergies that result from university
research that shifts back the frontiers and injects new ideas into an industrial company
that has complementary skills in engineering and technology applications and an
intimate knowledge of the market.
The development of variable speed drive technology in New Zealand illustrates the
pre-eminent importance of strong and charismatic academic supervisors who can
provide intellectual leadership and attract able students to work in their field. The
contribution of such supervisors includes the creation of skills and competencies that
are later applied, often in different and unexpected ways, in a commercial setting.
This is probably a more important contribution than the creation of research results
which are then transfened in a linear way from a university to a company.
PDL's association with Auckland University generated new technical ideas and
control algorithms embodied in the ASDi but also helped the company on an ongoing
basis to keep up to speed with the latest technical developments overseas.
Significantly, the innovation depended on PDL having the in-house skills and research
and engineering capabilities to turn university ideas and core technology into
something workable in the market. University research results only lead to
commercial outcomes when companies themselves have the skill-bases and
technology "absorptive capacity''to understand and apply them.
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PDL was able to exploit academic ideas and staff and student competencies to go
from being a small company vulnerable in its largely domestic market, to being a
significant player in international markets. Auckland University gained substantial
financial support for its researctq as well as a measure of the relevance and suitability
for industry both of its research and of its graduate students.
Key lessons from the case are the need for openness and trust, and for the effective
knitting together of the academic and commercial inputs involved in innovation. The
case also illustrates that the movement of people is the best form of technology
transfeq and that technology transfer is often the transfer of tacit know-how and
human capital rather than the transfer of codified and research-based knowledge per
se.
Postscript
ln 1994, Simon Walton, Murray Porteous and John Penny left PDL to found
Innovative Developments Ltd, a technolory-based company established to perform
engineering consulting and joint venture electronic development. The loss of the
company's three key technologists may have profound implications for PDL
Electronics in the future, but on the other hand New Zealand has gained a very
interesting new start-up company.
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Appendix 1
Key Events in the ASDi and Associated Innovations
Kcy Events
1964 David Byers joins Department ofElec-trical Engineering at
Canterbury University
February 1976 Technology agreement with Canterbury University
(Patents NZ 1718721174825, UK 148681l/2, US 3947736,
November 1976 DJB Series introduced in New Zealand
1977 lohn Boys joins Department of Electrical and Electronic
Engineering, Auckland University
t.9E0 Simon Walton graduates BE at Auckland University
L982 Simon Walton begins masterate research on a control problem
involving induction motors
October 1982 Microdrive Series introduced
November 1983 ASD Series introduced
August 1985 Microdrive lvlk l1 introduced
November 1985 Technology agreement with Auckland University




November 1988 ASDi Series introduced
April 1989 ASDi launched into European market
(flanover Trade Fair)
19E9 NEDA award to Simon Walton and Murray Porteous for the
ASDi
November 1990 ASDi to 355 kW
March 1991 ASDito 500kW
(Parallel inverters)
April 1991 Microdrive-3 introduced
(IGBT, "Whispenuave" modulation, incorporating D5rnaflux)
1992 PDL receives export commendation from Tradenz
March 1994 Murray Porteous, Iohn Penny and Simon Wdton leave PDL
and form a new start-up company
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CASE 2: KIWIFRUIT WINE
Introduction
The kiwifruit wine innovation is based on the process developed by Heatherbell et al
(1980), with later work done by Lodge (1981) and Withy and Lodge (1982). Most
kiwifilit wine is similar to Riesling Sylvaner or Muller-Thurgau wine, with a fresh and
fioity flavour and aroma and a high vitamin C content. Several different types of
kiwifruit wine are made, including dry, sweet and carbonated wines.
The wine is cheaper to produce than grape and many fruit wines primarily because,
while prices of kiwifruit and gmpes fluctuate, kiwifruit gives a higher yield per
hectare and a higher volume ofjuice (about 84Yo) can be extracted from the fruit.
Fresh kiwifruit, unlike grapes, can be kept in coolstores for up to 12 months without
deteriorating, enabling wineries to be kept going all year round. The wine has a short
shelf life and is best consumed in the year of vintage, though storage can be prolonged
by refrigeration.
Kiwifruit wine earned David Heatherbell and Norman Lodge a Ministerial Award for
Technological Excellence in 1987.
Background
The kiwifruit industry developed first in New Zealand, based on a small quantity of
Actinidia chinensis seed introduced in 1904 from China and planted by Alexander
Allison in Wanganui. Selection of the Hayward variety by Avondale nurseryman
Hayward Wright had, by 1935, produced plant material with commercial potential.
Pioneering work in the mid-1950s by H. M. Mouat of the Fruit Research Divisiorq
DSR" laid a scientific base for variety classifications and comparisons, but the
industry only grew substantially from the early 1970s on.
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Market Background of the Innovation
Commercial kiwifruit orchards occupied less than 40 ha in the early 1950s, but
totalled 8,000 ha in 1982. In 1982 alone, around another 2,500 ha was planted.
Kiwifruit production rose from 2,338 tonnes in l97l to L7,965 tonnes in 1980
(Lodge, 1981, p. 35). In 1980, 1,968 tonnes of fnrit was processed, with exports
including canned slices, frozen pulp, frozen slices, and small amounts of freeze-dried
slices.
The major external barrier for kiwifruit wine to overcome was the perception in New
Zealand that it was an inferior product because it was not made from grapes.
Kiwifruit has a strong flavour and people found it difficult to accept that it could be
the basis of a quality wine. This barrier proved impossible to overcome, and Prestons
eventually gave up any real focus on the New Zealand market once it had established
itself in the tourist market.
Export-quality fruit initially commanded premium prices, but as early as the mid-
1970s the industry and DSIR scientists realised that production volumes would
inevitably lead to large quantities of non-export grade fruit and an associated need for
processing. At this time about 20Yo of the crop was rejected for export, and the long-
term trend was towards more demanding export standards, and therefore an increase
in the proportion as well as the total volume of fnrit that needed to be processed.
Technical Backeround of the Innovation
The first reference to using Actinidia for wine production was made by Graebener in
1894 (see Lodge, 1981 p. 35). A Chinese visitor to DSIR in l98l mentioned that the
people of South Chin4 where the fruit grows wild, have for many years used kiwifruit
juice to make a Chinese-style heavy, sweet white wine (Burns, 1981, p. 39).
Zukovskij (1950) stated that "Actinidia arguta produces an excellent wine" while
Vitkovskij (1972) alluded to an Actinidia-based wine that had "the qualities of
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champagne wine". However, none of these authors validated their claims or gave
details of the wine making processes used.
Kiwifruit presents some unique processing problems associated with its high acidity,
the presence of proteolytic enzymes which degrade protein, and a tendency to oxidise,
leading to colour deterioration in the processed product. Kiwifruit juice is unusual
due to its high concentration of quinic and ascorbic acid and its low soluble solid
content. Quinic acid causes an astringent taste in kiwifruit juice. When pressed,
kiwifruit yields a viscous pulp with little free-run juice being released through
pressing.
Because commercial horticulture of kiwiftrit had been a world first for New Zealand,
and had produced significant crops only from the early 1970s, there was little in the
way of an international body of knowledge to exploit. As a result, most of the
knowledge base on kiwifruit breeding and selection, production, post-harvest
physiolory, and on the fruit's composition and processing characteristics, had to be
developed in New Zealand.
The Innovation
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the DSIR was a government science department
with funding appropriated directly from Parliament. It lacked commercial powers, but
on the other hand there were few "user pays" earning requirements or constraints on
applied product development or interactive partnerships with industry.
The DSIR at the time tended not to patent or earn royalties, and researchers earned
little personal reward from successful technological innovation. Promotion often
depended on scientific achievements and academic paper publications. DSIR
scientists were not all that well paid, but their work was prestigious, they had a great
deal of intellectual freedom and the right to work on undirected research.
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The DSIR Research
In the mid-1970s David Heatherbell, a DSIR scientist, was experimenting with a wide
range of fruit products including feijoas, tamarillos and kiwifruit. This included work
on clarified juice products from kiwifnrit, schnapps, and distilled kiwifruit liqueurs. At
this time Heatherbell heard suggestions that wine could also be made from kiwifruit.
David Heatherbell's work was very much "science push" research that was in advance
of industry and market demand, but which still focused on creating a knowledge base
that industry could exploit in the future, A positive feature of the DSIR environment
was the ability to pursue new opportunities, to think reflectively, and to advance the
frontiers of strategic and high risk research. Heatherbell says of this time:
You did feel that you belonged to a little elite, tlat you belonged to something special, even
though it wasn't the highest prestige group in society...I think you had good directors you
felt like you wanted to achierye for, and it was something to do with your age as well...I was
clearly focused and higNy motivated.
Much of Heatherbell's work was multi-disciplinary and he was also aware of work
done by Rainer Eschenbruch at the MAF Research Station at Te Kauwhata.
Eschenbruch and a technician, Tom van DanL had attempted to make kiwifruit wine
using conventional wine making techniques. The product had bitter oflflavours, and
was "grassy, green and stalky" in aroma and taste, with an unacceptable bitterness and
astringency.
Using different technology to that traditionally used in wine making, Heatherbell
experimented by treating juice samples with pectinese enrymes, with other samples
being centrifuged. He noted that samples that had been pre-treated with enzymes
changed in taste and aroma and developed a Riesling-Sylvaner character.
A key technical advance was the realisation that fermentation of kiwifnrit juice by
itself led to a very bitter wine, and that an essential step was enzymatically treating the
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juice prior to fermentation. Heatherbell et al established that juice clarification with
pectolytic enzymes to remove residual pectins before fermentation is essential if wines
with acceptable aroma and taste are to be produced. The pectolytic enzyme
processing removes astringency and bitterness and catalyses the emergence of a fuity,
Riesling-sylvaner style aroma during fermentation. The removal of bitterness and
astringency coincides with the removal of flavonoids and a reduction in total phenols.
This pioneering research was summarised in a seminal 1980 publication (Heatherbell
et al, 1980). Heatherbell et al also showed how the juice extraction yield could be
increased from 55-60yo to 84oA by treatment of the pulp with pectolytic enzyme.
Both enzyme and press-aid treatments produced juices with low solids content.
Water and sugar was added to raise the soluble solid content and lower the titratable
acidity.
Heatherbell's detection of an attractive aroma and flavour resulting from these
experimental techniques was a key milestone in the kiwifnrit wine innovation.
David Heatherbell continued his work and in 1978 supplied samples to an
international wine symposium held in Auckland. Heatherbell hosted several German
wine experts attending this symposium in his home, and conducted a blind tasting of
kiwifruit wine and a number of grape wines. The experts picked the kiwifnrit wine as
the best "Riesling-Sylvaner"" praising it for its fresh and fruity flavour.
The work of Heatherbell et al was followed by that of Lodge (1981) and Withy and
Lodge (1982). The process eventually brought into commercial production included
enzymatic treatment before fermentation, adding water to reduce the acidity of the
kiwifruit juice, and then initiating fermentation with an actively growing yeast strain.
Sucrose was then added to supplement natural sugars to allow an alcohol content
similar to grape wine to be achieved. Sulphur dioxide was added during fruit crushing
and at bottling to retard browning.
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Technoloe.v Transfer and Commercial i sati on
David Heatherbell first approached the head of Montana Wines in New Zealand in the
late 1970s and sought to interest him in kiwifruit wine making. At this time the grape
wine industry was still emerging, and fruit wines were looked down on as inferior
products. Montana decided not to invest in kiwifruit wine making.
At the end of 1978 Heatherbell took up a position in the United States. His papers
and presentations at meetings served to publicise his breakthrough not only in New
Zealand but also led to some kiwifruit wine making in California" France and Italy.
After Heatherbell's departure to the United States, Norman Lodge did further
refinement and modification of the process and took up the task of encouraging and
facilitating its full adoption and commercialisation in industry. An important step was
delivery of papers at conferences to build awareness of the possibilities and to
stimulate interest in developing the process further. This aimed to overcome reticence
from the existing wine industry and to stimulate new entrepreneurs to investigate the
commercial development of kiwifruit wine.
The DSIR at the time had no major commercial revenue requirements, and did not
actively manage intellectual property to achieve a financial return. Research results
were seen as being publicly available. DSIR at this time tended to be "all things to all
men", and an expectation was created that because it was publicly funded the private
sector had unlimited access to its services and capabilities. DSIR technologists such
as Norman Lodge were able to deal with all clients with few major restrictions.
Lodge was able, for example, to assist competitors such as Preston's Kiwifruit Winery
and the Kiwifruit Wine Company.
Fruit wine makers initially assumed that kiwifruit wine would be commercialised by
the larger and better resourced grape wine makers. However, the existence of a
regulation barring the making of fruit wine on the same premises as grape wine to
avoid contamination or adulteration effectively discouraged grape wine makers. This
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provided an opportunity for smaller and very entrepreneurial fruit wine makers to
enter the market, with at least some confidence that they would not be blocked by
larger, established players.
Regulations were also in place preventing the addition of water to grape wines. Fruit
wines often needed water added to reduce acidity. Grape wine makers launched a
concerted campaign arguing that this distinction gave fruit wine makers an unfair
advantage in being able to produce a cheaper product, and that government should
regulate against it. This move failed, but anticipating the possible regulatory threat,
Lodge and colleagues used a deionisation process using ion exchange resin to reduce
the acidity of kiwifruit juice without adding water (see Lodge et al, 1986). This
research demonstrated that it was possible to make wine from l00%o kiwiftrit juice
while still reducing natural acidity levels.
Lodge made a major contribution at this time in providing ongoing technical
assistance to companies such as the Kiwifruit Wine Company and Preston's Kiwifruit
Winery, to help solve the problems of moving from a laboratory-scale process to full
commercial production.
The first commercial production of kiwifruit wine was undertaken by Russell Baker, a
solo operator, in Te Puke. His product was on the market by October 1981. Other
producers then entered the market, but often in an unsystematic and badly planned
way. A difficulty with some early attempts was that wine makers took shortcuts and
produced an inferior product, only gradually learning that the published procedures
had to be followed precisely. For example, some producers attempted quicker, easier
juice yields without full enzyme treatment of the juice before fermentation.
Preston's Kiwifruit Winery entered the market in Easter 1982. This winery was
established outside Tauranga by ex-Wellington butcher and builder Paddy Preston,
and his sons Warren and Tim. Paddy Preston was an entrepreneurial figure who came
to Tauranga armed with a hobby interest in wine making, and who first explored the
possibility of buying a kiwifruit orchard in the region. Having learned of the DSIR
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achievements in the media he approached DSIR for further information and his focus
shifted to kiwifnrit wine.
The Preston family lacked expertise in wine making, and it was a major effort for
them to solve problems associated with upscaling laboratory processes that worked
with l0 litre samples to commercial production of 1,000 litres of kiwifuit wine at a
time. Much of this involved trial and error, learning from other wine makers and
machinery producers, and the invaluable technical assistance of Norman Lodge. The
Prestons built their winery with largely second-hand equipment and did not invest in
substantial new equipment until about 1988. Preston's Kiwifruit Winery is now
widely credited with perfecting the total process cycle for kiwifruit wine making, and
with producing the best quality product.
In early 1982 Te Puna orchardists David Manton and Bill Smith first discussed the
possibility of a kiwifruit winery. Later talks with two other orchardists and some
market research undertaken suggested good sales potential for a quality kiwifruit
wine, and in 1982 the Kiwifruit Wine Company was formed. This company
eventually had 9 shareholders, made up of orchardists and local business people. The
principals of the Kiwifruit Wine Company were shareholders who employed specialist
stafi, rather than being a family or other partnership where the owners were also the
wine makers and the business operators.
David Manton then formally approached Norman Lodge with a lawyer and financial
adviser, and sought advice on the process, as well as on wine makers with the skills
needed to produce the product. Norman Lodge recommended Neville Wilson, a wine
maker at Selaks. Wilson was recruited and the Kiwifiuit Wine Company was
established to produce a wine under the brand name "Durham Light".
The Kiwifruit Wine Company established its winery and produced its first wine in
1983. The winery was named Hayward-Lodge in honour of Hayward Wright, the
breeder of the Hayward kiwifruit variety, and Norman Lodge. The company created
the Durham Light brand, named after the Light Infantry Regiment stationed at the site
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of the winery at Glen Lyon Place, Greerton from 1864-1866. The winery was granted
permission to use the now disbanded Regiment's badge on its labels.
The Kiwifiuit Wine Company invested heavily and probably extravagantly in the very
best new equipment and plant, including a two thousand bottle an hour automated
bottling and labelling conveyor system, to allow for ambitious plans for future
expansion. Investment in the winery in 1983 dollars was estimated at over $lM.
Neville Wilsoq with some input from Norman Lodge, helped supervise the design and
building of the winery.
Marketins and Commercial Aspects
By 1983 kiwifruit wine was creating a lot of interest due to its novelty and its image
as a unique New Zealand product. Durham Light wine was accepted for use in the
official residences of the Governor General and the Prime Minister. A number of top
restaurants added the wine to their wine lists.
The first significant commercial success for kiwifruit wine however came in the
Japanese market. New Zealanders, Europeans and Americans favoured grape wines
and treated fnrit wines as an inferior product. A possible opportunity was seen in the
Japanese market that did not have such biases. The Kiwifiuit Wine Company
endeavoured to produce a kiwifruit wine with a high vitamin C content, lightness, and
a sweetish character that it believed could appeal to the Japanese. At this time
identification of the tastes and preferences in overseas markets was almost guessworlg
and only in later years did DSIR and other research institutes develop systematic
programmes of sensory evaluation.
The Kiwifruit Wine Company led by its marketing manager, David Manton" took a
systematic, professional and team-based approach to marketing the wine in Japan.
The key objective was to establish links with a marketing and distribution agent in
Japan, and the breakthrough was achieved when a relationship developed with
Suntory, the fourth largest liquor distributor in the world. Assistance was requested
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from Norman Lodge h developing the Japanese market. Lodge had some knowledge
of this market and went on the company's marketing mission to Japan. The team sent
to Japan included David Manton, a grower, an accountant, a legal adviser, a writer for
Metro magazine and Norman Lodge, all with specialised roles to play.
The team met with Suntory executives and made a positive impression with their
knowledge, preparation and overall approach. Suntory's president was given a bottle
to sample. Suntory was impressed enough with the product to feature it in a glossy
brochure of wines and spirits.
Durham Light was targeted at the Japanese market, and hopes were held for a niche
among young Japanese "office ladies". These were young, single women with
discretionary income who were becoming more cosmopolitan and disliked spirits and
drinks that had masculine associations. It was thought that a relatively low alcohol
(8.5% by volume) kiwifruit wine with a high vitamin C content would appeal to this
market. The Japanese had fewer ingrained prejudices against non-grape wines, since
after all their own traditional wines were made from rice, and some other alcoholic
drinks were made from sweet potatoes.
The Kiwifruit Wine Company exported 43 crates of wine for display and sampling
purposes to the Foodex 83 wine and food festival in Tokyo in March 1983. The early
reports from the wine sampling were positive, and the Japanese found it hard to
believe it was not made from grape juice.
The link with Suntory gave Durham Light an entry into the Japanese market, and over
2 years about 20 container loads were exported. David Manton managed an
advertising campaign in Japan which coincided with a New Zealand Kiwifruit
Authority's fresh fruit promotional campaign. At this time, kiwifruit wine was both
the onfy fruit wine and the only New Zealand wine that Suntory imported. In 1985
the Kiwifruit Wine Company also launched a kiwifruit liqueur, also produced by
Neville Wilson.
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By 1985 Durham Light Kiwifruit Winery employed just under 20 people at peak
times, and by 1986 about $1.5M in kiwifruit wine was being exported annually. This
amounted to a substantial part of New Zealand's wine exports at the time.
This early success with a relatively large volume of sales gave the Kiwifnrit Wine
Company an optimistic view of long-term market prospects. However, these sales
were to liquor distributors and were used to provide small amounts of stock to a very
large number of outlets. The sales did not in fact represent consumer purchases or
ongoing demand. With no further marketing and advertising funding available from
New Zealand, Suntory realised the product was not selling well and was no longer
prepared to put major effort into its promotion.
The poor sales were partly due to the failure of labelling to differentiate the wine, and
the lack of the large-scale promotional resources that would be needed to make an
impression in a market such as Japan. The marketing of kiwifruit wine may well have
confused whether the wine was a distinct new beverage with unique attributes, or
simply an undifferentiated copy of grape wine which sought to emulate grape wine
flavour without however being "the real thing". For example, Durham Light's label
did not feature a kiwifruit, although Prestons' labelling strongly identified the wine
with kiwifruit.
The Kiwifruit Wine Company's enthusiastic foray into the Japanese market indirectly
helped pave the way for the Prestons. Preston's Kiwifruit Winery became active in
the Japanese kiwifiuit wine market from 1984, with the company visiting Japan every
year since. Preston's participated in a number of trade shows there, but found it a
very difficult market from 1984 to about 1988. The key lessons it learnt from the
Japanese market were the need to be patient and to think and plan long-term. The
Prestons have maintained a relationship with a Japanese liquor importer and
distributor for the last l0 years, and by 1988 had established a small but worthwhile
niche in the market.
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Only about t5-20% of Prestons' sales to the Japanese are in fact exports to the
Japanese domestic market, with the market for kiwifruit wine in 1994 being
dominated by sales of wine within New Zealand to tourists, especially to Japanese
tourists. Some of these sales take the form of orders for the wine to be delivered to
their homes in Japan.
The appeal of the wine is as a novelty and a souvenir from a New Zealand visit. This
has proved a small but profitable enough market for Preston's Kiwifruit Winery. With
the potential for tourist arrivals in New Zealand to double or treble in the next decade
or so, the prospects for this niche market seem good. In more recent years, transport
and input costs have dropped and freeing up of the duty free market has helped the
Prestons. There are now 3 major duty-free companies in New Zealand, all of which
buy from Prestons' Kiwifruit Winery.
Key success factors for Prestons have been that it is a family business and that Paddy
Preston and his two sons had strongly complementary skills and personalities. Paddy
Preston provided the entrepreneurial vision, while his sons Warren and Tim had a
business and marketing background and a horticultural background respectively.
As a closely knit family business, the Prestons were prepared to live on very little for
some yenrs and to weather the difficult times together. In contrast, the Kiwifruit
Wine Company, with paid employees and shareholders who wanted a medium-term
financial returrL did not have this resilience. Over-capitalised, the Kiwifruit Wine
Company went out of business after about 8 years.
Perhaps the single biggest mistake of the Prestons was the location of their winery
several kilometres down a dead-end road. This meant the company never generated
the gate sales which have provided the "bread and butter" cash flow for so many small
horticultural businesses. However, what the Prestons lacked in formal business
planning was made up for by their drive, family cohesiveness, and Paddy Preston's
total absorption in the process of innovation and of building a business rather than
trylng to forecast and plan around the risks or likely financial returns. By 1988, with
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the help of some innovative marketing, Prestons finally achieved a level of profitability
which has been sustained, and the company is now doing well and is also diversifying
into grape wines.
Market Influences
In the late 1970s and early 1980s New Zealand was a heavily protectionist economy.
This meant that freight and other input costs were high, and the exchange rate was
often a disincentive for exporters. However, the kiwifruit industry had been
supported through subsidised planting and there were a number of tax and other
incentives of value to new companies and emerging industries.
An important feature of the innovation process from the early stages was DSIR's role
of acting strategically for the industry, anticipating possible technical or regulatory
barriers, and influencing the political, industrial and market environment that impacted
on the innovation. DSIR scientists such as Norman Lodge facilitated the fnrit wine
makers in establishing the Fruit Wine Makers Association, and encouraged them to
network and to share information. The Association was set up to lobby and act as a
focus for the industry, and to stimulate interest in fnrit wines, for example by running
annual competitions. The first President of the Association was Graham Oldfield, and
later Presidents included Paddy and then Warren Preston. The Association was active
in establishing export certification standards and codes of practice for the export of
kiwifruit wine, for example to allow control of haze formation and other quality
factors.
Background of the Key People
David Heatherbell grew up on a New Zealand orchard before completing a
biochemistry degree at Canterbury University. He worked for the DSIR in Auckland
in the early 1960s, which then funded him to complete a doctorate in food science at
an American university. Heatherbell has a very impressive publication record in food
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and beverage science, especially in juice and wine product research, and some of this
work has attracted substantial international interest.
Heatherbell's time as a PhD student and later as a researcher in the Pacific North
West of the United States was crucial. In this region, the fruit wine industry was
bigger than the grape wine industry, and it gave him insights into what might be
possible for the fnrit wine sector in New Zealand. David Heatherbell had grown up in
and always had a strong motivation to help the fruit industry and this provided a
crucial focus for his research interests.
Norman Lodge grew up in Liverpool with a background that exposed him, as he said,
to the "raw elements of life". His early jobs included as a barman and driving
instructor. He studied chemistry part-time at the Liverpool Polytechnic before
completing an MSc in Food Science at Reading University. Norman Lodge's
technical background is in organic chemistry and he started out working for ICI in
heavy chemical manufacturing research. He then went to Pilkington and worked in
the field of analysis of glass using radioactive analysis for trace elements. Lodge then
spent 7 years working in the analysis of food, drugs and water.
After emigrating to New Zealand, Lodge worked with MAF in a chemical laboratory
in the dairy division. After completing a post-graduate degree in food science, which
built on his knowledge of chemistry, he transferred to the DSIR's food science group.
He was heavily involved in food research as part of a Pacific Islands development
scheme. After his success with the kiwifruit wine innovation" Lodge's work
increasingly focused on technology marketing in Asia and the Pacific, and on the
establishment and management of the DSIR's Singapore office.
Linda Withy is a senior technical officer at HortResearch at Mt Albert. Withy did
some important technical work with Norman Lodge in improving the kiwifnrit wine
making process.
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Neville Wilson earned a diploma in Dairy Technology in 1966 at Massey University.
Two years later he obtained a Certificate of Proficiency in Food Microbiology. He
spent 12 years in the dairy industry, including 6 years as chief chemist at the
Manawatu Dairy Company in Palmerston North. He later joined the St George
cannery company as chief chemist, before employment as factory manager at the
company's Pukekohe and Dunedin factories. Wilson went on to assist the
establishment of an Auekland meat cannery before joining the wine industry. After
just over a year at Pacific Wines in Hendersoq Wilson spent five years as a chemist at
Selaks Wines, assisting in the wine making process.
Rainer Eschenbruch earned his PhD in microbiology and biology from Freiburg
University in Germany. His thesis investigated malolactic bacteria in wine making.
Eschenbruch came to New Zealand in 1974 after four years at the South African
Oenological and Viticultural Research Institute in Stellenbosch. He became a
National Research Advisory Council (NTRAC) Fellow at MAF, Ruakura in Hamilton.
MAF, Ruakura was responsible for the Te Kauwhata Viticultural Research Statiorl
and Eschenbruch became leader of the wine research effort.
Paddy Preston left school at 15 to become an apprentice butcher with his family
business, and he later became a builder. Paddy Preston was driven by a single-minded
interest in the kiwifruit innovation and "making it happen". He was as much
interested in the journey as the destination. He retained a strong focus on kiwifruit
wine making until the process had been perfected and the winery had become well
established and profitable.
Significantly, Paddy Preston has now started to move into new things, including grape
wine making. His drive now comes from trying to make "the best" chardonnay and
methode champenoise under a different brand, and establishing a winery with a
restaurant close to Tauranga.
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Paddy Preston's two sons, Warren and Tirq had backgrounds that complemented
their fathers. Warren had a business degree while Tim had qualifications in
horticulture.
Conclusions
The kiwifruit wine innovation is a fine example of "science and technology push",
where a small but worthwhile new industry is initiated by the technical skills and
inventiveness of scientists in a public research institute and fully commercialised by
small, entrepreneurial companies. Unusually, a key scientific publicatioq together
with some promotional work, provided sufficient stimulus for private sector
involvement. Remarkably, DSIR scientists then played a key role in acting not only as
the creators of new knowledge for industry, but also actively facilitating industry
lobbying, marketing and promotion for the product.
The key players in the kiwifruit wine innovation complemented each other very well.
David Heatherbell provided the scientific foundation for Norman Lodge's more
applied and developmental work, and Lodge's closeness to industry and to the
Japanese market was crucial to successful commercialisation. Both the Kiwifruit
Wine Company and Prestons' Kiwifruit Winery were effective at team-based
innovation and marketing, and at using specialised personnel for different parts of the
business operation.
The entrepreneurial flair of small companies such as the Kiwifruit Wine Company and
Prestons' Kiwifruit Winery is a striking feature of the case, and shows the willingness
of entrepreneurs to take both technical and market risks with new technology. The
competition between Prestons' Kiwifruit Winery and the Kiwifiuit Wine Company
reminds one of the turtle and the hare fable. The first entrepreneurs cornmercialising a
new innovation very often fail, and success often comes to those who follow, who
learn from the mistakes of others and above all have the staying power.
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A lesson from the case is not to be too "pseudo-analytical". Paddy Preston's
optimism may be associated with having left school at fifteen and not having been
"educated" enough to over-analyse risks and falter at the thought of taking them.
What held the business together was its focus on the future and Paddy Preston's
"passion for the vision".
Warren Preston" reflecting back on the difficult times from 198l-1988, wondered
whether if he had known in l98l of the lean years ahead he would have devoted l0
years of his life to the oompany. If the Prestons had done a detailed business plaq put
financial values by their time, discounted the years of effort with little reward, and
moved only when detailed market research had been completed, they would probably
never have tried to make kiwifruit wine or been successful at it. On the other hand,
the lack of planning and attention to detail by Prestons caused unnecessary problems,
though the company is now more systematic and is investigating ISO accreditation.
While the commercial success of kiwifruit wine has been modest compared to some
earlier expectations, it has found an enduring and profitable small niche in the market.
That niche is likely to g[ow with increased tourist arrivals in New Zealand, with the








First known published reference to kiwifruit wine
First kiwifruit seeds imported to New Zealand
1925-f935 Selection of major kiwifnrit cultivars takes place
1956 DSIR classifies and trials major kiwifruit selections
Early 1970s Kiwifruit exports begrn on a significant scale
19E0 Heatherbell el a/ publish key paper
Easter 19E2 Prestons' Kiwifruit Winery launches its kiwiftiit wine
1983 Kiwifuit Wine Company establishes winery, named
Ilayward-Lodge
19t6 Kiwifruit wine exports at about $1.5M
l9t7 Ministerial Award to David Heatherbell and Norman Lodge for
kiwifruit wine achievement
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CASE 3: RUAKTJRA MILK HARVESTER
Introduction
The Ruakura Mlk Harvester is an electronically-controlled milking system developed
and commercialised by MAF Ruakura (later Dairying Research Corporation) and AIII
Plastic Moulding Company (later InterAg, a subsidiary of Carter Holt Harvey Plastic
Products Group). The system is referred to throughout as the Ruakura Mlk
Harvester (RMH), though it was known at various stages of its development as a
Separate Milk Transporter (SMT) or as an Integrated Milk Harvester G/ft|.
Background
The history ofNew Zealand's dairy industry is one of social and technical innovation.
New Zealand was a world leader in the introduction of the heningbone dairy with
rapid batch milking. New Zealand innovators played important roles in the
development of two of the major technological innovations in dairying - the electric
fence and the milking machine.
Ruakura Research Station/Dairyi n g Research Co{porati on
Ruakura Agricultural Research Station began life as a farm training establishment and
only in 1938 did its focus move from training to research. It began its first research
on milking and milking machine technology in 1946. Wattie Whittlestone and Doug
Phillips were early pioneers in milk harvesting, and by the end of 1950 an efficient
relief valve had been designed to maintain vacuum at a stable level. Whittlestong
Phillips and their team developed a milk flow meter and advanced the whole
engineering structure of the machine, including its rubberware and testing methods.
This improved system was later marketed by the National Dairy Association (NDA)
as the "Ruakura Milking Machine". This machine captured some 6OYo of the New
Zealand market in the mid-1960s. Research also focused on improved milking
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machine cleaning, vacuum pumps, releasers and pulsators, and these steady and
incremental improvements enhanced milking machine efEciency and the health of
cows. Whittlestone and Phillips also made significant international contributions to
the understanding of the responsiveness of cows to machine milking (see
Mclauchlary 1982, p. 138).
At the time the RMH was initiated Ruakura was part of MAF Agricultural Research
Division, which later became MAFTech. In 1990 the dairy research effort in
MAFTech Ruakura was restructured into the Dairying Research Corporation @RC).
The DRC is now a joint venture between the Dairy Board and AgResearch (formerly
MAFTech).
InterAg
While the history of Carter Holt Harvey extends back over a century, InterAg's
beginnings can be traced to the early 1940s. A company called Plastic Products was
set up in l94l by the father of Bill Foremaq the founder of a major New Zealand
packaging company, Trigon. At one stage Foreman senior experimented trying to
make plastics out of casein, and while this work was not commercialised it created
some of the technical and market knowledge that led him into the plastics industry.
Plastic Products became a New Zealand leader in plastic moulding and related
technologies. The core competencies of the company as it evolved were very much
applications in plastics and other materials, moulding, and related fields. On the
retirement of the company's founder in 1963 the company merged with Alex Harvey
Industries (AI{I) and was named AHI Plastic Moulding company.
This company's first major product was a vacuum regulatoq followed by the Waikato
Milkmeter, a product that ended up becoming a big seller. The company moved into
pulsators and then to products such as an isolator claw and a mastitis detector. Much
of this work and innovation was undertaken in association with Doug Phillips and Dr
Murray Woolford. Later, when Graham Duirs joined AHI as its business manager in
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the early 1980s, it was recognised that the company's quality control and its
marketing needed improvement. Duirs focused effort on building up the New Zealand
market, revamping the distribution network, and on moving to selling systems rather
than a more limited emphasis on components.
At this time an opportunity was seen to improve the flow rate in milking machines. In
1983 AHI introduced the Supamilker, a large bore milking system which rapidly
became the industry standard. The Supamilker was devised by Warren Coles. Coles
had formerly been milking machine sales manager for the NDA during the time of the
original Ruakura Milking Machine. He managed the Atil milking machine business
before Graham Duirs joined the company. The Supamilker was a simple
redevelopment of conventional milking machines that increased the milk pipeline size.
The Supamilker's high capacity milk line speeds up milking and allows the milk to
flow below the airflow in the line, which helps eliminate a cornmon cause of vacuum
fluctuations. Compared to other machines, the Supamilker's high capacity reduced
turbulence in the milk line, with some potential benefits in milkfat quality.
By 1988 AHI had merged with Carter Holt to become Carter Holt Harvey (CFtrO.
AHI Plastic Moulding Company was renamed Plastic Products, before being renamed
the Milking Equipment Division and then the Agricultural Divisioq before finally in
1992 becoming InterAg, a subsidiary of the CHH Plastic Products group.
Within its budget, InterAg is semi-autonomous within the CHH group, but it does
benefit from being part of a larger corporation, for example through its access to the
Plastic Products Group's world-class tooling facility. InterAg subcontracts
electronics and components manufacturing to other companies, including within the
CHH group, and then assembles and markets the product.
Market Background
In the early 1980s there was an increasing awareness among dairy farmers of the lack
of innovation in milking systems. Particular concerns included milk frothing and
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flooding in spring when cows are at their peak levels of production. This was raised
at a political level by the Federated Farmers and by the dairy industry in the Bay of
Plenty. The problems of flooding and frothing were aggravated by a trend towards
increasing average herd sizes in the Bay. Ruakura at the time was a "centre of
excellence" in milking machine technology, with key milking machine experts such as
Murray Woolford and his team leader, Doug Phillips. Woolford and Phillips
discussed the problems with farmers in the Bay of Plenty. These discussions led
Murray Woolford to propose a systematic programme of development of new
technology in milking machine design, in response to what was peroeived as a market
demand from farmers.
Technical Background
In the early days of the New Zealand dairy industry cows were hand milked. The first
milking machines were developed in the 1890s in Europe and were introduced to New
Zealand in the early 20th century (Callaghan ed., 1957, p. 179). Over time, milking
machines were improved, simplified and made more hygienig and other technical
advances such as farm electrification enhanced their performance and efficiency.
In the early 1980s the standard milking machine embodied design concepts that were
decades old. At this time, several different configurations were used in milking
systems internationally. The most important were bucket, recorder jar and pipeline
milkers. Bucket milkers used a small milk collection vessel with relatively short tubes
connected to the teatcups. Recorder jar milking systems collected milk in a vessel
located in the bail unit. Pipeline milkers did not use an intermediate collection vessel
for the millq but transported it from a comrnon pipeline to a milk storage vat. In
pipeline milking systems milk is often transported over considerable distances (for
example 30 metres), and this can result in considerable accumulations of froth in milk
receiver vessels.
The standard milking machine conveys milk essentially by blowing air through it. Air
mixed with milk means that the vacuum fluctuates a lot. A major difficulty is that the
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vacuum at the teatcup is regulated via the milk flow path. Consequently higher milk
flow rates result in higher vacuum losses at the cow, and the milk mass renders the
regulator ineffective in controlling local vacuum fluctuations at individual clusters.
The vacuum loss significantly reduces milking rates and can cause clusters to fall off
in the middle of milking. Excessive air admission is also associated with mastitis
levels and the risk of inter-mammary infection.
The entrainment of air in the milk and the violent nature of the flow causes frothing.
Froth and entrained air in milk often impairs the efficiency of milk pumping devices,
especially those pumps of centrifugal design. Air-milk flow systems also cause serious
difficulties in metering milk yield and flow rates because of the amount of air that is
entrained.
The air transportation of milk and subsequent frothing is associated with damage to
the milldat. This damage to milldat is caused by lypolysis (enzyme-induced
generation of free fatty acids following mechanical rupture of the fat globule
membrane). This is believed to be a major contributor to oflflavours and product
loss, including through a shorter shelf life for fat-bearing products such as butter,
cheese and wholemilk powder. Churning or fat aggregation may also occur due to air
entrainment in milk.
High air levels in the milk may lead to bacterial contamination. Air drawn into the
cluster may directly contaminate milk with environmental bacteria, fungi or other
material since the air is drawn from the immediate environment of the milking shed.
Relationship Between MAF Ruakura and AHI
A technologist in AHI Plastic Moulding company, Doug Millar, and Doug Phillips, a
milking systems expert at Ruakura, established some of the first links between the two
organisations. These relationships were built informally at a personal level with very
open access and information flows. The relationship between the company and
Ruakura became strong and productive over time. AHI developed and
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commercialised Ruakura innovations and from the late 1980s paid royalties on the
technology. When in the early 1970s the company developed the Milkmeter, the
device was tested and approved at Ruakura and over 90olo of production is now sold
overseas. Doug Phillips and Muray Woolford in pre-RMH days also worked with
AHI developing such products as claws and pulsators.
AfII's competencies in materials moulding and in dairy equipment fabrication created
a technical platform for other types of innovation. Doug Mllar worked with Ruakura
on problems of rubber quality in diaphragms used in milking technology^ Murray
Woolford at Ruakura suggested using silicone, the diaphragm was duly changed to
this material, and a great improvement in quality and durability resulted. In tunq skills
in silicone technology formed a basis for drug release technology, including a core
element in a major AHI/InterAg success - CIDR devices.
The CIDR is a drug delivery system based on Ruakura technology and is a major
success for InterAg. The CIDR competes in the veterinary drug release market and
has gained international regulatory approval. The CIDR is strongly market-driven and
is likely to form a building block for future innovation and product development in
this field. In a small but growing niche market InterAg is a world leader as a result.
The Innovation
In 1982 Murray Woolford proposed a break away from incremental improvements to
milking machines and to the "patching up" of the traditional systern, and identified a
major technological goal as the separation of air and milk at the cluster, with the milk
being separately transported, and the air flow and hence the control vacuum being
achieved through a separate pathway (Woolford et al, 1982, p. 99). The separation
of milk and air flow would facilitate the measurement of milk yield, improve milking
efficiency, and provide a basis for improving milk quality. Woolford conceived at this
time of a Separate Milk Transport (SMT) machine and predicted that its
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microprocessor control could allow milk flow optimisation and udder health
monitoring.
Having defined the goal, Woolford forecast the technological pathway to achieve it,
predicting that "...the microprocessor will invade the domain of the NZ milking shed
and be used to improve milking efficiency" (Woolford et al, 1982, P. 99).
Significantly, Woolford also saw that any such milking system had to have a cost,
simplicity and efficiency that was appropriate to the New Zealand dairy farm, In the
early 1980s there were two competing air-milk separation systems available
internationally, but these were based on fairly simple float valve separation
technology. These two systems were the Alfa-Laval Trio-vac system and the Zero
Concord system. There is documentary evidence that around 1985/86 one of these
companies was involved in covert activities to determine the nature of the Ruakura
milking system innovation.
Dr Ken Jury, a director of animal research in MAF at the time, backed Woolford's
ideas for appllng more advanced technotogy in milking systems and supported a
research programme being put in place.
Joint Venture Between MAF Ruakura and AHI Plastic Mouldins Company
While Ruakura was strong in scientific research, design and electronics it lacked
competencies in complex prototyping, short-run fabrication and production
manufacturing.
In the early 1980s MAF was still a Government department, funded by Parliamentary
appropriation and with few commercial powers. Government research laboratories
could not borrow commercially or hold equity and they faced limits on their ability to
develop and commercialise intellectual property. Their perceived role was to do
"public good" research, the results of which would be freely available to all. [n some
senses they were handicapped by the expectation that they were "all things to all men"
and had to be even handed to all. The public sector environment in the early 1980s
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was only gradually evolving towards public sector trading and research activities
being free of bureaucratic constraints inherent in government departments. Before
this time, government researohers were so constrained that they effectively "gave
away'' some of their most promising innovations. This was true in the case of the
electric fence developed at Ruakura.
Ken Jury informally discussed the constraints Government departments faced in
commercialising their technology with Dr Ian Shearer, the Minister of Science at the
time. Shearer encouraged Jury to "go ahead and do it in a way that would be open
and politically defensible". The informal strategy adopted by Ruakura was to
overcome the institutional baniers by as far as possible ignoring them.
Dr John Huttor\ Director of the MAF Agricultural Research Division at the time,
strongly supported the innovatioq and this top-level support within MAF was crucial.
For political reasons, MAF felt it necessary in 1982 to solicit registrations of interest
in the project from every company in New Zealand that could possibly act as a project
partner in developing a new milking machine This concern to use a politically
acceptable process in finding a commercial partner resulted from awareness of the
ambiguity in the role of Government research laboratories when it came to
commercialising their research results, and from a knowledge that companies could
lobby the Minister and argue that publicly funded research results should be widely
available and not be captured by any one company.
All companies in New Zealand that could act as partners were invited to register their
interest in participating in a joint project to develop and commercialise what was then
termed a "new technology New Zealand milking system". A number of companies
were assessed in more detail before a short-list of 3 were interviewed in more depth.
Ken Jury, Murray Woolford, Pat Joyce and John Hutton were on the interview panel
ild, after extensive investigation, they offered the partnership to AHI Plastic
Moulding Company.
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There is no question that AHI was the company most suited to work with Ruakura on
the project. The company at that time was making milk meters, pulsation systems and
a mastitis detector and had a strong export focus. However, its selection provoked
letters to politicians from rival companies claiming that favourable treatment had been
given to AHI. There were questions in Parliament challenging the legitimacy of a
Government department entering into commercial arrangements on a proprietary basis
with a company. The widespread nature of the tender also served to publicise the
technical goals of the project to competitors, and as a result Alfa-Laval moved to
adapt an existing machine (already competing overseas) to the New Zealand market,
to compete against the RMH. This reflected the institutional handicap that MAF was
under in fulfilling technological and developmental goals while still being subject to
political pressures. It took about 18 months from the request for expressions of
interest to the point where political and other concerns had been resolved, and an
agreement entered into with AHI Plastic Moulding company.
The initial agreement between Ruakura and AHI, negotiated primarily by the
MAFTech business manager, Fred Phillips, and Jack Jenkins of AHI, lacked
specificity and did not include detailed performance targets, goals and deadlines. The
agreement focused overly on royalties, at the expense of the project management
requirements needed for success such as the documentation of inputs, performance
specifications and rights to renegotiate.
During the early developmental stage Jack Jenkins, General Manager of Plastic
Products, kept the machine firrnly under wraps. Jack Jenkins tried to keep the
development ('Project R" as it was called) secret as long as possible and this
adversely affected information flows within the company.
In the early stages the relationship between Ruakura and the company was on a one-
to-one basis. Only later was an informal management committee set up, meeting
three-monthly, with the chair rotated between Graham Duirs and Ken Jury. Formal
agreements took a long time to be negotiated and agreed to. However, when the first
prototype was developed, CHH technical and marketing staff were amazed at the
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level of technology. Ruakura and some company staff were convinced that the
system's technical edge could be translated into a competitive advantage in the
market but other company staff lacked the technical skills to understand and
confidently manage the technology.
Following the selection of AHI Plastic Moulding Company a wide range of design
options for an air-milk separation system were prototyped and tested. Air-milk
separation systems in use in some overseas machines generally separated milk at the
claw using a float-valve principle, with a dual vacuum system or some form of
synchronous pulsation-driven milk removal valve. Such systems however tended to
achieve poor separation performance and were inefficient mechanically. After
evaluating these and other approaches, the Ruakura team decided on a different
technology to separate milk and air at the claw, through intelligent microprocessor
control.
Design. Development and Prototyping
While negotiations were underway with AFII, Woolford was looking for someone
with skills in such areas as instrumentatioq measurement and applied physics. Dr
Robert Sherlock, then at Waikato University, had already had considerable contact
with Ruakura, having supervised a number of masterate students who worked on
projects in association with Ruakura, including at No I Dairy. Sherlock had in fact
provided some notional supervision of Murray Woolford's PhD when Woolford was
technically enrolled at Waikato University, though Woolford's research on laser light
scattering was largely supervised by John Harvey at Auckland University.
Sherlock was recruited in early 1984 specifically to work on the project, and came on
board after AHI had been selected but before the developmental process had got
underway. Sherlock at this time had spent 9 years at Waikato University and moved
to Ruakura, partly because of dissatisfaction with how university administrative and
teaching demands reduced his opportunities to do research.
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Woolford and Sherlock then embarked on an intensive period of technological
innovations leading to completion of the first milking experiments with air-milk
separating claws in November 1984. Sherlock focused primarily on the electronics
while Woolford gave emphasis to the overall conceptual and system development.
MAF probably invested about $lM in the innovation over the period of its
development, including about $160,000 on a milking shed alone.
Woolford and Sherlock developed the key concepts, with their implementation
assisted by others at Ruakura such as Alan Wilsor\ a very able technologist. Alan
Wilson did the layout design of the circuit board while at the early stages a skilled
technician, Len Stringer, did some important applied engineering work. Jim Pharaoll
Ross Mandersoq Ross Stokes and Ray Pryor at AHI were also major contributors to
the project. Woolford and Sherlock may have suffered later in the project, after
Wilson and a skilled technician had left, from a lack of support from technicians and
applied technologists needed to underpin their R&D at Ruakura.
The two key design concepts promoted by Woolford and Sherlock were the
separation of air and milk, and the use of microelectronics as a technical platform to
build more flexibility into the milking machine so that the system could be added to
and extended.
When the project was initiated, single chip microcontrollers were becoming
commercially available in New Zealand. One option was to simply use analogue
electronics in a chip encased in epory in the claw itself to control the air-milk
separation only, with no other functions. This would have allowed the production of
something that would look like a conventional machine and would efficiently solve the
separation problem. The other option, and the one decided on, was to build more
complex electronics that would lay a technical platform for additional functions such
as milk yield measurement and monitoring the performance of individual cows.
A key technical observation by Sherlock was relating the opening and closing times of
the milk valve to the flow rate of milk. With a single phase outflow of milk from the
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claw at a substantially constant velocity, the milk yield could be determined by
measuring the total "open-time" for the valve in the claw. This motivated the choice
of a digital control system (based on a microcomputer) so that the computations
necessary to implement a milk metering function could be made. This gave a milk
metering function done with software and no additional hardware.
At this early stage of design and prototype development the links between AHI and
Ruakura were at a technical level, and this partnership worked very well in the early
years. AIII engineers built the first prototype, including some hand-made parts. The
3 key components were the claw-piece, the pneumatic control module, and the
electronic control module, with some other componentry being essentially standard
items from conventional machines. Traditional milk pumps would not work efficiently
in the RMH, due to higher vacuum levels in the milk system. The search for
alternatives saw the adoption of a new type of pump from a UK manufacturer. This
generated the spin-off that these pumps have now been widely adopted in
conventional milking machines, and have probably had a beneficial effect on milk
quality.
Experimentation and Trialing
The machine was in fact up and running on an experimental basis at No I Dairy very
early in the process, with Woolford and Sherlock beginning experimentation with the
RMH prototype in November 1984. AHI had a strong technical design and
engineering team that played a crucial role at this stage in designing and building
prototype systems. AIII'S team effectively built the models and fabricated the
prototypes, with Ross Mandersoq Ross Stokes and Ray Pryor being key contributors.
In early 1986 an 8-unit pipeline system was installed in an experimental herringbone
dairy. Trials led to design improvements and an l8-unit single pipeline system was
installed during the 1986-87 season. By this time the key components had been
developed to the point of commercial prototype stage, but some secondary
components of the machine still required attention, having been fabricated from
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existing devices. AHI technologists Alan Wilson and Jim Pharaoh later devised a
complex and innovative plastics technology device to implement the pneumatic
funotions in the machine.
Over two years Woolford and Sherlock milked a split herd of twins - one milked by
the RMH and the other by a conventional machine. Over 80,000 milkings it was
shown that the RMH reduced air in the milldow from around 90% to less than 5o/o,
increased milking speed by 2OYo, increased milkfat in the vat by 2-3o , delivered milk
with a low somatic cell count and reduced milkfat damage (Mountfort, 1988, p. 10).
Ruakura trials showed that the RMH almost completely eliminated milk surface frottq
and delivered milk with virtually the same free fatty acid content as those measured
directly at the cow. This compares to over a doubling of free fatty acid levels for a
conventional machine (Woolford & Sherloclg 1987, p. 60).
By 1987 the reliability of the system had been extensively demonstrated in cow
milkings in a dairy laboratory situation. However, this testing ground was quite
different from the extreme reliability needed in a milking shed.
Technical Advantases of the RMH
In the RMH all machine functions at each cluster, including the air-milk separation
process, are electronically controlled. The machine incorporated a Ruakura-designed
single chip microcomputer for each bail, to control and monitor functions. Each bail
computer provides a display of milk yield, together with a keypad for machine control
or cow ID entry. The bail controllers use low cost microcomputer technology
allowing flexibility to modify machine functions or software. The RMH made
standard a number of functions that were optional on conventional milking machines,
such as yield monitoring, pulsation function, end milk flow detection, automated
cluster removal and wash control.
The optimum pulsation rate and ratio differs significantly from cow to cow. In
conventional systems, pulsation rates and ratios are controlled from a central point.
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However, the RMH allows pulsation to be controlled by a separate bail controller at
each milking station. The electronic control technology detects the end of milking
and actuates automatic cup removal. It also allows milk metering without the need
for separate add-on devices.
The early RMH allowed as a standard feature milk yield monitoring. As the cow
enters the bail the farmer enters a number on a keypad. This is an interim measure
until automatic cow ID is developed. The machine could monitor milk yield, but
initially lacked a fully developed software capability to process the information
generated and use it as a management tool.
An optional add-on feature was a basic PC allowing communication with the RMH
machine to read milk yields, add to a herd database, and generate reports on cow
performance relative to other cows. The full value of the milk yield facility on the
machine can only be realised if this microcomputer database option is installed. The
RMH machine provides for manual entry of numbers via each bail key pad. The
intention was that automated ID svstems that are much less labour intensive could be
added in the future.
The RMH has more stable milking vacuum, and a greater flexibility to reduce vacuum
levels if desired, since the vacuum losses during milk flow are not as great as for
conventional systems. Lower vacuum levels are consistent with optimum teat health.
The microcomputer was designed to be programmed to initiate pulsation aclion only
after a particular volume of foremilk had been removed, and this is advantageous to
udder health. The milker can select 3 modes: Heifer, Cow or Discard. The pulsation
modes are selected by way of the key pad, with Heifer mode simply a narrow ratio
pulsation setting used in training new or sensitive animals, while Cow mode is a wider
ratio, faster milking base pulsation. The Discard mode allows contaminated milk to
be diverted to a separate pump or holding tank. The RMH is easy to use, requiring
the minimum introductory training.
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The milk produced by the RMH is very close in quality to milk from hand milking.
The milk tastes and smells differently from that of a conventional milking machine.
Potential gains in milldat production may result from a higher milk withdrawal rate
during peak flow and the consequently improved udder evacuation achieved by the
RMH system. The RMH was the first successful milking machine in the world to
have a milk meter as part of the overall system design, made possible due to the
separation of milk and air. It offers reduced labour costs and access to detailed herd
management information on a per milking basis.
Commercialisation
By 1985 the RMH's core technology was patented, and the patent assigned, in accord
with Government poliry, to the Director-General of Agriculture and Fisheries. The
challenge then faced by Graham Duirs in CHH in particular was how to commercialise
the technology. Duirs planned the commercialisation around the 3 phases of
developing the concept, prototype development, and the development and marketing
of production models.
Ruakura scientists, while they had no prospect of personal reward from the
innovation, had developed high expectations for the likely commercial success of the
RMH. In its first year of release in the 1989/90 season 3 RMHs were installed on
three farms. The first was installed at a farm run by Mark Ofsoske at Paeroa. This
was one of five farms owned by Fielden Farms Ltd. Higher speed milking, and the
ability of the electronic control module to produce instant milk production figures
appealed to farmers such as Ofsoske. The first machine was installed on a trial basis,
with the right to return the machine after 12 months. At this time a single 20 bail
machine cost about twice that of a comparable conventional unit (Farm Equipment
News, 1990, p. l).
However, significant technical problems began to occur in a farm situation almost
immediately and these proved difficult and time-consuming to solve. The technical
problems were compounded by a recession placing financial pressure on farmers. The
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technical problems were essentially teething ones, including inadequate water-
proofing of the electronics, and liners and other parts falling off or breaking down.
Some of these problems were easily rectified but others took some time to solve or
continued to cause problems. After the launch of the machine the company found that
the original design of the claw proved unsatisfactory because of the difficulty io
manufacturing it, but the company successfully redesigned the claw body. Further
improvements were made, including changes to the software made by Sherlock in the
light of dairy farmer experience.
It is unclear the extent to which the problems resulted from inadequate field trialing by
Ruakura or poor quality management and product support by the company. What is
clear is that the technology was such a major step forward that significant technical
problems would inevitably occur regardless of how well managed the project was.
Because many problems occurred on dairy farms rather than at Ruakura, solving them
created a drain on the time of CHH's technical staff and did not help the profile or
reputation of the RMH in the field. CHH's sales and marketing staffwere unfamiliar
with and scared of the technology and this was a major internal barrier that Duirs had
to struggle to overcome. At points throughout the process Graham Duirs had to fight
a battle against internal competition within the company for the resources to develop
the RMH. Duirs had to "manage downwards" against a fear of the technology from
his own stafi and may not have spent sufficient time on "managing upwards" and
carrying the top management of CHH Plastic Products with him.
Around this time the company's export milk meter market came under challenge from
new European standards, and the company had to divert technical and other resources
away from the RMH into adapting the meter and defending the market.
Problems in the field created strains in the relationship between Ruakura and CHH.
Ruakura scientists felt that the company was not putting sufficient financial resources
into the development, marketing and promotion of the Rl\trl or in providing
adequate quality management in production or support in the field. In particular,
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quality assurance in manufacturing may have been deficient. The strains
relationship were exacerbated by poor communication, and this was only
resolved with formal meetings.
At this time Ruakura scientists felt daunted by a feeling they had created something so
big that they no longer had control over it, and that despite a high level of emotional
investment in it they could not control all the variables that determined its success or
failure.
Graham Duirs was conscious of the technical problems likely to occur in moving into
full production of a large volume of machines, and so he set the objective of selling 5
machines in the first year. This was achieved, with the sales being to younger farmers.
Ruakura scientists may have had some unrealistic expectations for machine sales in
the short-ternq and probably under-estimated the effects of the farming recession on
the willingness to buy the product. Howeveq the Ruakura scientists themselves did
not wish to see further expansion in sales once it became obvious that quality
problems in the manufacturing and servicing of the systems remained to be solved. It
is noted that some basic technical problems still existed in systems three years after
their installation in the field.
CHH's low-key approach to funding and marketing the RMH in these early stages
was criticised by Ruakura staff. CHH's work was financed from ourrent revenue
rather than major new capital investment, and this may be interpreted as an overly
short-term view of R&D, or as over-confidence regarding the scale of resources
needed to successfully commercialise something as complex as the RMH. However,
in retrospect CHH may well have had the right approach because significant problems
occurred with the first machines in the field, and large-scale sales at too early a stage
would have placed an intolerable burden on CfIH's technical servicing personnel. It is
also worth noting that the company's total sales at the time were less than $l0M per





Ruakura scientists attended to technical faults in the field. Crraham Duirs also
reviewed machine performance in the field on a personal basis. He attended one
breakdown of the machine on Christmas day and offered to remove the machine at no
cost to the farmer. The farmer concerned, despite being under immense pressure in
the midst of a recessioq refused the offer and said he would give up milking cows if
he had to go back to conventional milking machines. It is very significant that those
farmers who bought the RMH never regretted it, and would never go back to
conventional milking machines.
With two systems in the field, Duirs then tried to move into the next phase of market
testing and development. This included educating dealers and CHH's own staff in
installation and servicing. Booklets and videos on the new machine were circulated to
selected farmers. A significant constraint, however, was the unfamiliarity and fear
that CHH's staff had of the technology, with only one staff member being able to
service the electronics. After about 2 years on the RMH project Alan Wilson at
Ruakura accepted an offer from Graham Duirs to work at CHH, at a time when Duirs
was conscious of having to build up his company's technical skills.
Marketins Aspects
The market envisaged for the RMH was New Zealand dairy farmers, especially those
with larger herds and those wanting to produce better quality milk. Graham Duirs
was also conscious of the export possibilities, for example to the large-scale dairying
operations in the United States. Two were sold to research establishments.
The RMH was initially marketed under the Milkrite brand as 'the world's most
intelligent milking system". Graham Duirs promoted the machine as the first in the
world to offer milking claw milk metering and automatic milk discard.
Ruakura scientists felt that the machine was priced too high, but CHH argued that any
lower price would lose money, especially on a small sales volume. The added
complexity of the system made it inherently more expensive, compounded by the
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higher per unit cost inherent in short-run manufacturing and the lack of scale
economies. The claw had more tubes and connections and was necessarily more
complex than a conventional unit. The microcomputer system that controlled each
bail position and the associated control valves and wires contributed added
complexity.
By mid-1989 five prototype systems had been sold and were being installed. The
sales of the RMH were to more progressive farmers, but the machine was not able to
achieve volume sales among the mass of farmers whose primary concern was cost
efficiency and who could not justiry the higher cost. Milking machine dealers were
uncomfortable with the technology, were often unable to fix even minor technical
problems that occurred, and were therefore reluctant to promote the system.
While, for example, the elimination of "test buckets" for mastitic cows was of
considerable tangible benefit in milking management, the technical advantages of the
RMH could not all be turned into "bottom line" commercial benefits. The higher
milldat quality achieved by the RMH did not earn a price premium from dairy
companies. The only way of commercially realising the benefits would be if a dairy
company paid a premium and could be confident that enough farmers would adopt the
machine and deliver a sufEcient volume of high quality product to allow market
differentiation. The technology provided a technical platform for identification and
monitoring of datq but this required manual entry of cow ID datq and the system
could not be used for creating records that would be deemed official for herd testing
purposes.
Two commercially available air-milk separation milking systems were available
overseas as potential competitors for the RMH. An example was Alfa-Laval's
Triovac machine which had the vacuum supply to the claw separate from the milk
transport system. However, these machines tended not to be engineered around the
specific requirements of the New Zealand milking shed configuratiorq and
consequently were less appropriate to, or not available in New Zealand.
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A possible marketing problem may have been that the RMH competes with other
products of CHFI/InterAg, and is marketed as the "Rolls Royce" of milking machines.
The RMH fits into a defined niche at the top of the InterAg range, but because the
company markets a range of different milking machines, there is some overlap and
competition between them. InterAg cannot therefore devote its fuU marketing and
promotional energies to the machine.
Mainly to promote the RMH, CHH had bought a company in the United States that
had a big dealership network. Graham Duirs tried to negotiate a contract with
Vermont State University to install a machine there and get the regulatory issues
sorted out. Vermont was chosen in preference to a larger dairying area such as
Wisconsirq to avoid attracting too much attention from competitors while CIIH got a
toehold in the US market. CHH was unable to overcome the difficulties posed by US
dairy regulatory standards. Duirs then used the United States company to market the
Supamilker, and after 3 years the company was breaking even. However, CHH
Plastics Products corporate became impatient with the progress made, and found itself
at odds with longer term and ambitious plans to use the RMH to build an intemational
agritech company.
InterAg's marketing of the RMH now focuses on its improved milk quality and its
ability to gather and allow the processing of data needed for sophisticated herd
management. One focus is promotion to dairy companies of the machine's ability to
produce milk of a higher quality, not only for differentiated products such as
chocolate and some cheeses, but also commodity products such as butter and
wholemilk powder. Ruakura has, for example, done some work on the impact of the
RMH system on butter flavouq and further work is planned on the implications of the
free fatty acid reductions that the RMH achieves.
The experimentation of Woolford and Sherlock demonstrates that improved milk
quality occurs, but the price signals paid for such milk do not acknowledge it.
Currently dairy companies are still not paying a premium for this higher quality millq
and until this happens farmers lack an incentive to pay the extra costs for the machine.
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This lack of a price premium for quality seems to result from the practice of "bundling
returns" from milk sales, which negates attempts to differentiate products.
The RMH continues to be marketed at National Agricultural Field Days at Mystery
Creek. The RMH has stimulated or been associated with further developments, for
example the development ofthe Ruakura Touch Tag for automatic cow ID.
Background of Key People
Dr Murray Woolford is a biophysicist with strong competencies and an international
reputation in milking machine design and systems. Woolford's formal training is in
physics and mathematics and his biological training was essentially learnt "on the job".
Woolford began working at Ruakura in the facial eczema field in his student holidays
at university in the 1960s. He was involved in a number of innovations even as a
student, and now has about 12 patents to his credit. When Woolford developed an
interest in biophysics, the group at Ruakura was run by Doug Phillips, a mifting
machine expert at the time who proved a strong mentor for younger scientists. From
1969 Woolford worked at Ruakura on various aspects of milking machine desigq as
well as on other biophysics projects such as electronic measurement of grass yields.
In the mid-1970s Woolford did a masters degree supported by MAF, and became
interested in laser light scattering. He then advanced to a PtiD involved with applying
similar technology to bovine speffn to measure motility. In the years leading up to
the RMH, Murray Woolford and Doug Phillips were looking at alternative pulsation
systems and engaging in theoretical studies of infection transport within the milking
environment.
Dr Robert Sherlock came to New Zealand from Britain in 1975 to take up an
academic post in physics at Waikato University. Sherlock was an experimental
physicist by background. He was attracted, as much as anything, by the possibility of
moving into more interdisciplinary research involving biological systems. Robert
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Sherlock was a Reader in the Physics Department at Waikato University before
moving to Ruakura.
In the 1980s, scientific careers depended greatly on more basic research publications
and on peer review. Both Woolford and Sherlock had to forgo opportunities that
would have resulted from more basic research, in order to devote time to a
proprietary and confidential commercial development, the outcome of which was
uncertain. Only very modest rewards have resulted from their innovative
.performance, and these have been trivial recompense for the energy and creative
endeavour they both sank into the innovation.
Graham Duirs has a background in dairy science, working in the National Dairy
Laboratory. In the late 1970s he was involved in introducing somatic cell counts into
New Zealand dairying. These are now subject to an industry standard, as free fatty
acid levels may be in the future, Duirs has an excellent understanding of dairy science
internationally, including milk quality and hygiene with a focus on mastitis, as well as
a strong interest in milking machines. He also has a strong background in technology
transfer, including from his time at the National Dairy Laboratory.
Graham Duirs moved from a research position into a marketing manager position for
Alfa-Laval. Duirs spent some months working for this company before moving to
AHI. Graham Duirs shared with Robert Sherlock and others involved a passionate
commitment to the RMH and was highly motivated to make it a success. Duirs is
now General Manager of Business Development for AgResearch CRI.
Conclusions
The RMH is a major technological achievement, ranking at the highest level of
technical innovation within New Zealand in the 1980s. While New Zealand has been
innovative in milking machine components, the RMH is not only a radical
technological advance but is also a completely new milking system.
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However, the system has so far not been a major commercial success. The RMH was
released on the market in the late 1980s, coinciding with a major recession in the dairy
industry that saw a dramatic drop in milkfat payouts. This was undoubtedly a major
external factor that limited its commercial success. There are currently only about 14
RMHs in the field. Royalties paid to DRC from the RMH have nowhere near
covered costs and the company has not yet recouped its investment. Nevertheless,
both scientists and industry people still believe the system embodies much of the
future of milk harvesting technology and that its "time will come" in the market.
The RMH was initiated within MAF when it was a govemment department and over
the course of its development the philosophies and structures of public sector research
changed several times. Changes included the implementation of "user pays" for much
scientific research, the merging of MAF's Agricultural Research Division and
Advisory Services Division, the establishment of Crown Research Institutes (CRIs),
and the formation of the DRC as a joint venture between the Government (later
AgResearch) and the Dairy Board. In addition, from 1990 most public funding for
research was placed on a contestable basis and allocated by the Foundation for
Research, Science and Technology. It is remarkable that the innovation got on the
market given the discontinuities and institutional uncertainties associated with these
changes. This perhaps suggests that if the motivation, personal commitment and
intellectual energies are there, all kinds of institutional barriers can be overcome.
The constraints goverTrment departments faced in technology transfer and
commercialisation significantly impeded the development of the RMH. The lack of
commercial powers was a critical banier to innovation and reduced the incentives for
researchers to transfer their technology to industry. However, towards the end of the
development of the RMH the DRC had more commercial powers as a result of its
restructuring and of the science reforms. The commercial powers and right to earn
royalty and other commercial income for his organisation was a key motivator for
DRC's Director, Ken Jury.
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Since the formation of the DRC, farmer interests have stressed the importance of its
independence and been reluctant to allow the DRC to side with any particular
commercial product. It is possible that the relationship with CHH could not have
developed, or at least would be substantially different, if the DRC had been in place at
the time the RMH was being developed.
The RMH was to a significant extent a technologyJed innovation, and this itself
caused some of the early diffculties. In striking contrast, the CIDR was a market-pull
innovation that embodied significant new technology and has proved outstandingly
successful both technically and commercially. More sophisticated market input earlier
in the development process to link the performance attributes of the RMH more
explicitly to farmer benefits and to higher payouts by dairy companies for better
quality milk, together with improved quality control in on-farm applications, would
have improved the system's commercial prospects. The joint venture between
Ruakura and the company should probably have been managed on a cross-functional
basis to embed concurrent engineering principles into the development and
commercialisation of the system.
There may have been an over-emphasis on the science and an under-emphasis on the
technical functionality of the machine in a practical dairy shed situation. For example,
when the machine was released at field days farmers commented that the milk
metering capability was of limited value unless there was also a means of analysing the
data and using it as a management tool. This may illustrate how the technical
attributes of the machine may not have been adequately tailored to the practical needs
or opportunities of farmers. However, the shortcomings of the milk metering
capability were fully understood by the Ruakura scientists, and it was seen as an
interim technology before more advanced metering could be developed. Gven the
Iack of resources, the milk metering capability put in place was the best that could be
achieved.
The low sales of the RMH may imply that some of the problems associated with air
entrainment, such as milk flooding, were not as serious as Ruakura scientists believed.
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But an important factor may be that the development of larger volume main milkline-
based machines such as the Supamilker offered at least a partial solution to some of
these problems, using more familiar and conventional technology at a lower cost. The
Supamilker was an incremental improvement to conventional milking machines that
addressed the problem of milk flooding and took some of the market away from the
RNtrI, a system that addressed the same and other problems but with a more
sophisticated and expensive approach.
New Zealand competes well in niche markets where economies of scope rather than
scale prevail. However, with the RMH the scale of the resources needed to
successfully develop the innovation were high in relation to the size of the New
Zealand market. The New Zealand market for top of the range "Rolls Royce"
machines may have been too small to generate the domestic sales needed to provide
the cash flow to support more ambitious export marketing. As a result, production
volumes never reached the level that could achieve production economies, and allow
the marginal cost of each machine to be reduced.
New Zealand innovators are often exceptional in product innovation but less effective
at the production and manufacturing technology needed to make a product cheaply
and to very high quality standards. Inadequate developmental investment by CHH,
difficulties in the cost-efficient manufacture of reliable RMHs, and associated with
this, inadequate technical servicing in the field, were major problems with the
innovation. The RMH was thoroughly tested scientifically, but may well have been
released too early, before the teething technical problems were solved. This created
unnecessary problems for CIIII's technical people and for the image the machine
created with some of its first buyers.
The more fundamental difiiculties with the RMH's development and
commercialisation resulted from the market conditions and the "people side of
innovation", including institutional and management processes, rather than the
technology per se. Murray Woolford and Robert Sherlock complemented each other
well personally and technically and the social dynamics within Ruakura were good.
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However, a core weakness in the development of the RMH was a pervasive lack of
trust between the key players in Ruakura and in the company. This resulted from, or
at least manifested itself in, a lack of openness at many stages in the process. Crraham
Duirs also faced significant internal difficulties within his company.
Graham Duirs appears not to have been given the information, the confidence, or the
time from CHH Plastics Products to deliver on the machine's full potential. And yet
the development and marketing strategy of Duirs seems to have been thought
through, and was a reasonable approach for such an innovation.
The lack of a formal agreement that specified meaningful and measurable goals, and
the informality of the relationship, exacerbated the tensions between Ruakura and the
company and allowed ambiguity and distrust to fester.
A major organisational weakness was the lack of a project leader or champion able to
coordinate a project team drawn from both Ruakura and the company, and to
command adequate resources from both organisations. While Woolford and Sherlock
were very committed project champions for the technology, and Graham Duirs for the
commercialisation of the innovation, none of them had the overarching responsibility
of "pulling it all together," or the power to do so. Jack Jenkins initiated the
company's involvement in the innovation and promoted it, but then gave the task of
making it happen to Graham Duirs. Duirs however had not been involved from the
very beginning, so the innovation lacked a product manager or champion who could
carry the whole thing through from the very early stages.
The Technology for Business Growth (TBG) scheme now in place would probably
have solved many of the difficulties experienced with the RNff! because this scheme
insists on a high standard in management of technology. Interestingly, only in recent
years have public funding mechanisms such as the TBG enhanced technology
management skills and fostered properly-structured project management.
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The emotional investment made in the innovation by key players such as Robert
Sherlock and Graham Duirs was quite extraordinary, and was the major factor in
keeping the innovation alive when otherwise it would have been abandoned. As
Robert Sherlock said later "who would have thought that this seemingly
straightforward thing would turn out to be so difficult to implement in practice."
Murray Woolford, Robert Sherlock and Graham Duirs were motivated by a strong
and in fact emotional commitment to "making the innovation happen". The challenge
and intellectual excitement of applying advanced new electronics technology to a set
of dairy farm problems, and the teamwork that existed between Sherlock, Woolford
and CHH technical staff, was very rewarding for those involved. This led to a
confidence that was sensed by those farmers who became interested in the machine.
This in turn engendered a very strong feeling of loyalty by innovators such as Robert
Sherlock to those farmers who demonstrated their confidence in the technology by
being prepared to pay twice what they would pay for a conventional machine. This
feeling of loyalty to the 12 or so farmers who bought the machine was the single most
important factor in innovators such as Sherlock continuing to work on the machine
into the early 1990s, despite their fnrstrations.
On a positive note, the RMH demonstrates that "invention is the mother of necessity"
and that superior technology will, if it is used, create a dependency by the user, who
in turn will refuse to go back to inferior technology. The "acid test" of this is that
farmers who have bought an RMH have refused to go back to conventional milking
machines.
Postscript
On the restructuring of MAFTech as part of the science reforms, Graham Duirs
ensured that the agreement was transferred to DRC to follow Woolford and Sherlock.
The new agreement now in place between the company and the DRC acknowledges
that the development phase is now past and identifies agreed responsibilities in
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relation to ongoing support. It foreshadows and provides a framework for automatic
identification and for data handling and processing technologies that could be added
to the RMH.
The intellectual property rights of the RMH now belong to the DRC. InterAg is now
a successful company, its success very much dependent on past innovations such as
the Supamilker and the CIDR. Bill Thompson became General Manager of InterAg in
L992 and recognises the potential of the RMH. Thompson has appointed a product
manager to promote the system. These changes have been positive and some further
progress is being made with the RMH. The key challenge for InterAg is to encourage
dairy companies to investigate the potential to differentiate their products by utilising
the RMH's contribution to better quality milkfat. A key goal is to get dairy companies
to "ask the question" and at least to investigate the differentiation possibilities.
Machines have now been in the field for over 5 years, but components have been
changed and improved over that time. Some aspects of the RMH still need to be
improved. Ongoing work on the RMH includes improvements in the manufacturing
reliability of the various components in the machine, including such factors as
improved waterproofing of the electronics and adding automatic cow identification to
the RMH. Automatic identification means that as the cow enters the bail its number is
read electronically rather than through the current practice of having to key in the
number. Robert Sherlock is now working in the field of automatic identification and
in data handling and processing in the milking shed environment. Automatic
identification is now in the RMH at Ruakura and at on-farm sites. Murray Woolford
is working in the field of milk composition work for the Dairy Board and in
immunisation research. Work is continuing on some topics relevant to the RNGI,
such as in-line milk conductivity and composition sensing.
The prospects for the RMH or variations on it seem reasonably positive for the future.
Standards are beginning to be tightened for the control of millcfat damage due to air
entrainment. These are set out in the draft NZCP 3: Hygienic Design and Layout of
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Farm Dairies. One New Zealand dairy company is starting to place emphasis on
better quality milk with lower free fatty acids.
The emphasis in New Zealand agriculture is now moving from stocking rates and total
volume of production to improving per animal performance and enhancing quality.
The RMH's ability to meter, to measure, and in the future to automatically identif
cows should be important management tools in the future. Dairy herds may become
more differentiated in the future, for example some cows in a herd may produce a
lactose-modified mil( others a hyper-immune milk and the Rl\fit with automatic
identification and other technical extensions, may be able to recognise such cows and
separately handle their milk.
With tariff reductions resulting from GATT, it is possible that other countries will
develop new, non-tariffbarriers such as more rigorous technical standards governing
food safety and purity. These could well impact on the dairy shed environment and
markets may emerge for milking systems such as the RMH that can achieve higher
levels of milk hygiene and milkfat quality.
Any move to impose ISO standards on the milking shed environment could be a boost
for the RMH systerq although it is always possible that such standards could be
written to exclude the RMH. lncreasing demands for accuracy in herd recording




Key Events in the Ruakura Milk Haruester Innovation
Kcy Events
1969 Murray Woolford becomes involved in milking machine
research at Rualarra
1975 Robert Sherlock emigrates to New Zealand and joins the
Physics Department at Waikato University
1982 Munay Woolford outlines proposals for the RMH at the
Ruakura Farmers' Conference
Early l9t4 MAF solicits registrations of interest for a company to
participate in a joint project for the development of the RMH
June 1984 Robert Sherlock joins Ruakura at No I Dairy
1984 AHI Plastic Moulding Company and MAF begin joint
development ofRMH
November 1984 Sherlock and Woolford conduct first experiments on RMH
prototype
1985 Patent awarded for "A Method and Means for the Machine
Milking of Animals"
Early 1986 8 unit pipeline RMH installed experimentally at Ruakura
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l9E6lt7' 18 unit pipeline system trialsd at Ruahra




1989 Sate aqd instatrlation of five RldIIs
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CASE 4: FP4OOO INTELLIGENT FIRE ALARM INNOVATION
Introduction
The FP4000 is an intelligent microprocessor-based fire alarm and fire protection
control system. It combines both conventional and analogue addressable detectiorq
and uses modular construction and an addressable serial communications loop. It was
developed by Vigilant Fire and Evacuation Systems, a Christchurch-based company,
and launched on the market in 1988. On its launch the FP4000 was an immediate
success, dominating the New Zealand market despite the building and construction
recession that set in after the 1987 sharemarket collapse. The FP4000 was a
significant technical step forward and in 1990 it won a TELARC Design Mark award.
Background
The background of the FP4000 fire alarm system can only be understood in the
context of the development of fire alarm companies in New Zealand from early in the
century.
The Development of Vigilant Fire and Evacuation Systems
The history of Vigilant Fire and Evacuation Systems can be traced back to the launch
of the Vigilant company in Christchurch in 1914. This company was set up to market
the Vigilant Fire Alarm invented by Mr M. Moloney, a Post and Telegraph Office
electrical engineer in Christchurch. In the process of expansion Vigilant bought the
May-Oatway company in Dunedin. This company had been set up to commercialise
the May-Oatway fire alarm, invented by Mr May, who was also a Post and Telegraph
Office engineer. The modern electric fire alarm is therefore essentially based on the
early work and innovation of May, Moloney and other New Zealand technologists,
and this formed the basis of over 75 years of subsequent evolutionary improvement of
fire alarm technology in New Zealand.
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From l9l5 to 1946 the Vigilant company traded with only moderate success,
primarily because there was little recognition of the importance of fire detection and
protection systems in New Zealand. During this period the company designed,
patented and marketed many different fire detectors and control panels and built up a
considerable body of experience. While only about 200 alarms had been installed by
1946, the company's alarms had built up an impressive record of "saves".
It took the tragic Ballantyne's fire in Christchurch on 18 November 1947 to radically
change public, official and business attitudes to fire protection systems. The
Ballantyne's building was equipped with a Vigilant fire alarm system, but due to
negligence by the company it had not been maintained and was out of action when the
fire started. The fire claimed 4l lives, and a subsequent Royal Commission of Inquiry
had a major impact on the understanding of, and demand for, fire detection and alarm
systems.
Based on this market demand, and with an improved detector available, Vigilant
expanded its sales and grew substantially from 1948 to 1955. Branches were
established in major New Zealand cities, and during this period the company also
started manufacturing fire brigade alarm receiving equipment.
While Vigilant in New Zealand evolved as a fire alarm-based company, Wormald
Brothers in Australia" founded in l9l l, was developing primarity around its sprinkler
business. The two companies were therefore based around complementary markets
and technologies, and when Vigilant became part of the Wormald Group in 196l a
strong strategic fit and synergy was created.
As a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wormald Brothers the company traded from 196l
to 1963 in competition with Wormald Electric. In July 1963 the electrical division of
Wormald Brothers and the Vigilant company were integrated. This saw the company
expand to cover a wide array of detection and alarm systems for fire, burglary, gas
and industrial hazards.
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By the late 1960s, Wormald New Zealand was operating as a publicly-listed company,
with the Australian company having a controlling share and representation on the
Vigilant board in Auckland. While corporate policy was determined in Australi4 the
companies traded separately. The New Zealand company had a high degree of
autonomy over its R&D budget and initiated its own R&D and product and system
development in the fields of fire alarms and associated technologies.
As part of the larger Wormald group, Wormald Vigilant was able to obtain access to
overseas microelectronics technology, and also teamed up with other parts of the
Wormald group for major projects. These included work on the Maui drilling platform
and the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter.
By the early 1980s the company had about 250 staff employed throughout New
Zealand, including in the Christchurch head office and development and production
facility, and in contracting and servicing branches throughout New Zealnd. The
company was involved in a broad range of fields, including building management
systems, and the specialised design of systems that were custom-made to a client's
specifications. Examples of these included the MERE mortar calculator for the
Ministry of Defence, exchange switching equipment for the Post Office's Landmobile
radio systerq and specialised applications of the company's Safe automatic fire alarm
monitoring system for Porirua" Sunnyside and Kew hospitals. Other products and
systems produced by the company included microprocessor-based products, telemetry
systems such as Lotac, small-scale industrial and process control systems, and the
electronically-based Warp 4 animal weighing system based on an NZAEI protoqpe
and developed jointly by the company and Rathglen Scales Ltd.
However, the company's diversifications away from fire alarms still built on the
company's core competencies of detection systems, embedded software, and
electronic hardware. The core competencies in the company depended on the
integration of electronic hardware and software design and innovation. The company,
for example, recruits staff with an electrical engineering and electronic hardware
background to develop software, acknowledging the close interrelationship between
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the technologies. This is especially important for a company that has to develop its
own customised hardware technology, since engineers who are also developing
software are better able to diagnose problems that relate to the interface between the
hardware and software.
The Companv Today
Today, Vigilant Fire and Evacuation Systems is part of the Tyco group and entirely
overseas owned. [fowever, it still has substantial autonomy over its R&D, and it
develops and manufactures products for the international market.
The company invests a percentage of its total sales in R&D. The company decides on
its own R&D priorities, except for larger projects, or those involving other companies
within the group, and generally finances new product development out of ongoing
revenue, with developmental expenditure expensed as it is incurred. The company is
analytical in its product development planning and endeavours to do cost/benefit
forecasts on new innovations based on likelv sales.
The company internalises most of its R&D, though it has used outside technical input
on some occasions, for example for assistance in ideas relating to mechanical design,
It has however tended to temper these ideas with the practicalities of manufacture. In
particular, the company has always had to ensure that any ideas or design innovations
take account of cost factors that are crucial in its market.
The company rarely patents, primarily because of the cost and time involved. It does
however vigorously protect and enforce its copyrights. It aims to be a leader in the
market, and in the case ofthe FP4000 competitors took about 5 years to catch up and
produce a competing product. The company has a well established quality
management system and is on the point of achieving ISO 9000 accreditation.
Like so many New Zealand companies, Vigilant is essentially a leader in a niche
market, exploiting economies of scope rather than economies of scale. The lack of
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volume and associated cost pressures remain big issues for the company. The
company has to be cost competitive to compete in its market. The innovation strategy
of the company is very much to develop new, market-linked products that embody
new ideas, but also to drive cost out of the product, often through an evolutionary
process of continuous product improvement.
While in the forefront of the technology, the company tends to use commodity
components, preferably those that are multi-sourced, rather than using leading-edge
technology. The price differences are striking, with often the latest technology
dropping in price by a factor of l0 within 2-3 years of launch, when it becomes a
commodity component produced in volume. A lot of effort within the company also
goes into reducing rework and improving the cost efficiency and environmental
acceptability of production processes.
Market Backeround
For much of its history Wormald Vigilant was both a development and a contracting
company and this gave it a strong customer focus. At the time the FP4000 was
developed, the company offered a nationwide installation and a 24 hour service
network. Over the last 25 years the company has moved on occasion into other
fields, such as building management and control and security systems. However, the
strong links with the contract installation and maintenance of fire detection systems,
and the influence of long-serving managers and technologists, has meant that the
company has retained a core focus on the fire detection and protection market.
However, the company's involvement in building management systems from about
1980 gave it some useful exposure to the field of intelligent building technology,
especially the concept of building systems management moving away from centralised
computer control to distributed intelligence to minimise the effects of malfunctions
(New Electronics, 1988c, p. 19.)
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In the mid-1980s the company was aware of overseas technological trends and that its
existing product range was becoming dated, and it was also conscious of
opportunities resulting from a construction boom, especially in high-rise buildings.
Much of this was construction of high-rise buildings that had particularly stringent
requirements for fire detection and protection. The company, while the dominant
player in New Zealand, faced threats of competition from new entries or smaller
players and saw a need to retain a competitive edge through new, technically superior
products.
The company was also aware of addressable fire alarm systems overseas. These
produced localised information, for example detecting a fire in a specific hotel room
and alerting reception to it. At this time, a number of major hotel contracts were
emerging or pending, and these were important in forecasting a likely market for the
system.
The company undertook thorough market analyses, focusing on what the customer
wanted, and this was enhanced by the feedback the company received from those of
its branches involved with installation and servicing in the field. This was crucial to
the success of the FP4000, since it involved in-depth discussions with customers and
with the contracting and servicing side of the business.
Rezulatory Issues
New Zealand has a long history in fire detection and alarm systems, and because of
this has developed its own standards over many years. The FP4000 met the
requirements of New Zealand standards NZS45l2 "Automatic Fire Alarm Systems in
Buildings" and NZS456I "Manual Fire Alarm Systems in Buildings".
Vigilant is represented on the standards committees in Australia and New Zealand.
New Zealand standards governing fire detection and protection systems differ in some
important respects to those of other countries. Agencies such as the New Zealand
Fire Service have been very particular in the standards they wish to see applied in
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New Zealand. This has indirectly assisted the company, since competing overseas
companies do not always find it easy to comply with the local standard.
This effect of the New Zealand standards has proved double-edged however, since
fire alarm systems developed by Vigilant to meet New Zealand standards are often not
suited to the export market. However, the main impact of standards on Vigilant really
relates to how they influence the technology, since standards set clear technical
guidelines that must be adhered to.
Currently, other countries are up with, and in some respects ahead of, New Zealand in
the use of advanced technology in fire alarm systems, and Vigilant monitors standards
associated with these technologies to ensure it is "up with the play".
Technical Backeround
New Zealand has a long history of involvement in fire alarm systems and related
technologies, and the FP4000 should be understood as part ofa continuum ofnew
product development and evolutionary technological change. This has encompassed
crude electrical devices through to more advanced electro-mechanical, electronic, and
"intelligent" fire detection and alarm systems.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, some commercialpremises in Dunedin and
Auckland began to install automatic sprinkler systems, and street alarms began to
appear in the main centres from the 1880s. Alarm technology advanced rapidly in the
early part of the century and by the 1930s private fire alarm connections in
commercial premises enabled brigades to monitor buildings automatically.
In the early years of the century, Dunedin was still a centre of New Zealand
manufacturing and a technology leader in such fields as electrical engineering
communications and radio technology. The innovation in the city resulted partly from
individual entrepreneurs and partly from the technicians and engineers trained in the
Post and Telegraph service.
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Mr G. Porter, chief motorman at the Dunedin central fire station, invented the Duplex
Fire Alarm system after four years of study and experimentation. In l9l I Porter
applied for provisional protection of his fire alarm technology, and shortly after this a
company was formed to take over the invention. The Dunedin Fire Board was the
first to place an order for the Duplex system and the first installation of it was by the
Roslyn Borough Council in 1913. By 1948 thirty Duplex systems had been instdled
in New Zealand (Little, 1948, p. 153).
During the early stages of the development of fire alarms, a number of alternative
approaches were tried. These included bowed strip fixed temperature devices, bi-
metallic strip fixed temperature devices, and "rate-of-rise" types (Underwood, l97l).
Rate of rise detectors such as the May-Oatway included those made up of bi-metallic
strips or bowed strips which essentially activated alarms by the effects of heat on the
behaviour of different metals. The May-Oatway detector was triggered by the effect
of heat on a copper wire, which causes the wire to sag, and through the medium of a
sealed tube containing mercury, completes an electrical circuit which in turn activates
an alarm.
Up until 1969 Vigilant's systems were still based on electro-mechanical technology,
but it then began moving into electronics on an evolutionary basis. A major part of
this evolution into electronics resulted from the ongoing recruitment of recent
university graduates with knowledge of the latest technological developments. The
company launched New Zealand's first electronic fire alarm system in the early 1970s,
and about l0 years later launched a more advanced technology system.
By 1987 the company had taken over another business that was working on a
modular distributed fire alarm system. This system had some significant
shortcomings, including security concerns, but it did help provide a conceptual basis
for the development of the FP4000.
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The Innovation
The innovation process for the FP4000 began with a comprehensive market analysis
based on what the customer wanted in fire detection and alarm systems. This was
facilitated by the company's contracting branches that were closely linked into
customer needs and how those needs were changing. The market analyses identified
high-rise buildings as the fastest growing market niche for fire alarms. The company
then focused on the right technological solution to fire alarm systems for high-rise
buildings, and identified the distributed loop arrangement as best accommodating the
needs of such buildings.
The General Manager ofWormald Vigilant at the time, Martyn Gall, saw a need to do
something different in the marketplace, and was able to work closely with the product
development and the contracting side to match product desigq development and
engineering with factors such as installation, maintenance, servicing, architectural and
building trend considerations.
The company established that in high-rise buildings a distributed loop arrangement led
to substantial cost savings in wiring, improved flexibility, and allowed for expansion
of the system once it was installed. A senior engineer in the company, David Sharp,
and others analysed the cost savings that could be achieved with a distributed
structure which avoided the need to bring all the cable wiring back to one central
location. This showed that significant savings could be achieved, especially in high-
rise buildings. Only when this hard economic analysis had been done did the design
process commence.
David Shaqp investigated addressable systems in the UK and Europe and concluded
that a market niche existed for a product that would meet the New Zealand regulatory
standards. Sharp looked at a system produced by one of the company's associates
overseas which was technologically advanced, but too elaborate for the New Zealand
market.
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Design work on the FP4000 began in 1987, with Richard Cree as development
manager. Cree's aim was to come up with a professional, well designed and well
performing product in as short a time as possible, within the parameters of cost,
appearance and projected sales. The design clearly had to meet New Zealand
standards for fire alarms, and the choice of a distributed loop arrangement created
some difficulties in meeting this standard. Richard Cree led a process of testing a
number of alternative technical approaches to meet the standard, while ensuring that
the distributed structure and customer-oriented operating requirements of the product
could also be met.
The design concepts for the new system were developed by Cree and two product
managers, David Sharp and David Prosser. This work was supported by other
engineers, including Ewan Fraser, who had done a lot of work on microprocessors,
and a new graduate from Canterbury University Engineering School, Mike Holdaway.
Richard Cree acted as project leader of a team that included David Sharp, David
Prosser, Mike Holdaway and about three other engineers doing the software and
hardware development. The project was broken down into its two major component
parts. These were the main fire alarm panel and the responder. Both of these had a
hardware and a software component. The project team was essentially structured
around a hardware and a software specialist on each of the two main components, an
engineer working on the mechanical componentry, and an engineer working on the
PCB layouts, with these six people working on the project full-time. The project,
including all the electronics, was designed and developed entirely within the company,
with the minor exception of some external consultancy advice that was sought on an
aspect of the mechanical design.
The innovation itself took about 12 months of intensive R&D effort, and probably
cost around $llv[ though the innovation built on past R&D investment and
antecedent technologies.
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While there was interaction among development managers and technical staff, most in
the team concentrated on their bit of the system. David Prosser did a lot of the
technical ground worlg including communications, and the design of some of the
responders. Ewan Fraser concentrated on the FP4000 main cabinet and responderq
while Mike Holdaway worked mainly on software for the fire alarm panel.
One of the most difficult parts of the innovation was achieving the right balance
between price and technology. The innovation could not be allowed to price itself out
of the market, but at the same it had to be robust enough to stand up to field use and
fulfil the functional performance and operating requirements of the customers.
A number of technical decisions made at the early stages of developing the FP4000
limited the future expansion and development of the system. While appropriate for
the FP4000 as a stand-alone product per se, the software structure did not fully lend
itself to later developments, and with the wisdom of hindsight a multi-tasking system
may have been more appropriate. This would have facilitated later additions to the
software. This shortcoming occurred due to the speed with which the product was
developed, some inexperience among a number of technical people, and a failure by
managers to foresee the limitations that might emerge in future from some of the
technical decisions in relation to the software design and architecture. More
fundamentally, it may have reflected a tendenry to see the innovation in isolatioq
rather than as forming one step in an evolutionary process of technical improvement
which would form a building block for later developments, and which therefore
should have incorporated software and other technology that provided a technical
platform for "follow on" products and innovations.
Choices made in software development did reflect design trade-offs, since building a
generic applications platform that is more flexible and expandable may involve
compromise in the "fitness for purpose" of a given product developed for a specific
application. However, other systems that may have competed with the FP4000 in fact
failed because they were too elaborate, or their technology was designed to have a
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very wide generic application, lacking the specificity of the FP4000's technology to a
well researched and verv focused market niche.
Performance and Operating Features of the FP4000
The major technical features of the FP4000 are the communications loop, the alarm
signalling, the indicators and controls, and other advanced features:
Communications Loop
A major feature of the FP4000 is the alarm responder communications loop. Whereas
conventional systems require heat/smoke detector groups to be individually wired
back to the main control unit, the FP4000 has only a single loop of four wires laid
around the building.
A number of addressable responders are located around the protected premises.
Detector circuits and control outputs wire locally to these responders, which are
connected in a four wire loop to the main control unit. The loop has high security
integrity, such that a partial or complete break or short anyvhere on the loop is
detected and isolated automatically. All communications and system operations are
maintained even in the presence of the fault condition. This is achieved by the dual
path nature ofthe loop and the fault isolation facilities incorporated in each responder.
Virtually any fire protection measure can be implemented automatically by
programming the FP4000, including returning lifts to the ground floor, closing smoke
stop doors, and activating other control processes.
The responders are designed to cater for a wide range of detector types, such as
smoke, heat and flame detectors. A relay output responder is also available for
remote evacuation or control functions.
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Alarm Signalling
The FP4000 is suitable for connection to the various types of fire brigade alarm
receiving equipment, and it is authorised for connection to New Zealand Fire Service
remote receiving stations.
In addition to brigade signalling, the FP4000 also provides the power supply and
control of a range of alerting devices for evacuation control. All alerting devices may
be wired to the main controller. Alternatively, local devices may be controlled by a
local relay output responder. Provision has also been made for the connection of a
separate evacuation control system for specialised applications.
The FP4000 monitors detector circuits and allows for display of alarm conditions at
multiple locations, control of evacuation devices, individual identification of operated
or dirty detectors, supervision of sprinkler systems, sophisticated ancillary control
functions, and a variety of remote signalling options.
Indicators and Controls
Individual fire indicators are provided for each zone. Indicators may also be
programmed to display other types of information. A number of remote zone display
units may be connected optionally. These allow the remote display of the indications
provided on the main controller.
Advanced Fealures
The FP4000 utilises the flexibility and intelligence of microprocessor-based
electronics, and advanced programming features are available in the field to trained
service and installation personnel. The programmable features include customised
control functions, fully programmable circuit/zone allocations, and monitoring of
remote evacuation circuits. Provision is also available for the supply of alarm
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information to building services systems. An optional printer is available for the
recording of all events.
The F4000
Around the time that the FP4000 was being conceived, Wormald in Australia had
tried to develop an addressable fire alarm system that included a wide range of
options aimed at meeting market needs in a lot of different countries. The Australian
system development failed partly because it was an overly elaborate system designed
to meet the needs of many different markets, rather than being more customised or
specific to a particular market and set of regulatory standards.
The Australian company then asked Vigilant if the FP4000 could be adapted to meet
the standards prevailing in the Australian market. Wormald Vigilant responded to this
opportunity in 1989, producing for the Australian market a modified version of the
FP4000 called the F4000. The F4000 shared with the FP4000 a common
microprocessor and a common core of software code. However, the lack of flexibility
and extendability in the FP4000 software was carried over into the Australian version
of the product and this hampered further upgrade of the F4000 system.
Background of Key People
Richard Cree completed an electrical engineering degree at Canterbury Universi$ and
joined Wormald Vigilant in 1979. He worked as an engineer on both hardware and
software within the Wormald group. This included significant work experience on a
major project in Australia with Wormald Security operations, with Cree maintaining
regular contact with the Australian side of the operation ever since.
David Sharp began as a cadet in Vigilant in 1969, did his NZCE in the company, and
from early on gained a wide range of experience in the company. David Sharp's time
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with Vigilant was broken with several years as a schoolteacher, before he rejoined the
company in 1993.
Martyn Gall was General Manager of Wormald Vigilant when the FP4000 was
initiated in 1987. Gall had the vision to see the need to develop the product and get it
on the market within a tight time-frame. Gall joined Wormald Vigilant from Tait
Electronics, worked for the company for some years, and then later rejoined Tait,
where he is now General Manager. This pattern of movement between Christchurch
electronics companies is not unusual and reflects interlinkages and networking
between generally non-competing companies in the city. A common pattern in
Christchurch in the past has been for technologists to start out in Tait Electronics or
Wormald Vigilant, and in some cases the Post Office, before moving to smaller
companies, or starting their own.
Mike Holdaway did a BE in electrical engineering at Canterbury University and joined
Wormald Vigilant straight from university in 1988. Holdaway wrote much of the
software for the FP4000. Most of his time in Vigilant has been spent on the FP4000
and F4000 systems, but he has also been involved in PC-based programming for other
products and in the development of the evacuation panel, with some input into aspects
of hardware design.
External Influences
The major external influence on the FP4000 was the trend towards high-rise building
construction in the mid-1980s, as well as the regulatory standards environment. The
economic reforms of the 1980s did not have a major influence, although the more
flexible labour market facilitated some down-sizing and the company has benefited
from a lower cost structure in New Zealand, compared for example to Australia.
The Wormald Vigilant company has developed most of its technology internally,
especially in areas such as software programming, but has occasionally used external
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consultants for some specialised assistance and ideas, for example in some aspects of
design. The company did receive some financial support from DFC earlier in its
history, as well as some modest amount of public funding for technological innovation
in the 1980s, and has occasionally used DSIR to tackle specific technical and quality
assurance problems. However, these external influences have not been crucial.
The company has always kept up to date with the trade and technical literature, what
competitors are doing, and international standards in fire alarms and related
technology. Howeveq the main external source of new ideas has been the customers.
The FP4000 and the company's competitive strategy as a whole was greatly
influenced by the opportunities presented by technological advances in electronic
hardware and software.
Conclusions
The FP4000 was a major technical and commercial success, due to the skills and
competencies of Wormald Vigilant's staff. The skills of the company in fire detection
and protection have been transmitted over time through recruitment and training of
new engineers and their training on the job.
A great deal of new product development in the company has been evolutionary and
based on careful appraisal of existing designs to form a basis for product improvement
and the incorporation of new technology and design concepts. Much technology is
codified in manuals that form the building block or technical platform for future
product development and innovation. However, the skill-base in the company is very
largely built up and maintained over time through "learning by doing" and the
transmission of knowledge among staff.
Vigilant develops most of its technology internally, but does depend on customers and
contractors to define the domain within which product innovation occurs and to
generate a lot of the ideas and technical specifications which drive innovations such as
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the FP4000. The specificity of the company and its innovations to a tightly defined
market niche is a strength that has enabled it to concentrate its marketing
technologies and skill-bases, but which also limits its diversification and future growth
potential. Many of the company's competencies, such as electronics hardware and
embedded software and detection systems, have potential for generic applications.
However, the company has tended to perform best when it has maintained a strong
focus on its core niche in fire detection and protection systems within a very
specialised regulatory, market and technological framework.
The informal technical network and mobility of people between electronics and
technology-based companies in Christchurch, and the output of skilled engineers and
technologists from the Canterbury University School of Engineering, have been
important success factors for companies such as Wormald Vigilant.
The FP4000, especially its software, should probably have been planned not as a
single innovation but as a technical platform with multi-tasking software and other
features that would allow expandability and extensions at a later date. A lesson from
the case is the need to plan ahead, especially in relation to ensuring that the
technology creates a more flexible technical platform for future evolutionary
expansion and development.
Postscript
In 1990 the Wormald group went through a major reorganisation, and as a result the
Australian manufacturing side of the business was transfened back to New Zealand.
The company's middle management has now shrunk to the point where there is no
Iayer between Richard Cree, the General Manager, and the product managers and
senior engineers. By doing away with much of its middle management the company
has achieved a flatter organisational structure, and this means that engineers now do
work, such as on specifications, that formerly would have been done by managers.
This has essentially been an empowennent process for the engineers, and project
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leaders are now responsible for projects rather than that responsibility being at a
higher management level.
Since about 1990 Vigilant has been the major manufacturer for the Australian as well
as the New Zealand market. When the FP4000 was initially developed the company's
market was essentially New Zealand. At this time Wormald Vigilant included the
product development and manufacturing as well as the contract installation and
servicing businesses, and the General Manager had direct responsibility for both parts
of the business. However, the company now has only two big customers, which are
the contract and installation companies within the Wormald group in Australia and
New Zealand. One of the downsides of this is that the company no longer has a direct
link with the contracting side of the business and lacks the customer feedback and
input into product development that resulted from that. This may well cause some
difficulties in future in maintaining a sharp customer focus for the company.
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Appendix I
Key Events in the FP4000 Innovation
Key Events
1967 Wormald Vigilant establishesR&D team
Early 1970s Wonnald Vigilant brings inNew Zealand's first electronic fire
alarm
lgTS Wormatd Vigilant becomes involved in microprocessors
19E7 Design work begins on FP4000
19t8 FP4000launched on the market
1989 F4000 developed for the Australian market
1990 FP4000 wins TELARC Design Mark award
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CASE 5: ALATAL 821 INNOVATION
Introduction
Alatal 821 is a whey protein hydrolysate made from lactalbumin, a milk protein. It is
made by the controlled enzyme treatment of whey protein isolate to produce amino
acids, peptides and polypeptides. The enzyme treatment retains essential amino acids,
and maintains high protein quality. Alatal 821 has high nutritional value, greatly
reduced allergenicity (100,000 times less than unprocessed whey proteins), high
solubility and clarity, low fat, ash and lactose content and a good flavour.
Alatal 821 is designed for use in infant formulae, especially for babies with low
tolerance of conventional bovine milk products, and for a range of formulations for
the adult market, including sports food formulations and diets for hospital patients.
Alatal 821 was jointly developed by NZ Milk Products at its North American
Regional Development Centre (NARDC) in Santa Ros4 California Whey Products
(NZ) Ltd (a Dairy Board subsidiary), the NZ Dairy Research Institute (NZDRI), and
the NZ Dairy Group's Anchor Products plant at Hautapu.
Alatal 821 won the 1993 Tradenz award for new export products and the Printpac-
UEB Multiwall group award for industrial products. Production has risen from 50
tonnes in 1993 to 150 tonnes in 1994, major sales have been achieved in Europe, the
United States and North Asia, and the product is rapidly becoming a major
commercial as well as technological success for the New Zealand dairy industry.
Alatal 821 is now creating a technical and market platform for further diversification
and product innovation in the speciality food ingredient and hydrolysates market.
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Background of Dairy Industry
Innovations such as Alatal 821 can best be understood in the wider context of the
development of the dairy industry and its strategy.
Milk Characteristics and Industry Structure and Strateey
Two characteristics of milk have helped drive the evolution of the industry's market
structure: its perishability and its technical complexity. Because milk starts
deteriorating the moment it leaves the cow, and because the fresh milk market is
limited, the value of most dairy farms rests on the ability to process milk into less
perishable products and to market them internationally'
Because milk has to provide the sole source of nutrition for young mammals it is a
very complex and complete food and a rich source of nutritional components. Casein
alone can form the basis for an extraordinary range of products, including food
ingredients, plastics, artificial silk, and coatings for TV screens. Whey can be
processed into whey powders, lactose, ethanol, calcium additives, and protein
concentrates such as lactalbumin. Alatal 821 is just one of many products that has
been developed from lactalbumin alone.
Historical Development ofNew Zealand Dairy Industry
In the 1920s the New Zealand dairy processing industry was made up of several
hundred dairy companies, and dairy products were essentially sold at the factory door
to overseas buyers. The wlnerability of dairy farmers as "weak sellers" to the market
power of overseas buyers led to a cooperative structure emerging, to allow some
control over processing and marketing. From the 1930s through to the 1960s the
industry extended its cooperative structure further down the value chairq from
processing to export marketing and distribution.
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Through the 1960s and 1970s the Dairy Board saw that British entry to the EEC and
subsequent market access problems, and the price-driven nature of commodity
exports with low margins, meant that the industry had to diversiff both its markets
and its product range. The Dairy Board's strategic response was to diversi& its
markets to reduce dependence on Britain. It began to differentiate so that it could
increasingly compete through branded products that competed on the basis of
functional performance and technical characteristics rather than price. It reduced its
dependence on the commodity forms of butter, cheese and milk powder exports' It
began to develop premium products for the industrial ingredients market, including
protein-based products from casein and whey.
Development of Industry's Technical Base
The dairy industry developed scientific and technical skills to tackle such practical
problems as the reliability of cheese starters and butter and cheese quality. The
industry recruited world-class scientists, and some major early successes built hdustry
confidence in science as a core part ofbusiness strategy.
In l92l the NZ Cooperative Dairy Company set up a laboratory to provide scientific
assistance in butter and cheese making and in the production of dried milk and casein.
A group of dairy companies in South Taranaki established a laboratory in 1925 to
provide a more scientific basis for cheese making. The industry and Government
jointly established the NZ Dairy Research Institute in 1927 -
As the industry developed it became clear that high levels of technical skill were
needed not only in research laboratories but also in manufacturing plants and
throughout the industry. Over time, more emphasis was placed on all parts of the
industry being able to communicate at a similar technical level and this was fostered
by gfaduate recruitment, by the development of a graduate training programme, and
by encouraging staffmovements through all parts of the sector.
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The industry is now New Zealand's largest single investor in R&D, with total
investment of around $52 million a year. This is about lo/o of total sales and
proportionately similar to that of its major food industry competitors'
The dairy industry's R&D is coordinated and funded primarily by the Dairy Board and
now consists of the NZDRI, which performs more strategic and early stage
development researctq the dairy company development centres, which handle most
product and process development and manufacturing scale-up worh the regional
development centres, which provide offshore market liaison and product development
tailored to their particular markets, and the Livestock Improvement Corporation'
Joint venture or publicly-funded research is also undertaken in the Dairying Research
Corporation, Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) and universities. The Dairy Board
also funds a Chair in Dairy Science and Technology and a strategic alliance for
nutrition science at Massey University.
While specific product development is undertaken by regional development centres
and by dairy companies with their own funding, the Dairy Board is still dominant in
setting the research direction and priorities for the industry. This itself is a live issue
within the industry since the regional development centres and offshore subsidiaries
generate sales that can support their own, more decentralised R&D, and the New
Zealand-based dairy companies can also support R&D-based innovation that focuses
on niche markets.
The Industry Today
New Zealand is generally accepted as the world's most efficient milk producer. There
are about 13,000 dairy farms supplying cooperative dairy processing companies and
about 1,000 farms that supply the domestic liquid milk market. The industry is higltly
vertically integrated, with milk produced mainly on family-owned farms, and almost
all processing is undertaken by producer-owned cooperative dairy companies' The
industry has a very tight and cooperative culture and this is reflected in a high degree
of commitment at all levels of the industry to working in the interests of the dairy
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farmer. The value of a dairy farm is determined largely by the value the companies
and the Dairy Board can create through processing and marketing' Processing is now
undertaken by 16 dairy companies, of which 5 are the dominant players' The North
Island-based New Zealand Dairy Group alone processes around 47Yo of New
Zealand's milk production.
New Zealand produces around l.SYo of the world's milk output but has about 25Yo of
world trade (Hus sey, 1992). With exports of around $3.29 billion the dairy industry
is New Zealand's largest single export earner (Cleland, 1993). The Dairy Board is the
industry's statutory single seller export marketer with a mission of maximising the
income of NZ dairy farmers through the global marketing of dairy products' The
Dairy Board is effectively a "cooperative of the cooperatives" and it determines the
mix of products and markets that will maximise returns to dairy farmers'
The Dairy Board owns five regional development centres in Britain, Singapore, the
United States, Japan and Germany to facilitate and provide technical support to its
international product development and marketing. It also owns a host of marketing,
distribution, processing and technology-related companies that make up an
international marketing network.
Market Background to Alatal 821
In about l99l it was recognised that hydrolysates were carving out a market niche of
their own and a business strategy was developed within Whey Products (NZ) for
whey hydrolysates as their own defined business. This strategy is now extending to
protein hydrolysates as a whole.
In the early 1990s the nutritional applications market was seen to have major potential
for the New Zealand dairy industry. There are a number of sub-segments within this
market. These include the fickle and rapidly changing sports nutrition market,
functional foods ("nutraceuticals"), the adult medical nutrition and the weight
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management markets (Oliveq lgg4). However, the infant formula market is the
largest and most well established of the nutritional market segments.
Market analysis by Dairy Board subsidiaries before Alatal 821 was developed showd
that aroun d lO% of the European infant formula market was met by products
marketed as hypoallergenic or reduced tolerance products. Only l-3% of babies are in
fact allergic to bovine milk protein, and for only a tiny number is the allergenic
reaction life threatening. However, a significant market exists for more digestible
milk proteins with low allergenicity that can improve the comfort of babies, and
therefore the comfort of their parents. This is a "comfort food" market rather than a
health food market. Because babies are restricted to just one food source'
development of infant formulae with all of a baby's nutritional requirements was a
major market opportunity. Another potential market was in sports nutrition'
especially as an ingredient in protein fortified beverages, for example for body builders
and weight lifters.
The Dairy Board has long been involved in the infant formula and food ingredients
markets, and though reduced tolerance products did require more sophisticated
analytical testing, development of a more specialised and technically demanding
product such as Alatal 821 was not entirely new territory'
While the development of Alatal 821 was stimulated by customer interest from
Europe, the customer had not stipulated specifications that had to be met' The
European market was however seen as a good indicator of likely market appeal in
other regions, such as the United States and Japan. Santa Rosa researchers and their
New Zealand-based collaborators had broad indications of customer requirementg
and were able to build on their substantial knowledge base to design a product with a
technical functionality that would meet a broad base of customer expectations.
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Technical Background to Alatal 821'
Whey was originally a waste by-product from the cheese and casein making process
that was fed to pigs, sprayed back onto paddocks or dumped' It was therefore a low
or negative value product that also posed significant environmental problems. By the
late 1960s the dairy industry was devoting research effort to added value whey
processing. A greater scientific understanding of the composition of whey allowed
the industry over time to begin to turn this waste stream into a source of differentiated
and higher added value Products.
In 1982 the Dairy Board established the Whey Products corporation to focus on the
processing and marketing of whey-based products' Whey Products (NZ) forms part
of the protein Division of the Dairy Board. It has its own board and R&D and capital
budget, though R&D and capital investment above a certain level has to be approved
by the Dairy Board itself.
Early work on whey processing helped build up the scientific base to tackle some of
the more difficult challenges, such as extracting value out of raw materials such as
lactalbumin. Lactalbumin is an insoluble protein made by the heat precipitation of
whey protein. It has a higher protein efficiency ratio than most other protein sources
but its insolubility makes it a kind of non-functional "nutritional sand"'
At the time the Whey Products corporation was established six plants were producing
large quantities of lactalbumin as a bread improvement ingredient. A crisis occurred
when the potential customer for lactalbumin declined to buy the product, and the
Dairy Board was left with a large amount of lactalbumin it could not dispose ot, as
well as surplus processing capacity. The Whey Products corporation had to close a
number of plants in the short term, but it then began to develop a longer term strategy
to exploit the ability to make the lactalbumin soluble and thereby open up wider
potential applications for it. Hydrolysed protein for such applications as
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hypoallergenic diets had been around for about 40 years but there was little
understanding of the potential of lactalbumin for such products.
In 1984 the Dairy Board successfully hydrolysed lactalbumin as a world first' This
was a fundamental achievement that opened up potential new market opporhrnities
because of improved flavour and amino acid profile relative to other proteins. A
research programme was then initiated to develop and commercialise hydrolysed
protein products. While some initiatives such as the development of a casein-based
insect attractant failed, progress was made in making lactalbumin soluble and in the
development of food ingredient formulae for infants with low tolerance of milk
products.
Work on lactalbumin built on experience the dairy industry had already gained in
altering the functionality of casein. Enzyme treatment of caseinates had led to the
development ofthe food ingredient Alanate220, a significant success for the industry'
While some other attempts to develop casein-based products with specialist
applications failed, work on hydrolysing lactalbumins at NZ Milk Products in Santa
Rosa was beginning to create some potential in the sports food area' This work on
lactalbumin-based hydrolysates in the United States effectively kept the lactalbumin
business afloat in the years leading up to the development of Alatal 821. The use of
hydrolysed lactalbumin in sports food applications created the success and confidence
that encouraged further work in the nutritional foods are4 and acted as a flagship for
the development of later lactalbumin-based products, including Alatal 821'
Innovation and Product Development up to Alatal 821
By December 1984 NZ Milk Products (USA) had developed three generic
lactalbumin hydrolysates, branded Alatal 815, 816 and 817. By 1986 some customer
interest had been showninthese products, especially inthe potential of Alatal 817 in
the infant nutrition market. Its potential was however restricted by the molecular
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weight profile of the product. In November 1985 a Japanese customer asked the
Dairy Board to produce a non-bitter hydrolysed product for infant formula' Alatal
817 was offered but not accePted.
There were some difficulties in the hydrolysis research prograrnme in the early years
resulting from the "product push" drive to find markets for products rather than to
tailor them to the market, and a lack of foresighted project planning and leadership'
There were also some difEculties in communication and management of technology
between the different parts of the dairy industry involved (Walker, 1993)' However,
it is worth noting that in the early years the market itself was not yet aware o{' or
ready to define its need for new products. Technologists ended up playing an
important role in educating customers on the potential of new products and fostering
demand for them.
In June 1987 a potential niche market for hydrolysates for infant products was
identified. However, it was clear that the molecular weight profile needed to be
modified, and in 1988 NZ Milk Products (USA) requested NZDRI to allocate some
of its membrane separation technology capabilities to the project. This project was
dubbed 'project Nina' and its goals were to reduce the high molecular weight profiles
by ultrafiltration, for preparation of hypoallergenic lactalbumin hydrolysates. Project
Nina trials continued over 1988/89, with success achieved in August 1989. This was
the first successful use of membrane separation in this area.
In 1989 work was undertaken in the United States with three major customers, but
none of this was brought to fruition. The reasons were customer indecision over
requirements, some market concerns over the use of hydrolysed proteins in dairy
foods, flavour problems, and difEculties in technology transfer and communication
between NZDRI and NZ Milk Products (USA).
By the late 1980s Nestle, partly based on some work by Australian researchers, had
established not only that hydrolysis of milk proteins makes them less likely to produce
an allergenic reaction in babies, but also that flavour defects from the hydrolysis
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process could be minimised if whey rather than casein proteins were used' Nestle
launched its resulting "Good Start- product in the USA and Germany, and despite
early marketing problems over its claimed hypoallergenicity, it has since gained a
significant market share. Whey Products (NZ) saw a market in supplying ingredients
to Nestle's smaller rivals that intended to compete with the Good Start product'
In 1990 research was undertaken at Santa Rosa and at NZDRI for two customers
using lactalbumin and whey protein conc€ntrate as bases. Progress was made in using
a microfilter for a product with an intermediate molecular weight profile' The
essential requirement was to remove both the large peptides that have allergenic
potential and free amino acids that are less readily assimilated by the body' This was a
major technological challenge. In l99l agreement was reached with a Japanese
customer over test methods, and by the end of the year discussions had cornmenced
on the scaling up of production for the Board's first sale of whey hydrolysate for
hypoallergenic infant food formulae.
By l99ll91 substantial sales of some solubilised hydrolysates had been achieved in the
United States, especially of Alatal 816 which was used in body-building products'
The earlier work developing relatively simple lactalbumin hydrolysates had by this
time created a cumulative body of expertise in the industry, and laid a technical
platform for the development of the more technically demanding and advanced Alatal
821 hydrolysate.
Developing Alatal 821
Focused development of Alatal 821 began in mid-1991. NZ Milk Products @urope)
had identified market potential from discussions with infant formula manufacturers in
Europe, and this potential was discussed with NZ Milk Products in Santa Rosa. While
the Santa Rosa researchers focused on specific markets and product developments for
the North American market, in the field of hydrolysates they thought more globally'
The New Zealand dairy industry's product development strengths in hydrolysates
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were really built up in Santa Rosa. Most of this was fairly independent research' but
with some liaison with NZDRI on the scientific information and test methods' NZ
Milk Products @urope) had a fair idea of what product was needed and could even
project likely volumes and selling prices.
while santa Rosa researchers had good links with customers, Alatal 821 was
developed without detailed customer specifications being set' In effect' customers
were still unsure of precisely what they needed and were looking for guidance from
their suppliers. The Dairy Board had the skill-base and market awareness to "take a
punt" on what specifications the customer would require' While this was a guess' it
was an educated and technically informed guess with a high degree of general
customer focus and market awareness softening what would othenrise be an overly
"technology push" innovation.
Before Alatal 821 was produced Julie O'Sullivan in NZDRI had been working on a
whey protein hydrolysate for another company and had spent 3 months at Santa Rosa'
This early work was very customer-specific, but helped form a basis for the Santa
Rosa researchers to embark on the Alatal 821 development, which was more broadly
focused on a wider set of possible applications and customers. O'sullivan only
became involved again when Alatal 821 had been developed at a bench scale and was
ready to be commercialised.
Alatal 821 is made by the mild and precisely controlled enzyme treatment of whey
protein so that essential amino acids remain intact and the protein remains high in
quality. Without any enzyme producers in New Zealand with sufficiently advanced
technology, it was decided not to proceed with a strategic alliance with a single
enzyme producer but to remain open to all producers that could provide enzymes to
the required standard. This decision worked in the case of Alatal 821, but the Dairy
Board may be disadvantaged in some respects, compared to some overseali
competitors, in not having a local enzyme producer that can tailor enzymes to the
specific needs and opportunities of the New Zealand industry'
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Because of the diversity of enzymes and enzyme suppliers, it was decided to
investigate the activity of specific enzymes on specific proteins' However, after 2
years of effort it was realised that a commercially valuable understanding of all
reasonably cornmon enzymes and the protein substrates would require l0 years of
effort and a multi-million dollar R&D investment, and that this was beyond the
resources of the Dary Board.
Product Development and Testine
By late 1991, Santa Rosa had developed small pilot-scale samples, and in liaison with
technical marketing stafr these were submitted to potential customers in Europe- The
response was positive and one customer in particular requested several hundred
kilograms, with the aim of replacing a whey protein hydrolysate in an existing
product. This feedback gave confidence to proceed to pilot-scale production. At this
time, market planning focused on two possible applications: reduced hypoallergenictty
for infant formul4 and clean flavour and clarity in solution for adult medical products.
A key feature of Alatal 821 is the very precisely defined range of peptides present and
the demands this places on analytical measurement. At times during the Alatd 821
development 30%-50o/o of the funding was spent on the very precise measurement
and analysis needed to produce a product to very tight specifications' It was
necessary to measure allergenicity, residual enzyme activity, protein levels, fat,
microbiological requirements, and to meet the analytical requirements needed for
process control.
The NZDRI's involvement in Alatal 821 really began with High Performance Liquid
Chromatography GfLC) assays for hydrolysates, and also with work on enzyme
selection. Specifically, NZDRI drew on work completed in 1984 on the development
of analytical methods relating to peptide-sized profiles and the degree of hydrolysis'
essentially measuring how many peptides had been produced to indicate how
hydrolysed the protein was.
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A key challenge was coordinating between Santa Rosa technologists such as Marsha
Swartz, Dr Chao Wu and Neal Van Degrift and New Zealandtechnologists, especially
those at NZDRI. There were significant communication problems between NZDRI
and Santa Rosa, primarily because very difficult technical issues, for example in
molecular weight profiling, had to be worked through on a basis of common technicd
understandings. For example, technical problems such as how a chromatogfam
should be interpreted had to be resolved by fax between NZDRI and Santa Rosa'
A major technical problem was reducing allergenicity in the milk protein. Unlike other
hydrolysates previously manufactured, membrane technology played a major role in
reducing allergenicity in Alatal 821. The membrane technology removes larger
molecular material, thereby removing the allergenic content from the milk protein'
Santa Rosa was not strong in ultrafiltration technology, and it was recognised that
full-scale commercial production of Alatal 821 needed a large membrane plant. Such
plants were already available in the New Zealand whey processing industry. The New
Zealand dairy industry had considerable expertise in membrane technology and these
were complemented by manufacturing strengths in New Zealand in process control
and quality assurance. It was decided to transfer pilot development from the United
States to New Zealand to capitalise on these strengths.
In Septemb er 1992DRI began doing pilot trials and in August of that year Santa Rosa
technologists involved in the development came to the NZDRI and worked with
technologists from Whey Products (NZ) and the NZDRI on pilot trials. Samples from
these trials were then used in product development trials involving key target
customers in EuroPe.
Production Start-up and Launch
The initial market response was encouraging, and in November 1992 Whey Products
(NZ) invited New Zealand dairy companies to submit proposals for the commercial-
scale manufacture of Alatal 821. NZDzu trialing was well advanced by the time
tenders were called for in December 1992. Anchor Products, part of the NZ Dairy
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Group, was selected to manufacture the product at its Hautapu site' A target ofjust
four months was set for commercial production to commence' A difficulty was that
production depended on the use of existing membrane plants in the dairy industry,
these plants were used in the dairy season, and the limited window of opportunity was
between May to August when the equipment was otherwise lying idle' Hautapu
proved an ideal site however, with its cheese making vats and on-site driers suited to
make the product, ild with sufficient knowledge of enzyme processes in cheese
making to form a basis for understanding of the enzyme hydrolysis process used in
manufacturing Alatal 821. NZDRI transferred analytical techniques to Hautapu to
enable analysis of the product on site.
The innovation was advancing very fast at this time, with a high degree of confidence
in the market and in the feasibility of commercialisation. That the innovation worked
so well is a credit to the teamwork and commitment of those involved at Santa Rosa
and NZDRI and the excellent coordination skills of Andrew Revfeim at Whey
products (NZ) Regular conference calls maintained links and there were staff
exchanges between New Zealand and the United States. Neal Van Degdft and Dr
Chao Wu in Santa Rosa" who acted more or less as product champions' were able to
follow the innovation all the way to NZDRI and Hautapu.
The availability of capital equipment, analytical capabilities and of plant available at
Hautapu during the dairy off-season were key success factors at this stage of the
innovation process. The Hautapu plant was utilised in the oFseason, so only the
marginal costs of the capital equipment were incurred. About $75 million in plant was
used but only around $l million of new investment was needed to commercialise the
product, The development costs far outweighed the research costs' However, there
were many other unquantified or uncharged for contributions all the way tlnougtl




There were some delays in moving from trialing at NZDRI to production at Hautapu,
and these can probably be attributed to Hautapu personnel not having been involved
lq or been observers at, the earlier NZDRI trials. However, scientists from Santa
Rosa, the NZDRI and Whey Products (NZ) undertook full-scale trials at Hautapu in
February 1993. These trials were successful and provided crucial control data for the
production campaign.
The Alatal S2l manufacturing process involves a series of precisely controlled enzyme
reactions resulting in a hydrolysate with the desired molecular weight, reduoed
allergenicity and a good flavour profile. A major problem in hydrolysing whey
proteins is the bitter and brothy flavour that results from peptides created. A major
technical challenge throughout the development process was understanding the
actions of individual enzymes to minimise the oflflavours'
production of Alatal 821 has to be stringently monitored and controlled as the
slightest contamination of the product renders it useless. High Performance Liquid
Chromatography GPLC) was used for on-line control of hydrolysis' HPLC is used at
Hautapu in conjunction with standard parameters such as pH and temperature to
control hydrolyses as they occur. Customer requirements posed great demands on the
objective measurement technology needed to measure allergenicity-related properties
at very low levels. Santa Rosa researchers developed an innovative and low-cost
Enzryme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) for whey proteins to meet this
requirement.
Successful commercial production began in April 1993, a major achievement glven
the extremely tight time-frame. NZDRI assisted in the initial scaling-up of the process
but now only provides some assistance with assays on a routine basis'
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Marketine and Commercialisation
whey Products (NZ) had very good links with infant formula manufacturers through
the Dairy Board's network of oflshore subsidiaries. These market links were
complemented by the technical networks maintained by NZ Milk Products (USA) and
the NZDRI.
Despite strong competition, Alatal 821 is now well positioned as a premium product
earning very good margins. The competitive advantage for the product results from
the industry's ability to tailor it to specialised market needs, New Zealand's strong
competencies in hydrolysis, membrane technology, objective measurement
technology, and the manufacturing of product to stringent quality standards. The use
of very pure lactalbumin with high nutritional value as a raw material has been a major
competitive advantage, as Whey Products is the only commercial producer of
lactalbumin in the world.
Ongoing sales of Alatal E21 in the infant formula market have now started in Europe,
the United States and North Asia, and further evaluation is underway for customers in
the sports nutrition field. Three new customers have been recruited in the last year.
Important benefits from the success of Alatal 821 include the opening it is creating for
the New Zealand dairy industry in the nutritional and functional food ingredients
markets, the learning curve the industry has moved through to achieve success, and
the potential for Alatal 821 to act as a technical and market platform for further
innovation and product development.
Apart from infant formula and sports nutrition applications, major gfowth potential
exists for hydrolysates in physiologically functional foods and in medical applications,
such as easily digestible food products for patients recovering from surgery' The
Darry Board's customers continue to demand new hydrolysates with different
molecular weight profiles and this continues to influence the research agenda for the
Board. The NZDRI is continuing work on methods of analysing products, means of
improving the flavour of hydrolysates by reducing bitterness and controlling flavours,
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and the development of novel processes for making hydrolysates @airy Exporteq
1994b, p. 82).
A key focus is now on capturing the benefits of Alatal 821 and other innovations'
The specificity of Alatal 821 to customer formulations constitutes a form of "sunk
cost" that makes it expensive for customers to change their suppliers' In effect, once
a food manufacturer incorporates Alatal 821 into a food product it is likely to be in
that product for a long time, because the analytical testing that is needed dissuades
food manufacturing companies from the arbitrary changing of such specialised
ingredients.
The New Zealand industry's expertise in hydrolysis R&D and availability of capital
plant and sophisticated manufacturing techniques constitute major barriers to
competing whey processors entering the infant food formula hydrolysates market'
The skills in testing and measurement amount to barriers to competitive entry, while
the purity of lactalbumin and New Zealand's monopoly over its production confers a
further competitive advantage and market entry barrier'
The dairy industry has relied on cornmercial confidentiality rather than patenting, but
this is no longer adequate. Other countries, especially the Japanese' use patents and
pre-emptive publication to restrict competition, even in widely applied and established
technologies, and this is forcing the Dairy Board and its subsidiaries to be more active
in these intellectual property protections'
Background of Key PeoPle
Dr Robin Fenwick is Development Manager of the Dairy Board's Protein Division'
Fenwick did a PhD in protein chemistry and joined the Dairy Board in the mid-I970s.
Fenwick has had a crucial role in creating and maintaining the scientffic base
underpinning whey protein and hydrolysate research.
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Andrew Revfeim is now Technical Manager (Hydrolysates) in whey Products (Nz)'
Revfeim is a chemical engineer who joined the Dairy Board after graduation in 1986'
Revfeim initially worked in protein extraction before becoming a specialist in the
hydrolysates business.
Marsha Swartz is leader of the Santa Rosa research team working on hydrolysates.
She has a masters degree in food science and has wide experience in a range of
companies, especially those dealing with retail food products' She has spent 14 years
with the NZ dairy industry and her time with NZ Milk Products has been entirely in
research. The key members of her team at Santa Rosa such as Neal Van Degift and
Dr Chao Wu have qualifications in food science and chemical process engineering and
generally had prior experience in the food and beverage sector before working in dairy
research.
Julie O'Sullivan completed a biotechnology degree at Massey University in 1988 and
worked for several months at the Leather and Shoe Research Association before
taking up a research position at the NZDRI. She assumed responsibility for NZDRI's
work in hydrolysates in 1990. She has recently completed a masters degree in
biotechnology and bioprocess engineering.
Conclusions
Alatal 821 is a technically demanding product that depends on a strong scientific,
marketing and production base. The Dairy Board is probably the only New Zealand
business with the vertically integrated structure and the concentration of R&D,
marketing and production resources needed to successfully carry through an
innovation of such magnitude and technical complexity.
Alatal 821 should be seen as part of a continuum of product and process development
that has been driven by the Dairy Board's diversification and added value strategy,
and which results from an accumulated scientific and technological base that has been
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built up in the industry since the 1920s' The product depends on antecedent
technologies and marketing and production competencies, and is as much a platform
for future technical and market developments as it is a "stand alone" product per se'
Alatal 821 demonstrates to the market the New Zealand dairy industry's ability to
make technically advanced hydrolysates, has shown the industry the potentid of the
ingredients market, and has enhanced the interactive dialogue with customers that
best allows specific customer needs in the hydrolysate field to be communicated to the
researchers.
The development of Alatal 821 from concept to commercialisation within a two year
time-scale was a major achievement that drew on the Dairy Board's international
scientific and marketing resources and on the vertically integrated nature of the
industry. The Dairy Board and its subsidiaries successfully balanced the tension
between the Board's dominance in industry R&D and the value of devolving some
product and process development to the regional development centres and to
companies. Clear criteria and strategies governing what research should be directed
by the Board, and what should be driven off the market interface by development
centres, subsidiaries and dairy companies could welt help facilitate new product
development in future.
The innovation reflects the industry's strong commitment to developing premium
products with precisely defined properties and consistent quality to meet the needs of
a demanding market. The 'fit' between the product development and the Dairy
Board's strategy of moving away from commodity products and into added value
markets based on product differentiation and specialisation was fundamental to
success.
Other Alatal-type products that have lacked a specific customer focus have languished
for years without significant sales. However, the customer-driven model is not always
appropriate and there is sometimes potential for a technology to languish for some
years, only to find that its time eventually comes. The development of Alatal 821
shows that customer awareness and consciousness can allow products to be
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successfully developed without very detailed customer specifications being set' To be
customer-driven can be a reactive strategy that would mean that the Dairy Board
would be invariably lagging behind the needs of customers. In the case of Alatal 821,
Nestle had demonstrated the market potential of the concept, and other producers
were anxious to catch up. The Dairy Board and its subsidiaries, as ingfedient
suppliers, were able to offer an answer before customers were in a position to
specifically define the product required. However, such success depends on the
ability to produce tangible product samples rather than simply new product ideas or
"disembodied technology''.
Unlike other investments that are subject to diminishing returns, scientific research
creates knowledge that is irreversible. This irreversibility of technical change, and its
creation of a cumulative knowledge base, is important in understanding not only the
success of Alatal 821 but how the asset specificity of the R&D investment in the
product also creates barriers to competitors entering the market.
The scientific knowledge base underpinning Alatal 821 was complemented by skills
and know-how that could be adapted and applied to new products as they emerged.
While some research and product development on lactalbumin-based hydrolysates did
not achieve commercial success, the early work was a crucial part of developing the
cumulative knowledge base needed for Alatal 821. Early failure to achieve
commercial success with other hydrolysate products was therefore an important part
of an iterative process of often tacit and uncodified learning by doing, adaptive
learning, reviewing the R&D process and improving on it until success was achieved.
Marsha Swartz, Dr Robin Fenwick, Neal Van Degrift, Dr Chao Wu and Julie
O'sullivan were involved in Alatal 821 essentially all the way through, and this was
important to its success. However, staff movements within and outside the industry
are very high and increasing, with much of this driven by the building up of dairy
industry capabilities offshore. The benefits of staff movement in terms of technology
transfer, personnel development and maintaining high levels of technical competency
throughout all parts of the industry are fundamental to its success' Such staff
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movement is actively encouraged and expected and rates of retention within the
industry after 8 years are still about 70Vo. However, a major problem in the industry
is that high staff movement leads to discontinuity in product and process
development, and aggravates the already difficult problem of coordinating multi-
national R&D and market development strategies.
In production of high volume products generic skills that are mobile throughout the
industry help ensure that all parts of the industry are speaking the same technical
language. With products such as butter and cheese the broad skill-base in the industry
means that mobility is not a problem but a profound strength. However, with very
specialised and differentiated markets, skills must cumulate over time, they are
specific not generic, and high mobility will tend to fragment competencies rather than
transfer and upgrade skills throughout the industry. Building an advanced technology
food business in niche markets requires a critical mass of specialised and centrally
concentrated skills, and spreading those skills thinly throughout the industry seems
counter-intuitive.
The Dairy Board may need to consider whether its approach to staffmovement within
the industry needs to be quite different for specialised and differentiated niche markets
than it is for the higher volume, more commodity-based markets.
Some minor glitches in the development process could well have been avoided if some
of the commercialisation and marketing decisions had been made earlier and all the
key players were involved early in the R&D process. Secrecy may have hampered the
trialing and upscaling work by NZDRI, since companies such as Anchor Products
were advised too late to participate in or observe the trials. This in turn created some
technical problems in bringing Alatal 821 into full-scale commercial production,
problems that could have been avoided if Anchor Products had been involved in the
trials.
Key success factors in Alatal 821 were the high levels of motivation and teamwork of
those involved from Santa Rosa, NZDRI and Anchor Products, and the remarkable
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facilitation of the process by Andrew Revfeim in Wellington' The process was
grounded in mutual respect, a cornmon purpose and a good spirit among the key
players. A technologist hvolved in Alatd 821 termed the innovation:
...bloody good fun...I don't come to work for any other reason but to have firn' Prcssure is
fun. If you're not working under pressure it becomes "why am I doing this?'
The facilitation and associated teamwork succeeded in carrying the innovation
through in spite of the lack of a more formal and structured project management
system with clear lines of authority. The innovation process was inevitably
complicated by the international coordination required, but the necessary cooperation
was fostered and this overcame the lack of a more formalised R&D project
management system.
However, the lack of a project leader with an overview of the innovation process and
the power to command resources and work on a cross-functional basis is an
interesting feature of the Alatal 821 case. Its success reflects the skills of those
involved but it does not imply that the project management structure for Alatal 821 is
the model for the future. The Dairy Board is keeping its product development
process under review, and the Board seems geared to extend even further its




Key Events associated with the Alatal 821 Innovation
Kcy Events
lggZtES NZ tvlilk Products, Petaluma develops 3 generic lactalbumin
hydrolysates
October 1984 Good quality lactalbumin hydrolysed at Opotiki
November 1985 Japanese company asks Dairy Board to produce a non-bitter
hydrolysed casein product for infant formula (Alatal 817
offered but unaccePtable)
lgg5-E8 MAF tests hydrolysates as potential insect attractants, but then
loses interest
lgs1 NZ 1,4;lkProducts in Europe identifies potential market for
hydrolysed products Alatal815, 816 and 817 in sports food,
health and diet food fields
June l9E7 Potential market for non-allergenic hydrolysates for infant
products identified
May l9g9 NZDRI develops new method to test for free amino acid levels
in hydrolysed products
August l9t9 Success with 'Project Nina' membrane fractionation achieved
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January 1990 In response to customer requests, research is canied out at
Petaluma and in NZDRI using lactalbumin and whey protein
concentrates
l99l Hydrolysates work structured as a programme of its own
Mid-1991 Initial concept discussion between NZ Milk Products Europe
and NZ Mlk Products (USA)
December 1991 Development of pilot-scale samples and submission to potential
customers
January 1992 Formulation of a development plan
January-May 1992 Process optimisation
August-
October 1992 NZDRI scale-up trials
December 1992 Selection of site for commercialisation
Februara 1993 Full-scale trials
Jenuara-
March 1993 Plant design, installation and modification
April 1993 Production commences




CASE 6: LOIN BONER INNOVATION
Introduction
The loin boner is a meat processing machine that removes the rear part of the
backbone from the attached (longissimus dorsi) muscle tissue of lambs' The loin
boner was developed by MIRINZ's Boning and Cutting project in association with
Richmond Ltd. It was fully commercialised in 1990'
The loin boner is a major technical and commercial success. It increases meat yield by
between l0-l5o/o, throughput by up to 30Yo, reduces labour costs and produces a
more consistent and better quality product. For a typical meat processing plant, the
machine pays for itself in about 8 months, or in about 4 months with a double shift
operation.
Background
The development of the loin boner must be seen in its wider institutional, market and
technical context.
Institutional Backeround
The Meat Industry Research Institute of New Zealand (!vm'hlz) was established in
1955 to undertake research in support of the meat industry. In the early years
MIRINZ was funded by Government, the Meat Industry Association (NflA) and the
Meat producers Board. MIRINZ started as a scientifically-based research institute
and later developed a strong applied engineering capability. This engineering
capability included provision of workshop and engineering services to support the
Institute's research effort. Over time, MIRINZ set up special engineering projects
involved with automation and processing, with each project headed by an engineering
manager.
l8l
The loin boner was developed during a period of major institutional change within
MIRINZ, By 1988 MIRINZ's government grant had been replaced by a system of
direct contracting between itself and DSIR. In 1989 Government radically
restructured its science poliry, with public research funding pooled and allocated on a
contestable basis by the Foundation for Researctq Science and Technology (FRST)'
In 1988 the collapse of Waitaki International Ltd, turmoil in the sheep industry, and a
threat of withdrawal of funding from the Meat Industry Association (MA) was
placing MIRINZ under a lot of pressure. The MIA agreed to extend funding for I
year and this gave MIRINZ management the opportunity to reappraise its strategy
and to take a more cofirmercial approach to its business.
After a review by Denis Hussey and David Campbell of ACIL in Australia a Meat
Research and Development Council (MRDC) was formed in 1990' The MRDC is
funded by a levy on slaughtered stock. The MRDC was initially intended to be
independent but in fact acts as an ann of the Meat Board, and it has not been entirely
free of meat industry politics.
Over 1988/89 Dr Doug Wright, the Director of MIRINZ, and the MIRINZ executive
implemented major changes to help it cope with the new environment' The MIRINZ
executive approved the Institute's involvement in international marketing of
technology and technical cooperation, and the membership base of MIRINZ was
expanded. The Institute also sought to expand its commercial earnings away from its
reliance on the major funding agencies.
Manaeement of Technological Innovation within MIRJNZ
MIRINZ learnt early on that successful innovation in the meat industry requires
dialogUe with companies at the conceptual stage, to ensure that developments address
real problems, and that commercially unrealistic specifications do not become locked
in, Often MIRINZ developments focus on a bottleneck to production" such as labour
costs in processing, shelf life of meat or meat tenderness, where clear perfonnance
goals can be set and used to provide a specific and commercially measurable focus for
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the research. Typically, machinery developments vary in time-frame depending on the
complexity of the task, funding, and the availability of equipment and facilities' The
development of an innovation from project proposal to full commercial adoption can
take from just over a year to almost 8 years (WickhanL 1992)'
MIRINZ has a very plilmed approach to management of its mechanioal engineering
innovations. MIRINZ typically sets up a management cornmittee to oversee its major
technological developments. The management committee normally comprises
representatives from industry, the R&D funders and MIRINZ. A project manager is
appointed to manage each development, reporting to the management committee'
This management structure has the benefit of a clearly identifiable project leader,
industry involvement from inception, and a high degree of "ownership" from dl the
major players.
At the time of the loin boner development, the approach taken by Doug Wright was
to ensure that a project team was established and to let it "get on with the job"
without too much top-down control. Project managers were accountable for the
outcome and given a high degree of management flexibility over the process of getting
there. This approach proved very successful in the case of the loin boner'
Market Backsround
While New Zealand produces less than lYo of the world's meat productioq its share
of international trade is higtr, with over 50% of the world's sheep meat trade. About
95% of lamb and 55o/o of mutton production is exported (Hussey, 1992)'
The production of export lamb cuts increased from 61,000 tonnes in l98l to 160,000
tonnes in 1991, corresponding with a decline in exports of unprocessed lamb carcases'
The move over this decade from the export of carcases to lamb cuts meant that meat
companies had to place more emphasis on the performance and productivity of their
boning rooms.
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In the early 1980s the meat industry was faced with over-production of some types of
sheep meat, such as mutton, with much of this over-production resulting from the
Livestock Incentive Scheme introduced in the mid-1970s, and Supplementary
Minimum prices (SMPs) introduced in 1978. The existence of a "mutton mountain"
of carcases to process stimulated interest in automated meat processing and led to the
development ofthe frame boner.
The economic reforms initiated by the Labour Government in 1984 had a dramatic
effect on the meat industry. Subsidies for the sheep industry were removed by 1985
and contraction in sheep numbers from the mid-1980s eventually led to a decline in
slaughterings and exacerbated over-capacity problems in the meat industry'
In the mid to late 1980s the reliability and cost of labour was a major issue, with high
absenteeism, high Accident Compensation Commission (ACC) costs due to
workplace injuries, and a greater overall processing cost structure than is the case
today. The labour productivity of sheep processing in the mid-1980s was far below
what it was for other animal-based industries, and the sheep industry was conscious of
the need to compete against beef,, pork and poultry, all of which had lower processing
costs per kilogram. For example, in the mid-1980s person hours to dress 10,000 kg
of edible meat were as follows:
Table 1: Person Hours to Dress 10,000 kg of Edible Meat



















Early attempts at automated machine boning failed to produce good results, primarily
because the variation in bone size and lack of uniformity in animals from the same
breed, and even the same grade, meant that too many variables were unpredictable'
Unlike automation of cars, whiteware or other products where all sizes' angles and
other parameters are predictable, no two animal carcases are exactly the same' This
has imposed severe limitations on mechanical engineering-based automation of meat
processing, and has posed major technical difficulties in applying more advanced
sensory technology and robotisation to meat processing'
In the late 1970s mechanical technology was developed to invert carcases to facilitate
manual and mechanical pelt removal. This paved the way for a series of inverted
dressing machines to perform a range of tasks. In the early 1980s MIRINZ licensed
Ellis Hardie Symington (later to become APV) and MacEwans Machinery to
commercialise dressing machinery emerging from MIRINZ',s mechanical dressing
project. Millers Mechanical worked with Ellis Hardie Symington/APV and in 1993
Apv's licence was formally assigned to Millers. tn l99l MacEwans Machinery's
licence was assigned to an Australian company, Construct Engineering' Much of the
work on inverted dressing was led by Dr Graeme Longdill, who later became head of
the Development Engineering Division of MIRINZ. Longdill and others at this time
encountered baniers to adoption of technology resulting from poor labour relations in
the meat industry, and companies faced great opposition from workers to technology
that was seen as labour saving or deskilling'
In the early 1980s key people in MIRINZ such as Lyn Frazerhurst, then head of the
Development Engineering Division, and later Graeme Longdill, Project Manager of
the Mechanical Dressing project, began to focus on the whole cost structure of sheep
carcase processing, and the potential for automation to reduce labour costs' The early
focus was on improved mechanical processing, although MIRINZ and other research
agencies also began assessing robotics, with a long-term vision of fully automating
meat processing Plants.
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MIRINZ's involvement in machine boning from the early 1980s focused on reducing
labour costs and producing structurally intact, whole-tissue product with high
consumer appeal. The mechanical processing work was organised into a mechanical
dressing project and a machine boning project, with each of these projects controlled
by management committees from the meat industry.
In 1983 MIRINZ began development of a frame boner machine to remove the soft
sides from whole mutton carcases, that is to remove all muscle tissue on the outside
of the skeletal frame. The first two years of this work used an experimental prototype
to establish the principles, and by 1985/86 the focus was on the design and
construction of a prototype machine for boning over the ribcage and down to the
pelvis. In the mid-1980s a proprietary pork shoulder boning machine adapted for
mutton was tested in a commercial boning room, and this work further assisted in
developing MIRINZ's skill-base in the area (MIRINZ, 1985, p. 2l). By this time,
MIRINZ had also built up very substantial research experience in shoulder and leg
boning.
The Innovation
Alan Dean was a production manager in Richmond Ltd in 1988 and was responsible,
inler alia, for the further processing of lamb cuts at a number of the company's
plants. At this time boneless loin eye muscle was in demand, but the manual boning
was labour intensive and produced low yields and a variable quality product'
Richmond depended therq as now, on external sources of technology' The company
was aware of the need to improve productivity and performance and was conscious of
the need to search out and adopt external ideas and sources ofinnovation.
In 1988 a group from Richmond Ltd that included Alan Dean visited MIRINZ and
inspected a number of its recent developments, including the frame boner' A
production protoqpe of the frame boner had been successfully trialed at MIRINZ in
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1988. At trialing stage the frame boner successfully boned two soft sides from the
skeletal frame with yields comparable to good manual boning standards, and generally
achieved excellent meat qualitY.
While the frame boner proved too complex and unwieldy for the practical needs of the
meat industry, Alan Dean was struck by the potential for part of the frame boner to be
adapted to the boning out of the loin muscle. The two components identified by Dean
were the marking down knives and the flexible disc and plough combination. These
two components could be combined for the removal of loin eye meat (part of the
longissimus dorsi muscle) from lamb loins (lumbar vertebrae). Dean discussed with
colleagues in Richmond the potential for machine boning of loins' Shortly after, he
approached Gordon Wickham (then Project Manager of MIRINZ's Boning and
Cutting Project) at a meat research conference, and asked whether it was possible to
isolate the loin boning part of the frame boner and turn it into a stand-alone
innovation.
The loin boner was not therefore developed in isolation but formed part of a
continuum of sheep meat engineering process innovations beginning in the late 1970s.
While the loin boner was a development from the frame boner, the loin boner itself
formed the technical platform for the later chine and feather boner development, and
also for later work on beef and pork boning.
MIRINZ technologists such as Gordon Wickham were keen to see the technologies
developed as part of the frame boner applied in industry, especially since by this stage
it was clear that the frame boner was unlikely to be a major commercial succ€ss. In
response to the interest from Richmond, Wickham and his team, drawing on the
technology developed for the frame boner, began work on a machine that focused
purely on the boning out of loins. This work was assisted by the mechanical
engineering services section of MIRINZ and the associated workshops' The
management committee that guided the development of the frame boner essentially
carried on to oversee the development of the loin boner.
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The first stage of development was to produce a machine that could remove the eye
muscle from the backbone of a carcase. In the case of the frame boner a flexible disc
was used to push the meat offthe spinal column. These discs were made of stainless
steel spiral wires in a continuous loop that followed the natural curve of the rib cage'
The flexible disc gave good meat yield but was difficult to manufacture to a consistent
quality and there were concerns about its service life. Faced with these difficulties,
and after discussion between MIRINZ and industry people, it was decided in the case
of the loin boner to move to a plough device to follow the bone contours and remove
the meat that waY.
Some technical problems were encountered due to variations in the size and shape of
the carcase vertebrae. In early trials the fixed width of the plough was too natrow
and the cut-out rate wasn't high enough. The response was to produce ploughs of
varying height and width, to accommodate the range of animal sizes likely to be
encountered over a typical processing season.
Alan Dean and his Richmond colleagues worked closely with MIRINZ during the
early stages of the development. Richmond was especially concerned to ensure that
the innovation would not be too big or too expensive to install and integrate into the
plant operations. Dean visited MIRINZ and provided input both on the test bench
model and prototype, and participated in trials on the prototype using meat supplied
by Richmond.
The relationship between Richmond and MIRINZ Save a sharp commercial focus to
the development, with the company clearly signalling commercial requirements
relating to the size, benchmark price and throughput needed for the machine to be a
commercial success. MIRINZ had good industry links and has had less of a tendency
than most research institutes to develop technology on a "science push" basis, without
acknowledging the need to focus on real industry problems, and to meet the cost'
functionality and practical operational requirements of companies' Dean was crucial
in supplying practical input, and also in maintaining relationships with meat plant staff
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who ultimately had to make it work. He was also adept at screening out "science-
push" technology that failed to meet industry needs.
With major progress made in the boning of loins, a further opportunity was seen to
remove the muscle from the whole of the saddle from the fifth rib right back to the
end of the lumbar vertebrae. The management committee was actively involved all
through the process, and made the decision to extend the machine to debone saddles.
The machine eventually developed therefore performed 2 functions and became a
loin/saddle boner.
Trialine
Trialing of meat processing equipment in working plants is crucial to successful
commercialisation. Trialing at a plant, and if necessary redevelopment based on
experience with trialing, is an integral part of the research because meat processing
innovations tend to succeed or fail on practical performance in the difficult working
environment of a meat plant. This is especially important given the variability in
animal size and condition, so that prototype trialing in a research lab may test only a
small number of the parameters and variables actually encountered in a commercial
plant. The trialing phase is also important in identifying the likely service life of
components.
Dean and a colleague trialed meat on the prototype loin boner at MIRINZ' By the
time the first prototype was trialed at Richmond's plant at Oringi most teething
problems had been solved, and while adjustments needed to be made at Oringi, there
were no major technical shortcomings in the machine. Adjustments were done by
Richmond stafi, but with some technical assistance from MIRINZ.
The trialing conducted on site at the Oringi plant focused on the machine's
performance in a working environment. Trialing can be quite a sensitive process with
some companies, since companies involved in trials are future customers for the
innovation, and MIRINZ's pricing of machines reflects the likely commercial benefits'
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Some meat companies were not always open about all the commercial benefits of a
machine for this reasor\ and even where most variables were measurable, it was not
always easy to quantify the detailed commercial benefits. However, the relationship
between MIRINZ and Richmond staff was excellent during this period, and the
openness and free exchange of ffirmation was a key success factor'
Adoption of the Innovation within the Company
Key MIRINZ managers such as Doug Wright and Graeme Longdill had built up
extensive experience in commercialising innovations in industry, and were aware of
some of the pitfalls. For example, dif6culties had been experienced with the
CAPTECH technology, a major packaging innovation that drew on in-depttq basic
scientific research. The CAPTECH technology had been released too soon" to
companies that lacked understanding of the basic microbiological science and were
inclined to take short cuts. This threatened the credibility of CAPTECH in the
market.
The experience with innovations such as CAPTECH shaped MIRINZ's attitudes to
the .,people side" of technology implementation. MIRINZ insisted in contracts with
companies adopting the loin boner that staff be trained, and that MIRINZ would be
involved in the setting up of machinery until company staff were familiar with and
understood the technologY.
A major chaltenge in meat automation was managing its workplace and social
impacts, especially given concerns about unemployment, poor labour relations in the
meat industry, and the strength of trade unions at the time the loin boner was
developed. MIRINZ had itself addressed these concerns and Doug Wright met with a
Meat Workers union leader to discuss the issues. The key arguments advanced by
MIRINZ in favour of automation were that without it the industry would be
uncompetitive in the long run, and that automation could improve the quality and
safety ofjobs by automating the dirty, dangerous and more repetitive tasks'
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Richmond generally had good labour relations at Oringi, and management and staff
had a history of working together on innovation and process improvement, for
example on developing new meat cuts. Manual loin boning was seen by workers as a
*fiddly'' and less popular job. Workers were paid on the number of carcases they
could process, and increased throughput due to the machine countered any potential
for job losses. A crucial point was that boners already employed had job securiry and
while the machine led to major labour productivity gains, these did not threaten the
existing jobs of staffalready employed.
Boning room workers therefore actively facilitated the development of the innovation,
and put forward their own suggestions on the location and other aspects of the
adoption of the machine. Because staff were involved at the trialing stage they
understood the technology, how it worked, and the impact it would have in the
workplace when it came to be adopted. All these factors greatly assisted the
successful commercialisation of the innovation.
The safety committee at the Richmond plant approved the machine and MAF verified
that hygiene requirements would be met. Other companies then came to view the
machine at the Richmond plant. While these companies were competitors, the
commercial advantage to Richmond came from obtaining the first two machines at a
major discount, and gaining a market edge from being the first to adopt it' Richmond
had about a year in which it was the only company operating the loin boner, and this
gave it an expanded market share as the higher throughput of the machine allowed it
to meet unsatisfied customer demand. Other companies then adopted the machine
and began to catch uP in the market.
Commercialisation and Ma rketing
MIRINZ had an active patenting policy and patenting was normally completed before
innovations went into plants. However, MIRINZ's commercialisation and marketing
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strategy for the loin boner centred on manufacturing the machine itselt and
demonstrating its technical advantages and economic benefits.
Manufacture of the Machine
To better capture some of the benefits of the innovation and to ensure quality control
in the commercialisation of the technology, MIRINZ decided to not only develop the
machine but manufacture and market it as well. While this created some consern
among engineering companies that had traditionally manufactured and commercialised
MIRINZ innovations, it allowed the Institute to move further down the value cha[\
and significantly contributed to its ability to strategically manage the
commercialisation and marketing of the technology and to earn more of a return from
its success.
Technical Advantages
The loin boner had some major technical advantages that became the selling points in
the commercialisation and marketing of the machine. These were:
Increased Yield
The loin boner increased meat yield by 10-15%. Compared to manual boning, meat
yield is improved due to the superior consistency and repeatability of machine boning,
and machine boning is better suited to following the contours of a carcase, especially
when the bones are not of a predictable shape. Manual boning can only approach the
meat yield of machine boning if an inordinate amount of time is spent on it'
Increased Throughput
One machine operator can prooess 6 carcases per minute with a loin boner while a
manual boner will only process about L5 carcases in the same period.
t92
Consistency and Appearance
While the output and quality of manual boning is influenced by a host of factors such
as tiredness, the time of day or week, or skill levels and experience, machine boning
produces much more consistent and predictable results. The loin boner removes meat
more cleanly and meat is free of nicks caused by knife cuts in the muscle'
Occapational Health
Tiredness and the speed or repetitive nature of manual boning leads to occupational
health problems, including OOS, accidents and psychological stress. The loin boner in
contrast separates the cutting device from the operator, and improves the safety and
quality of the job. This reduces accident rates and other costs associated with
occupational health and safetY.
Meat Hygiene
Meat hygiene is crucial to the shelf life and market acceptability of chilled products.
Machine boning reduces product handling by human hands, with potential benefits in
meat hygiene. There are, however, still some unresolved issues relating to the ease of
cleaning the loin boner.
Fit Between Technologt and the Workplace
The loin boner is a user-friendly machine that has a good fit with the workplace, in the
sense that it is relatively small, to a great extent it can be tuned and maintained by
company staffwithout too much reliance on MIRINZ, and it is a stand-alone machine
that does not have to be integrated into a large chain'
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Economic Benefits
The above technical advantages of the loin boner translated into measurable economic
benefits that were quantified by MIRINZ (Ng, 1992).
About 27 million lambs were slaughtered in the lggllg2 season. Assuming thwt}Of/o
of the annual kill of 27 million lambs was processed into short loins and racks, and
that a machine was operated on a single shift for 230 days a yetr' the following
economic benefits occur:
Table 2: Economics of the Loin Boner
Base Data
Labour $170 per 420 minute shift day (40 cents/minute)
Cost of installed machine $150,000
Capital charges 27o/o made up of l0oZ interest, 1004
dePreciatior\7% R&M
Machine charges 42 cents per minute
Processing Costs Per Unit
Manual boning




machiie boning 54 cents per carcase (12% or 369 per carcase)
Processing rate 6 carcases per minute
Labour cost 6.7 cents Per carcase
Consumables 1.5 cents Per carcase
Net gain per carcase: 65.5 cents
Total Economic Benefits
Estimated actual benefit in l99ll2 $2m annually
Potential benefit to the industry: $3.5m annually
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Pricins and Sales
MIRINZ felt confident enough to "take a gamble" on making 2-3 of the machines,
funding their manufacture from a previous year's financial surplus' The figure of
around $100,000 seemed, in 1989, to be about the benchmark price that companies
were prepared to pay for a machine with the performance of the loin boner. MIRINZ
made significant profits on each machine sale. Some companies criticised MIRINZ
for its pricing policy for the loin boner, and in response to this MIRINZ gave a
discount on the machine in the first year to companies that had contributed through
the Meat Industry Association to past MIRINZ boning and cutting research.
The release of the innovation was quickly followed by a substantial number of orders
as New Zealand meat companies saw the success Richmond was achieving with it.
Several were sold in Australia. MIRINZ staff found that Australian companies were
technologically some way behind New Zealand competitors, including in having the
engineers on site who could assist in the adoption of the technology' The decision to
market the machine overseas generated some ill-feeling in the industry' However, by
this time MIRINZ had lost guaranteed industry funding and was expected to operate
as a commercial organisation. Overseas sales were also important in MIRNZ
achieving international credibility, and the Institute has subsequently benefited
substantially from overseas contracts in the meat processing machinery field'
By mid-1992 19 loin boners were operating in New Zealand and overseas, and by this
time more than 60% of New Zealand's export lamb loins were processed on the loin
boner (MIRINZ, 1992).
Benefits to MIRINZ
The success of the loin boner had a very positive impact within MIRINZ' A major
gain to the Institute was the development of commercial skills and confidence from
carrying through an innovation to full commercialisation within a tight time-frame,
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capturing substantial benefits, and achieving credibility internationally as well as in
New Zealand.
The loin boner success encouraged further innovations such as the chine and feather
boner that drew on the skill-base that had been built up. The basic technology could
be adapted to other animals, including beef and pigs. In october l99l the Beef
Boning Project was begun, with an initial focus on loin boning' In 1993 MIRINZ
won a prestigious $l million international contract for the development of a pork loin
boning machine. This project was funded by a joint venture between the UK Meat
and Livestock Commission and the Japan Meat Technology Institute'
Background of Key PeoPle
Dr Graeme Longdill joined MIRINZ in 1973 as a mechanical engineer' He then
completed a PhD in mechanical engineering at Auckland University, with support
from MIRINZ. Longdill headed the mechanical dressing project that developed the
inverted dressing system for sheep chains. At the time the loin boner was developed
Longdill was head of MIRINZ's Development Engineering Division, and in l99l he
was appointed Director of MIRINZ.
Dr Doug Wright was appointed Director of MIRINZ in 1987. He led MIRINZ
through a period of major change in the late 1980s, and managed the Institute while
the loin boner was being developed.
Gordon Wickham was Project Manager of the Boning and Cutting project at the time
the loin boner was developed. Wickham came from a farming background, did an
aircraft apprenticeship with the NAC, and then spent several years working with VSA
in a number of under-developed countries. His time overseas included very diverse
and practical work in applied technology and mechanical engineering' He then
worked as a design engineer for Alcan, before completing a BE in mechanical
engineering at university. After some university work in data processing he joined
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MIRINZ in 1984, becoming Project Manager of the Boning and Cutting Project in
1987. In 1990 he was appointed manager of the Shoulder Boning Project'
Weng Ng was born in Malaysia and came to New Zealand as a mature student' He
qualified in engineering at Canterbury and Auckland universities and spent some years
in the car industry in materials handling and quality assurance. He then worked from
l98l to 1987 in the agricultural machinery industry. He also completed polytechnic
papers in electronics and electricat engineering. He joined MIRINZ in 1988, bringing
to the Institute his strong background in mechanical design and engineering. Weng Ng
was involved in, and made a major contribution to, the trialing stage of the loin boner
innovation.
Alan Dean was brought up on a farm and has spent his entire career in the meat
industry, working as a farm worker, meat inspector and in virttrally all major tasks in
meat processing plants. He also completed a meat technolory course at Massey
University. He was a production manager for Richmond at the time the loin boner
was initiated. He has spent 12 years with Richmond, initially as a production
manager, then as technical manager, and is now plant manager at Richmond's Otaki
plant.
Conclusions
The loin boner was a major technical and commercial success for MIRINZ, and has
achieved very signifrcant economic benefits for the meat industry' The major
advantage of the loin boner was not in fact the intended savings in labour costs, but
rather the improved meat yield. This was important at a time when there were major
concerns about the effects of automation on employment. While MIRINZ earned
substantial commercial income from the loin boner, the real economic benefits have
been captured by the meat companies. MIRINZ, for example, earned probably
around $2 million gross from the sale of about 20 machines, and yet the innovation is
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earning the meat industry as a whole around $2 million each year on an ongoing
basis.
It took MIRINZ only about a year to develop the loin boner, trial it in a plant, and
bring it to a stage where it could be brought into full commercial production. This
was a very tight time-frame for such an innovation. The speed and success can really
be attributed to the cumulative technical platform that had already been created by the
frame boner, the facilities and competencies available in MIRINZ, and the simple and
effective project management structure available in the Institute' The drive and
initiative of those involved such as Wickham, Ng and Dean, the rapport between
MIRINZ and meat company staff, and the ability of key players such as Wickham and
Dean to communicat e at a similar technical level were key success factors'
The "mini-task force" approach of a management committee that marshalled and
directed industry interest was essential to the success of the loin boner. The high level
backing of Doug Wright and Graeme Longdill, and their willingness to let Wickham
and his team "get on with the job" were vital.
Where both management and boning room staff supported an innovation it went
smoothly, but MIRINZ found in other innovations that top-level management
commitment is inadequate without involvement, a feeling of being part of the decision
making, and a sense of ownership from working people. For example, Fortex top
management was a "fast adopter" of new technology but took a top-down approach,
whereas in Richmond key people in the plants were involved and decisions on
adoption were more devolved and taken on a plant by plant basis. In the same way,
interest and commitment from the workforce will be stymied by management if the
top level is not adequately committed.
The loin boner was really based on integrating existing technology into a system and
applying it in a new way. The loin boner is "appropriate technology" that was a
relatively simple way of addressing a problem, rather than being based on the most
scientifically advanced solution. A key to the loin boner's success is that it focuses on
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doing one specific job in meat processing. Ambitious visionaries have sought to
automate, robotise and transform whole meat plants. Attempts at innovations that aim
to transform whole industries at one stroke seem to fail, and a key to the success of
the loin boner is that it aims to do one nalrow and specific job.
The loin boner worked because the scientific side of the innovation did not override
the practical functionality of the machine, and its application in a meat plant
environment. However, in the longer term specific and focused applications of
machine vision, robotics and advanced sensory technology may have the potential to
achieve major performance gains in automated meat processing (see Automation and
Control, 1993a).
Postscript
Further engineering and automation development work continues at MIRINZ, but the
chances of adoption are severely limited by the collapse of a number of major
companies such as Fortex and Weddells, by low profitability and associated short-
termism in the industry. Companies are now looking for a payback period of 6-12
months for new engineering innovations. Because the total size of the machinery
market is small, MIRINZ lacks the economies of scale in production that could allow
it to greatly reduce the unit price of new engineering developments' Much meat
processing machinery is only used on a seasonal basis, so the return on an automation
investment is obviously limited where plant is operated only for part of ayear' Many
of today's industry problems are structural or related to procurement difficulties and
excess capacity, rather than being technological or labour productivity problems'
At the time the loin boner was developed MIRINZhad funds available for trialing, so
that the cost to the companies involved could be minimised. In the 1990s, MIRINZ
no longer has such discretionary funds to spare. When the loin boner was developed
technologists such as Gordon Wickham had a high degree of flexibility to change
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dirwtion, but now fixed term contracts, especially those with industry funders, are
agreed to in advance, leading to a lot of inflexibility in the system.
MIRINZ now has a number of developments "on the shelf' awaiting trial, but the
MRDC and FRST are reluctant to fund further work which is seen as appropriable by
companies. This itself may raise the issue of whether there is a gap in the public and
private mechanisms to support technology transfer and associated trialing'
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Appendir I
Key Events in the Loin Boner Innovation
Key Events
lgTS MIRINZ begins work on mechanical dressing in conjunction
with DSIR urd Meat Industry Association
1933 MIRINZ Boning and cutting Project begins work on
mechani sing boning oPerations
1983
1984
Work begins on the frame boner
Gordon Wickham joins MIRINZ
June 19tt WengNgjoinsMIRINZ
July 1988 Prototype frame boner successfully trialed at MIRINZ
lgSS Richmond Ltd identifies potential for machine rernoval of
boneless loin eye meat
1989 Loin boner successfullY trialed
December 1989 First loin boner installed
October 1991 BeefBoning project begins




MIRINZ's Boning Machinery Development Process
MIRINZ has generally used the following formalised process in its development of
meat boning innovations:
Stage l: Project ProPosal
o With industry input, identiff the potential development area and quanti$
requirements
o Research the potential benefits for the process, the processor and the industry
o Formulate and submit proposal(s) for funding to R&D funder(s)
o Granting of funding
Stage 2: Bench Scale Testing
o Finalise the specifications of the product entering and leaving the boning
process
o Finalise the machine performance specifications necessary to meet the
requirements, eg. production rate, minimum and maximum product size,
maximum machine dimensions, and desired number of operators
o Generate ideas for possible ways of performing the required boning process
r prioritise these ideas, then bench test them in order of priority to identi& the
likely boning process solutions
Stage 3: Proof of ConcePt
o From successful bench test results, construct, test and develop proof-of-
concept process(es) and machine(s)
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Stage 4: Production PrototYPe
o From the successful proof-of-concept stage, desigfr, construct and trid in
MIRINZ a production prototlpe machine. This machine would be
manufactured to a standard of hygiene and safety acceptable for use in meat
plant boning rooms
Stage 5: IndustrA Trials
o Trial production prototype machine in a meat plant boning room under normal
boning room operating conditions
o Collect and record information on machine performance, production rates
achieved yields obtained, manning requirements, product consistency and/or
quality achieved
o Compile and release trial results to industry
o On verification that the machine meets specification requirements for both
product and machine, commercially release machine
Stage 6r Commercial Manufacture
r The technology owner(s) select a licensee
r The licensee manufactures and markets the machine
(Wickham, 1992, p.318)
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CASE 7: TREOTEK IhINOVATION
Introduction
Treotek is a wool spinning innovation that allows fine yarns to be produced from
coarse New Zealand cross-bred wools, and superfine yarns to be produoed from New
Zealandfine wools. The Treotek technology was developed by the Wool Research
Organisation of New Zealand (WRONZ) and commercialised with Alliance Textiles,
with some assistance from the Government's Emerging Technologies (later the
Technology for Business Growth) programme.
The Treotek process is known as 'tri-component spinning'. Tri-component spinning
uses two non-wool filaments to capture and support the wool fibres during spinning'
Of the 2 non-wool yarns, one runs through the yarn while the other wraps around the
outside. As a result as few as 20 fibres rather than the 40-50 normally required can be
oontained in the yarn cross section. This means that markedly finer yarns can be spun
from New Zealand wools without sacrificing yarn strength or processing efficiency'
Treotek yarn is spun at Alliance Knitting Yarns in Mosgiel, and is woven at Alliance
Fabric and Apparel in Timaru, as well as by Norwellan Textiles in Australia and John
Fosters in England.
Background
The development of Treotek must be seen in its wider institutional, industrial, market
and technical context.
Institutional B ackground
WRONZ,s roots go back to the 1930s. In 1938 the Wool Industries Research
Institute (WRI) was set up to provide technical support for New Zealand's many
small woollen mills. In 1957 the wool scourers joined WIRL After the New Zealand
Wool Board recognised the need for a scientific base for the wool industry and set up
a scientific advisory committee the Wool Research Organisation was established by
Act of Parliament in 1961. Some of the science needs of the sector at this time were
met by wool Board grants to the International wool Secretariat (Iws) in London.
In 1968 WIRI was merged with the wool Research organisation to form wRoNZ.
This organisation focused initially on basic researctq but over time WRONZ's focus
has moved from basic scientific research to more applied technological development'
Over WRONZ's existence the breakdown of scientific research to technological
development would be about 30:70 (Carnaby, 1994, p' 5)' In l97l WRONZ
established a textile processing plant at Lincoln that formed the basis for an expanded
capability in applied technology and product and process development'
Since its formation WRONZ has produced well over 1000 technical papers' patents
and articles and grown in size from 33 to around 133 staff. It has a remarkable record
of technological innovation which, for economic impact and in proportion to the size
of the organisation, compares very favourably with any other New Zealand research
institute. WRONZ has several world-class inventors on its staff and all share a gfeat
faith in their own ideas, personal drive and the ability to sustain high levels of energy
and enthusiasm in turning ideas into commercial reality'
WRONZ now operates as an independent incorporated society with its own directors.
It is funded by the Wool Board, the Foundation for Research, Science and
Technology (FRST) and by commercial clients from the private sector' The Wool
Board uses levy funds to support selected research projects while FRST funds more
strategic and underpinning research. Neither organisation seeks to directly manage or
control the technology and the mission of WRONZ is to use its technology to
improve the economic competitiveness of the New Zealand wool and wool-using
industry, thereby enhancing returns to wool growers'
WRONZ from about the early 1980s began to move away from concentrating solely
on process innovations that would benefit the wool industry as a whole and started to
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focus as well on niche product development. An obvious goal was to produce new
products from coarse wool that would be able to compete in the higher added-value
markets occupied by fine wool or by synthetics' fui early attempt to establish a
WRONZ presence in product development was the appointment of an experienced
textile technologist, Keith Jowsey. However, at this time WRONZ's links with textile
companies were less developed and the industry had less interest in innovation
because of tariff protection. Attempts at this time to move into knitwear were not
successfu lly commercialised.
However, in 1982 Jack Watt was appointed to WRONZ and the Institute began to
develop a comperency around him. From about 1989 this appointment started to pay
big dividends to WRONZ and to the industry and this area now represents around
25Yo of WRONZ's activity. Jack watt, Dr Peter Ingram and Ian McFarlane are
among the key researchers in this field. In addition to its current director, Dr Garth
Carnaby, Keith Jowsey and Jack Watt, WRONZ in the lead up to the Treotek
development had built up significant skills in wool processing and yarn spinning
through recruits such as Dr Jim Lappage and Dr Nigel Johnson. Dr Lappage was a
highly regarded wool processing specialist who, before joining WRONZ, was
involved in the development of Sirospun in CSIRO. Dr Nigel Johnson was recruited
by WRONZ from his former yarn manufacturing lectureship at the University of New
South Wales.
In the late 1980s WRONZ began to reduce its dependence on Wool Board and
Government funding by building up more income from direct contracts with
companies. This strategy was given great impetus by Dr Garth Carnaby who' as
Deputy Director at the time, was responsible for expanding WRONZ's private sector
income. This focused WRONZ on the "sharp edge" of trading the currency of its
technology to companies competing in the consumer market' As at 1993194 33Vo of
WRONZ's income was earned from the private sector, 25Yo from FRST nd 42%
from wool growers (Labes, 1994, p' l5).
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Alliance Textiles Backsround
Alliance Tentiles developed from a number of small mills established in towns such as
Oamaru and Timaru in the late lgth century and grew up behind protective trade
barriers. The company in its modern form emerged with the takeover of the Timaru
Worsted and Woollen Mills Ltd by Oamaru Worsted and Woollen Mills Ltd in 1960,
to form Alliance Textiles (Mclean, l98l). In 1980 Alliance Textiles bought out
Mosgiel Ltd from its receivers.
Alliance Te:rtile's fortunes were driven largely by cyclical commodity prices
determined overseas, and research and innovation played a peripheral role in its
business strategy. In the early 1980s, in the lucid description of one commentator:
The previous generation of [Alliance Textilesl 6anagement had tived through an era of
feeling that only tarifrprotection and export incentives, subsidies in some form or another'
made a textile industry in New Z.ealandviable at all, and that they were fighting a rearguard
action against attrition and the eventual disappearance of the textile indrstry here' So it was
rather negative protective thinking...it seemed to me to be largely a collection of agtng
[menl hoping that the company would hold together long enough for them to reach
retirement age.
By the mid-1980s Alliance had been reduced to a limited product range and its
technology was outdated. The Labour Government elected in 1984 initiated a
process of trade liberalisation and lowering or removal of protective tariffs and this,
together with the 1987 sharemarket craslq meant that the company's future became
uncertain. In 1989 Alliance Textiles was a subsidiary company of R&W Hellaby Ltd
which was itself a subsidiary of Renouf Corporation, a publiclyJisted company' The
company's product line consisted of wootlen yiuns, including carpet yafns' woollen
fabrics, hand knitting yarns, weaving and machine knitting yarns and Swanndri
clothing. It had mills in Oamaru, Timaru, Mosgiel and Milton, but divisions in the
company such as Alliance Knitting Yarns in Mosgiel and Alliance Fabric and Apparel
in Timaru acted as an integrated group of companies.
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Industry Backsround
New Zealand is the world's largest producer of coarse wool, the third largest wool
producing country in the world and is responsible for around hdf the world's exports
of coarse wools (flussey, 1992, p.190). However, wool is a relatively minor fibre in
an intensely competitive world market and its price is determined by international
demand from offl-shore textile processors.
New Zealand's sheep industry is based on multi-purpose sheep that produce both
meat and wool, rather than sheep such as the merino that are farmed for fine wool
production. New Zealand's wool clip is largely coarse wools of around 35 microns,
which are less suited to high value applications such as quality clothing. Demand for
coarse wools grew up around machine made and hand knotted carpets, bedding,
upholstery and some apparel. This is a narow range of applications and the New
Zealandwool industry has been in a state of gradual decline from about the 1960s on'
Over the 30 years ending in l99lt2 the value of New Zealand greasy wool fell from
$2.3 billion to $0.93 billion in constant dollar terms (Labes, 1994). Over this period
production was essentially static but clean wool prices fell from $l Ukg to $4/kg'
The Wool Board's strategy from the 1960s until recent times has been to influence the
demand for New Zealand wool by generic promotion through the International Wool
Secretariat [WS) and by the export of process-related technology to improve the
efficiency of oFshore wool processing. The IWS focused on generic wool
promotion rather than supporting more differentiated strategies that promoted wool in
a wide range of different, niche-oriented applications competing in different markets.
The IWS, arguably, also tended to favour promotion of fine wools. The tWS has
tended to a narrow view of the wool market and this was sometimes reflected in a
view that WRONZ should be developing pure wool products rather than products
such as Treotek that combined wool with other materials'
The IWS has failed to reverse the long-term trend for wool to lose market share to
other fibres. Wool represents around 5olo of world fibre production compared to l0o/o
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in the early 1960s. Generic wool promotion, by favouring price competitioll' has had
the effect of benefiting producers of cheaper, commodity-type wools rather than
fostering product differentiatioq quality and functional performance. Such a strategy
has been anathema to the fostering of niche-oriented product development' However,
the IWS's strategic influence has greatly diminished in recent years'
The wool industry has sought to reverse a seemingly intractable decline in the
industry's fortunes, and the report 'strategic Directions for the Wool Industry 1992'
2000' sets a goal of achieving and maintaining the price of clean wool at $8/kg '
WRONZ has established two key inter-related strategies to achieve this: the building
up of international demand through product innovation, and increasing the value
added to New Zealand wool in early stage processes prior to export' Specifically,
WRONZ research now aims to influence world demand for wool by changing the
product mix through the development of new consumer products, especially for
higher added value niche markets, and enhancing existing wool products or reducing
their cost of manufacture.
Market Backeround
Due to lifestyle changes and consumer preferences the long-term trends in textile
apparel have been for finer, lighter and softer clothing. Ongoing investment in
synthetic fibre R&D has continually stretched the lead of these fibres over coarser
wool, with acrylic on the knitwear and polyester on the woven apparel side posing
major threats to New Zealand coarse wools. New Zealand does not have the
domestic market, scale economies or cheap labour to compete in many high volume
markets. While New Zealand has to a great extent eliminated tariff protection for
most of its industries, significant barriers exist to market access for wool products in
other countries such as the United States.
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The IWS over a period of 18 months recently invested around $8 million in a review
of global market trends and the implications for wool R&D' Dr Garth Carnaby,
WRONZ's managing director, sits on a committee that meets six monthly around the
world with marketing people from IWS and with the Chief Executive of CSIRO. And
yet the most important detailed stimulus for WRONZ has been its private sector
clients. Annual negotiation of contracts with companies is itself a valuable source of
new market-driven ideas for WRONZ, and it has been direct links with companies
that have stimulated WRONZ's niche product development activity, dbeit within a
broader global priority framework.
Technical Background
While synthetic fibre research aims to design new fibres and technologies with specific
technical and performance features, wool research has to focus on exploiting the
inherent traits of wool as a natural fibre, or changing or building in new
characteristics. A number of technical barriers have stood in the way of wool product
innovation to allow coarse wools to compete in the premium price, added value
market where products compete on quality and functional performance characteristics
rather than on price.
A fundamental technical constraint in wool processing was the need to have a twofold
warp yarn in fabrics, rather than a single yarn produced by the spinning frame' Single
yarns could not withstand the processing demands of the weaving process' Sirospur;
a CSIRO innovation, provided a technical solution to this problem and was developed
for finer wools. Sirospun was championed by the IWS but this innovation has not
been relevant to New Zealand growers of coarse wool. A second fundamental
constraint in using wool to make lightweight fabrics was the need to have at least 40-
50 fibres in a cross section of worsted yarns. Treotek was developed to solve this
technical difficulty.
Some results of earlier niche product-related research included a process for using
coarse wools in fine tropical suitings. A five year programme of joint research
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between WRONZ and the TIESC (fland Evaluation Standards Committee) resulted in
1987 in the development of luxury tropical worsted cloths containing 30-60% of 35
micron wool. The first garments made from these fabrics were released onto the
Japanese market in 1988. The main significance of this development was that it
demonstrated that coarse wools could be used to make lurury apparel and that the
technology could be developed to make the cloth fine enough and to minimise prickle'
The Innovation
The earlier research was important in building the confidence to develop processes
such as Treotek and in creating the knowledge of the science, engineering technology
and market requirements that allow new conceptual insights to occur'
Conceptual Development
The idea for a tri-component spinning technology to produce lightweight fabrics from
coarse wool came to Garth Carnaby in an aircraft high above Alaska on his way to
Japan to participate in meetings with the FIESC. The HESC is a group of weavers,
finishers, fibre producers and academics and includes around 24 Japanese companies
active in the worsted industry. Carnaby had been at the IWS centre in Yorkshire,
England examining the Sirofil innovation, a spin-offfrom Sirospun.
Garth Carnaby has around 20 patents to his credit and he submitted a patent
application for multi-component yarn in August 1988. He has been a prolific
generator of new ideas for wool-based innovations and the WRONZ needle was one
of his most striking successes. As Carnaby says of his new ideas:
...basically I work when I'm not asleep...When the penny drops a sense of absolute certainty
overcomes you about the inevitability of the technologt eclipsing what crrrrently exists' It
alt happens within an hour. An invention happens when you make mental connections
between unrelated things. The experience is the real high, because you're excited with the
possibilities.
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By the time Carnaby returned to New Zealand he had made sketches of the concept
and immediately discussed the possibilities with Jack Watt, a very experienced
WRONZ worsted technologist. Carnaby's idea was to put a very fine (non-wool)
yarn structure around wool fibres at the moment when the yarn is constructed on the
spinning frame. This tri-component process would allow the spinning of yarn with 20
rather than 40-50 wool fibres and would allow weaving as a single yarq
circumventing the need to have two foldings of the yarn.
Link with Alliance
In late l99l Alliance Textiles was in real diffrculties and its ownership structure was
in fact not fully resolved until 1993. At this time Alliance Fabric and Apparel
managers in Timaru considered limiting production to blankets and Swanndri
clothing. However, the General Manager, Alistair Colemarl recognised that limiting
the product range and staying in the commodity market with few barriers to
competition spelt long term bankruptcy for the company. Alliance Textiles responded
by building the profile of the Swanndri brand in Alliance Fabric and Apparel, and
moving into the protective clothing market niche under the Protek brand. These
tentative moves into more differentiated product niches helped lay a basis for the
move into commercialising the Treotek technolory.
The competitive pressure that Alliance Textiles was under was a stimulus to its
managers to take a risk whictr, if it paid ofl would give the company a future rather
than accept a slow decline in a price-driven commodity market. The leadership of
Bruce Munro, the company's managing director, was crucial at this point since he saw
the company's future as depending on technological innovation, skill development
workplace reform and a total quality management approach to business.
Before Treotek was developed, WRONZ and Alliance had a long standing (but not
close) relationship, and both were linked into the TIESC network' WRONZ was
anxious to build a stronger relationship with Alliance as part of its strategy to reduce
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its dependence on the Wool Board and Government funding. WRONZ's future was
bound up with Alliance since the company was by far the biggest in the New Zealand
industry and if it collapsed it would threaten the long-term viability of wool
processing in New Zealand as a whole-
The willingness and energy of WRONZ to promote and market its skills to the private
sector was fundamental to forgrng a relationship with Alliance. WRONZ had been
forced to adopt a more commercial strategy by earning money from companies rather
than rely on more stable and predictable funding from the Wool Board or
Government, and this lent urgency and focus to its strategy'
Garth Carnaby and colleagues gave a presentation to Alliance Textiles and the
enthusiasm for Treotek shone through. Carnaby drove back to Lincoln with Bruce
Munro, Alliance Textiles' Chief Executive, and they discussed the possibilities for
further cooperation in R&D. The very good working relationship and rapport
established between Munro and Carnaby laid a platform for the development of a
strong link between the two organisations and a shared commitment to Treotek.
Munro was committed to making new technology, education and training core to the
company's competitive strategy. He quickly saw the potential to exploit WRONZ
technologies and was confident enough to invest substantially in the development of
Treotek. This was a courageous move, as Alliance was in serious difficulties and
investment in Treotek was pivotat in a series of Bruce Munro initiatives that
effectively saved the company.
While WRONZ could have taken the innovation offshore to more financially stable
companies, the link with Alliance was the right approach to commercialisation since
the technology represented a lifeline to the business and it therefore had a compelling
incentive to put the resources into it and make it a success. The availability of some
public funding through the Government's Emerging Technologies Programme (later
Technology for Business Growth) programme encouraged the development, with
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Alliance Textiles and WRONZ submitting a successful joint application to this
programme in December 1989.
Technoloeical Development
Moving the tri-component concept through to full commercial development involved
a number of discrete phases, the most important of which were the development of a
WRONZ prototype, machinery development for the spinning system based on this
prototlpe, developing and trialing new products based on the Treotek yarns, and
associated marketing and commercialisation.
WRONZ in the past used the IWS as the route through which new technology was
transferred and commercialised. The IWS however was committed to the Sirospun
technology and was reluctant to put the resources behind Treotek' WRONZ
therefore worked through its Japanese academic and industry contacts in IIESC,
integrating aspects of the Treotek development with plans by Japanese academic and
industry interests to upgrade objective measurement technology in the textile spinning
process. The development of Treotek was therefore able to leverage offthe technical
development work by IIESC.
The early process and machinery development work on Treotek was funded by the
Wool Board tkough WRONZ, while Alliance Textiles funded the product
development work with some help from the Technology for Business Growth (TBG)
prograrnme. Keith Jowsey, a senior technologist, was seconded with funding from
the TBG to liaise between WRONZ and Alliance in commercialising the technology.
Prototype Development
Based on Carnaby's crude sketches, Jack Watt built a spinning frame within WRONZ
and took over the process of developing the spinning technology' This was itself a
major technical challenge and involved design features which were themselves
significant innovations. The existence of an in-house engineering capability in
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WRONZ and of extremely able technologists such as Jack Watt was crucial because it
enabled ideas to be turned into prototype form and trialed, and it gave WRONZ the
ability to produce tangible samples or models for companies rather than "disembodied
ideas". This was especially important given the lack of a substantial in-house
advanced engineering capability in textile companies in New Zealand.
Development of Spinnine System
The spinning process took about 12 months to refine and involved converting one
side of a WRONZ spinner, designing a way to put extra apparatus above the spinner,
and the design and sourcing of new equipment.
Major problems in developing the spinning system were caused by the feeding of the
binder thread during the yarn spinning process. A difficulty was ensuring that all 3
threads ran at the same time, since Treotek depends on the spinning into yarn of the 3
components and breaks are hard to detect. Ughting was improved to enhance the
detection of breaks in the spinning yarn, but with 240 spindles in each machine and
several machines overseen by one operator it is difficult to pick up all breaks in a
commercial environment. A binder yarn break may go undetected by an operator
since the yarn can continue to spin with only one binder. If undetected for several
hours this can lead to the large-scale production of substandard yarn and later
weaving faults which in turn can downgrade whole batches. However, a high level of
supervision and quality control by Alliance Teniles has been able to cope with this
difficulty in a commercial setting.
The Treotek spinning process as finally developed allows the spinning of fabrics that
combine the lightrveight luxury feel of fine wool fabrics with the strength and form
retention of strong wool fibres. The fabric developed through the Treotek technology
is one-third lighter than the conventional weight of 450gms per squiye metre but
retains the natural strength and abrasion resistance of coarse wools. Martindale
abrasion tests show Treotek fabrics have up to three times the abrasion resistance of
comparable worsted fabrics. The yarn spun is stronger because it is wrapped with a
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synthetic filament and can be woven without twisting with another yarn. Treotek has
high natural crush resistance.
It is therefore possible to spin fine yarns from coarser wool fibres which have better
performance characteristics than similar fibres made from fine wools or synthetic
fibres. Treotek achieves cost savings by using coarser wools for lightweight fabrics'
It also has the potential to produce ultra-fine yarns from fine merino wool' Treotek
has outstanding pattern clarity and further enhances design opportunities for wool
yarns because fabrics can incorporate combinations with cottoru silk or other textiles
to create new or unusual features.
Developins and Trialing New Products
A spinning frame at Alliance Textile's Mosgiel Mill was converted for Treotek
spinning and the early product development work focused on apparel fabrics. HESC
and Alliance Knitting Yarns exchanged visits and the yarn was promoted to Japanese
textile interests for high quality suiting. WRONZ supplied a series of samples to
HESC and the Japanese group contributed its own expertise and design input. The
Japanese had a technological input into the finished product rather than the yarn
construction and used different finishing techniques to enhance the quality of the
product.
Professor Kawabata of Kyoto University was the chairman and a driving force of
I{ESC and encouraged FIESC to refinish the fabric to achieve improved functional
properties. WRONZ was Successful in involving a range of Japanese companies in
trialing Treotek samples. Wearer and Finisher members of the I{ESC group in Japan
examined Treotek fabrics and obtained further yarn samples to conduct trials in 1990'
HESC members met in late 1990 to evaluate Treotek fabrics both subjectively and
using objective test data supplied by Professor Nwa of Nara Women's University'
Some Japanese test results showed that fabrics produced by the Treotek process had
properties more similar to silk than to wool, but at the early stages I{ESC tended to
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over-emphasise price factors at the expense of the technical performance of the
technology.
While Treotek allowed the spinning of lighter fabric yarns it did not solve the problem
of stiffiress and prickle in coarse wools. While impressed with the physical properties
of Treotek fabrics it was felt that the handle was still too harsh for current fashion.
Moves were then made to make further samples of the yarn using mixed micron tops
in an attempt to provide more softness, while still maintaining performance'
After Alliance Knitting Yarns at Mosgiel learnt how to spin the wool using the
Treotek system, Alliance Fabric and Apparel in Timaru then became involved in
weaving it into fabrics. WRONZ continued to provide significant assistance and
Alliance staff solved minor technical problems through trial and error and through the
application of skills built up in the company in areas such as applied chemistry'
Alliance Fabric and Apparel in Timaru had already been involved in producing mixed
micron tops, mainly for Japanese applications for lightrrueight suiting, and became
involved in Treotek initially with an eye to the lightweight suiting market in Japan'
The company sent its finishing manager to Japan. However, after extensive testing
and trialing it became obvious that the most promising medium-term application for
Treotek was in fact in the upholstery area.
The first Treotek upholstery yarns were woven in the UK in trials arranged by the
IWS and the Wool Board. The IWS did support some market research for Treotek'
The upholstery fabrics demonstrated improved abrasion resistance over the equivalent
all-wool product. However, the IWS did not commit significant resources to the
development because it competed with the Sirofil process which the IWS owned the
trademark for, and this may have slowed down the commercialisation of the process'
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Marketinq and Commercialisation
By l99Z a number of applications for Treotek yarn had been trialed and the yarn was
moving rapidly to full commercialisation. By 1992, it was clear that Treotek yarns
would not easily find acceptance in knitwear, but that the yarn would have a wide
appeal in upholstery. The advantages of Treotek over conventional wool yarns in
upholstery fabrics were seen as increased abrasion resistance, the ability to make
fabrics of a clean and clear definitiorL and to make lightweight cloth'
In the period leading up to Treotek the Wool Board had focused much of its funding
of WRONZ R&D on finding new applications for coarse New Zealand wools. This
meant that when WRONZ came to develop Treotek in the market it may have been
overly influenced in the early stages by a perceived need to use very coarse wools'
However, the handle of Treotek-based fabrics has yet to meet Japanese requirements
for the higher value apparel uses, and this market niche represented a "false start" that
may have significantly delayed the commercialisation of Treotek' However, more
recent efforts to exploit the technology with finer wools have quickly resulted in
commercial success.
Alliance Knitting Yarns, under the leadership of its General Manager, Stuart Hammer,
marketed Treotek-based yarns under the Treotek brand for the upholstery market. In
1993 the first major sale of Treotek was made, to refurbish the interior seating on
New Zealand Rail's Interisland ferry the Aratika. The Treotek fabric used on the
Aratilm has additional stain resistance and fire retardant treatment, plus a UV block
for increased colour fastness to light. Treotek was chosen ahead of cheaper synthetic
fibres because of its superior functional properties and appearance.
The focus on upholstery therefore gave Alliance and WRONZ a matket proving
ground for the technology and allowed the company to achieve a return on its
investment within a relatively short time-frame. Other applications such as woven and
fine gauge knitted apparel have more recently become the focus of a parallel
development programme and have attractive longer-term prospects.
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The early success with upholstery opened up new possibilities in more highly
patterned fabric and in aircraft upholstery. Alliance Fabric and Apparel at Timaru saw
the opportunity to move into the airline upholstery market. This is around a $150
million a year market with a few large suppliers. The company felt confident that the
Treotek technology gave it the ability to produce the technically best fabric for this
market. Norwellan Textiles in Australia was already established in that market and
had accreditation from Boeing, and Alliance Textiles developed a partnership with it
to fully exploit the technology in the airlines market.
The resulting Flightweave development, a light but hard-wearing Treotek-based seat
fabric, was unveiled to the world's airline industry at the Asian Aerospace 94 show in
Singapore in 1994. Flightweave is about 30% lighter than conventional materials
used on aircraft seats and is flame resistant. Trials of the fabric are underway in Air
New Zealand, Qantas and British Airways. Alliance Textiles and Norwellan Textiles
now jointly market the fabric which is produced at two mills, one in New Zealand and
one in Australia.
Intellectual Property Protection
WRONZ's core mission is to develop and transfer technologies that add value to the
New Zealand wool clip, and its funding from the Wool Board is on that basis'
WRONZ has an active patenting strategy and took out patents on both the Treotek
concept and some of Jack Watt's machinery innovations needed to develop it'
WRONZ has dispensed with open publication of much of its research in favour of
offering confidential material to particular clients on a proprietary basis. Alliance
Textiles is now using technology to create an edge in the market through products
and processes that are difficult to imitate. The company relies significantly on in-
house tacit technolory and know-how, incremental process improvement, and a
strategy of using technology as a competitive tool to capture for itself much of the
benefits of technological innovations such as Treotek. Franchising is an option which
Alliance will likely explore if it cannot meet the global demand for yarn'
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Subsequent Developments
The convergence and interrelationships between wool product and Process innovation
reflects strong "cross overs" in technology, and this in turn means that innovations
such as Treotek can lay a basis for subsequent developments'
The Treotek technology has been combined with yarn bulking technology for woollen
fabrics. Treotek has been combined with the Protek technology to produce new flame
and heat-resistant fabrics with exceptionally high abrasion resistance and lighter
weight. A lightweight Protek development based on Treotek fabric has been released
for motor-sport end uses, and new applications of Treotek in the protective clothing
and Swanndri areas are also feasible.
Skills built up within Alliance Textiles in the course of developing machine-washable
fabrics for Protek have been applied to the development of the Flightweave fabric'
"Cross overs" of technology among several products have encompassed flame
retardability and machine washability technologies. The generic nature of much of this
technology means that equipment can be more easily afforded because of higher
volumes ofthroughput.
Cunently, further work is still underway on the use of Treotek fabrics for apparel
applications, and Japanese companies maintain an interest in the yarn's potential for
quality apparel. Alliance Fabric and Apparel is looking at apparel fabrics that utilise
the WRONZ Spin-bulk technology in combination with Treotek.
Background of Key PeoPle
Garth Carnaby was leader of the Textile Physics Group in WRONZ in 1987, before
becoming WRONZ Deputy Director with responsibility for much of the organisation's
longer-term strategic planning. He has received many awards, distinctions and
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patents during his career in wool research and is a Fellow of the Royal Society of
New Zealand. He was appointed Managing Director of WRONZ in August 1992'
Bruce Munro is Chief Executive of Alliance Textiles, with very extensive business
experience in the insurance, automotive and wine industries' He has acted as a
.'trouble shoote/'in a number of businesses. He is now a member of the Wool Board'
Jack watt joined wRoNz in 1982, having been recruited from Britain. He is a very
experienced synthetic fibre and wool processing and product development
technologist of international standing. He is now part of WRONZ's senior
management team.
Stuart Hammer is General Manager of Alliance Knitting Yarns in Mosgiel. His
background is in production planning and production management in the textile
industry. He has a very detailed knowledge of the market and process requirements
of key parts of the industry.
Alistair Coleman is General Manager of Alliance Fabric and Apparel in Timaru. He
was brought up on a farm but began his professional career in the motor trade'
Before joining the textile industry he was involved in finance with a trade and
marketing focus and picked up knowledge of branding, marketing and
commercialisation which assisted in his later work with the Treotek and Protek
developments. Coleman joined Alliance Textiles in 1987 in a financial role and then
moved to the Timaru plant in 1989 as General Manager of the top-making plant' He
was also a director of a wool scouring company. He took up his current position in
September 1991.
Keith Jowsey has spent his entire career in the textile industry and joined Alliance
Textiles in 1966. From LgTl-1g77 he worked as a senior scientist in WRONZ, before
rejoining Alliance and spending time as Group Technical Manager, Mill Manager and
Crroup Operations Service Manager. He was seconded as an Associate under the
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Emerging Technologies Programme (later the TBG scheme) to liaise between
WRONZ and Alliance in the development of Treotek.
Conclusions
Treotek is a major technological innovation that depended on the conceptual insights
of Garth Carnaby and the ability of Jack Watt and Alliance Textiles staff to translate
an idea into a new technological development. The innovation built on Carnaby's
knowledge of state of the art worsted technology developments in BritairL such as
spin-offs from the Sirospun technology, on a good grasp by WRONZ of the interface
between technology and the consumer products market, and a special appreciation of
the international science underpinning textile technology.
The success of Treotek was a strong endorsement of WRONZ's strategy of moving
into added value product development for the onshore industry, and of its move into
company-specific innovation. WRONZ now has the confidence of major textile
companies in New Zealandand abroad in its ability to deliver technologies that confer
a competitive edge. It has built up its company-level business and reduced its
dependence on the Wool Board and Government funding. Each technological success
has enhanced WRONZ's confidence further. WRONZ now has very good industry
links and transacts its private sector business in an environment of trust and close
cooperation. The success of Treotek has cemented the relationship between WRONZ
and Alliance. The Chief Executive and other top managers of Alliance now visit
WRONZ on a regular basis, and vice versa.
The success with Treotek is paying both economic and cultural dividends to Alliance
Textiles. The development of Treotek cost about $2 million, of which around
$250,000 was the research cost. This does not include the cost of antecedent research
which helped create the knowledge base and generic technological platform
underpinning Treotek and other wool processing technologies' The economic
benefits of Treotek and l0 other WRONZ innovations were assessed by Scobie and
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facobsen (1994). The analysis built in research and return from investment lag times
and used a total investment horizon from 1962 to 2021. The study demonstrated an
internal rate of return of 65.5% average over all the projects, or a return of $l l'40 for
every $l invested. Using relatively conservative assumptions the report concluded
that Treotek had a total present value ($1992193 ) of $43.31 million. Together with its
other innovations, achievement of ISO 9000 accreditation, skill upgrading and more
flexible working practices, Treotek has demonstrated the success of Bruce Munro's
strategy of making technological innovation and niche product and market
differentiation central to the company's innovative strategy. Because Treotek worked
WRONZ is now emboldened to bring other ideas to Alliance. Treotek has been a
catalyst both for Alliance to be seen as a high-tech textile company and for investment
by the company in new plant. Alliance Textiles has converted a significant number of
spinning frames to Treotek and is forecasting strong revenue growth from Treotek-
based products.
The success with the innovation means that Alliance Textiles' top management is now
committed to the positioning of R&D as a core part of its business. Alliance Textiles
now spends about 3.5%o of its budget on R&D. The company does not have an R&D
manager and Bruce Munro has a firm belief that the divisional general managers have
the responsibility for generating and carrying through new technological innovations'
Alliance has developed its skills in technology management, has increased its
commitment to quality management and to the use of measurement technology, and it
is now more effective at identifying and solving technical process bottlenecks.
Treotek illustrates the importance of the receptivity to new ideas and technologies in
companies, and the willingness to foster an innovative culture that will turn those
ideas into commercial outcomes. The vision and drive of Bruce Munro, Alistair
Coleman and Stuart Hammer, and the willingness of Alliance Textiles staff to accept
new ideas, learn new skills and adapt to new technology was fundamental to the
success of Treotek. The experience of Bruce Munro and Alistair Coleman outside the
wool industry ensured their awareness of the new possibilities and helped counter the
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influence of some traditionalists in the IWS and I{ESC who initially had somewhat of
a "mental block" to Treotek.
The Employment Contracts Act provided important leverage in implementing more
flexible workplace practices within Alliance Textiles. Total quality management,
customer focus throughout all levels of the organisation, team-based participation and
improved information flows helped create an environment in which innovations such
as Treotek could be successfully commercialised. The leadership of Munro, Hammer
and Coleman was paramount and inextricably linked to workplace reform and
changing company culture. For example, ISO only succeeded in Alliance Fabric and
Apparel after Coleman changed the culture and ensured that the workplace
foundations were in place.
The TBG scheme played an important though not pivotal role. Its support for a
seconded technologist spending part of his time in the company and part in the
research institute created an extra channel of communication between WRONZ and
Alliance Textiles.
The wool industry has historically emphasised the market needs of the sector as a
whole, and in hindsight such a generic approach implies that wool-based innovation
should benefit all wool growers and users in an equitable way. This generic approach
is appropriate to a homogeneous industry where all players can benefit from an
innovation, but seems counter-intuitive when premium returns can only be achieved
by differentiation, niche product development, and proprietary and specialised
technologies that competitors find difficult to imitate.
The success of the Treotek innovation resulted partly from its focus on new
applications for New Zealand coarse wools in very specific niche applications. As a
platform for branded, differentiated products developed in close liaison with
customers the Treotek development is almost the antithesis of the IWS and Wool
Board's erstwhile strategy of generic and undiscriminating focus on wool as a
commodity product.
224
Both the Wool Board and WRONZ are now focusing on new product development
and new uses for wool, with an emphasis on adding value onshore and targeting more
differentiated, niche markets, rather than trusting in the nebulous and difficult to
meuure benefits of generic promotion and technical development under the aegis of
the IWS. The Wool Board is now concentrating its marketing and administrative
effort onNew Zealandwool users globally.
Success breeds suocess, andjust aS Carnaby's confidence in his ideas grew from the
WRONZ needle innovation" the confidence of both WRONZ and Alliance has




Key Events in the Treotek Innovation
1982
Key Evcnts
WRONZ and HESC begn work on tropical worsted cloth
lgt5 Tropical lightrveight worsted cloth incorporating crossbred
wool created, using advanced measuring equipment and a
scientific knowledge of wool structure
lgEZ Lightweight worsted suiting cloths eontaining 30%by mass of
35 micron wool blended with merino wool adopted by
Japanese worsted manufacturers and tailors
19SZ Garth Carnaby conceives of idea for Treotek on flight over
Alaska
August 1988 Garth Carnaby submits patent application 225679 for
multi-component Yarn
19E9 Alliance Textiles in financial difficulties
August 1.989 Garth carnaby visits FIESC in Japan and discusses
opportunities to develoP Treotek
December l9E9 WRONZ and Alliance Textiles (Munro as Managing
Director) submit joint application to Emerging Technologies
progrtunme
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July 1990 Emerging Technologies project on Treotek commences
1990 Treotekyarn spinning process under trial in WRONZ
Late 1990 Spinning frame at Mosgiel converted and used to trial Treotek,
successfully producing Treotek yarn
Late 1990 I{ESC group in Japan examines Treotek firbrics and expresses
interest in further samples to conduct trials
l99l Members of FIESC in Japan conduct trials of Treotek
fabrics
lggL-g2 Focus of Treotek moves to upholstery
March 1992 Alliance Fabric and Apparel begins Qualiry Management
programme
August 1992 Garth Carnaby becomes Managtng Director ofWRONZ
Scptember 1992 Emerging TechnologieVTBG projea on Treotek and other
processes finishes
lgg2 Trialing of Treotek in Japan continues, with a focus on
apparel applications
Lggz Treotek-based cloth finished by Alliance Textiles and by
Japanese
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CASE 8: GS 2085 APPLE VARIETY INNOVATION
Introduction
The GS 2085 apple is a cross befween the Gala and Splendour varieties, produced
through controlled pollination by the DSIR (later HortResearch). It is a large, rosy
pink fnrit with flesh that is creamy coloured, crisp and with a fine texture. It is juicy
with a sweet and slightly tangy flavour. GS 2085 is a late maturing apple with the
eating and storage quality of Splendour and the thicker skin of Gala.
The GS 2085 innovation must be placed in its wider industry, institutional, technical
and market context.
Industry Background
New Zealand's two most important apple growing areas are Nelson and Hawkes Bay,
with other important regions being Canterbury and Waikato. The total New Zealand
apple crop was almost 23 million cartons in 1992193, of which just over half were
exported @xport News, 1993a). Total export earnings were $320 million in 1993194.
The New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board has the largest pipfruit product
range in the world and achieves the highest premiums. The Board won the Governor-
General's Supreme Award for Exporter of the Year in 1993, an award sponsored by
Traderuand Air New Zealand. Around one third of the apples the Board receives are
processed, it has over half the fruit juice market in New Zealand and is dominant in
mineral water. The Board is New Zealand's single biggest beverage exporter but the
highest returns come from supplying fresh fruit to the export market' In 1993 the
Board exported 1,400 apple products,292 pear products and 15 apple concentrates
to 56 countries (Orchardist, 1993a).
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The industry saw the dangers of weak selling early in its existence and the New
zealandFruit Export control Board was created under the Fruit control Act 1926'
This Board had a statutory monopoly to market fnrit on behalf of exporters. The
Apple and Pear Marketing Board was then established in 1949 to act as the sole
export and domestic marketer of New Zealand pipfrgit. The Board became involved
in processing in 1962. The Board is now involved in promotior\ research and
development, marketing, distribution and quality management. The Board has two
main foci: maximising returns to growers through the fresh fruit exporting side of the
business, and maximising return on assets through other activities, such as processed
products and fruit juices. Since the Board was established the market has grown from
$750,000 in total exporr earnings from 4 export markets in 1949 to $349 million in
export earnings from about 56 countriesin 1992193 '
The Board has a long history of innovation in its transport, marketing and institutional
arrangements, as well as in technological innovation. The Board's marketing
innovations include its pioneering of the export of German apples to England and
English apples to Germany. In l97l the Board ended its connection with the
Conference Lines and established its own export shipping arrangements and
associated fruit transportation technology. This allowed it to exercise more control
over the distribution of its export product. ln I974 the Board moved away from the
auction system into a system of private treaties and wholesale arrangements in
Europe. Since then, the Board has strengthened its offshore market and distribution
system in Europe, Australia and North America. The Board has emphasised the need
to exercise control as far as possible down the value chain in pipfruit marketing and
thereby maximise returns to growers, and this has been reflected in its approach to the
development of new varieties.
The Fruit Industry Plant Improvement Agency (FIPIA) was set up in 1981 to
administer the introduction and development of new plant varieties and to allow a
more systematic approach to their trialing and commercialisation' In 1982 it was
structured as a company jointly owned by the Apple and Pear Marketing Board
(Apln6) and the New Zealand Fruitgrowers' Federation. Before FIPIA was set up
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MAF and DSIR were involved in introducing and screening plant varieties, but trialing
of these was spasmodic, only small numbers of trees were planted out with growers
and there was inadequate follow-up.
In 1983/84 the APMB began to tund DSIR pipftrit breeding, initially in pears and
later in apples. FIPIA has been involved since 1985 in commercialising fnrit varieties
released by the DSIR. The APMB took over full control of FIPIA in 1990 and it has
established a New Product Development Committee that facilitates the process of
linking new variety development with market needs. The New Product Development
Committee is a communication liaison group that brings together researchers,
technical people, product development people, FIPIA and marketing staff
In 1984 MAF withdrew from the provision of quality assurance services to the
pipfruit industry and forced it to pick up the costs, This had a profoundly beneficial
effect on the industry since it had to employ skilled technical people to provide quality
management and other technical services, and this has substantially enhanced the
ability of the industry to interpret and commercialise the results of research.
The Board has been criticised for its statutory control over the export crop and for
stabilisation policies that do not always translate price premiums for specffic varieties
back to growers. The effect of price stabilisation (or "smoothing") has been to reduce
the rate of change to new varieties. This may have positive effects, by ensuring that
growers do not respond pre-emptively to short-term premium earnings from new
varieties that are not sustainable in the long-term. It also helps maintain a balanced
portfolio of varieties that can allow the Board to service a wide range of markets and
consumer preferences. Price stabilisation has now been dispensed with, but the Board
has strong majority support from pipfnrit gtowers to retain its marketing powers'
The Board provides information on new varieties rather than prescriptive advice'
Growers are entrepreneurial in identiSing sports, taking a risk and "having a go" with
new varieties. The culture of the industry has been to use new varieties as the major
source of competitive advantage. The concentration of most growers in the Hawkes
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Bay and Nelson has facilitated informal, "over the fence" information flows that
accelerate the rate of diffirsion of new varieties and of technical information.
The industry is one of the better-performing export sectors and many gfowers have
had the surplus income to make risky investments in new varieties. Since the mid-
1980s the industry has been less stable because of economic, market and trade
reforms, strong international competitioq changing tastes, adverse climatic events,
criticism of the APMB structure, and deregulation of the domestic market. This
instability has been a major spur for the Board and industry to be innovative and to
diversify into new varieties and into new markets such as in Asia.
The search for new varieties is pivotal to the Board's strategy, and in 1993 128 new
apple and 25 new pear varieties were introduced. The varietal composition of the
New Zealand apple industry is changing rapidly as shown in Table 1 below:
Teble 1: The Varietal Composition of New Zealand's Apple Exports
























Europe is still the biggest export market but the Board has a major presence in North
America and Asia, After 20 years of effort it has now achieved access to the Japanese
market. It is diversifuing into a number of non-traditional markets, including Eastern
Europe and Mexico. New Zealand's major export competitors afe Southern
Hemisphere countries such as Chile, Australia and South Africa. While New Zealand
has in the past struggled to compete with competitors such as Chile on cost or
closeness to markets, it has an edge in new varieties, in marketing and distribution,
innovation, technology, and in its "single desP' selling structure' The competitive
advantages conferred by the industry structure are matched only by the South African
industry. South Africa is a strong competitor even in premiurq New Zealand-bred
varieties such as Royal Gala and Braeburn, and much of its strengh flows from its
single desk Board structure.
Tastes in apples differ markedly among countries and have in the past been slow to
change. However tastes now seem to be changing more rapidly' Recent trends in
major markets favour larger fruit with brilliant coloured and unblemished skirl crisp
texture, and a mild sweet flavour. Other important varietal factors for the export
market include post-harvest behaviour, a thick skin to minimise damage, and
production factors such as yield, tree form and health, timing and duration of harvest,
and susceptibility to plant health problems'
The Board has differentiated itself from its commodity competitors at all levels,
including for processed products as well as new varieties, and has pursued an
aggressive branding strategy. In l99l the Board adopted the ENZA brand' The
Board has sought to control the distribution of its product and about 70% of New
Zealand's pipfnrit exports are sold directly to retailers by Board-owned companies'
While new varieties are a core part of industry strategy, the Board as far as possible
aims for year round supply of a comprehensive range of varieties that can meet the
needs of all customers. This requires it to carefully balance the need for the price
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premiums for new varieties to influence planting and production by glowers, while at
the same time maintaining substantial export volumes of more traditional varieties'
Institutional Backeround
The DSIR established a Fruit Research Division in 1948 to handle dl its horticultural
researclq other than that undertaken by the Plant Diseases Division. From the 1970s
on both MAF and the DSIR expanded their investment in horticulture with much of
this driven by the success of industries such as pipfrtrit and kiwifruit'
The science reforms initiated in 1989 saw the horticultural research capabilities of
MAF Technology, DSIR Fruit and Trees and DSIR Plant Protection incorporated into
the HortResearch Crown Research Institute (CRI) HortResearch is now a Crown-
owned company registered under the Companies Act and with full commercial
powers. The new commercial focus of the CRI has helped strengthen its relationship
with industry but has also raised concerns about the appropriate balance between
..public good" research to benefit the industry and the Institute's commercial earning
objectives. Upon the establishment of the CRI the APMB extended a broader
research agreement already in place with DSIR by setting up a specific agreement
governing plant breeding.
Technical Background
Apple growing has been established in New Zealand since the middle of the l9th
century. In 1875 woolly aphis broke out in New Zealand and the resulting
devastation forced growers to look at new resistant varieties such as Northern Spy'
An Auckland nurseryman, H.E. Sharp, for the first time in New Zealand used
scientific apple breeding techniques to produce a number of important selections such
as Mona Hay and Sharp's Late Red. By 1925 American sweet flavoured apples such
as Red Delicious and Jonathan were established in New Zealand and were rapidly
replacing traditional English and European varieties'
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Most new apple varieties have been natural mutations or sports and New Zealand
growers have an impressive track record in spotting their potential and breeding from
them. Although the first controlled apple crosses have been attributed to Thomas
Knight in 1906, inNew Zealand GS 2OS5 is the only new variety resulting from a
cross by a scientific institution that is achieving substantial success'
To achieve success in a single generation a large progeny population is necessary. It
is estimated that progeny populations of 30,000 seedlings are needed to confidently
combine 5 characters (such as frgit size or skin colour) in a new selection (McKenzie,
1983). Apple breeding is also a long-term business: in the past it took l0 years to
select a new hybrid from a progeny population (although HortResearch plant breeders
now take as little as 4-6 years), and another 10 years to reach full commercial
production. It may take several more decades for growers to master the production
and post-harvest management of the variety, and for the variety to attain full
acceptance in the market. For example, Braeburn was discovered in 1952 and
released in 1970, but has only been a major variety in the market in the last decade'
J.H. Kidd, a very progressive Wairarapa grower, saw the opportunity in the 1920s to
combine the rich aromatic taste of English apples with the bland sweetness and good
appearance of the best American types. The result was Kidd's Orange, a cross
between Delicious and Cox's Orange Pippin, which was successfully established by
1931. Encouraged by this success Kidd continued with hand pollination. Much later,
he was visited by Dr Don McKenzie, a DSIR scientist in Havelock North, who saw
the potentiat for one of Kidd's crosses, a hybrid between Kidd's Orange and Golden
Delicious. After Kidd's death this cross was further selected in 1965 by DSIR
scientists at Havelock North Research Orchard and named Gala' Commercial
production of Gala commenced on a substantial scale in 1970.
The Braeburn sport was discovered on the Nelson property of Eustace and Norman
Williams in 1952. Braeburn may well have been a natural cross between Lady
Hamilton and a Cox-like apple. Braeburn was successfully developed with a focus on
the European market, but it had post-harvest problems that required significant effort
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to overcome. In 1954 1,000 apple cultivars were imported by Dr Don McKenzie for
trial at the Havelock North Research Orchard. None of these have had continuing
commercial success, although Spartan had some success as a cultivar for around l0
years.
Splendour was discovered and selected by c. L. Roberts and released in 1964' A
sport of Galq Royal Gala" was found by Matamata orchardist Bill Ten Hove on his
orchard in 1969. Ten Hove had in fact been introduced to Gala by Dr Don
McKenzie, and Royal Gala was released on a substantial commercial scale in 1973'
Don McKenzie earned great mana in the industry from his efforts in the 1970s and
early 1980s and was "intraprenuerial" in raising funds from a local fruit growers'
association to support further pollination for breeding research' He worked on
"bootleg projects", initially as a sideline to his work as a plant physiologist, ild
essentially produced results for his managers as alait accompli' His entrepreneurship
made him a role model for younger acolytes such as Allan White. In the same way
that McKenzie inherited Kidd's new varietieq Allan White took over McKenzie's
selections and this formed the basis for his breeding programme.
The Innovation
Impressed by the success of Gala, Don McKenzie had initiated a systematic
progranme of breeding of new varieties, producing three very large families with
populations of 40,000 seedlings each. One of these families was developed h
cooperation with Dr Yoshida of Moroika Fruit Tree Research Station in Japan'
Another series of crosses made between Red Dougherty and Golden Delicious have
not been commercially successful. The third family was a series of crosses between
Splendour and Gal4 with McKenzie aiming at an eventual replacement or supplement
to Red Delicious. Splendour is a popular and very high quality apple with good
flavour but is prone to bruising. Gala has a thicker skin and is more suited to the
export market, The aim of the crosses was therefore to combine the best features of
both apples.
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Selection and Trialine of GS 2085
GS 2085 was one of about 100 selections made out of a fruiting population of about
4,000 seedlings. Gala was the seed-bearing parent and Splendour the pollen parent of
the variety. An initial progeny population of 40,000 was reduced to 4,000 by
elimination of seedlings susceptible to woolly aphis, black spot, and mildew' About
ZOYo of the survivors produced fruit of good colour and quality.
Allan White continued the selection programme after McKenzie retired in 1984.
Further selection was undertaken with some external advisory input until, through a
process of eliminatiorL GS 2085 became one of about six selections that were trialed
in orchards. Of other Gala/Splendour selections GS 330 is also showing promise and
significant plantings of this variety have been made.
Trialing of the GS crosses at these early stages was a little ad hoc, and systematic
sensory evaluation, market analysis and study of cultural characteristics was not
rigorously built into the trialing process.
AParallel Development: The Taylor's Gold Innovation
An interesting parallel development to GS 2085, and worth comparing with it, was
the commercialisation of the Taylor's Gold pear. Taylor's Gold was a sport of
Doyenne du Comice, found on the property of Wendy and Mchael King-Taylor at
Riwaka in 1985. The potential of this pear was quickly recognised by the APMB's
Product Development Manager, David Cranwell. Joe Pope, the Board's Chief
Executive, saw the 'fit' between the pear's technical characteristics such as flavour
and colour and the market potential. Against the pessimistic views of some
specialised marketers, Pope and David Cranwell acted as product champions for the
variety. Taylor's Gold has proved a major success with several thousand cartons
successfully exported by 1994 and around 300,000 trees in the ground' The rapid
uptake of this new variety was partly driven by growers wanting alternatives to
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pipfnrit varieties with low returns or, in the case of new entries to the industry,
alternatives to declining crops such as tobacco.
Capturins the Benefits in New Zealand
The DSIR's Division of Horticulture and Processing submitted an application to the
commissioner of Plant variety Rights in August 1989 for the GS 2085 variety, with
*GS 2085" as the breeder's reference number, and under the proposed denomination
of ..scIRoS". Plant variety rights for a term of 23 years under the name SCIROS
were awarded to the DSIR in September 1991, and patent protection has since been
obtained in the United States. Reciprocal variety rights need to be obtained in other
countries when new plant material is placed in those countries. Royalties of $1.50 are
paid to HortResearch on each tree sold.
Against a backdrop of mutual respect and a long-term and productive partnership
between HortResearch and the APMB, the industry is concerned about the oontrol of
the results of CRI research. The Board is now placing increased emphasis on
Commercial confidentiality to protect New Zealand's advantages from overseas
competitors. Tight control of new plant material is especially important because New
Zealand's excellent reputation for innovation in apple varieties makes it a target for
competitors. The openness of the New Zealand industry, of its science establishment,
and the history of relatively open exchange of new plant material is in marked contrast
to other more secretive competitors such as South Africa. However, there is also
awareness within the Board and in HortResearch that New Zealand benefits
enormously from the exchange of plant material and that any overly restrictive
approach may lead to retaliatory barriers emerging in other countries.
The APMB and FIPIA have now agreed that New zealand growers would be given
about 5 years of exclusivity over new tree varieties. This translates into a competitive
advantage of about 9-10 years by the time new plant material is released overseas and
volume production comes on stream. New biotechnology techniques may also aid the
protection of the intellectual property embodied in new varieties. Tracer genes can be
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inserted to embed a genetic 'fingerprint' into new tree varieties. Other strategies to
protect premium earnings from the variety may include licensing or franchising
production by Northern Hemisphere or other growers, to complement production
from New Zealand and provide year-round supply without eroding margins for the
New Zealand grower.
Commercial Release
After GS 2085 had been under evaluation for around 2 years the New Product
Development Committee recommended to the Board that the full release be delayed
another year in order to best capture the commercial benefits. The Board initially
agreed to this. However, at this time the industry was in a trough and grower
representatives on the Board pressed for the early release of GS 2085 on the basis of
the available information on its potential. Crrowers felt that the industry desperately
needed a new variety and as result the Board, despite the reservations of marketers,
overturned its earlier decision at its next meeting and decided on its release. This
decision was partly motivated by awareness that the release of New Zealand plant
material to overseas competitors had in some cases eroded the premiums earned by
New Zealand growers, and a need was felt to move quickly to establish a competitive
advantage.
Allan White was concerned that inadequate trialing and evaluation had been
undertaken at the time the variety was released and his concerns \ /ere shared by
marketing people in the industry. Although trees were released and planted without
adequate information on production methods or market prospects, this was a risk that
was understood and accepted by growers. About 147,000 GS 2085 buds were
released in the first year and a further 200,000 were released in 1993 alone. GS 2085
is now the fifth most commonly planted apple variety in the country' With over
500,000 trees in the ground the volume of GS 2085 likely to come on stream in 3-4
years will pose a huge marketing challenge for the Board'
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Orchard Performance of GS 2085
GS 2085 produces high quality, large fnrit even from young trees, it is an early fruit
producer, and has low susceptibility to bitter pit, powdery mildew and apple scab' GS
2085 has inherited Splendour's eating and storage quality but it may also have
inherited that variety's susceptibility to russet. There are significant regional
variations in the performance of different apple varieties, for example between Nelson
and coastal Hawkes Bay and cooler climates such as Canterbury and inland Hawkes
Bay.
GS 2085 seems suited to East Coast districts, Blenheim, Canterbury, parts of Hawkes
Bay, and Central Otago. Its performance in wetter parts of Nelson and the Waikato is
uncertain because of russet. The apple is also prone to storage scold which is a
problem because the chemical used to treat it, DPA., may eventually need to be phased
out. On lighter soils GS 2085 may be subject to leaf drop problems' Howevef, on
balance the orchard performance of the variety looks very promising.
Marketin s and Commercialisation
The ApMB tends to become heavily involved in new variety developments when the
trees are available for trialing on comlnercial properties. GS 2085 trees have been
available to New Zealand growers since 1991. Because of the niche GS 2085
occupies it is well positioned to earn price premiums, but at the same time it has to be
marketed as part of a basket of varieties where the objective is to maximise total
returns to the New Zealand grower rather than returns from an individual variety'
Production may grow from 100,000 cartons in one year to 500,0000 cartons 2 years
after that. It will be a challenge to market such high volumes of GS 2085 as well as
Braeburn, Fuji, and Granny Smith at the same time, especially given the high cross-
elasticity of demand that exists among a number of these varieties.
GS 2085 has good colour, shape, flavour, and storage quality and has a very wide
appeal compared, for example, to Braeburn which is more a European-style apple'
The German market has a reputation for innovation in new food products and may
well be a leader in the market acceptance of GS 2085, as it was for Braeburn' The
U.S. market is more conservative and places a higher value on appearance, and
Braeburn has not fulfilled its potential there as a result' However, the good
appeuance and flavour of GS 2085 augurs well for the variety in the U'S'
David Cranwell, Product Development Manager for the Board, is responsible for
managing the development of new varieties' This involves preparing regular
evaluations of varieties from different sources, including market feedback informatiott"
sensory evaluation, handling, and cultural information which forms the basis of a
variety database which is available on a confidential basis to New Zealand gtowcrs
only.
Selection is both objective (eg. screening out for mildew) and subjective (appearance)'
Cranwell's work aims to take much of the subjective judgement out of the choice of
new varieties, by facilitating a more scientific basis for it. This approach is driven by
some difficulties that have occurred when growers have planted large quantities of
varieties such as Fiesta and Granny Smith on the basis of incomplete and anecdotal
information or subjective advice.
Trial of new varieties on different rootstocks is undertaken by growers in difrerent
regions, while an international network of retailers tests varieties and provides market
information. In 1992 Cranwell began using sensory evaluation for new pipfruit
varieties, using the HortResearch unit in Auckland and the Dairy Board's sensory unit
in Singapore. Sensory evaluation undertaken at the Dairy Board's Singapore facility
has produced positive results for GS 2085's taste and shape, and most in the industry
believe that the variety will be a major success.
An important aspect of marketing is the naming of the variety, and this has caused
some discomfort within the industry. A name was suggested about 3 years ago but
rejected on marketing grounds. Some have argued that delaying naming has been
itself a deliberate and effective marketing tactic. However, on balance the ongoing
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delay is seen by most as a serious shortcoming in managing the development and
market introduction of the new variety'
It is difficult to forecast the market lifespan of GS 2085 but it is likely to be around
10-15 years as a premium variety, after which increasing volumes may well turn it into
a commodity apple. While Red Delicious and Granny Smith have had many decades
of substantial popularity, changing tastes, new markets and competition from new
varieties seems to be reducing the time-frame in which a new apple can earn
premiums.
Subsequent Developments
The success of GS 2085 has been instrumental in the expansion of HortResearch's
pipfnrit breeding programme. In the early 1980s Allan White was alone with one
part-time technician, but his programme now has about 8 full-time staff' Allan
White's programme includes longer-term breeding using parents, or building in
varietal features that may not currently be popular but which could well fill important
niches in future decades. Other Gala and Splendour crosses from the mid-1970s
include GS 330 and GS 472. GS 330 is well advanced in trialing while an "old
fashioned" apple, OPS 2429, may also have promise.
Apple breeders internationally are working with a narrow genetic base. Around two
thirds of the apple cultivars released in the world over the last 30 years originate from
5 parents. Golden Delicious, Cox's Orange Pippin, Red Delicious, Jonathaq and
Mclntosh (Noiton et al, lgg4). This genetic uniformity is a threat to the apple
industry because of inbreeding defects and lack of robustness in the face of disease or
ecological change.
To counter this, in 1990 DSIR initiated a pipfnrit genetics programme' This
prograrnme is headed by Dr Dominique Noiton and has as its major objective
broadening the genetic base for apple breeding and extending the scientific tools
available to complement the established techniques for apple breeding based around
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hybridisation and selection. An aim is to maximise the genetic variability within the
apple population and thereby open up new possibilities for varieties with quite
different characteristics. This involves the planting of seedlings at orchard sites in
Hawkes Bay, Nelson and Otago. The aim is to ensure that the focused breeding of
new conrmercial cultivars is complemented by a longer-tenn stratery of broadening
the genetic base to underpin breeding to meet future and quite unpredictable tastes
and preferences.
New DNA and isoenzyme techniques are being applied to "fingerprint" cultivars.
Isoenzyme analysis makes it a lot easier to predict whether a variety or selection has
the desired genetic characteristics. There is increasing awareness in the industry of the
need to reduce the use of pesticides, and HortResearch is now active in plant breeding
to foster natural resistance to plant diseases.
The ApMB is increasingly using sensory evaluation techniques and is aligning market
information with the cultural and production characteristics of new varieties- The
Board now has one grower in each region paid to dedicate one hectare to trialing new
varieties on 3 rootstocks. This process should allow the development times of future
promising varieties to be reduced substantially. More reliance is being placed on
directly ascertaining consumer preference rather than relying on intermediaries such as
retailers and marketers. While quality and leadership in new varieties remain core to
the industry's strategy, low chemical residues, and clean, green and sustainable
production are major emerging issues for the late 1990s.
Background of Key PeoPle
The late Dr Don McKenzie was a plant physiologist in the Plant Diseases Division of
DSIR who developed the apple breeding programtne within the organisation. He
retired in 1984.
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Allan White's family have been orchardists for four generations and he runs his own
orchard on a part-time basis. He was appointed to a position as a technician at the
Goddard Lane Research Orchard in Havelock North under Dr Don McKenzie in
1975. From 1981 he began to assume responsibility for the apple breeding programme
and took full responsibility in 1984.
David Cranwell has been Product Development Manager for the Apple and Pear
Marketing Board since 1992. His family has been involved in the pipfruit industry
since the 1890s. He completed a Diploma in Horticulture at Massey University and
ran his own landscaping business before spending time with MAF and then joining the
Apple and Pear Marketing Board as a field officer. He has very wide experience in
the industry in the field service, in research, and very extensive marketing-related
experience in Europe and Asia.
Conclusions
New Zealand's fruit breeding successes illustrate the importance of the single-minded
individual, ranging from Hayward Wright in kiwifnrit to Bill Ten Hove, J'H'Kidd,
Don McKenzie and Allan White in pipfnrit. Many of these individuals had a lifelong
dedication to ftuit breeding and a love of their jobs, and like Allan White and David
Cranwell came from a long family line of orchardists' Don McKenzie's
entrepreneurship provided much of the focus and intellectual leadership for a more
scientific base to pipfruit breeding in New Zealand, but his work has to be understood
in relation to those that came before such as J.H. Kidd, and those in HortResearch
who have continued and greatly extended his work.
The GS 2085 is a major achievement in plant breeding resulting from the skills built
up over many years by breeders such as Don McKenzie and Allan White' It is a very
positive outcome from collaboration befween HortResearch and industry. GS 2085
was developed from the base of New Zealand's remarkable legacy of private sector
selection and commercialisation of natural apple mutations.
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New Zealand's apple breeding effFort is essential to adapting imported plant material
to local circumstances, and to creating a competitive advantage in a market where
New Zealand cannot compete on cost or price' The release of GS 2085 was partly
"technology push", but was also informed by a clear understanding that it is through
new varieties that premium earnings in the market can be achieved.
The commercial potential of the cross is likely to be realised because of the pipfinrit
industry's capacity for trialing, sensory evaluation and marketing' The success so far
has drawn heavily on those in the Board such as David Cranwell who have a multi-
disciplinary perspective, and who understand the strategic fit betrryeen new pipfrgit
varieties and the marketing opportunities'
The Apple and Pear Marketing Board is an exemplar in the use of branding and
control over marketing and distribution to create market power in pipfruit marketing'
Key challenges for the industry are the need for a longer-term vision of what new
varieties are needed as a function of the market opportunities, and the need to
appraise the impact of a new variety on the overall portfolio of pipfruit exports'
The Board only becam e systematicatly involved in GS 2085 from about the late
1980s, even though it was crossed in 1974. The Board should have been involved
earlier in the process and undertaken rigorous trialing over a number of regions and
through sensory and post-harvest evaluation. The success of the Board in
commercialising the Taylor's Gold sport in 9 years, from discovery in 1985 to
substantial export performance in 1994, demonstrates what can be done when the
skills of variety assessment, evaluatiotlr production and marketing can be brought to
bear within cornmercially-driven deadlines.
The Board and HortResearch have yet to fully crystallise the right balance between
capturing the benefits of pipfruit innovation in New Zealand, while at the same time
retaining access to the international networks, exchanges of ideas and new plant
material that are needed to foster an innovative and outward-looking system for the
development and commercialisation of new pipfruit varieties.
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Postscript












Apple breeding programme cornmences at DSIR's Havelock
North research orchard
Pollination of GS 2085 at Havelock North research orchard
Selection of GS 2085
lgts GS 2085 recommended for commercial evaluation
August l9B9 DSIR applies for plant variety right for GS 2085
1991 Apple and Pear Marketing Board obtains worldwide marketing
rights for GS 2085
september 1991 Plant variety rights granted for GS 2085
1992 Positive response to trial shipments of GS 2085
Lgg3tg4 First significant harvest of GS 2085
lggglg4 Further 200,000 GS 2085 trees planted
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CASE 9: XAB-17 BEACON INNOVATION
Introduction
The XAB-IZ lighthouse beacon was designed and developed by Vega Industries Ltd,
a private company based in Porirua, in response to specifications and tender requests
from the United States Coast Guard. The XAB-17 Beacon is a fully automatic
rotating marine beacon that is solar powered and energy efficient' The beacon
automatically switches itself on at dusk and off at dawn' introduoes new lamps when
existing ones fail or time-out, monitors itself for correct operation, and switches on a
stand-by beacon or alarm in the event of a failure. The XAB-17 was developed in
parallel with the VRB-25 Rotating Beacon, both in response to the needs of the US
Coast Guard.
Background
The XAB-17 Beacon innovation needs to be understood in relation to its technical,
company and market background.
Technical Backeround
DSIR became involved in optics R&D in World War I I under the direction of the
Auckland Technical Development Committee. The Dominion Physical Laboratory,
the precursor to the DSIR's Physics and Engineering Laboratory (PEL), was actively
involved but most of the key effort focused around university groups in Auckland and
Christchurch. This university work was coordinated by Ernest Marsden' then
Director of Scientific Developments and the key DSIR liaison person with the armed
services. By the end of the war this effort had produced mirrors for signal lamps,
working parts for hand prismatic compasses, mortar sights, and assorted bubbles for
army instruments. The legacy of this wartime work gave PEL New Zealand's major
248
competencies in instrument making and objective measurement technologY, os well as
substantial capabilities in optics (see Atkinson, 1976).
In the post-war years the Marine Department became concerned with the limited
useful range of major New Zealand lighthouses. PEL physicists were called in to
measure the light intensities of the beams in question. A special technique was
devised for this task and the intensity of the beams was determined' From the results
it was possible to calculate the maximum range of each light under various weather
conditions (Atkinson, 1976). After this success the National Roads Board receivd
help from PEL in measuring the performance of lamps for street lighting which
required the laboratory to develop specialised equipment. A key strength of DSIR at
this time was its instrument making workshops and facilities, and the ability of its
technologists to demonstrate scientific ideas in practical working prototypes, and to
fabricate instruments and products to demanding specifications. This capability
reflected a multi-disciplinary approach, especially at the technical ofEcer level'
Company Background
Vega Industries Ltd is a designer and manufacturer of lighted navigational aids and
optical, electronic and electro-mechanical instruments. Vega Industries' roots can be
traced to the 1960s and to early work done in the Physics and Engineering Laboratory
(pEL) of DSIR. Norm Rumsey, a PEL physicist and mathematician in the Optics
Section of PEL, had a strong theoretical interest in optics and in 1963 designed a
navigation light, known as the PEL sector light, to control marine trafEc in the
Paremata harbour entrance. Each PEL sector light is tailor-made using computer
programmes developed by Rumsey to manage the complex optical calculations
involved. The PEL sector light projects a precision, multi-coloured beam of light,
allowing mariners observing the colour of the light to determine their position relative
to the safe channel. By 1970 the light was earning royalties for the DSB but its full
commercial potential only came to be realised after Vega Industries was set up to
market the innovation.
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Vega Industries Ltd was incorporated on 12 April 1972 as a private company with 4
shareholders, with its initial focus being the commercialisation of the PEL sector light'
It grew out of a small company owned by John Ruddick and his wife that made
navigation lights, and which had been advised by the New Zealand Inventions
Development Authority to increase the company's size and expand its shareholding
base. John Ruddick became its first Managing Director, with other key shareholders
including Bob Barnes and George Bunce. Vega expanded into sector lights, with Bob
Barnes of Barnes Optical providing a significant technical input.
The PEL sector light has been widely adopted throughout the world, and Vega has
since developed a wide range of marine navigational aids such as rotating beacons,
signal projectors, lamp changers, naval searchlights, as well as navaids for
aeronautical use such as a Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)'
John Rochfort, now Managing Director, joined the company n 1977 ' One of his first
projects was a visual approach slope indicator system that applied principles used in
marine navigation to aviation control at Wellington Airport' In 1983 the company
began developing a traverse light to guide large ships into English wharves, as well as
automatic lamp changers, and signal projectors for the Ministry of Defence' In
response to requirements for the AirlZAC frigate project, Vega achieved ISO 9001
accreditation and, against strong international competition, won the only "design and
build" contract involving unproven technology in the whole project' In the lead up to
the XAB-17 innovatioq Vega in the early 1990s researched, developed and marketed
a rotating sector beacon installed at the Port of Napier, a high-intensity sector light
which provides the main lead into Port Botany in sydney, and a wide-angle oscillating
boundary version of the PEL sector light for the Port of Tauranga.
Apart from some assistance in its frrst decade from the DFC, and in more reoent times
some minor grants from a Business Development Board and from Tradenz, the
company has survived in a competitive market through its own efforts' After its initial
success in commercialising the PEL sector light Vega has found it difEcult to utilise
the publicly-funded technical infrastructure on an ongoing basis, relying instead on its
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own technological competencies. This is primarily because of the inability of public
research agencies to meet tight commercial deadlines, to achieve the technical quality
standards, and to provide the testing services required in Vega's very specialised
market. John Rocffiort regrets the decline in the ability of Crown Research Institutes
(formerly agencies such as the DSIR) to do the instrument making and
interdisciplinary applied technological work that can make productive and practically
apply scientific results. In the 1990s technologists may be overly specialised, which in
the long-terrn may deprive companies such as Vega of staff with a broad skill-base
and an understanding of the conceptual basis of different technologies'
While navigationat aids are its major business, Vega also handles design and
machining work for other clients, most of it in very small or one-offproduction runs'
These contracts have ranged from cavity resonators for the Post Office to a
fingerprint machine for the Police. Vega does most product manufacturing internally,
except for some specialised components such as circuit boards' In some cases, Vega
has had to build a machine to make just one small part. The cost of one-offproduct
development, such as the injection moulding, is often very significant and Vega is very
conscious of the need to design products to be simple enough to manufacture, thereby
keeping the price down.
The lack of standardisation of products makes it difficult to achieve economies of
scale and has limited Vega's ability to grow. The business is capital intensive for a
small company and Vega has invested substantially in capital equipment, including in
advanced CNC turning and milling machines. The company typically undertakes one
large system project a yeaf . Vega is currently developing a maritime ship control
system for the Hong Kong government.
In 1994 the company had 6 shareholders and a staffof 9. Key staffare the Managing
Director, John Rochfort, and the Marketing Manager, Martyn Cook' John Rochfort
owns his own separate company that builds the computer technology required in
Vega's lights, with this technology being constantly upgraded to meet new technical
demands. RocMort writes some software, but also depends on some external
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software development. The company employs 6 workshop staff, who perform both
R&D and production manufacturing, and an office manager. Vega draws on a range
of consultants and companies to provide specialist technical or subcontracting
services. It retains the services of Norm Rumsey in optical design and Rod Ruddick
in electronio design. Companies providing services include Strobe Engineering, as
well as Industrial Optics Ltd for lens manufacturing, and Hella Industries for injection
mouldings. Iohn Iorns, a director, assists in management and accounting while Peter
Clarke assists with the quality system.
Vega lndustries began exporting from its establishment in 1972 and now exports
around 90% of its production. It currently invests around 25Yo of total sales on R&D'
It strongly focuses on the marine navigational market and quality control is typically
undertaken by staff with extensive sailing experience. However, its core business
could be best defined as instrument making for niche markets, rather than being
exclusively locked into the marine and navigational markets.
Market Backeround
Marine safety is governed by international agreements which place a high premium on
reliability. The agencies responsible for marine safety make up a tightknit and
conservative group which communicates freely on technical matters. The United
States Coast Guard maintains 231 major lighthouses in the US, of which 106 are
required to have a night-time range in excess of 20 nautical miles. With the most
extensive and diverse range of lighted maritime navigation aids in the world the US
Coast Guard is the biggest market as well as the technology leader' It has been a
multi-million dollar funder ofR&D in companies to develop marine navigation-related
technology. While it meets its needs by contracting companies to produce required
products rather than making them internally, it manages a rigorous testing Progftulrme
that fulfils military standards and performance criteria. Other lighthouse authorities in
the world, including in New Zealand, make use of products first developed for the US
Coast Guard.
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Technological progress is driving changes in the market for lighthouse and
navigational aid technologies. With major lighthouses now fully automated the major
efftciency gains will result from reducing through-life operational costs, essentially the
energy and maintenance costs. Global Positioning Systems (GPS) are likely to reduce
the number of minor lights, but the major lighthouse services are likely to continue to
rely on shore-based lights because of mariner beliefs that other systems are not fail-
safe.
Vega faces international competition in its core market from companies in Holland'
Germany and France and also has to overcome such market barriers as the "Buy
American" preference policy in the United States.
In its earlier years Vega was a technology-based product development company' but
from 1990 and with the encouragement of a market research grant from Traderrz,
Vega began to take a more systematic approach to marketing. Martyn Cook
evaluated a range of marketing options and Vega put in place a worldwide sales and
distribution system through the London-based firm AB Pharos Marine, the world
leader in the marine navigational aids market. Vega sector lights are now also
marketed by Zeniyalights of Japan.
Vega does not now patent most of its innovations because of the cost and time
involved, relying instead on commercial confidentiality to protect clever technical
details of its innovation such as the optics, and capitalising on its technical reputation'
The niche-oriented nature of the market means that competition is from relatively
small companies, and the technical difficulties of the optics involved, the need for
customised, tailor-made products with very small or one-offproduction runs, all serve




In lggl Martyn Cook undertook market research and promotion in the united States.
This began with the promotion of existing products, but in the course of this he
identified a forthcoming tender for a Landfall Beacon (lighthouse light) for the US
Coast Guard. The US Coast Guard saw an opportunity to exploit changUg
technology to address technical inefticiencies in the performance of its existing
lighthouse network. At this time the standard 24 ntle lighthouse beacon operated by
the Coast Guard consisted of 600 mm searchlights mounted on heavy steel turntables'
Each of these lights had a 1000 watt lamp and the turntable required a further 600
watts to operate. A typical installation had a total power requirement of 1600-2600
watts and was energy intensive. Solar power was uneconomic for installations above
around 400 watts of all-night consumption. Existing lighthouses depended on diesel
generators for remote areas, including back-up generators for emergencies, or
mainline supply involving expensive cabling, some of it submarine' Such cabling
deteriorated, was expensive to maintain or replace, and often had adverse
environmental impacts, for example due to power line reticulation through sensitive
environmental areas.
Specifications and Tendering
In l99l the Aids to Navigation section of the US Coast Guard issued a solicitation
(call for tenders) setting out specifications and technical performance requirements for
a new landfall beacon that would be sufficiently energy efficient to economically use
solar power. In preparing its specifications the US Coast Guard was conscious of a
range of technical developments that could allow major performance gains. These
included new light sources such as xenon-arc and metal-halide that emit more light
energy per joule of electricity consumed than existing tungsten-halogen lamps, new
developments in switch mode power supplies, and new optical technologies that allow
more emitted light to be captured and held within a beam rather than being dissipated
as stray light.
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The soticitation was based on a careful comparison of the through-life costs of
existing mains or diesel generator-powered beacons compared to solar-powered units
that could be developed. There was a requirement for 1,360,000 candela effective
intensity, a range of 26 nautical miles, the motor driving the turntable could not
consume more than 8 watts, it had to be solar powered and have an automatio lamp
changer so that the light would only need to be relamped once ayear' The xenon-arc
lamp that would be required to meet the specifications needed a wattage of 100-250
watts. This set of specifications was technically extremely challengltrg, especially
compared to existing lighthouses with a lesser range which consume 3.5 kilowatts of
power with a 1,000 watt lamp and an effective intensity of 1,360,000 candelas' The
beacon had to be able to operate unattended for 12 months in temperatures ranging
from -24 degrees Q 1s +65 degrees C, with humidity up to l00oh, and with exposure
to salt and sunlight.
Vega had built up expertise through the xenon-arc signalling searchlight it designed
for the AIIZAC ship project, but it clearly needed to extend its expertise in turntable
drive systems, precision optical reflecting systems, and high-frequency SMR power
supplies. Vega responded to the solicitation by submitting a tender that demonstrated
the company's understanding of the technical problems, something which competing
companies could not match. Its tender had to be 6Yo lower than a US corporation or
l2o/o lower than a small US company. However, the Coast Guard made clear that
Vega's success was overwhelmingly due to its ability to articulate its grasp of the
problem and set out possible technical solutions, rather than due to its price'
The design and development contract was awarded to Vega against international
competition on 31 March 1992, with the requirement being to desigq develop and
produce two prototype beacons, and with the tender price being $300,000.
Design and Development
Vega had only one year to
technical standards stipulated
design and produce a prototype that would meet the
in the contract. The Coast Guard paid for the R&D on
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the beacon, much of it concerned with cracking the technical problems associated
with fulfilling the specifications. Vega reviewed existing designs and technologies to
identify the best technical route to solving the problems posed by the specifications'
Xenon-arc technology was needed to achieve the energJ savings required in the
specifications. Only one lamp from a German company that did not exceed 150 watts
had the expected life needed for a lighthouse.
Vega,s optical design consultant spent over 3 months elucidating different technical
approaches to meeting the requirements for the xenon-arc lamp, before Rochfort
made a decision on the most practical solution. Vega designed the parabolic reflector
lens. No New Zealand company or laboratory had the ability to deposit a specialised
coating needed on the beacon's electrical mirror because of an inability to measure the
wavelength. Vega therefore designed the die and contracted a Californian company
to produce the die and provide the service. The resulting reflector has a multi-layer
reflectivity-enhancing coating deposited under vacuum that produces reflectivity in
the visible light range in excess of 94o/o.
Vega contracted Cadac Ltd, an innovative New Zealand start-up company that had
developed a unique brushless DC electric motor (see Glbertson & Knight, 1992), to
develop drive circuitry for its motor so that it could be incorporated in the beacon'
After about 7 months effort it was clear that Cadac would not succeed, so Rochfort
and an electronics consultant retained by Vega decided on an alternative motor drive
system. This motor drive system was developed to prototype stage over about 4
days, after which circuit boards were made up, Vega adopted Cadac's motor stator'
wired to Vega's specifications, while Vega itself made the other part of the motor
which required a lot more accuracy, for example to measure the magnetic pulses and
to achieve speed control.
Vega also had to develop an auto-injection transformer and igniter system to start the
lamp, and contracted the Wellington company' Futureworks, to develop a switch
mode power supply that would provide both the boost circuitry and the drive circuitry
for the lamp itself. A specification requirement was the ability to measure the hours
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each lamp had done, so the switch
system that records this for the lamp-
pushed that starts recording again.
mode power supply includes a computerised
Each time relamping occurs a reset button is
The energy into the rotating head had to be controlled and recorded. Vega's policy
was to avoid the use of any materials or parts, such as mercury slip rings, that could
have adverse environmental impacts at any time in the future' A problem was that
brushes on slip rings are designed to carry current at all times. Brushes are designed
to drop a volt in order to worlg but with only 12 volts, Vega could not accept a I volt
drop. Vega had to find a slip ring material and a brush that wouldn't create too much
of a voltage drop. The minimum voltage that could be supplied is around I I volts, or
as much as 18 volts, so the R&D on the brush system had to achieve an effective
compromise within tight technical parameters'
A master logic controller electronically manages all the functions of the beacorq
inctuding self monitoring, a sotar switch circuit controlling activation and deactivation
of the light, activation of stand-by lights in the event of beacon failure, and provision
for remote monitoring of rotation and of the number of back up lamps remaining' An
electronic multiplexer monitors the optic head in senrice and redirects power to the
next optic set in the event of lamp failure or time-out. The circuit design electronics
for this was done by Vega.
Based on long experience with suitably durable materials for marine navigation aids,
Vega built the light using an aluminium with very good corrosion-resistant properties'
Vega also, for the first time, used special suspension mounts to counter the problem
of high-frequency vibration that Rochfort had observed in elevated structures such as
lighthouses.
Success of the XAB-17
The XAB-17 converts electrical energy into useable light energy very efficiently' It
uses about l0% of the energy of existing lighthouse beacons' The light flashes by
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rotating, achieving an effective intensity of 2,L21,200 candela' The XAB-17 is light
and portable, which facilitates installation in difficult and isolated locations.
The technical performance of the XAB-17 compared to existing beacons is set out
below:




























(Source: Vega Industries, 1993)
In 1994 the XAB-17 Landfall Beacon and the VRB-25 Rotating Beacon earned Vega
first prize in the ECNZ Rutherford Awards, awarded for their energy efEciency,
commercial excellence and environmental acceptability'
At the end of 1994 the Coast Guard will have completed extended trials of the
Landfall Beacon and it is likely to earn Vega substantial revenue over at least ten
years from the US, with some sales potential in Europe. The US Coast Guard has
already made substantial orders for the VRB-25 Rotating Beacons, and orders are
expected to follow from Australia South-east Asia and Canada' Vega is now working
on further contracts for the US Coast Guard,
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Background of Key PeoPle
John Rochfort completed part of a Certificate in Engineering in New Zealand'
followed by a Diploma in Industrial Electronics and certificates in vibration analysis
and dynamic balancing and in celestial navigation in Australia and the United States'
Rochfort worked from 1960 to 1963 in DSIR (PEL), starting as a technical trainee'
DSIR stimulated and challenged Rochfort at this time, and developed his skills in
applied technology spanning a range of interlinked disciplines and skill-bases' He then
spent over 13 years in Australia as a researcher, designer, instrument maker and
service engineer in Menzies Research Laboratories, Chrysler Experimental Ltd and
Tosco Ltd, including significant involvement in optics work' A number of his
inventions were patented by these companies during this time' After a short period
back in the DSIR as a technical officer involved in instrument development he became
factory manager of Solid State Equipment Ltd in Lower Hutt. In 1979 he was
appointed to his current position as Managing Director (as well as chief technologist,
designer, researcher and factory manager) of Vega Industries.
While lohn Rochfort regrets that he missed out on advanced, university-based
scientific training, he is in fact regarded as one of the world's foremost optical
engineers. Like other brilliant instrument makers such as Brian Hennessey of
Hennessey Grading Systems, Rochfort has an extraordinary ability to apply inductive
insights and lateral thinking to practical technological applications. His innovation has
often focused on meeting practical needs, and on developing his own product, system
or technical solution where one could not be bought offthe shelf.
Norman Rumsey graduated with a BSc in mathematics and physics at Auckland
University in 1943, followed by masterates in mathematics (1944) and physics (1946)'
After a period of war service in the Nary he joined the Physics and Engineering
Laboratory of DSIR in 1947,from which he retired as head of the optics laboratory in
1982. From his retirement he has been retained by Vega Industries as an optics
consultant.
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Martyn Cook completed an honours degree in mechanical engineering at Auckland in
1975, followed by a diploma in teaching. He then completed an MBA at Victoria
University in 1989. After time as a physics and mathematics teacher he worked as an
engineer and sales engineer, a project manager in a market research company' and a
strategic planner for a construction company. He started work for Vega Industries in
1991 as a marketing consultant and director, before commencing a period of VSA
service in 1994.
Conclusions
The XAB-17 innovation reflects the ability of small New Zealand companies to
compete in niche markets where total world sales are too small to attract the interest
of major overseas technology-based companies. The complexity of the technology
discourages and acts as a barrier to competition, and enables small companies such as
Vega that master the technical challenges to capture the benefits.
Vega has benefited from its links with lead users. The US Coast Guard is a discerning
and demanding customer and sets rigorous technical standards which, when achieved'
confer market prestige on those companies that can meet or exceed those standards'
Vega has the ability to integrate different technologies in marine navigation, and to do
the in-house engineering and instrumentation to fulfil demanding performance
specifications. It lacks scale economies but effectively exploits economies of scope'
The XAB-IZ owes much to the technical skills built up by John Rochfort during his
time in DStrL and in private sector workshops, tooling and instrument making
facilities. These skills are cumulative and based on international exposure to private
and public sector technologies. While significant growth and diversification
possibilities exist, Vega may well be overly dependent on one key technologist'
However, it has major opportunities to capitalise on its international reputation and to
earn premiums from specialised technological competencies that are hard for others to
imitate. It also has the potential to break out of the constraints imposed by one-offor
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small-scale production runs, by identifoing opportunities for the development and
commercialisation of standard products.
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CASE 10: GREENWELD INNOVATION
Introduction
Greenweld is an adhesive system that allows fast gluing of wood over a wide range of
moisture and temperature ranges. Greenweld allows timber to be glued without
drying, removes moisture content as a key quallty control variable for gluing, and
avoids the need for specialised adhesive-curing equipment. The Greenweld process as
finally commercialised involves cutting defects out of unseasoned lengths of sawn
timber, finger-jointing the short lengths of timber into continuous lengths of higher
value timber using the Greenweld adhesive technology and, if a dry product is
required, kiln drying the longer finger-jointed lengths. Crreenweld allows unseasoned
short lengths that would otherwise be chipped to be finger-jointed into saleable
lengths, followed by kiln drying and planing to final size for sale as high value
structural engineering components.
Greenweld was developed through collaborative work by the Wood Strengths and
Structures and the Wood Materials groups within the Forest Research Institute's
Wood Technology Division.
Background
The Greenweld innovation must be placed in its wider industry, technical and
institutional context.
Industry Background
Forestry is New Zealand's third biggest export industry, earning around $2,000
million in export earnings from a total wood harvest of around 14 million cubic metres
per year. The industry is based on 1.4 million hectares of mainly radiata pine softwood
forest. The forest processing sector includes pulp and paper mills, plyNood, particle
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board and panel plants, and around 260 sawmills. Most forestry exports are logs and
pulp and paper but there is also a diverse and growing solid wood products sector'
The sawmilling sector is pivotal to the long run economic performance of the forestry
industry as a whole. This is because of the potential of the sector to add value and
allow the industry to diversify away from a dependence on price-driven commodities'
Sawmills also produce the low-cost wood residues that help underpin the cost
competitiveness of the pulp and paper sector'
The sawmilling sector has enormous potential for growth and innovation but is made
up of mainly small companies with low skill levels, backward technology and limited
technology management capabilities. Sawmill managers tend to a short-term outlook
dominated by day-to-day problem solving and their plant and technology is ill-suited
to exploiting the added value opportunities increasingly opening up in international
markets. In the past, sawmill managers have typically lacked formal qualifications and
developed their skills through learning on the job. In more recent times, professional
managers in the sawmilling and solid wood product sectors have tended to hold
qualifications in accounting and other commercial fields rather than in technology'
These managers have lacked the ability to interact effectively with the Forest Research
Institute (FRI) on technical matters, but in some cases have responded positively
where FRI has supported its technological initiatives with sound business planning and
cost-benefit analYsis.
In recent times the sawmilling industry has come under increasing pressure to
minimise the environmental impacts of its waste streams. The increases in log prices in
recent years have focused industry thinking on the potential for low value waste
strea.ms to be a source of high value products, rather than representing a cost or
adverse environmental impact for the industry.
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Technical Backeround
In some sawmills around 20%o of thevolume of timber is likely to be chipped or used
for other low grade purposes. Short timber lengths that are chipped or sold for other
low-value uses are worth around $60 a cubic metre' versus around $400 a cubic
metre for longer finger-jointed lenglhs.
An important means of adding value to short timber lengths is to finger-joint them
together to form longer lenglhs of timber for high value uses such as in structural
engineering. Finger-joints are usually made by machining wedge-shaped fingers into
the end grain or side grain of pieces of timber, applying adhesives to the exposed
faces of the fingers, matching the fingers on any two pieces of timber so they dovetail
together, and applying end pressure to lock the fingers together.
There are a number of major technical deficiencies in the conventional finger-jointing
process. Conventional finger-jointing involves sawmilling of unseasoned timber, kiln
or air dryrng, and cutting out defects from timber, leaving short lengths of high gade
dry timber. These short lengths are very expensive to dry, preservative treat and
machine.
Kiln drying before finger-jointing can lead to timber distortion if timber is packed
incorrectly. For conventional finger-jointing the timber must be dried to uound lTYo
moisture content, and after defects are removed up to 30o/o of the wood may be
discarded, drastically increasing the cost of the dried timber' The defect removal and
finger-jointing process is carried out on timber that has already received a great deal
of processing in the form of drying, or even preservative treatment and machining,
and this means that any rejected defects constitute an expensive waste'
It was widely recognised internationally that the abitity to glue green or wet wood
together without drying would be a major advance in finger-jointing technology'
There was therefore a significant body of international literature and experience in
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gluing wet wood and in finger-jointing technologies, and this had aroused interest in
the Forest Research Institute (FRI)
From the early 1970s FRL technologists developed an interest in finger-jointing and
finger-joint testing. FRI was aware of a Canadian method of finger-jointing green
wood developed in the early 1970s. The Canadian WFPL process involved passing
wood through a continuous kiln so that each piece was heated up and the fingers were
dry before it was jointed together. This method worked effectively but involved an
expensive and cumbersome method of drying the wood through air blasting, which
had the effect of heating the timber up and speeding the curing of the glue' Hank Bier
in the Wood Strength and Structures group of the Wood Technology Division in FRI
had a long-standing interest in finger-jointing and suggested some possible approaches
in the mid-1980s. However, FRI only launched a concerted attack on the problem
when commercial revenue requirements, uncertainties over Crown funding, and the
sharper strategic focus resulting from strategy development within the Wood
Technology Division came together from the late 1980s'
Institutional Background
FRI developed from an experimental station at whakarewarewa' Rotorua n 1947 '
The focus of FRI's early research was production forestry, but it later developed
strong capabilities in forest processing, wood technology, and in pulp and paper
research through the PAPRO collective. In recent years FRI has increased its focus
on adding value to wood products and extending the range of applications of radiata
timber.
FRI was funded through direct Government appropriation as part of the Ministry of
Forestry and also earned commerciat income from industry. From the mid-1980s the
Government began reducing direct appropriations to place FRI on a more commercial
footing and to force industry to pick up a higher proportion of the R&D costs' As
paft of the reforms of New Zealand's science system, on I July 1992 FRI was
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restnrctured as a stand-atone Crown Research Institute (CRI) with full commercial
powers.
FR['s Forest Technology DMsion undertakes the Institute's production forestry
research. This Division has over time succeeded in commercialising some of its major
technological innovations. As "user pays" began to have a major impact in the mid-
1980s, this Division was able to extend its earning base from public funding and
commercial contracts to include a stream of royalty and license income from such
technology as its software innovations. In contrast, the Wood Technolory Division
which undertook FRI's solid wood product and processing research was more weakly
positioned to deal with the new cornmercial environment. It lacked substantial
earnings from licensed technology. It serviced a sector that had a lower market
concentration than the plantation forestry and pulp and paper sectors and which was
dominated by smaller firms with less commitment to long-term R&D.
From l9g7 Dr John Butcher, the Director of the Wood Technology Divisiorq initiated
a systematic strategJ of diversifying earnings by focusing on technologies that could
potentially be commercialised in industry. Butcher was motivated by a need to avoid
the short-termism in research resulting from a dependence on commercial contract
earnings. He realised that his Division could not grow or diversify by providing
research services to the sector, and the early stages ofthe science reforms had created
great uncertainty about the future of public research funding. He was also conscious
that the undiscriminating transfer of research results as a "free good" meant no one
company had the incentive to commit the developmental investment needed for the
effective commercialisation of technology.
Butcher's approach was to identify and concentrate effort on a small number of major
technological opportunities where FRI had an international understanding of the
technology and the ability to build on and apply existing Institute capabilities to meet
the needs of the sector. This strategy involved the identification of the broad areas
that wood product innovation could focus oh, with scientists able to create
opportunities in these areas through whatever scientific methods or paradigms seemed
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most appropriate. This strategy led to a focus on areas such as the hardening of
radiata to improve its durability and functionality, anti-sapstain treatment, and
environmentally safe preservation systems, which in turn led to the vapour boron
innovation. It was this strategy of encouraging new ideas focused on the strategic
needs of industry that led to the identification of gluing of green timber as an
important technical opportunity.
Butcher effectively established a process that encouraged the generatiorq capture and
exploitation of new ideas, fostering peoples' creativity within the parameters set by
the Institute's core capabilities and by industry needs and opportunities' By 1988
Butcher had this strategy in place. His Division suffered some revenue shortfalls as it
struggled to meet financial targets white moving investment into the identified areas of
technological priority. However, the strategy proved extremely effective over the
longer term for the Wood Technology Division, leading to innovations in wood
hardening, anti-sapstain technology, vapour boron wood treatment and to Crreenweld'
The Innovation
The commercial pressures FRI was under in 1987 led to "brainstorming" sessions to
generate new ideas for industrial technologies that could be commercialised to earn
revenue for the Institute. At a December 1987 session of the timber engineering
group Jeff Parker, a technologist in the Wood Strength and Structures team'
suggested that the successful development of a green finger-jointing system "would be
of considerable benefit to industry and a licensing agreement would provide a
cashflow for the laboratory."
The proposal was to build on earlier Canadian technology and apply it to radiata' In
its green (unseasoned) state radiata was a very wet timber and it was clear that it
would pose new technical challenges in finger-jointing technology' At this time
collaboration was envisaged between FRI'S timber engineering, adhesive chemistry
and wood dryi.g technologists. JeffParker began working on the idea in early 1988'
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with this early lab-scale work undertaken in FR['s finger-joint cutting operation' This
work included experimenting with flash drying the wood, using existing glues in new
ways, and modi$ing the finger-jointing process itself'
Jeff Parker and his colleagues were effectively a composites engineering group but
Greenweld involved processing and adhesives chemistry, and the ability of the team to
make connections across disciplines was essential to make progress in finger-jointing'
While New Zealand as a whole is not strong in polymer chemistry and adhesives
technology FRI had built up considerable expertise in chemical applications in wood
processing through the efforts of scientists such as Dr Robert Franich and Dr Terry
Lomar<.
The major technical problem encountered in gluing green wood with water-based
adhesives was migration of the glue into the wood, so that the glue became too
diluted to form an adequate bond. The technical challenge was therefore to develop a
glue process that cured the adhesive rapidly enough to avoid migration. A number of
alternative technical approaches were tried within FRI from 1988 on.
Alternative Technical Approaches
The approach initiated by Dr David Plackett, at the time an engineering and chemistry
research field leader in FR[, was to use surface activation chemistry to glue wet wood
by adding a chemical to the glue surface to inhibit glue migration' This appeared to
be successful but tests later showed that the chemicals were behaving differently from
expected and that surface activation was not a feasible technical solution. Terr)'
Lomax, a chemist in David Plackett's group, then suggested using high molecular
weight chemistry to stop the migration of the adhesive. This involved waiting for the
glue potlife to progress to the point where the molecular weight was high enough and
apply the glue to the green timber to be jointed. Lomax's approach worked well
technically, but it was diffrcult to adequately control the curing of the glue in practical
industrial applications. The glue kept curing, meaning that there was only a minimal
269
time in which the adhesive was in a state to glue green wood but still be moist enough
to apply to the timber.
Robert Franich, a senior and distinguished chemist in FRI, suggested that the curing
process depended on the pll, and that changing the pH would enable the process to
be effectively controlled in an industrial setting. The idea was to pre-cure the glue to
its ideal state and add ammonia to stop the curing. However, experirnentation
showed that the chemical did the opposite and made the glue cure very quickly' This
however was a key finding, because it meant that the chemical could be used as an
accelerant to catalyse an almost instant bonding of the joints.
Franich's contribution was a crucial technical step forward but it did not itself solve
the problem. Jeremy Taylor, a young technologist in the Wood Strength and
Structures group, then experimented further and in a key step applied the accelerant
to the wood rather than the glue. This meant that a standard adhesive could be used
since it was the accelerant that allowed the rapid curing. The glue could be put on the
wood at an earlier stage and when the joint was formed the accelerant would catalyse
rapid curing before the water could cause glue migration. A key advantage of this
was that the normal potlife of the glue was still appropriate, and conventional finger-
jointing machinery, a glue applicator, a spray system to apply the accelerant chemical,
and a ventilation hood were all that was required for the process to work in an
industrial setting.
Early Development Work
Taylor persisted with his work against a backdrop of competing technical approaches'
Surface activation was still promoted by others as a more effFective technical attack on
the problem. It was at this stage that Dr Justin Williamson, a recently recruited
scientist with a background in structural engineering and statistical modelling, became
involved in the work and the team became Parker, Taylor and Williamson' with some
assistance from chemists such as Robert Franich. A range of chemicals were
experimented with and Williamson undertook statistical analysis of the results'
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With the Wood Technology Division under pressure throughout 1988 to ratse
commercial revenue, longer-term research was suffering' At this time Jeremy Taylor
was involved in commercial work and the team had a strong motivation to develop
technology that would provide a stream of income that would reduce the pressures to
earn short-term commercial revenue. The Crreenweld process was clearly promising
and the innovation did not require large-scale capital investment, since it aimed at
using existing machinery to exploit a new adhesive system' Justin Williamson and Jeff
Parker kept working on Greenweld with a minimal time allocation devoted to it'
Work continued on the processing parameters, pressure and assembly times, the
testing and validation of bonding strengths, the durability, and ensuring compliance
with standards. However, throughout 1988 and 1989 the project was quite marginal
in terms of FRI's commitment of resources to it.
In July 1989 $15 million in new funding was approved in the Budget to form an initial
basis for a contestable funding system to give effect to the Government's science
reforms. The DSIR structured this funding as the Priority Research Contracts
Scheme (PRCS) and called for bids. Applications were received and transferred to
the newly established Foundation for Research, Science and Technology for decision
on allocations. The Foundation approved a $100,000 bid from FRI for "Improved
utilisation of low grade timber." At this time, the three alternative technical
approaches to the gluing of green wood had been experimented with at laboratory
level, but FRI's focus was coalescing around the method developed by Franictr'
Taylor and Parker.
The success in winning PRCS funding was orucial because it built the Greenweld
team's confidence and gave it leverage as it sought internal support for
commercialisation of the process. The PRCS funding allowed further development of
the process and the completion of pre-commercial trials to the point where financial
and technical feasibility could be demonstrated.
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Patentins
By early 1990 the commercial potential of the process was clear and John Butcher
became concerned at the danger of FRI compromising its intellectual property
position if too many details were disclosed too early' Butcher moved to get a
provisional patent in place. Finger-jointing of lower grade lengths of timber to higher
value longer lengths was the most commercially promising application of Greenweld
and the patent application was based on this. Fast drying wood adhesives were not
new and the novelty in the FRI innovation was the fast gluing of wet wood, and the
overall Greenweld process as a package. The provisional patent applicatiorq filed in
1990, focused on adhesive technology to glue wet wood. This meant that the scope
of the finat patents awarded may be too nalrow to encompass the wider possible
applications of the technology. For example, the ability of the technology to glue
wood together at very low temperatures and to glue dry wood were not claimed in
the patent application, and FRI is now trying to extend intellectual property protection
to these features.
The full patent application had to be submitted within a year of the provisional
application. It was extremely difficult to find the money for the patent' Howwer,
with the application process lagging technologists such as Justin Williamson raced
against time and met a deadline set by the expiry date of the provisional patent' Jeff
Parker, David Plackett, Jeremy Taylor and Terry Lomax are the names on the patent'
but the Greenweld team members also pay tribute to the contribution of Robert
Franich in closing a key knowledge gap. In l99l patent applications were filed
internationally.
Trialing and Promotion
With the patent going through there was an urgent need for a strong commercial link
to ensure that trialing could be undertaken in a cornmercial environment. FRI was
constrained by its lack of in-house finger-jointing machinery of a standard that would
enable trials to be conducted and demonstrated to industry on FRI premises.
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Proposals for FRI investment in a finger-jointing machine were declined by FRI
management, at least partly because the uncertainties associated with the CRI
establishment process had led to a cautious approach to new capital investment'
The first trial of Greenweld in a commercial setting was conducted in late 1990 at
Carter Holt Harvey's (CHH) Taupo plant. This and subsequent CHH trials were a
success and the company intended using the process to finger-joint Douglas fir for the
Australian market. However, CHH then lost access to Forestry Corporation's
Douglas fir and the project came to a halt as a result. At this time, a senior scientist in
FRI's timber engineering group approached the owner of a financially struggling
sawmilling business, asking him to act as a marketing consultant to assess and
promote the commercial potential of the system in a real industrial setting'
This marketing consultant was appointed with an ill-defined mission of promoting and
commercialising Greenweld. He was enthusiastic and energetic and stimulated a lot
of interest in the technology, especially among smaller companies' However' he
lacked the technical expertise and systematic approach to oversee trials of a
technology that involved both toxic chemicals and the need to meet tight technical
parameters in finger-jointing applications. Toxic chemicals were sent in the mail with
written instructions on their use, substandard chemicals were used, and the safety and
efficacy of the process was compromised.
ICI made the three-part resorcinol type-adhesive system for Greenweld, consisting of
the chemical, the adhesive and the hardener. Because the glue used was relatively
expensive the marketing consultant proposed a cheaper adhesive' Though this
seemed to work at a laboratory stage it proved inappropriate in an industrial setting'
Subsequent progress has since been made on screening alternative and cheaper resins,
and on more basic research to better understand the chemistry of the process'
The consultant did not work alongside the FRI technologists or with ICI as the
chemical supplier, and his lack of understanding of the technical parameters caused
some major difficulties in trialing and promotion of the technology' As a result of the
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consultant's efforts the technology's reputation was damaged, especially when
ammonia was used without fumehoods and small sawmills adopted the process
without proper quality management systems being in place'
Members of the Greenweld team led by the marketing consultant conducted two
poorly-handled trials in Australi4 and problems were experienced with one type of
press system unsuited to Greenweld applications on very wet timber' The consultant
did persuade one Australian and five New Zealand companies to attempt to adopt the
technology but gave inadequate technical advice and support' This left technologists
such as Jeff Parker and leremy Taylor with a legacy of technical problems to solve'
However, this problem solving has itself provided valuable feedback to FRI and these
companies are now using the process effectively'
The major negative impact of the marketing consultancy was its effect on the morale,
involvement and sense of ownership of the key FRI technologists. The consultant's
role was never clearly defined, he had the effect of turning FRI managers and staff
against one another, it became unclear who had an overview of the innovation' the
key FRI technologists felt disempowered and "squeezed out", and FRI lost a lot of
ground as a result.
Further Development
The Greenweld process required only minor modification to the finger-jointing
process, for example installation of fumehoods, to work effectively with existing
finger-jointing machinery. ln LggZ Lakeland Timber Processors designed and built a
new finger-jointer incorporating facilities to use Greenweld. The Lakeland Timber
Processors' finger-jointer was tailored to local users, ffid while not designed
specifically for Greenweld it has been easy to attach and programme the Greenweld
applicator into its operations. At the same time Canterbury University began
developing an in-line tensioner to prove joints for structural use.
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In 1991 and early 1992 John Butcher was heavily involved in the CRI establishment
process, David Plackett was managing the Divisiorq but there was some confusion
over who was managing the Greenweld project itself' The project by this time was
costing the Division around $300,000 ayear' By mid-1992 interest had been shown
in the technology from Europe, India, Australi4 North America and from about 40
New Zealand companies. However, by this time the innovation was hampered by
serious human resource management problems, mainly stemming from the
appointment of external consultants and lack of effective project management' This
meant that the key FRI technologists in the Greenweld team lacked a sense of
.,ownership" of the project. FRI management had appointed a financial consultant to
provide input into the financial side of the innovation' The Greenweld team felt it was
not adequately consulted over an early marketing report commissioned on Greenweld'
and over a technical evaluation of the process undertaken in Britain'
In July lgg2DrRussell Burton, FR['s Manager, Wood Products, began taking charge
of the Greenweld process. With the financiat consultant's contract completed, Burton
decided not to renew it for Greenweld, and addressed the financial issues himself'
From July 1992 Russell Burton focused on the longer-term research opportunities
associated with Greenweld, while Jeff Parker was appointed operational director to
manage the technical aspects of the commercialisation process. Burton encouraged
Parker, Williamson and Taylor to work closely with industry users as the champions
of the technology. Allowing technologists who have developed an innovation to be
active in helping carry it through to full cornmercialisation was fundamental to the
eventual success of Greenweld'
Based on a detailed business plan prepared by Justin williamson, Russell Burton
pulled together an operational plan governing commercialisation of Greenweld' He
also acted as a facilitator and a link person between Parker's team and FR[ colporate
management. Burton provided a key financial and economic input into the
commercialisation process but also understood the technology sufficiently to interpret
and articulate its benefits. The operational plan provided vision and direction for the
Greenweld innovation, elucidated the further technological and market development
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required, and provided a clear work plan for the team to follow' This plan was centrd
to Greenweld's longer-term success'
From 1993 Parker's role as operational project leader was complemented by Justin
Williamson taking over the underpinning R&D work, allowing Parker to concentrate
on the applied technology, machinery, industry liaison and technical back up aspects'
Commercialisation
In mid-1992 Parapine Timber in Upper Hutt became the first company in the world
licensed to use Greenweld. However, the uptake of the technology in New Zealand
wns poor, partly because of the low technical understanding of the systerq the short-
term outlook of sawmill managers, and the inept nature of the trialing and promotion
by FRI's marketing consultant. Some companies were also reluctant to depend purely
on a research institute to provide an ongoing technical support service for innovations
such as Greenweld.
FRI decided to take the technology offshore and also to build closer commercial links
with companies that could supply the chemicals and technical services to the
sawmilling sector. John Butcher understood that in some cases the best form of
technology transfer was not direct links from FRI to the end user companies but to
work through intermediaries such as chemical or wood-drying companies that
provided a service or input to the end users. FRI management convinced their Board
that commercialisation required substantial investment, and the Board accepted a
$110,000 financial exposure associated with the process of licensing the technology
offshore.
An important breakthrough for Greenweld was its adoption by the Australian
sawmilling company SEAS Sapfor. SEAS Sapfor was assessing ways of avoiding the
waste involved in chipping short lengths and had heard of the Greenweld process'
Les Cunningham, one of its project engineers, visited FRI and Lakeland Timber
Processors in mid-1993 and put forward a case to his company to invest in Greenweld
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and the Lakeland finger-jointer as a system. After the company agreed, two of its
staffwent to Rotorua and JeffParker and a colleagge, Doug Stewart, demonstrated
the technology to them. They also visited the ICI Adhesives and Resins plant at Mt
Maunganui. The first Australian installation of Greenweld was installed at the SEAS
Sapfors mill in Tarpeena, South Australia in September 1993, with assistance from
Jeremy Taylor. some technical problems were resolved in technical meetings
invoMng Taylor, Parker, Williamson, Doug Stewart and ICI Adhesives and Resins
staff.
SEAS Sapfor is ISO certificated and its quality manager worked with FRI to produce
a Greenweld manual for the company. Greenweld-bonded wood is used in timber
engineering structures and the strength of the bond is crucial to its acceptance in
international markets with varying regulatory standards governing building materials'
FRI is covered by professional indemnity insurance but not product liability insurance'
A detailed quality manual for Greenweld was prepared by FRI with this manual
excluding FRI from liability for applications of Greenweld outside the guidelines in
the manual. FRI produced guidelines on the total system to allow a wide range of
users to produce their own quality manuals.
Dyno Polymers, a large chemical supplier, was licensed in 1993 to exploit Greenweld
in North America, with options for Central and South America' After this, FRI
cornmenced negotiations with ICI New Zealand and ICI Australia Operations Pty to
exploit the technology in the New Zealand,Australian and Pacific Island markets' Jeff
parker and other FRI technologists concentrated on technical applications and back
up in end user companies, while Russell Burton had primary responsibility for
commercial negotiations with ICI.
In 1994 FRI licensed the Greenweld technology to ICI New Zealand' ICI was
granted an exclusive licence to exploit the technology commercially in Australasia and
it pays a royalty to FRI for every cubic metre of timber produced using the Greenweld
process. ICI has the expertise to provide useful feedback to FRI on further
developments of the Greenweld system, and the involvement of this company has
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encouraged adoption of the technology by wood processing companies that were
reluctant to do so while the process was fully under FRI control'
In 1994 FRI and the Building Research Establishment (BRE) in Britain signed an
agreement through which the BRE will act in a technical capacity for FRI in the
exploitation of Greenweld technology in Europe' A first step in this has been the
investigation of ways to improve the performance and value of Sitka spruce' In 1994
CHH revived its interest in Greenweld and prospects look bright for the process in
New Zealand solid wood processing companies'
Benefits of Greenweld
Greenwetd is starting to deliver major benefits to both industry and to FRI'
The Greenweld process is easier and less expensive than the Canadian WFPL process'
allows increased kiln drying efficiency and reduces processing costs. Unlike the
WFPL process Greenweld does not require heat input and can be easily installed in
existing factories. With Greenweld, defects are removed before kiln drying, which
means all the dried timber is suitable for use in the final product. Timber containing
defects does not have to be kiln dried so costs are reduced' The effective capacity of
timber-drying kilns is increased because instead of only 50'70% of kiln-dried timber
appearing in the final product as in the conventional finger-jointing process, the entire
kiln-dried volume can be used. Greenweld makes it possible to upgrade unseasoned
timber products such as framing. Greenweld is at least as strong as conventional
finger-jointing.
The process works on both wet and dry timbers and the quick setting time (about 5
minutes compared to up to 24 hours with conventional technology) means that finger-
jointed material does not need costly equipment to accelerate curing, and the material
can be used almost immediately with almost no intemrption to processing'
Greenweld can joint dry timber without radio frequency curing.
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Greenweld allows a greater proportion of a tree to be converted to higher-value uses'
and reduces environmentally harmful waste products as a result' Greenweld allows
wastes to be removed early in the production process before they start to generate
costs, and avoids having to dispose of treated wastes'
The Greenweld process can reduce stockholding by producing grade/length
combinations to order, allows targeted exploitation of the market for unifonn, quality
products and can generate energJ savings by avoiding the energy-intensive processing
of reject or low quality material. The overall cost of Greenweld is similar to that of
conventional finger-jointing, with rapid payback periods depending on throughput'
Greenweld has allowed FRI to extend its skills in adhesives and surface chemistry' It
has given FRI a vista into the adhesives industry, enhanced its links into the
sawmilling industry, expanded its servicing work in materials testing, and boosted its
reputation in the field of adhesive applications in wood product innovation' The
relationships FRI has developed with industry are now less fuzzy and generic,
partnerships have been established with companies, and this has given a lot more
commercial focus to FRI developmental research. It has also provided FRI with a
generic and evolutionary applications platform that will allow the Institute to expand
into related areas, and provide the cashflow to support this. The success has built up
FR[,s commercial skills, its confidence in commercialisation of its technology,
enhanced its intellectual property capabilities, and given its technologists a truer
appreciate of the value of their contribution.
Future Opportunities
The Greenweld technology has a host of potential future applications in laminated
products, plywood and particle board production' and in other process applications'
Income generated by the Greenweld technology is funding the development of parallel
and new FRI technologies. Greenweld has formed a platform for spin-off
technologies and wider downstream applications. New applications being explored
include bonding of dry wood and gluing of non-radiata species such as Black spruce'
279
Jack pine, Western red cedar and Northern white spruce. Greenweld has been
successfully applied to the side gluing of timber.
Background of Key People
Jeff Parker joined FRI as a technical trainee in 1974. He received a thorough
grounding in a wide range of FRI actMty under a technicians training scheme. Parker
completed a NZ Certificate of Forestry with a specialisation in wood technology and a
Certificate of Engineering (Mechanical). In 1985 he completed the equivalent of an
MSc in timber engineering, timber technology and wood protection at the Imperial
College of Science and Technology in London.
Jeremy Taylor has been a technologist in FRI since 1986. He developed strong in-
house skills in testing and analytical methods in FRI before becoming involved in
Greenweld from its inception in 1988.
Dr Justin Williamson completed a masterate degree in structural engineering at
Auckland University and a PhD involving statistical modelling at Vancouver
University. He joined FRI as a research scientist in 1988.
Dr John Butcher is Manager of the Corporate Development Division of FRI and
formerly headed the Wood Technology Division. Butcher spent 20 years as a
research scientist in wood preservation. He was very active in international research
groups and organisations involved in wood preservation and wood protection, was a
member of the Ministerial Science Task Group charged with overseeing the
establishment of Crown Research Institutes, and in 1992 served on the Science and
Technology Expert Panel (STEP) advising Government on New Zealand's long-term
science priorities.
Dr Robert Franich joined FRI in 1973 and is now a senior scientist and a Fellow of the
Royal Society. His major achievements include the application of chemistry to an
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understanding of the Dothistroma fungus toxin, development of possum lures' wood
hardening and environmental monitoring innovation, and input into the Greenweld
innovation.
Dr Russell Burton was a research scientist in chemical and process engineering' His
early research included work for the New Zealand Energy Research and Development
Committee on conversion of raw materials into liquid fuels, He was then appointed to
FRI and worked in process economics, pilot plant development and composite
products. He worked closely with lohn Butcher in managing innovations such as
vapour boron and wood hardening, In July 1992 Burton was appointed Manager of
the Wood Products Division.
Dr Terry Lomax is a research chemist in FRI. Lomax completed his PtiD in surfactant
chemistry at Auckland University, and spent a period as a junior lecturer and then as a
researcher at National Womens' Hospital. He spent over 2 years as Chief Chemist for
Petersons Chemicals in Auckland before joining FRI'
Conclusions
The Greenweld process is a major technological and commercial achievement' It
resulted from FR['s intimate understanding of the technological needs and
opportunities of the forest products industry and from the strategy initiated by FRI
managers such as John Butcher to develop and commercialise innovations that could
earn FRI a stream of income from licensed technology' Above all, it depended on the
creativity of FRI technologists, their ability to understand the fit between industry
needs and opportunities, and their multi-disciplinary understanding of timber
engineering and chemistry.
Central to the Greenweld success was FRI's ability to create strong commercial
relationships with individual companies. FRI accepts that commercialisation of
innovations such as Greenweld does not stop with licensing but takes the form of
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longer-term business relationships with companies, and the provision of extensive
technical and back uP services.
FRI sells not science to industry but technological packages with forecasted rates of
returq evidence of technical feasibility, and the ability to practically apply these
packages in a commercial setting. CRIs cannot easily sell ideas or research results to
industry but must have the in-house capability to develop prototypes, trial processes'
and make the investment in the refining of processes and in technology demonstration
to ensure effective commercialisation in industry. FRI's solid wood product
laboratories may well be under-capitalised and ill-equipped to undertake the in-house
experimentation and trialing needed to create technology packages suited to uptake in
a fragmented sector that is dominated by small and technically backward companies'
The Greenweld case suggests that CRIs require discretionary funding and the ability
to seed new ideas to counter inflexibilities inherent in funding from the Foundation for
Research, Science and Technology. The Priority Research Contract Scheme (PRCS)
funding was invaluable because of its timeliness. However, the key benefit of the
PRCS was that it was more open ended and less objective driven than the
Foundation's Public Good Science Fund (PGSF), and it supported research focused
on applied technologies with proprietary applications'
A major motivation of FRI technologists was to use their expertise to help New
Zealand industry by attacking real industry problems, bottlenecks to productiorq
waste minimisation and added value opportunities. The key players involved in
Greenweld were motivated by the satisfaction of carrying something through to
commercial reality and by a sense of ownership and participation' Delays in the
commercialisation of innovations such as Greenweld and vapour boron have occurred
primarily because the motivation of key technologists dropped as a result of a sense of
alienation or disempowerment, not because of technical problems, or even barriers to
new technology in industry.
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Motivation and staff retention remain key problems for FRI. The Institute is losing
significant numbers of scientists and technologists to industry, partly because of low
morale resulting from the new science system and uncompetitive remuneration. There
is a deep-seated problem in FRI in retaining key staff in a commercially focused
environment at a time when forest product companies are gradually becoming more
aware of the need to upgrade their own, in-house scientific and technical capabilities.
It is also difficult to reward individuals for innovation when multi-disciplinary teams
have worked together in a complementary way, and where key innovators have
depended on the wider science infrastructure and on antecedent research.
Greenweld was based on cumulative expertise built up through servicing finger-
jointing and a wide range of other technologies in the forest processing sector.
Greenweld depended on multi-disciplinary research and the ability of timber engineers
to draw on core competencies such as adhesive chemistry which had been built up
through basic and strategic research by scientists such as Robert Franich and Terry
Lomax. This team work was especially crucial in aligning chemistry with engineering
applications. Scientists such as Franich and Lomax share with musicians a pattern
recognition ability, and their knowledge of basic chemistry and of the industry enabled
them to apply their knowledge in a problem-solving way.
FRI achieved most of its success with Greenweld by marketing it to intermediary
companies such as ICI that provide inputs to the end-user sector. The involvement of
adhesive companies illustrates the distinction between the end use of technology and
the companies that are most likely to first adopt and commercialise. The sawmilling
companies were the first targets for commercialisation, and while they saw the
benefits, they were slow to adopt the technology because of inept marketing and
demonstration by FR['s marketing consultant, and a lack of the technical
understanding and quality management systems needed to solve the technology
adoption problems needed for successfu I commercialisation.
The Greenweld case illustrates the need for strong and unambiguous project
management, clear line control, with project teams commanding discretionary
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resources and which involve all the key players in the project from inception to full
commercialisation. Teamwork is essential in complex innovations and "solo
operators" typically have a deleterious impact on the management of technological
innovation.
Marketing and financial consultants who deprived the key technologists of a sense of
ownership of the innovatioq who lacked any commitment to FRI, and who did not
understand the technology impeded the commercialisation of Greenweld' When
management or marketing of the innovation was taken from the Greenweld
technologists enthusiasm dropped, and only when Russell Burton created an effective
project management structure was the innovation process put back on track and
canied through to successful commercialisation. Key success factors for Greenweld
included Burton's ability to weld together a common vision and a team approach the
shortening of the decision making process, and the returning of enough power and
discretion to the Greenweld team to give its members the sense of ownership from
which so much motivation flows.
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Appcndix I
Key Events in the Greenweld Innovation
Key Evcnts
Eerly 1970s FRI undertakes work on gluing wet timber
Mid-1970s FRI investigates canadian method of finger-jointing wet wood
1985 Hank Bier proposes one approach to fast finger-jointing
lgsSTerryLomorinvolvedinexperimentationongluinggreen
wood
tgs6tsT John Butcher begins development of technology
commercialisation strategy in the wood Technology Division
December 1987 JeffParker suggests a focus on green gluing finger-joints at
"brainstorming" session
Early 1988 JeffParker undertakes work on green gluing finger-joints
l98E Justin Williamson joins FRI
lgsSWorkunderwayonuseofsurfaceaotivationforgluingwet
wood
1989 Priority Research Contracts Scheme set up
Late 1989 FRST awards contract to FRI for Greenweld process
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1990 First commercial trial of Greenweld undertaken in Carter Holt
llarvey plant in TauPo
1990 Provisional patent filed for Crreenweld process
lgg0ERImarketingconsultantundertakestrials
July 1992 Russell Burton appointed Manager of the Wood Products
Division
1igg1 Jeffparker appointed technical manager of Greenweld project
September 1993 Greenweld installation commissioned at SEAS Sapfor plant at
Tarpeen4 South Australia
tgg4 Greenweld licensed to ICI
Lgg4 FRI and BRE sign agreement for promotion of Greenweld in
Europe
286
CASE 1I: DUAL FUEL KIT INNOVATION
Introduction
The DieselGas dual fuel kit innovation is an electronically-controlled conversion kit
that allows the substitution in diesel engines of diesel with gas' The kits were
developed by the Lower Hutt company DieselGas, with early versions in use in New
zealandfrom 1984, but with the kits only being fully commercialised in 1993. The
DieselGas dual fuel kit innovation comes as two models: a "standard" model for
engines up to 250hp and a "Matchtorque" model for larger engines.
Background
The DieselGas dual fuelling innovation
company and technical context.
Market Baskeround
must be understood in its wider market,
The world's reserves of natural gas are enorrnous and will be increasingly exploited as
oil reserves dwindle. With the "oil shoclC' of the 1970s interest in alternative fuels
increased, largely to augment insecure or expensive oil supplies, and to a lesser extent
because of the lower pollution from gas compared to fuels such as diesel'
Currently the world market for alternative fuels is driven largely by political factors,
that is by Government ta:< and pricing policies, rather than by the cost of production'
New Zealand converts much of its natural gas to petrol, generates electricity with it,
and maintains a pricing structure that does not currently allow a sufficient price
differential to favour gas over petrol and diesel as a vehicle fuel' However, markets
exist in other countries where difilerent tax and pricing policies make it attractive to
substitute natural gas for diesel, and where there are environmental benefits due to
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lower diesel smoke emissions as a result of gas substitution. Ongoing instability in the
Middle East has also maintained interest in many countries in alternative fuels'
Dual fuelling to substitute gas for diesel can substantially lower fuel costs in countries
where diesel is more expensive than gas, and can also reduce the smoke emission
pollution from diesel engines. A small amount of gas gets rid of a lot of diesel smoke,
but the effect is greater with older than newer diesel engines' Engines run on a
dieseVgas mixture generally last longer.
Company Background
DieselGas's roots can be traced back to work from the late 1970s by a specialist
diesel engineering technologist, Harvey Reid, and to the evolution of the Lower Hutt
company, Solid State EquiPment.
In the 1960s Harvey Reid completed an apprenticeship as a diesel mechanic, before
moving to the more specialised field of diesel fuel injection repair and maintenance in
Timaru. He then spent from 1972 to 1975 managing the diesel fuel injection section
of a Wellington company, before in 1975 becoming Managing Director of Diesel
Progress, a company specialising in diesel injection repairs. He developed an interest
in dual fuelling of diesel engines in the late 1970s, but only linked up with solid state
Equipment in 1983.
Solid State Equipment was founded in l97l by ex-DSIR technologists George Jones
and Neil Poletti. The company's first major product line was making navigation
beacons. It later developed a wide range of other products and technologies through
contract research, including a multi-fuel dispensing pump, and electronic applications
in the sporting, computing, burglar alarm and emergency lighting fields' Solid State
began working on microprocessor technology from 1974'
The company has developed over 20 diflerent datalogger models for applications such
as sewerage flow, diesel engine control, well depth studies, corrosion mitigatioq
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geothermal research, and a general purpose field logger with a wide range of multi-
purpose functions. [n the mid-1970s the company developed an advanced field
datalogger embodying computer technology that was in the forefront of New Zealand
technology at the time. It developed further expertise in computing and
microelectronics through developing a piezoelectric composite oscillator ("crystal
driver").
ln 1977 Solid State was in financial difficulties but was assisted by the Development
Finance Corporation @FC) through a loans and royalties agreement. The DFC took
about one-third control of the company and encouraged it to implement effective
accounting practices. The DFC involvement also helped Solid State's credibility in
dealing with the business and financial community.
Solid State now operates as an R&D company that focuses on electronic solutions to
practical problems, and that commercialises the results of its research. It does little
advertising, generating most of its business through its reputation and by word of
mouth. It operates out of two converted houses in Lower Hutt. It functions as a
contract R&D laboratory rather than as a vertically integrated R&D-based
manufacturing company. The company has developed a lot of products in response to
research contracts commissioned by clients. Because of the nature of its business, its
production runs are small and sometimes one-off. It maintains only a one person
assembly operation" which at times is only a part-time position. While at one stage it
had 20 staffit now employs around 6 and has no desire to grow.
DieselGas was formed in 1983 by Harvey Reid and by George Jones and Neil Poletti
of Solid State Equipment. DieselGas currently undertakes CNG and LPG R&D, as
well as road vehicle design and certification, hea't y vehicle engine dynamometer
testing, the provision and installation of its CNG/diesel dual fuel kits, mechanical
engineering consultancy, and Natural Gas Vehicle (NGV) industry planning and
consultancy. DieselGas forms part of Enerry 2000, a consortium of New Zealand
companies with natural gas vehicle-related interests.
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Technical Backsround
Dual fuelling of diesel engines with natural gas has been carried out since the 1930s'
At this time some diesel engines, mainly used for power generatiorq were designed to
run a fixed pilot injection of 5o/oto l0% diesel, with the balance of the power coming
from natural gas. However, New Zealand only developed significant interest in dual
fuelling from the mid-1970s, very much due to the economic impact of the "oil
shocts" of that time. Use of CNG and LPG is subject to strict technical and safety
standards. These standards are strict, sometimes inconsistent and costly to achieve'
but on the whole they provide a helpful set of market-related specifications for
companies to meet.
In 1979 Solid State Equipment was asked by a client to assist in developing metering
technology to measure the dispensing of CNG. After 4 years of work Solid State
produced a CNG meter that was a technical success but a commercial failure'
However, it did give Solid State some familiarity with CNG technology, and with the
application of electronics to gas measurement and control. Solid State Equipment
also built up experience in automotive technology through its Taupo-V datalogger,
which was developed as a commissioned research project to monitor engine operating
conditions. Solid State therefore built up expertise in important engineering and
electronic fields in the late 1970s and early 1980s while working in isolation from
Harvey Reid.
The Innovation
In 1978 Harvey Reid developed an interest in dual fuelling technology, partly in
response to a client who wanted some equipment fitted to a diesel pump so that he
could convert that equipment to run on LPG and diesel at the same time' From 1978
to 1982 Reid experimented with a number of methods of dual fuelling of diesel
engines with CNG. These methods included vacuum systems, hydraulic, and various
mechanical systems. He chose to work on CNG rather than LPG because it was a
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technically easier fuel to work with and there seemed to be more potential for it in
New Zealand.
While the economy had got past most of the trauma of the "oil shoclC' by the early
1980s, the Government was still actively committed to alternative fuels. Howeveq
after several years of solo effort, Reid realised in 1982 that mechanical technology
lacked the sophistication needed for dual fuelling and that electronics was required.
At Zam one morning, after agonising over a key technical problem he was grappling
with, Reid saw a possible solution and by 6am he had sketched the design of a
proposed electronic dual fuel kit. This design later became the basis of a patent, and
Reid commenced his search for the electronic skills needed to advance his innovation
beyond the limits of mechanical technology.
Establishment of DieselGas
The development of the DieselGas dual fuelling innovation is inseparable from the
emergence of the company itself.
By 1983 Reid had a conceptual outline of his innovation, and conscious of his lack of
expertise in electronics, he began looking for a partner with these skills. He
approached a number of companies in the Wellington region, and then met Neil
Poletti and George Jones at a trade fair in Wellington. In 1983 they set up DieselGas,
initially as an informal joint venture and then in 1984 as a private company. The
emergence of the DieselGas company was a key organisational step forward since it
provided Reid with a framework for development of his dual fuelling ideas, and gave
him access to the electronics, software and to some of the business skills that he
lacked.
Early Development ofDual Fuelling Kits
The company then embarked on an ambitious programme of dual fuelling R&D, and
had a vehicle running on dual fuel by the end of 1983. Through 1984 and 1985 two
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engineers were typically working on the innovation at any one time, with funding from
the company and from the DFC. DieselGas began working on an LPG/diesel dual
fuel kit development project in 1985, with the initial work undertaken with the
Ministry of Works and Development (MoWD) An engine was donated to the project
by the Mack Truck company and this was used in dynamometer testing. The initial
funding of this work was from a DFC Applied Technology Prograrnme loan which
covered the first two years of work. Reid continued running his existing diesel
injection repair business, while keeping at least one engineer working on the dual
fuelling project from 1986 on.
In 1gg6 the Government removed the subsidy from natural gas. while natural gas
was still cheaper than petrol this move had a major impact because it was perceived as
a loss of faith in gas as an alternative fuel. DieselGas at this time had borrowed a lot
of money from the DFC and had around $500,000 in debt. oil prices had dropped
internationally and the company's accountants suggested closing the business down'
Flowever, DieselGas struggled through with the help of the DFC, motivated by a
belief in its technology and by the need to keep faith with and retain the trust of its
creditors and business colleagues. In November 1987 DieselGas identified a means of
controlling the combustion rate of dual fuels to avoid detonation and to allow
substitution of around 80% of the diesel with LPG. From 1988 the prospects for
alternative fuels seemed to improve. Reid sold his diesel injection business that year
and in l9g9 moved futl-time into DiesetGas to devote himself to the innovation.
Reid proved persistent in raising finance for his projects, and at one stage phoned a
DFC analyst almost every day for a year in the course of raising capital' Reid
approached politicians such as Mike Moore for advice and he explored the potential
for tax and other incentives for his innovation. Reid, over the life of the project
received several hundred thousand dollars in incentive and grant finance, including
export tax incentives and Applied Technology Programme (ATP), Technology for
Business Growth (TBG) and Business Development Investigation Grant (BDIG)
funding. DieselGas received substantial R&D funding from Australian sources in the
form of subcontracted work for an Australian company on LPG dual fuelling' and on
292
gas extraction from coal mines to power coal transportation vehicles' Much of this
R&D funding was embodied in the product price rather than funding for research per
se.
Developing Dual Fuel Kits
Over the period 1984 to 1989 DieselGas made significant technical progress' It
designed a unique servo-controlled gas valve and worked on the design and
application of actuators, transducers and associated hardware' Dedicated electronic
hardware and software was developed to allow individual engine and application
tuning, with these developments complemented by the application of advanced
combustion science through the use of dynamometer engine testing' Several designs
had been patented by 1989 in around 20 countries and considerable experience had
been built up.
However, in 1989 DieselGas, having invested around $500,000 in the innovation'
failed to realise it had taken the wrong technical approach by working on dual fuelling
with LPG rather than CNG Only later did the company switch its focus back to
CNG/diesel dual fuelling which it had begun work on in the early 1980s' While the
LpG work built up a cumulative skill-base in dual fuelling technology, the inability of
the company to choose the right technical path early on, and to know when to stop
when it was following the wrong technological pathway, cost the company at least 5
years and a substantial amount of money.
By 1990 DieselGas was carrying out production engineering for electronic CNG-
diesel kits and installing an engine dynamometer to allow kit application work to
continue. Both of these activities had been partly funded by the Foundation for
Research, Science and Technology (FRST) through its contestable funding system'
Harvey Reid had travelled to the US and identified a source of high-speed valves
which allowed for the design of an electronically-controlled diesel injection system'
Several different design variations were tested. DieselGas by late 1990 had a full-time
managing director, an office assistant and three part-time technical personnel,
including shareholder directors. By this time about $800,000 had been invested from
all sources in the dual fuelling project. However, funding then ran out and work
essentially stopped until further support was obtained from FRST in the form of
applied research funding.
DieselGas applied for a TBG project in August 1990 as a cooperative project with the
DSIR. DSIR had some interest in dual fuelling technologies and DieselGas had a
good technical relationship with DSIR's Peter Waring in its dual fuelling
developments. The TBG project aimed to develop an electronic LPG/diesel
conversion kit to substitute up to 80% of the diesel with LPG. The major market
opportunity was seen as the Boral Group of companies in Australia. This Group ran a
fleet of around 1,000 trucks and had a network of LPG sales outlets. TNO in Holland
had produced a low substitution LPG/diesel kit using 20-30yo LPG to 70% diesel.
However, Boral Gas tested these kits on some of its trucks, and because of the low
substitution rate supported DieselGas's alternative technology.
The TBG provided 50Yo of the salary for two engineers to work on the project in
DieselGas. Tom Holtslag was employed from November 1990, followed later by
Trevor Lister. In parallel with the TBG LPc/diesel project DieselGas provided
consulting services to South-east Asian countries, helping to develop CNG-related
industries in those countries. It also advanced the production engineering of its
Standard CNG/diesel kit with a focus on its sales potential in Latin America and
Eastern Europe. This work was assisted by the BDIG scheme.
The TBG project was based on earlier work indicating that the LPG supplementation
of diesel fuelling could be increased substantially by controlling the initial ignition
using diesel fuelling and subsequent injection. The project demonstrated that this
principle was correct, and that high substitution of LPG for diesel fuel was possible
without the onset of detonatiorq provided that the rate of pressure rise due to the
initial injection of diesel fuel for ignition purposes was carefully controlled.
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With the assistance of TBG funding the mechanical and electronic hardware and the
software were enhanced to improve the load and substitution levels' Problems were
encountered with the solenoid valves used to deliver and meter the diesel to each
cylinder. The TBG project proved useful in characterising the diesel injection spray
used in earlier tests. The project supported the building of a single cylinder prototype
electronic diesel injection system which reproduced injection characteristics and
allowed control of fuel delivery volume and timing'
However, the project encountered two major problems: an inability to control the
diesel fuel injection pressure to the prescribed time/pressure profile, and the
unforeseen aspiration of LPG into the cylinders of the engine which retained normal
diesel fuelling. A major difficulty was obtaining the correct diesel line pressure for
the LPG cylinder. It also proved extremely difficult to analyse the dynamics of the
injection control system.
By the end of 1992 Boral Transport had invested around $300,000, the TBG had
spent $83,000, and DieselGas itself had invested over $100,000 in the project' TBG
funding for the project finished in Septemb er 1992, at which point the project was
abandoned.
Marketine and Redevelopment
While struggling with its LPG/diesel dual fuelling kit, DieselGas was in parallel
redeveloping and making progress with its CNG/diesel kit. The small price
differentials between diesel and gas, the stow acceptance of CNG as a diesel
replacement, and poor quality conversion equipment have constrained acceptance of
dual fuelling technologies in New Zealand and forced DieselGas to look for overseas
markets. The Gulf War in 1990, and ongoing unease in the Middle East, to some
extent had revived interest in alternative fuels. However, New Zealand's isolation and
the travel costs to attend alternative fuel and NGV conferences and trade and
marketing events had posed a major constraint to the company's marketing efforts'
295
By 1990 the cNG/diesel kit was well advanced with a price of around us$6,000 per
unit. Harvey Reid launched the CNG/diesel kit at an NGV 90 trade fair in Argentina
in October 1990 but did not make any sales. It became clear that the price would
need to be at least halved to achieve any penetration in the market' George Jones
argued consistently for more rather than less electronics, and his view eventually
prevailed with Reid.
The product was heavily re-engineered in l99l with more complex software to
produce a simpler, cheaper and more reliable product which at the same time had
greatly improved performance. The product redevelopment included modular
production and software to produce the three control servos in software rather than
hardware, which in turn eliminated a printed circuit board for each servo' The gas
valve redevelopment produced a valve that was only 20Yo of the original weight but
had 60Yo of the capacity. The valve was capable of supplying sufficient gas for
engines up to 225 kW with larger engines using multiple valves. The redevelopment
produced a simple product with a much higher performance, cut costs by around two-
thirds, and was crucial to achieving the competitive price needed for the first sale'
Technical Performance of the Dual Fuel Kits
The DieselGas CNG/diesel conversion kit, as finally launched on the market, consists
of a microprocessor-based engine management system which at any given engine load
or speed determines, among other variables, the amount of diesel and gas fuelling for
optimised diesel substitution and overall fuel economy' DieselGas dual fuel kits
achieve significant energy savings at full engine loads. The electronic system is
designed to maximise the diesel substitution under all speed and load conditions'
The Matchtorque and Standard DieselGas dual fuel kits have some significant
advantages over competing products. Most dual fuel systems seek to optimise diesel
substitution at a set load/speed point, with performance sub-optimal at other settings'
The Matchtorque system gives optimal performance at all loads and speeds' The
Matchtorque CNG/diesel conversion kit can be applied to almost any automotive'
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marine, railway or industrial diesel engine and was specially developed for retrofitting
to existing diesel engines. It is especially suited to high power output turbo-charged
and inter-cooled engines of greater than 200 hp. The system controls ingested air
volumes as well as diesel and gas fuel supplies, resulting in enhanced light load
efficiency.
The Standard electronic dual fuel kit is fully programmable, with options including
diesel servo and air servo feedback, diesel injection timing variation, exhaust
temperature, water and oil temperature sensing, exhaust brake switching, low CNG
switch to full diesel, altitude and/or ambient temperature compensation and knock
sensing.
The DieselGas kits have simple design, easy installation, low maintenance and are
tamper-proof. Each engine conversion is individually programmed to match the
engine, original power and torque curves. No major engine modifications are needed
for kit installation.
Commercialisation
DieselGas was approached in 1992 by a local Pakistani living in New Zealand with
links to a company in Pakistan that wanted to develop a CNG dual fuel industry'
Stafffrom this company visited New Zealand. In early 1993 ECOTEC CNG (PVT)
Ltd of Pakistan confirmed an order for 69 dual fuel kits at around $2,000 each in
Pakistan, to be fitted to a fleet of service vehicles belonging to the Sui Southern Gas
company in Karachi.
The DieselGas kit had been developed for markets with well-developed service
infrastructures and skilled service staff. DieselGas therefore had real problems in
marketing in less developed countries such as Pakistan and Turkey, because of the
Government bureaucracy, lack of awareness of CNG as a fuel, rough roads and low
maintenance skills. When DieselGas received orders from Pakistan, Reid recognised
that new challenges were posed by the relatively unsophisticated nature of the market'
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with a need to tailor the product to the market to ensure ease of installation and local
maintenance. It took 18 months for the first contact to be made till the shipment of
the product. This was the first substantial sale for DieselGas and a big morale booster
for the company.
The Matchtorque system has been in continuous use for eight years in New Zealand
and has attracted world-wide interest. The company has now made dual fuel kit sdes
in Australia, South Korea, Turkey and Pakistan' The sale in Turkey was the direct
result of contacts Harvey Reid made at a Natural Gas Vehicles (NGV) conference in
Kiev. DieselGas is endeavouring to develop new markets for its kits, especially in less
developed Asian countries, and it is undertaking market development work in
Indonesia, TurkeY and Pakistan.
By 1994 DieselGas had invested over $1.5M in the CNG/diesel fuel kit, with the total
investment by all parties being around $2M. However, sales of around $2M are
projected by the end of 1995. The Matchtorque system has recently been chosen by
BHP for its upcoming dual fuel trials, and DieselGas is now dealing with major engine
manufacturers such as Caterpillar. The company is exploring other new
opportunities, for example providing dual fuelling technology for Moscow buses, and
the company may also develop a CNG/petrol dual fuel kit'
Background of KeY PeoPle
Harvey Reid completed an apprenticeship as a diesel mechanic and serviced a wide
range of diesel engines for some years' before developing specialised expertise in
diesel fuel injection technology. From 1972 to 1975 Reid was service manager of
Lucas Industries Ltd, responsible for running its diesel fuel injection service
department. From 1975 to 1978 he managed a diesel injection repair business'
Harvey Reid holds world-wide patents in CNG/diesel and LPG/diesel dual fuelling
technology.
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George Jones completed a BSc in physics at Otago University in 1964, developing a
strong understanding of basic science. He joined DSIR in 1964, and after a period as
a scientific officer in Antarctica became a scientist in the electronics design section of
the Physics and Engineering Laboratory in Lower Hutt. In 1971 he launched Solid
State Equipment in partnership with Neil Poletti, and in 1974 became full-time in the
company. Jones is dedicated to his work and to his principles and is a committed
pacifist who refuses to participate in any projects with the Ministry of Defence.
Neil Poletti began in DSIR as a technical trainee in 1960, completing an NZCE in
1964. He spent 9 years as a technologist in the Physics and Engineering Laboratory
in DSIR, before in 1969 taking a job as a development engineer in Natronics Ltd in
Sydney. After 3 years in this company he co-founded Solid State Equipment in
Lower Hutt in partnership with George Jones.
Conclusions
The DieselGas dual fuel kit resulted from extraordinary perseverance over some years
and from the cumulative skill-base built up by three key individuals. Harvey Reid was
kept going by a belief in his product and by the motivation that comes from "experts"
arguing that it couldn't be done. The positive synergies between Reid, Jones and
Poletti were crucial for success. The single-minded passion of Harvey Reid, and his
knowledge of diesel engines and mechanical hardware, needed to be complemented by
the electronic hardware skills of Poletti, and the software and physics expertise of
George Jones. Jones' ability to temper enthusiasm with more objective criticd
appraisal, and to assist Reid in learning how to manage an R&D prograrnme was
crucial. Reid's ability to recognise his limitations and work as part of a team was
fundamental to eventual success.
The case illustrates that success has to be planned for to avoid the costs in time and
money of inadequate appraisal of the technical and market parameters early in a
research programme. Over the period 1983 to 1992 DieselGas put considerable effort
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into LPG dual fuelling, and yet its major commercial success has been with CNG
because it is technically easier to work with and more acceptable in the market.
The case demonstrates the need to be open to new ideas and new technologies and to
be aware of alternative technical pathways to achieve a given goal. DieselGas went
down several technical "blind alleys" from 1983, with one of these costing about 5
years of development time, until the company basically reverted to its original
CNG/diesel design. However, these failures were themselves useful learning
experiences, with much of this learning being generic and providing valuable insight
into other technologies or products of interest to the company.
Solid State and DieselGas have had bad experiences in business, and Jones and Reid
are adamant that ethics and trust are at the heart of good business relationships. The
DieselGas case illustrates the importance of the "people side of innovation". The trust
between people is fundamental to success and Harvey Reid argues that customers buy
"because they like and trust you" rather than just because they like the product.
DieselGas has shared with other technology-based companies a difficulty in raising
capital from banks reluctant to support high risk projects. The company takes a
conservative attitude to debt, and lack of capital will continue to limit its growth and
development.
R&D and product development funded by customers is a major source of
development finance for companies such as DieselGas and Solid State Equipment.
Such R&D is often product-specific, and may be funded by payment for an end
product delivered. The contracts for such research are often tightly specified and
leave little room to earn premiums. R&D companies that do not undertake vertically
integrated manufacturing and volume production find it difficult to grow, because
research contracts from other parties do not allow substantial premiums to be earned,
and research results are not embodied in tradeable products.
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Solid State and DieselGas are examples of R&D companies that provide an essential
part of a countqf's technical infrastructure and which are niche-oriented and almost
"cottage industqy'' in scale. As technological "cottage industried'they lack the scale
economies to compete in large-scale volume manufacture. However, they have the
flExibility and creativity to perform in smaller, niche markets that larger international
companies do not have a zufficient incentive to compete in.
301
Appendix 1










Solid State begins work in microprocessing technology
Harvey Reid starts business repairing and servicing
diesel pumps
Harvey Reid develops interest in dual fuel kits
Work begins with MoWD on LPG/diesel dual fuel kit
Harvey Reid moves full-time into DieselGas
Harvey Reid attempts to market dual fuel kit in Argentina
Product is redeveloPed
First significant sale of DieselGas dual fuel kits in Pakistan
1g7E-19E2 Harvey Reid undertakes experimentation with mechanical
technology for CNG dual fuel kits
Late 1982 Harvey Reid recognises need for electronically controlled
dual fuel kits
1933 DieselGas formed




In exploring the role of learning processes
technological innovatioq this thesis draws on
underpinning and catalYsing
theoretical insights from the
management, neo-Schumpeterian, evolutionary economics and new growth theory
literature. These provided the broad theoretical backdrop against which the empirical
research was undertaken.
This chapter outlines the data generated and the key themes and variables highlighted
by the research, and presents the results of the open, urial and selective coding
processes. Core categories of variables that provide explanatory insight into
technological innovation are then developed. These provide a basis for the advanced
analysis of the research findings and the model building set out in the Conclusions and
Implications chaPter.
Overview of OPen Coded Data
The case study research generated a mass of open coded variables. These are listed in
Annex 3, which also sets out how the variables are organised into axial categories.
The following provides an overview of the open coded data and sets out the key
themes arising from it. This data is discussed for convenience within the 5 broad
research areas.
Orieins of Innovation
A firm's ability to innovate is bounded by its strategic behaviour, by the human capital
and competencies that it has built up cumulatively over time, its social and




The origins of innovation lie in the interplay between a firm, with its internal
competencies and processes, and the wider (and often global) environment' Firms
within New Zealand have different capabilities and are positioned at varying points
inside the bounds of the world's "technological production possibility frontieC'' Some
internationally competitive firms and industries, such as in agritectq industrial drives
and horticulture are at the outer rim of the world's technological production
possibility frontier. The technological capability of other firms fall far short of this'
and their potential to innovate is correspondingly limited' Dynamic and interactive
technological learning processes at the level of a firm constantly shift its technological
possibility frontier.
Technological learning is integral to the origins of innovation, because it serves to
catalyse processes through which new ideas, insights and sources of technology can
be made economically productive. New ideas and learning processes do not occur in
isolation but are localised and domain-dependent. Technological learning is localised
in the sense that it tends to occur withir\ or it branches off from techniques that are
already in use, and from the interaction a firm has with its search and selection
environment (see Nelson & Winter, 1982)'
Technological innovation is an interactive process (Kline, 1985; Rothwell, 1992)' and
technological learning is a process of continuous interactiveness (see FreemalL 1994)'
Interaction between a firm and its external environment is fundamental to innovation
because it expands the diversity and richness of the ideas, technologies and market
niches that firms can select from and turn into new opportunities. The diversity and
richness of the competing ideas in the external environment from which firms make
selections helps drive the rate of evolutionary technological change' This
technological change is greatly influenced by the extent to which firms link with and
exploit the international body of knowledge.
Especially since the economic reforms of the mid-1980s, New Zealand firms have
increasingly looked internationally, so that the environment from which ideas can seed
new technological developments has been extended beyond New Zealand' For
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example, the Treotek innovation was significantly influenced by Japanese
technologists, and the Phoebe fat measurement innovation has its genesis in Japanese
and Australian applications of nuclear technology to measure moisture levels in coal.
MAF's scallop enhancement programme was developed in conjunction with Japan's
Overseas Fisheries Commission, vapour boron was developed by FRI in collaboration
with Imperial College, London, while Alatal 821 involved collaboration between New
Ze,aland and American researchers.
New Zealand's economic history has shaped the origins of its innovation. New
Zealand's evolution as a "trade colony" of Britain has meant that much innovation
was stimulated by the transport bottlenecks of servicing distant markets with
biological products that change continuously from harvest to delivery to the customer.
These influences have stimulated many of the innovations recorded in the Annex I
Database of Innovations, including in packaging, objective measurement technology,
conveyancy, automated grading, sensory technology, powder handling, processing to
improve shelf life, controlled atmosphere storage and transport, and data loggers to
monitor the condition of products over time. However, geography and transport
costs are not always major factors constraining New Zealand innovation. PEL in
Marton for example lacks a port, airport or significant local market, but can compete
in fuel dispensing and security electronics with competitors in their home markets in
Europe and North America.
New Zealand's domestic environment and natural resource endowments have led to
strong concentrations of innovation around the dairy, meat, horticulture, forestry and
agritech industries. This reflects the extent to which technological innovation has its
origins in demand from domestic industries, which leads to innovations being
concentrated around industry clusters (see Porter, 1990). As shown in the Annex I
Database of Innovations, the biologically-based primary sectors are particularly
significant asers of new innovations, for example, animal vaccines, logging machinery
and milk measurement technology. The "behind the farm or forest gate" primary
industries are not themselves major direct producers of innovations, except in fields
such as plant breeding, but rather create a demand for innovations from the
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manufacturing, electronics, secondary and tertiary processing and servicing industries.
Many innovations result from particular characteristics of the biologically-based
industries, such as the perishability of their products. For example, perishability
creates processing and shelf life constraints, but has also helped drive the processing
investment and industry vertical integration in sectors such as the dairy industry.
Often it is the lack of a resource, or a specific problem in the resource base or the
natural environment that has stimulated innovation. Examples have included steel
making processes using iron sands and earthquake shock absorbers, Innovation has
also focused on upgrading the value of waste or low value materials such as
lactalbumin, whey, short timber lengths or export-reject kiwifruit. Innovations such
as Treotek have exploited innate characteristics of raw materials, such as coarse wool
fibres that would otherwise be a disadvantage in the market. The unreliability of
labour, the need for improved safety as with the loin boner, and reducing
environmental impacts such as with the dual fuelling development have also been key
stimuli for innovation.
Market or customer links have often triggered innovation and these links are almost
always crucial at some stage in the ongoing development of an innovation. These
customer or market-related origins of innovation have encompassed such drivers as
the cost of production, and solving technical or quality control problems as with the
Ruakura Milk Harvester.
Lead users and discriminating customers (see von Hippel, 1986) are often key to the
origins of innovation and associated technological learning processes. This is
demonstrated in the FP4000 fire alarm and the loin boner innovations. In some cases,
lead users may set extremely demanding technical specifications that in themselves
drive a learning process that leads to major technological advances. An example is
the demands placed on Vega Industries by the US Coast Guard's lighthouse beacon
specifications. However, learning from markets and customers is only possible when
a firm has the internal competencies that enable it to inteqpret, adapt and apply
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external ideas and technologies and allow it to interact in a stimulating and catalytic
way with its environment.
The origins of innovation must be seen not in isolation but as part of a technological
continuum. Past ideas and technologies seed or lay a technical platform or knowledge
base for new ones. Innovations build on those that came before and the quality or
functionality of a new innovation will typically be higher than that of antecedent
innovations (see Grossman & Helpmaq l99lb). The integrated circuit built on
knowledge created through the development of the transistor, and in turn laid the
basis for the information technology revolution that has transformed modern
economies. In New Zealand, research on the properties of the dairy protein casein
stimulated a proliferation of later applications of protein chemistry to different
product opportunities. The father of Bill Foreman, founder of the major New Zealand
plastics company Trigon, made plastics out of casein when New Zealand was
deprived of plastic imports in World War ll. Robert Franictq an emhent FRI
scientist who was a key player in the Greenweld technology, found his knowledge of
casein chemistry to be catalytic in leading him to the key insights underpinning FRI's
wood hardening innovation. Casein now forms the raw material for an artificial paua
food, buttons, artificial silk, and the coating of TV screens, as well as being a food
ingredient in a range of markets. Technological learning that is built up cumulatively
within a field can therefore involve significant economies of scope, since it often has
generic and multiple applications. Such economies of scope and generic applications
reflect the non-rival characteristics of much of this learning.
In many cases, the origins of new ideas or technologies lie in systematic R&D effort in
research institutes in New Zealand or overseas, in published scientific papers, or in
technology demonstrations. In most of the case studies innovation has drawn heavily
on overseas research endeavour, and in all cases it has drawn in an evolutionary way
on past research and technological innovation. Formally-organised R&D, in the sense
of controlled experimentation in a laboratory-type environment, is highly desirable in
most innovations and necessary in many. Obviously, in-house R&D enhances a firm's
receptivity to external sources of science and technology (Gambardella, L992). As
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shown in the DieselGas case, learning from "failed" research, the process of
"organisational forgetting" (Lundvall ed., lgg2), or of "unlearning" (see Starbuch
1996) helps to sharpen the focus of future researctq search and selection processes or
creates new spin-offopportunities that can be explored'
While the creation of new knowledge and technology always requires 'oresearch" h
the very widest sense, technological innovations can flow from firms that lack
formally-structured R&D. Fisher and Paykel, for example, marshalls the skills of all
staff from production workers to senior design engineers in innovation, rather than
depending on a separately-organised R&D team. This reflects a view that an
innovative firm is a learning organisation and that the whole of the organisation can be
the ..R&D,, or the "innovation" department, rather than having these activities
separately structured.
The limits of the model of research-based knowledge creation leading in a linear way
to innovation are demonstrated in the large number of innovations developed through
market-driven applied technology rather than systematic R&D effort' However'
innovations such as kiwifruit wine, GS 2085 and the Ruakura Milk Harvester show
that the more traditional models of innovation based on strategic scientific research in
centralised research institutes still work in some cases, especially in homogeneous'
biologically-based industries. Formal seminar and industry presentations were key
learning processes leading up to the loin boner and the ASDi, while the Greenweld
innovation illustrates the value of structured idea-generating processes such as
"brainstorming" techniques.
The internal culture of organisations significantly influences the origins of new
innovations. The free exchange of ideas and open coilrmunication in firms' in the
universities, the former DSIR' and in research institutes has helped foster an
environment in which important new ideas or insights have emerged'
Ideas for an innovation are often stimulated by a trigger event or stimulus that
generates a "bright idea", very often in the course of tackling a real problem' Arrow
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(1962b) argues that learning does not occur through repetition, but involves
knowledge being built up by actually doing things and tackling real problemg through
fixed views being challenged, and through people being forced to continually revise
their understanding of a problem as new information comes to hand.
Garth Carnaby with the Treotek innovatiorq Robert Franich in wood hardening
technology, and Harvey Reid in DieselGas all had flashes of insight or recognised a
pattern or set of connections that provided a key insight into a new innovation. As in
the float glass innovation, conceived by Pilkington while washing the dishes,
innovators often experience a key insight after extended musing over a problem, but
while engaged in some other, non-work related activity. Serendipity, or a sudden
flash of insight, does not however occur in isolation from other origins of innovation.
"Luck favours a prepared mind", and men such as Carnaby and Franich are very
strong scientists or technologists fully imbued in the context of the problems they
address.
Dynamic Processes Over Time
Technological innovation is about "extending the frontiers" in a dynamic way, rather
than the rearangement of fixed inputs in an existing market within the broadly given
state of technology. The thesis research highlighted the inherently integrative and
dynamic nature of technological innovation, the processes through which the benefits
of innovation over time can be captured, the skills and techniques applied in
innovationq and how people and firms can be organised to manage dynamic innovation
and technological learning processes.
Innovation can be characterised as the "carrying out of new combinations" (see
Schumpeter, 1942) or as the "craft of combination" @lam, 1993). As an integrated
process, technological innovation involves the bringing together of people, ideas and
technologies and their dynamic management over time. This requires strategic
leadership or governance through which a firm focuses its resources on innovative
opportunities, the ability to combine existing skills and technologies in a new way, and
through systemic innovation to link different technologies together to achieve major
performance gains.
Much of the dynamics of innovation over time relates to capturing its benefits, by
speed to the market, through asset specificity and embedded uniqueness, creating
barriers to competitive entry, confidentiality, branding, differentiation, and intellectual
property protection. Competitive strategy often aims to migrate away from
commodity and price-driven competition to earning premiums through competition on
the basis of quality, new functional properties and performance characteristics. This
in turn allows a market edge to be sustained by the accumulation of specialised assets
and the high barriers to competitive entry they create, and through tacit technology
that is difficult to imitate.
At the early stages of an innovation competitive strategy requires the choice of a
robust core design (see Rothwell & Gardiner, 1988; 1989). This is illustrated by the
industrial drive innovations outlined in the PDL Electronics case. Conversely, the
failure to create a robust design that forms a platform for later development is
illustrated in the FP4000 case. Once a robust design is chosen investment is
irreversible and fine-tuning only is possible. At a more advanced stage the preferred
design among competing options is identified by the market, volume builds up,
opportunities for scale economies emerge, leading to firms gearing up for mass
production and acquiring specialised and complementary assets. The asset specificity
so created is a major barrier against competitive entry. In the case of agritech
innovations by firms such as Tru-Test and Gallaghers, and mobile radio
communications from Tait Electronics, early market entry has meant that regulatory
standards have been designed around the product, creating barriers to other
competitors. Once established in one market, core designs, processes and
technologies can then spill over into other sectors. For example, dairy processing
knowledge and technology has spilled over into sectors such as wine and aquaculture.
Time is a competitive weapon to capture benefits, as illustrated in the PDL
Electronics and Vigilant cases. However, time pressures can mean firms take short
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cuts or produce technology that is suboptimal, or which has not been adequately
trialed. The Ruakura Milk Harvester was put into the field while technical problems
were still being solved, while the benefits of the kiwifruit wine innovation were
captured by "fast followers" such as Prestons rather than by the wine makers who first
commercialised it. Other innovations may be defeated by a combination of lack of
timeliness and following the wrong technological pathway. The development of
Advanced Testing Equipment (ATE) for the NZ Army that ended up being
"leapfrogged" by superior technology is an example.
Formal and codified skills, and analytical business management techniques such as
financial and market planning, can be effectively applied in the more dynamic and
stochastic processes of technological innovation. Obviously, technological
innovations of the highest potential will fail if there is a complete disregard for
planning, financing and marketing. The lack of commercial powers and structures
hampered innovation in Government science departments such as DSIR in the past
(see Bray & Perry, 1994). Improved financial, market and business planning would
have enhanced the process for many innovations, such as the Ruakura Milk Harvester,
kiwifruit wine and the DieselGas duel fuel kit, among many others. Since the reforms
of New Zealand's science system that began in 1989, the formal business planning of
research institutes has been an important success factor, as illustrated in the
Greenweld case.
But formal planning, analysis, measurement and codification can also dampen the
enthusiasm and "animal spirits" of an innovator, primarily because business planning
techniques are suited to the management of risk but not the management of
uncertainty. Innovators tend to be free thinkers who critically question and adopt
unstructured approaches (Twiss & Goodridge, 1989). Innovation sometimes benefits
from unreflecting instinct and from the use of and respect for intuition rather than an
over-emphasis on detailed and formal planning. The Prestons with their kiwifruit
wine innovation, and Murray Woolford and Robert Sherlock with the Ruakura Milk
Harvester, are examples of innovators whose extraordinary efforts may have been
discouraged if formal business planning had shown "how hard it was going to be".
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A firm needs the formal organisational structure, work practices and culture suited to
fostering dynamic innovation processes. Formal organisational design and structure
influence the ability to manage technological innovatiorU but even more important is
the way people are organised less formally. lnnovative forms of team and workplace
organisation aim at creating a "social architecture" that integrates people's skills,
fosters the flow of information and real-time communicatioru and accelerates the
response time and improves the flexibility and adaptiveness of project teams. This has
been characterised as the "rugby approach" to innovation (Takeuchi & Nonaka"
1986). It is axiomatic in the literature that organic structures and the use of task
forces, project-based teams and other cross-functional communication mechanisms
facilitates the learning, flexibility, adaptation and cross-fertilisation needed in
innovation (see Robbins et al, 1994). The evidence from the case studies supports the
conclusions reached by Brown & Eisenhardt (1995, p. 364) that:
..successful product development involves relatively autonomous problem solving by cross-
functional teams with high communication and the organisation of work according to the
demands of the development task.
As shown in the FP4000 case, innovations as well as organisations must be flexible,
with key design principles not locked in too early to be modified later, and with a
clear longer-term vision in place of how an innovation will create a technical platform
for future developments.
The ability to manage dynamic innovation processes is ultimately dependent on
people, and the social processes through which they relate to and work with each
other. There is a rich international literature on key roles that people play in
innovation, for example on the roles played by product champions and topJevel
sponsors (see Smith et al, 1984; Steele, 1989). The New Zealand evidence is in line
with what is known internationally about key innovation roles. Team and workplace
reform-based initiatives must be supported by good "people relationships" and a
business culture that fosters the cohesion, empowerment, toleration of diversity and
continuous improvement that is needed in innovation. This is illustrated in the
3t2
Treotek case, where Alliance Textile's workplace reform initiatives only succeeded
after the people relationships and cultural foundations had been put in place.
Investment in learning-related strategies and in human capital creation is crucial in
innovative firms. These learning strategies will fall within the domains important to
the firm and draw heavily on external stimuli from other firms, trade events and
literature, and external providers of science and technology. These learning strategies
will be dynamic and will encompass systematic learning and learning by doing, and the
creation of tacit and uncodified knowledge bases. Learning and skill-base
development may be specific to the firrq or be more generic in nature. A firm needs
to build up and retain over time competencies of high specificity to the firm, while
more generic competencies, or specialised skills needed only occasionally, can be
more mobile or can be bought in. This distinction between specialised and more
generic skills is highlighted in the Alatal 821 case.
Background/Past Experience of Key Players
The performance of people in innovation depends on their past background and
learning experiences, as well as on the structures and institutional and social processes
that make their skills productive. Variables relating to the background of people
include systematic learning experiences in different countries, industries and
workplaces, formal education and training, learning by doing and tacit knowledge
development, the influence of family background, and "orthogonal learning"
experiences that may arise, for example, from recreational interests.
Innovators very often have a rich and diverse background in a technical or industrial
field, often with international experience, or they may have worked at different levels
within an industry or organisation. Innovators often have a strong technical
background that builds confidence, or they may come from a family of high-achieving
professionals who have taken risks and achieved success by doing so. An innovator
may have taken an early rislq found it has paid ofi and gone on to further and riskier
innovations with the enhanced confidence that flows from success. Success often
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leads to innovators trusting in their ability, sometimes to the point of exuding an
infallible persona that can engender from others exceptional loyalty and willingness to
"go the extra mile".
The contribution of human capital and skill-bases to innovation is closely associated
with the mobility of human capital through the economy. This may take the form of
overseas technologists moving to New Zealand and playing a key role in an
innovatioq or the mobility of people among clusters of firms, such as among
electronics businesses in Christchurch or between research institutes, universities and
firms.
Many of New Zealand's most significant technology-based firms have been started by
innovators who have spun-off from other businesses, taking their skills, ideas and
technological competencies with them. Examples include Robinsons Industries (from
Fisher and Paykel), Switchtec (from Tait Electronics), and Innovative Developments,
started by the team of ex-PDL Electronics technologists that developed the ASDi
innovation. Other firms have been started by technologists who spun-off from
government agencies with strong technological competencies. Examples include
Vigilant (from the Post Oftice) and Vega and Network Communications (from the
DSIR). Technologists may have a core skill-base which can be applied in diffFerent
applications across a range of firms. Alan Fish developed his skills in optoelectronics
in DSm, applied them to meat grading technology in Hennessey Grading Systems, to
the entertainment industry in Microworld, and then to seafood processing in Exactics
Process Innovations.
There is still at least some place in innovation for the "backyard" innovators, many of
whom have a broad-based technical background. These innovators are often
stimulated by frustration with technical problems or bottlenecks, or see opportunities
in recreational or leisure activities as well as in the market economy. Examples of
innovations by solo inventors have included the electric fire alarm, and in much more
recent times, the Odjob concrete mixeq the kiwifruit-based product Eklanite, and the
Powerbeat battery. However, despite the folklore appeal of the solo innovator
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celebrated, for example, in Riley (1995), technological innovation is more generally a
team-based process carried through by firms with significant discretionary resources.
Motivations
Technological innovation involves the interplay between people and institutions.
People are shaped by institutional relationships, and themselves shape institutions.
Underlying the interchange between people and institutions are peoples' motivations.
Motivations encompass "what makes people tick" as individuals, and how individuals
relate to and motivate, or are motivated by groups, It includes how individuals align
themselves to the higher interests or values of the group.
The neoclassical view of economic motivations is that they are based on short-terrq
self-interest maximisation. However, such behaviour can erode the trust, long-
termism and focus on higher order goals often required in innovation. Trust is
important in technological innovation because it is a process that is subject to
uncertainty. Performance in innovation is difficult to speci$ in advance, create
incentives for, embody in contracts, or measure and reward. People may know that
their part of an innovation process is going badly, and may objectively quantify poor
financial and marketing prospects and intractable technical problems. However, they
often subsume their analytical judgement by trusting, perhaps uncritically, a self-
sacrificing innovator whose commitments are irreversible and whose focus is on
higher goals that all in a firm can share in and benefit from. This willingness to trust is
a pervasive influence on the motivations of people and their behaviour in the
innovation process.
Because the social benefits of technological innovation often exceed the private
benefits that can be captured, and because of the personal sacrifice and time lags
before benefits are achieved, the commitment innovators make to innovation is very
often "irrational" in a narrowly economic sense. Innovators are often motivated by
values, beliefs and incentives that are non-financial or material and which are higher
than themselves, or at least external to themselves. Businesses focused on such goals
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as benefiting customers or society, or producing the best quality product, are more
likely to make money than those that focus corporate energies exclusively on profit or
financial goals. Angus Tait of Tait Electronics emphasised that:
If you set out to make money then you might not succeed in building a business, but if you
set out to build a business and you do it right then you will certainly make money.
(Tait, 1989).
This philosophy also works at the product level: Fisher and Paykel's medical
humidifier was developed unquestionably for an altruistic, health-care reaso4 but
made money as a spin-off.
People's motivations include their creativity, in the sense that creativity is itself a
motivator and shapes people's behaviour. Creativity-related variables include pattern
recognition, lateral thinking, and generating new ideas by sustained musing on a
problem, often outside of the work context in which the problem arises. Innovators
often treat their innovations as a form of self-expression, almost a means of
perpetuating one's identity in a technology.
The innovation process can itself be the highest form of motivation. Innovators often
revel in the journey rather than the destination, the process not the outcome. This
love of the process of innovation is often a powerful motivator, but must be tempered
by a sufficiently clear focus on the outcomes and the deliverables, and by a discipline
that avoids too many deviations into "blind alleys". For example, failure to recognise
and withdraw from the blind alleys set back DieselGas's dual fuel kit innovation by
some years.
A firm requires leadership to align the motivations of individuals with the purposes of
the organisation, and to manage the dynamic change and adaptiveness inherent in
technological innovation. Innovation leaders must understand their inner motivations
and value systems, behave in accord with them and with their own nature. Innovation
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leaders typically have vision and an ability to articulate that vision in simple terms that
followers can understand. Their commitment and energy is perceived by others as
exceptional and novel, it reinforces a follower's belief in the unique knowledge and
abilities of the leader, and therefore his capacity to deliver. This in turn means that
innovation leaders will be capable of building trust, and of motivating others in an
innovation team to exceptional levels of performance.
External Influences
Innovation can never be divorced from the external influences a firm is subject to,
including a country's economic and regulatory policy framework, and the interaction
between a firm, its markets and external sources of ideas and technologies.
Major New Zealand innovations, such as Fisher and Paykel's medical innovations, and
agritech innovations from firms such as Tru-Test and Gallaghers, were developed at a
time when New Zealand was a highly regulated and protectionist economy. The
patterns of technological innovation reflected in the Annex I Database of Innovations
and in the case studies include many innovations that were developed in such an
economic environment.
The external influence of protectionism from 1935 to the mid-1980s had the effect of
stimulating local manufacturing. For example, Fisher and Paykel began business
marketing imported whiteware, but after import controls were introduced from 1935
on it had to become a whiteware manufacturer to supply its market. Protectionism
and import controls stimulated a very broad but thin manufacturing base, in many
cases with only one firm servicing a particular market segment. Firms often focused
on technologies such as agritech that have a specialised home market and could not be
bought "off the shelf' from overseas. These niche markets in some cases were
microcosms of larger world markets. New Zealand firms typically lacked the scale
economies and the advanced technology needed for high-volume international
markets. This in turn meant that these firms, to survive, had to evolve into businesses
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competing through economies of scope and rapid responsiveness to customer needs,
rather than through cost competition based on scale economies.
This need for flexibility, and the potential to exploit economies of scope, in turn
stimulated innovation in firms such as Scott Technology, Howick Engineering and
Fisher and Paykel Production Technology that make production technology for short,
customised, or flexibly-managed production runs. Industrial equipment businesses
such as PDL Electronics have been able to use local firms as a testing bed and
microcosm of the world market for their products over a very broad and differentiated
industrial front. This historical legacy has meant that innovative New Zealand firms
often compete in niche international markets where total world sales may be less than
$100-200 million ayear. Such a market is too small to attract interest from the big
international players, and the technology is too difficult or specialised for low-cost
competition from less developed countries.
In 1984 the New Zealand government began a widespread process of deregulation,
placing reliance primarily on market forces to determine decision making in the
economy. In neoclassical economics, the competitive workings of markets should
determine prices for goods and services and the cost of money. Price signals should
act as a language that communicates real values that economic agents can respond to,
so that resources can then be allocated to their highest valued use. Macroeconomic
stability does help innovative businesses to plan strategically over the longer ternr,
constrains input costs, and allows market signals to more clearly articulate longer
term consumer preferences. Mcroeconomic flexibility helps foster workplace
management practices that foster innovation, and which improve the response times
of innovators to opportunities and to dynamic change.
Deregulation has shaped the pattern of technological innovation in New Zealand.
Much automation innovation such as in meat engineering was designed to reduce
labour costs and to remove uncertainties associated with the unreliability, availability
or seasonality of labour in a regulated environment. Since the economic reforms from
the mid-1980s, and the freeing-up of the labour market, there have been less pressures
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for such labour-saving innovation. Howeveq over the same period the economy has
become more open to overseas competition and this has stimulated other innovations
that aim to improve the productivity of capital plant and of production processes in
industry.
The ownership structure of firms can significantly influence technological innovatiorL
both as an external influence on the firnL and in relation to its effect on a firm's
"strategic governance". Innovative, privately-owned firms such as Vegq Tait
Electronics and PEL have maintained a long-term focus on technological innovation
and made it integral to their business vision and strategy. In contrast, many publicly-
listed firms have taken a shorter term view under shareholder pressure for annual
dividends.
Overseas ownership can also impact on the extent to which firms invest in
technological innovation. Businesses that are subsidiaries of overseas firms, or R&D-
based firms such as Glaxo and Allflex that began in New Zealand and were later
bought or had their head offices transfened abroad by offshore investors, tend to
undertake little R&D in New Zealand. Overseas-owned firms that do undertake R&D
in New Zealand tend to focus on adapting overseas products to the New Zealand
market (see Johnston, 1991). This can lead to "truncated development" where
overseas-owned firms act as marketing and distribution outlets, rather than creating
and marketing their own innovations.
A key external influence on innovation is the public technostructure of educational
and training agencies, research institutes, agencies such as the Patents Office, libraries
and computer networks that help foster or underpin innovation in firms. The
structure and commercial powers of these agencies are important, but it is notable that
significant and commercially successful innovations such as the earthquake shock
absorber emerged from the DSIR at a time when it lacked the commercial powers and
skills now seen as fundamental for commercial performance. However, instifutes such
as the DSIR have produced many "science push" inventions such as instruments that
addressed laboratory problems rather than commercial opportunities.
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Commercialisation of these and other research institute inventions has often fallen
down because of the gulf in the culture, technical and commercial understanding
between research institutes and businesses (see Bray & Perry, 1994).
The major contribution of the public technostructure to innovation has surely been the
supply-side provision of education and training, and the creation of research results in
areas of importance to New Zealand industry. However, government agencies have
also created a demand-side stimulus to innovation, particularly in telecommunications
and defence. Innovations developed to meet the needs of public sector customers
have included defence electronics from Marine-Air-Systems and Oscmar, a mortar
calculator from the DSR, signalling technology from Vega, a locomotive "black box"
from PEL, and software and communications innovations from a host of software and
electronics firms.
Technological innovation is an externally interactive and nonJinear process that
involves the confluence of technological capabilities and market needs within the
framework of an innovating firm @othwell, 1992, p. 222). This confluence between
technology and the external influences of the market often depends on interactive
communication with customers and is catalysed by new ideas and sources of learning.
Peters & Waterman (1982, p. 193) argue that "...excellent companies are better
listeners", while Rothwell (1991, p. l0l) concludes that successful innovative firms
tend to have higher levels of communication with external clients.
External customer influences also shape the detailed focus and specific applications of
an emerging innovation. Alan Dean of Richmonds spotted the potential of one part of
MIRINZ's mutton frame boner and provided much of the direction needed for later
success. Customers created the specifications for the Vega beacon, and were central
to the broad focus of the Dairy Board on the reduced tolerance milk protein market.
Howeveq it is worth noting that the Alatal 821 success was achieved despite the lack
of detailed customer specifications in the early stages of the innovation, and ongoing
interactions with customers during the innovation process itself were minimal. Fear of
customer perceptions and reactions can also stifle innovation. A successful process
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from Talon Developments to produce cholesterol-free butter was not commercialised
by the dairy industry for fear of exacerbating consumer concerns about cholesterol in
dairy products.
Lack of external stimulus and challenge fosters a defensive, inwardJooking culture
where people become self-reinforcing clones of each other. Alliance Textiles
developed behind protectionist barriers. A new manager from outside the industry,
and the catalytic stimulus of WRONZ, was necessary to the transformation of that
firm and the success of innovations such as Treotek. Many innovations that have
lacked adequate interaction with and responsiveness to the market in the early stages,
such as the DieselGas dual fuel kit and GS 2085, tended to be delayed or ineffectively
developed and implemented as a result. Frequent interaction with the external
environment, and a willingness to adapt to it, therefore emerges as a key success
factor in technological innovation.
Core Categories
The open coded data outlined above constitutes a rich dataset from which meaning
and understanding needs to be extracted by more advanced data analysis. The data
generated by the research was axial coded (see Annex 3), and this in turn provided the
basis for selective and more advanced coding, using the processes set out in the
Methodolory chapter. To recap, selective coding began with the identification of
core categories by comparing axial categories and testing possible core categories




Is the category specifcally or largely to do with technological innovation?
Is the category a major and key driver of variables?
Is the category a necessary (rather than just a desirable) condition of
technological innovation?
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The application of the above criteria through selective coding led to the development
of 3 core categories of variables: the Dynamics of Significant New Technologt,
Human Capital, and Social Processes. Details of variables encompassed in each core
category are set out in Annex 4.
The core categories in turn laid the building blocks for the development of a
conceptual model of technological innovation, and for the conclusions and
implications outlined in the next chapter. The following outlines the core categories,
discusses them in relation to how they meet the criteria set out above, and makes
some observations on the key themes within, and in some cases across the core
categories of variables.
Dynamics of Sienificant New Technology
The variables within this core category share several common characteristics. They
involve, or are associated with, new technical performance or functional
characteristics. Significant new technology embodies new technical characteristics
that deliver improved quality, performance or "fitness for purpose" that is objectively
measurable. In contrast, imitative or trivial product development is associated with
high cross-elasticities of demand and R&D redundancy, and can therefore lead to a
loss in social welfare. Most of the variables within this core category generate
externalities, lay a technical platform for future innovations, or give rise to social
benefits that exceed the private benefits that can be captured.
Significant new technology is shaped by its past and its social and cultural context, but
is also itself a shaper of society and of the economy (see Bijker et al eds.,1987' Bijker
& Law eds., 1992). The core category encapsulates the interplay between social,
institutional and market processes and technological change, and the dynamic aspects
of how significant new technology behaves over time. The dynamics of significant
new technology over time flow from its inherent characteristics. These include the
irreversibility of technological change, its cumulativeness, the trajectories it follows,
and its systemic and clustering characteristics.
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Technological innovation based on significant new technology is irreversible, in the
sense that inventions cannot be uninvented, and users will not go back to substandard
or redundant technology. Technological learning is a cumulative process that draws
on codified and in-house tacit knowledge built up within a firm's domaiq and extends
and further accumulates that knowledge in a dynamic way. tneversibiltty and
cumulativeness are partly driven by the asset specificity and the high sunk costs
associated with new technology. A small technical edge created by a new technology
can achieve an early edge in the market and cumulate into technological dominance.
The interaction between a firm and its search and selection environment, as well as
historical and institutional factors, may then create particular technological trajectories
or pathways that shape the ongoing development of the technology (see Sahal, 1985;
Dosi el al, 1994). Network and systemic externalities can then be exploited and
clusters of innovations may emerge around a core technology. For these reasons, a
technology that is in some respects sub-optimal (in the sense of technical performance
or fitness for purpose) may still achieve market dominance.
Significant new technology often creates a technical platform for other follow-on
innovations. These technical platforms tend to be process rather than product
innovations, though they make new products possible. Significant new technology
allows a firm or an economy to deliver more with less. Often this will take the form
of new combinations of raw materials, in the sense that a new design combination of
metals, chemicals and circuitry in a computer will deliver many times the information
processing speed and capacity of older technology that combined metals, chemicals
and circuitry in a different way I0 years ago (Romer, 1993).
Significant new technology may be a "non-rival good", that is a good which, while the
cost of its creation may be high, will have a very low cost of dissemination to many
users. Examples of non-rival goods include the basic principles of software
engineering, of the semiconductor, or the principles underlying the invention of the
wheel. The ability of many firms to use a non-rival good at a minimal or near zero
marginal cost, or for that matter, for generations of scientists to cite the same
fundamental scientific paper or insight without having to repeat the researc[ is at the
323
heart of economic growth since it allows an economy to produce rising output from
fixed physical and labour resources (see Romer, 1986; 1993).
Competitive advantage can be created by such strategies as price competition for a
given commodity, or by creating new products, processes or services that embody
improved functional or performance characteristics. Without significant new
technology that delivers improved performance, price competition will bid away
premiums and will reduce firms to being price takers that lack the surpluses to invest
in improved productivity, research and new product development. The competitive
edge and quasi-monopoly that can be created by significant new technology allows
surpluses to be earned and reinvested in further technological development and
economic growth.
Significant new technology, over the longer term, shifts the technological production
possibility frontier outwards. It is the key driver of downstream innovations, spin-off
benefits ranging from new products based on a new technical platforrq through to
systemic innovation from convergent technologies. The creation of significant new
technology is also associated with the creation of new skills and human capital, tacit
technology, learning-by-doing and learning-to-learn processes.
Human Capital
This core category groups together the variables of skills and competencies, and the
associated intangible assets of information and both codified and tacit knowledge. It
has a high degree of specificity to technological innovation, since science and
technology-related human capital are the key resources in innovation. Essentially,
variables within this core category constitute disembodied human capital. When
human capital is embodied in physical artefacts it forms a quite different part of a
firm's capital stock. The core category includes the past experience which is reflected
in a person's human capital, as well as the core competencies and intangible assets of
a firm. The core category includes differentiated learning-related variables.
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Human capital embodied in technology-based firms constitutes a stock of untraded
and intangible assets. However, stockmarkets tend to value only tradeable and
tangible assets, thereby seriously understating the valuation of technology-based
firms. This in turn leads to an under-investment in them by the market. This is partly
because intangible capital stocks such as knowledge and skills do not provide a form
of collateral against which banks feel confident lending long-term risk finance.
The human capital core category is a key element of all case studies, and is a driver of
other variables. Human capital is not only the core productive resource of a
technology-based firm but also helps shape the "neighbourhood of search and
selection", in the sense that the knowledge and skills of people in a firm will largely
determine the bounds of its abilitv to exlernally search for and select new ideas and
technologies.
This core category is at the heart of an understanding of technological innovatiorq
because the variables it encompasses are intimately linked with other categories of
variables, and they drive or substantially influence those variables.
Social Processes
Social processes in innovation relate to the interplay between institutions and
individuals, to the perceptions of and feelings people have towards each other, and to
the social relationships and shared values that drive behaviour among people. This
core category encompasses variables relating to leadership, institutional and social
structures, and the role of trust, teamwork and communication in innovation.
Technological innovation requires strategic leadership to focus a firm's competencies
on economic opportunities. Strategic leadership is important to innovation because it
fosters long-term and integrated planning and investment. Leadership enhances
stability, and learning takes place more effectively in a stable environment because of
reduced transaction costs (see Langlois, 1992). Leadership involves external and
internal social processes and interactions. It encompasses the dynamic management
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of external relationships, as well as fostering a sense of ownership, the internal
empowerment, effective communication, and the marshalling of the skills and
capabilities of people in an organisation.
The social processes in a successful, technologically innovative firm often flow from
the leadership provided by a firm's founder or leader. Innovation leaders have to be
disciplined, committed, hard working, and have sufficient self-esteem to overcome
setbacks. They typically have exceptional self-reliance and a drive to turn ideas into
practice. The knowledge that an (often patriarchal) figure is motivated by the long-run
survival and growth of the business and will look after them helps shape the attitudes
of staff, and from that loyalty and committed performance will flow. The perception
others have of the integrity, expertise and the irreversible commitment of a leader to a
value system higher than himself is fundamental to the cohesive relationships between
people that are at the heart of innovation management.
To make their human capital-related assets productive, firms have to provide the
institutional and social structures that foster innovation. The institutional structures
for technological innovation must facilitate communication, so that tacit knowledge
that could not easily be made productive in hierarchal organisations can be effectively
exploited (see Child & Bate eds., 1987). This communication yields better and more
timely information but also builds team cohesion and trust, which in turn further
breaks down barriers to communication and increases the receptivity to new
information and ideas (see Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995, p. 368). As an uncertain and
dynamic process technological innovation is difficult to formally plar\ and the
expectations and evaluation of people's performance is subject to measurability
problems. Transaction cost economics highlights opportunism or "self seeking with
guile" as sources of transactions costs in business relationships. It is argued that
detailed contracts and stringent controls are therefore needed to reduce these
transaction costs (see Williamsoq 1985; Hosmer, 1995).
However, it is difficult to "buy'' creativity through a formal contract, to place a labour
market value on tacit knowledge, to manage innovators in a hierarchal way, or to
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contract for the extraordinary and unplannable efforts often needed in innovation. As
a result, new forms of management emerge that rely on informal or "implicit
contracts". These implicit contracts effectively constitute shared values and
understandings that allow people to predict how others will behave towards them and
with each other in the absence of formal guidelines, rewards and sanctions. At the
core of these implicit contracts is trust.
Bromily & Cummings (1992) argue that trust can reduce transaction costs. Arrow
(1971) laid an earlier theoretical base for this by arguing that information is most
likely to be accepted and absorbed through personal contact which helps to establish
trust in the reliability of information on the part of the recipient. Hirsch (1978, p. 78)
argued that trust is a public good and necessary for the success of economic
transactions. Michalos (1990) thought of trust as:
...a relatively informed attitude ...to allow oneself...to be vulnerable to harm in the interests
ofsome perceived greater good.
Many variables within this core category reflect how people perceive and relate to
each other, which in turn flows from how an individual's past behaviour gives
confidence in how an individual will behave in the future. This understanding of how
someone will behave creates trust. It also improves information flows that are crucial
to fast moving and dynamic innovation processes. High trust and cooperative
environments therefore help manage or reduce uncertainty, minimise the transaction
cost problems of "guile and opportunism", foster information flows and help enhance
organisational performance.
Social processes have high specificity to technological innovation because, while the
early stages of technological innovation may be "thing" or artefact driven, the later
stages are heavily driven by the particular social processes and interactions needed in
innovation. The dynamism of technological innovation, and in particular its integrated
nature and dependence on cross-functional learning, means that the key innovators
must be involved all the way through and they must work as a team. Teamwork builds
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a sense of ownership which in turn is a source of motivation. Teamwork also fosters
the multi-disciplinary input required throughout the innovation process, rather than
disciplinary or specialised inputs being segmented in a serial, linear and "pass the
baton on" process. Innovators must see themselves as part of a whole complex
system and not as a segment within it, and must work as a team so that learning
processes integrate all the organisation's sources of knowledge and expertise.
Case studies such as Treotek, the loin boner, and Alatal 821 demonstrate that social
processes that foster trust, open communication, cooperation and mutual respect are
key drivers in innovation. It is argued that effective informal relationships between
people are necessary conditions of innovation, and that the best strategic planning,
organisational design and contractual arrangements will fail if the social processes in
innovation are dysfunctional. The personal rapport between Garth Carnaby and
Bruce Munro, the empowerment vested in the MIRINZ engineers developing the loin
boneE and the superb international facilitation of Andrew Revfeim with Alatal 821,
demonstrate that positive and informal social interactions and processes between
people are necessary conditions of technological innovation. Conversely, poor
communication, low trust and strained relationships between people hampered the
development of the Ruakura Milk Harvester, Peter Witehira's Powerbeat battery, and
in some respects and at various stages the Greenweld innovation.
Conclusions
This chapter provided an overview of the variables generated by the research and
outlined the results of the data analysis process. The data analysis process identified
both the necessary and desirable conditions for successful technological innovation by
uncovering categories of variables that provide explanatory insight into the
technological innovation process.
The necessary conditions of technological innovation are those that constitute "core
categories" of variables as identified by the data analysis process. These core
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categories express clusters of interlinked variables that are highly specific or unusually
present in technological innovatioq and drive or are strongly causative on it. In the
absence of any one of these core categories innovations will either not be initiated, or
the innovation management process will be badly handled or dysfirnctional, and the
benefits to society and the innovating organisation will be minimal or non-existent.
Many other variables and categories of variables generated through open and axial
coding reflect desirable and positive conditions for successful technological
innovation. The chance of success is maximised when all or most of the desirable
conditions are present, but the absence of these desirable conditions will not alwayg
or necessarily, greatly impede the innovation process.
In the next chapteq the results of the data analysis process are further developed into
a model of the technological innovation process, and then conclusions and




The research in this thesis has sought to deepen understanding ofhow technological
learning processes underpin and catalyse the key drivers of technological innovation.
The Dynamics of Significant New Technologt, Human Capilal and Social Processes
have been identified as core categories of variables that underly the technological
innovation process and the creation of competitive advantage.
This chapter explores and further develops these core categories, elucidates the
relationships between them, and then shows how they give rise to a thesis of
technological innovation as a differentiated learning process. The chapter gives
expression to this in a model of technological innovation, and sets out the implications
of this for the theory of technological innovation, with particular reference to a small,
open economy such as New Zealand. Finally, it sets out implications for business and
policy managers and suggests further research.
Conclusions about the Research Problem and Thesis Proposition
Successful performance in technological innovation requires the effective strategic
management of three groups of related variables: the Dyrnmics of Significant New
Technologt, Human Capital and Social Processes.
Dynamics of Sienificant New Technolog.v
The key variables within the Dynamics of Significant New Technologt core category
relate to its non-rival nature, technical platform effects, asset specificity, irreversibility,
cumulativeness and economies of scope. The major theoretical or explanatory
insights into variables within this core category come from evolutionary economics,
new growth theory and neo-Schumpeterianism.
Knowledge and technology created through research and learning is often non-rival
and non-excludable. It is non-rival because new ideas and new knowledge can be
used in many different applications in different firms at the same time, and because
one person's consumption of it does not stop another from using it. For example, the
same scientific papers on kiwifruit wine making techniques were adopted and applied
by several different wine makers. Knowledge is often non-excludable because it is
difficult for inventors or scientists to capture the benefits for themselves and exclude
others from them.
Significant new technology is associated with increasing rather than decreasing
returns (see Romer, 1986). It creates technical platforms that form a basis for
downstream innovation and technical change. For example, earlier plant breeding led
to new apple varieties such as Gala and Splendour, which in turn laid the genetic base
for the GS 2085 cultivar. Significant new technology creates competitive advantage,
and the asset specificity, embedded uniqueness or intellectual property rights
associated with it hamper competitive entry and allow that advantage to be sustained
over time. This is illustrated in the Alatal 821 and ASDi cases, and in agritech
innovations recorded in the Annex I Database of Innovations.
Cumulativeness and path-dependency help drive technological trajectories over time,
which in turn sets the bounds and frontiers around which technological learning
occurs. New technologl often leads to economies of scope because learning and
human capital is often generic in nature and transferable (see Dodgson & Rothwell
eds., 1994). This is reflected, for example, in the ability of technologists in Vega
Industries to apply their skills to a wide range of different applications across a range
of industries.
Human Capital
The key variables within the Human Capital cluster are skills, including those built up
through past experience, information and knowledge (both tacit and codified).
Information theoretics, new growth theory, neo-Schumpeterianism, and those
331
elements of evolutionary economics relating to the efFects of past experience provide
the major theoretical insights into the Human Capital cluster.
Human capital in the widest sense forms the key resource underpinning the creation of
significant new technology and is intimately linked with it. Human capital includes
formalised skills and encompasses the creativity of people in generating new ideas and
concepts beyond the bounds of existing "textbook knowledge". A firm's human
capital-related core competencies (see Prahalad, 1993) and its learning capabilities are
inextricably linked and co-dependent. Specialised skills may be of high asset
specificity and be tacit as well as codified. They can provide a difficult to replicate
competitive edge that can cumulate into an enduring advantage, as illustrated by
Vega's specialised tacit knowledge base in optics technology. Generic skills can
underpin economies of scope and lay a platform for diversification into new products,
and in some cases into new market or technological paradigms.
Information theoretics argues that information is an economic good that is quite
distinct from other classes of goods (see Lamberton, 1986). Although information
may be costly to produce, the marginal costs of dissemination are often so low that
social efficiency may be achieved if the information is free, or at least available at very
low cost. The producer of information should not therefore capture the information
completely if social efficiency is to be achieved. When embodied as knowledge,
information may be superseded but it does not depreciate in the same s€nse as a
physical asset. This is because new knowledge provides a building block for further
advances in understanding and the accumulation of additional knowledge.
Information is not a productive factor unless it is received, understood and embodied
in new technology. Human capital and related variables are important to the
absorption and embodiment of new ideas, information and technology, as well as to
their creation. The economic value of information depends not only on the incentives
to produce it but on the receptivity of economic agents to it. This requires learning
processes to catalyse the absorption of information and its expression and application
in the form of knowledge-based human capital and new technology. Low technical
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understanding at both a management and a workforce level is pervasive in many
industries in New Zealand. For example, a major barrier to the widespread adoption
of the Ruakura Milk Harvester was the low level of skills and human capital in the
businesses involved in manufacturing the innovation and servicing it in the field.
R&D-based human capital requires complementary assets such as manufacturing and
production engineering capabilities to shape and embody it in commercialised
products and processes. Without embodiment, the valuation of human capital, for
example that of an R&D lab that is a provider of research results, will always be
discounted. This is illustrated by the difficulty both DieselGas and Vega had in
achieving business growth when they operated largely as contract R&D flrms rather
than using R&D as an input into more vertically-integrated business activities. At the
same time, part of a firm's human capital should remain disembodied in the sense that
a firm must retain, independently of its sales of products and processes, a technical
platform of human capital that accumulates over time and can be applied generically
to future product and process development.
Social Processes
The key variables within the Social Processes cluster are those associated with
strategic governance, interactive team learning, and the importance of trust and
cooperation in the management of uncertainty over time. While most variables in this
cluster are empirically rather than theoretically derived, the literature relating to the
management of innovation is valuable in understanding these variables and their
interrelationships.
Technological learning is a social process that is best undertaken within a strategic
context. In the early stages of the DieselGas innovation, and with other innovations
covered in Annex I such as the Powerbeat battery, learning took place too much in
isolation from complementary skills, and was not given a strategic business focus.
Pralahad (1993) saw a firm's competencies as "technology times governance times
collective learning". However, it is probably more precise to argue that strategic
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governance encompasses the strategic directions, goals and policy framework in
which a firm's competencies are made productive through focused technological
learning, and through the embodiment of its outputs in new innovations.
Strategic governance has a public policy and economy-wide as well as a firm-specific
dimension. Van den ven et a/ (1989), Dodgson (1991; 1993), and Rothwell (1991) all
highlight the importance of goverrrment policy and corporate strategy in providing a
governance structure to facilitate networking relationships and learning processes.
The relationship between Government policy and regulatory frameworks and the firm
is illustrated, for example, in the kiwifruit wine and DieselGas cases.
New technology often integrates multi-disciplinary skills and technologies from inside
a firm, and from external, and often international sources. Technological innovation is
therefore an interactive process that blends the diverse skills of people working
together. This is highlighted in such cases as Alatal 821. New information and
technology has to be rapidly interpreted and applied, because of dynamic competition,
and because a complex and integrated technology will require technical inputs to be
delivered on time. This has to be reflected in how people are organised to work
together. As such, technological learning and innovation is essentially a social and
team-based process. Team learning is essential because it is teams not individuals that
are the fundamental learning unit in organisations (see Senge, 1990). Team learning
accommodates and often thrives on conflict, and always requires cooperation.
Cooperation depends on trust between people, which in turn is grounded in such
individual behavioural traits as integrity, competence, consistency, loyalty and
openness (see Butler & Cantrell, 1984).
Innovations developed in a high trust environment such as Alatal 821 and the loin
boner were commercialised far more effectively than those, such as the Ruakura Milk
Harvester, developed in a low trust environment. A high trust environment empowers
a team in managing dynamic processes that require constant interaction, rapid
communication, parallel learning, and the ability to integrate design, R&D, marketing
and production engineering processes. It also demands an appropriate organisational
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structure to empower the team and create an environment in which they can deliver.
This will typically involve flat management structures, cross-functionalisnq devolution
and empowerment. These proved eflective, for example, in the FP4000 intelligent fire
alarm innovation.
Relationships Between Core Categories of Variables
The effective management of technological innovation requires an integrated
understanding of the relationships between the Dynmtics of Significot Neut
Technologt, Human Capital and Social Processes categories of variables. These
core categories were analysed as set out in the Methodology chapter. The analysis
aimed to identiff a uni$ing principle or key idea across all core categories. This key
idea had to be pervasive across the core categories and be an enabling or catalytic
factor that made other variables productive.
The data analysis gave expression to differentiated learning processes as the key
theme that intenelates the dynamics of new technology, human capital and social
processes. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below:







The pervasiveness of differentiated learning variables across the core categories is
illustrated in Annex 5. Differentiated learning integrates and catalyses the core
category and other variables and makes them productive of outcomes. The salient
features of technological learning are its domain-specificity, its interactive and social
nature, and its differentiation.
Domain-Specifi city of Learning
A key feature of technological learning is that it is context-specific and occurs within
domains. While an international pool of public knowledge exists, turning that
knowledge into economic performance is a localised process. Learning develops from
the neighbourhood of existing competencies and technological and market paradigms
(see Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). It involves "new combinations" that apply existing
knowledge in new ways.
Learning is not confined to absorption or adaptation of the known and understood but
is also a creative process that encompasses the imaginative endeavours of individuals
and teams. However, even path-breaking, creative learning still builds from
antecedents and is shaped by its domain. The limits of the domain in which learning
can occur are set by the human capital and the competencies within an organisation
and by its external interactions and sources of stimuli. This domain is broadly
analogous to the Nelson & Winter (1982) concept of a search and selection
environment. The outer limit of the domain is analogous to the outer rim of a
neoclassical production possibility frontier.
Interactive and SocialNature of Learning
Learning is an interactive and social process in the sense that people learn by
interacting with each other rather than in isolation. Learning involves internal and
external interactions, and a creative tension between cooperation, competition and
challenge. Just as individuals work in teams and in networks, firms also learn through
networking and other group or collective learning strategies. Networks between
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firms seem to emerge to maximise information flows and knowledge exchange, not to
minimise transaction costs. Firms use networks to access external technology, or to
externalise some of their activities without losing control of their core competencies
or intangible assets.
Interactive learning occurs at the level of a firm and of a national innovation system
(see Lundvall ed., 1992; Nelson ed., 1993). While an innovative firm is a searcll
selection and leaming organisation, a national innovation system is a learning system
writ large; different in scale and complexity to that of a firm, but not radically different
in purpose. A national system of innovation involves many points of domestic and
international interaction between a country's technostructure and firms, and among
firms. The rate of technical (and in fact cultural and social) change in a country is to a
great extent driven by the extent to which a society is interacting with others, and by
its openness to new and international ideas. It is important that learning requires
contrast, challenge, and lateral and orthogonal thinking, and this implies that learning
will be enhanced by a strong external focus, cultural diversity and competing
paradigms. It is argued that the rate and effectiveness of learning is not determined by
the scale of the learning effort but also by the extent to which it involves different sets
of ideas and new challenges.
Differentiated Nature of Learning
Learning is differentiated by its domain, by the type and source of learning, and by
such variables as the type of firrq the industry sector, and the scientific and
technological base.
The type and sources of learning include, inter alia, R&D, formally structured
learning in a "classroom" setting, learning by doing, learning by using, from failure,
and from interactions with external customers, suppliers, other firms and from
research institutes. Firms allocate resources to create firm-specific competencies
using the above learning processes, and they exploit constant feedback from improved
knowledge and experience.
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Cimoli & Dosi (1995) highlight how learning is differentiated by the type of firrq
comparing, for example, Korean Chaebol with networks of small and medium-sized
firms in Taiwan. Florida & Kenney (1990) compare learning in small Italian fashion
firms with that of Silicon Valley microelectronics firms. Pavitt (in Dodgson &
Rothwell eds., 1994) notes as distinguishing marks of learning activities in larger firms
its specificity, cumulativeness over time, tacitness of knowledge built up through
experience, and its highly differentiated nature. Information channels for large firms
often need to address weaknesses in internal information flows, while smaller firms
need to focus more on external information flows. This can be illustrated when the
experience of the Dairy Board with the Alatal 821 innovation is contrasted with that
of Vega with its lighthouse beacon. Learning in firms of all sizes is not a process of
acquiring codified knowledge and buying technology "off a shelf' but rather depends
on firms actively extending and applying their knowledge and competencies that have
been built up cumulatively and path-dependently over time.
Innovations both in the case studies and in the Annex I Database of Innovations
illustrate how the sources of learning differ according to industry sector. The
Greenweld case shows how sawmilling firms more readily adopt new technology from
adhesives suppliers than directly from an R&D institute. While sheep farmers, for
example, adopt new forage plants from research institutes, the pig and poultry sectors
rely largely on feed suppliers and veterinarians as sources of new technology.
The source of learning will also differ according to the science and technology base
and how it is changing. The pharmaceutical industry is increasingly relying on basic,
university research to underpin its new product development. In recent years New
Zealand's dairy and forest industries have invested substantially in strategic research
to extend the knowledge base underpinning their industry strategies. New
technologies such as biotechnology, advanced new materials, and information
technology have been shown in studies to increase the dependence of technology on
science and to enhance the importance of external networks for innovative success
(Freeman, 1994, p. 470).
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Implications for Theory
It is important to elucidate how the core category variables and differentiated learning
processes fit together, interrelate and become productive in the innovation process.
The "learning" of existing knowledge by itself is not innovation. Innovation requires
active creativity to generate new ideas, and the integrated management of a host of
other variables. The thesis of differentiated technological learning being at the heart
of innovation therefore needs to be placed in the wider and more systemic context of
a model. This enables learning and the core category variables to be integrated with
subsidiary @ut still desirable) variables that impact on the technological innovation
process. The model of technological innovation advanced in this thesis is illustrated in
Figure 2 below:
Figure 2: A Model of Technological Innovation
The model effectively argues that the core categories encompass the necessary
conditions of technological innovation. These conditions are made productive
through technological learning processes that exploit existing human capital and
create new human capital, which in turn forms the basis for significant new
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External Markct Scarch and Selection Environment
technology. The learning processes are differentiated, interactive and social
processes. They do not occur in isolation but are managed within the strategic
governance of a firm. This strategic governance encompasses the firm's links with the
wider economic and policy framework in an economy and the national system of
innovation. It encompasses the firm's strategic leadership and the management of its
external relationships and interactions.
Learning and innovation occurs along a technological possibility frontier. The world's
technological possibility frontier is determined by humanity's total scientific and
technological knowledge base, the outer limits of which set the bounds around which
technological innovation can occur. A firm's technological possibility frontier
depends on such factors as the national innovation system within an economy and a
firm's market and technological paradigms, human capital and strategic governance.
Inside its technological possibility frontier 
^re 
a firm's existing and understood
products, processes, services and competencies; the "known and understood", while
outside lies the unknown realm of potential new technologies and new economic
opportunities. Firms search their immediate external neighbourhood for new ideas
and markets. They also undertake research to create new knowledge that shifts their
technological possibility frontier outwards, or which illuminate new neighbourhoods
of search. This interaction with the "neighbourhood" or external selection
environment will, with a firm's own competencies, create the intellectual and
technological diversity, new ideas and stimuli that determine the innovative
possibilities of firms.
The frontiers of New Zealand firms are very differentiated, and as part of a small,
open economy New Zealand firms rely heavily on international as well as domestic
influences. Government policy helps shape the national system of innovation which
encompasses research, search and learning institutions, and creates networks with the
international body of knowledge and technology. A national innovation system has
many nodes, networks and links between the public technostructure and firms, and
has both a domestic and an international dimension (see Nelson ed., 1993).
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Because learning processes occur within domains, firms need direction and a
purposeful focus for their search and learning strategies. Technology managers must
therefore synthesise a host of variables within a strategic governance framework and
achieve "strategic fit" between them and external market opportunities. The strategic
governance of a firm relates specific innovative activities to the "big picture" of the
fi,rm's competitive strategy, and provides a set of "compass bearings" that allows
interactive learning processes to be given a strategic focus. More subtly, strategic
governance helps combine and reconcile the competing value systems associated with
the competitive behaviour of firms and the more cooperative environment that fosters
interactive learning. Because the process of embodiment of knowledge is dynamic,
long-term and systems-based strategic governance is required to integrate multiple
inputs, ideas and technologies into a systemic whole. Systems learning and strategic
governance are therefore closely related, and are necessary conditions of much
technological innovation.
Domestic and international customers are both sources of stimulus for technologtcal
innovation. Where domestic customers are at an international standard and are highly
discriminating, and where the demand they create is a microcosm of the world market,
then firms learning from interactions with these customers can create a competitive
advantage internationally. Because firms learn from each other, clusters of related
industries and firms in a domestic economy can be a key success factor in
technological learning and competitive advantage (see Porteq 1990). However,
globalisation of world trade and the exceptional importance of international markets
and technologies to small, open economies means that countries such as New Zealand
need to be increasingly outward-looking.
The initial output of research and other creative activity is disembodied information
which in turn can be regarded as a form of human capital. However informatiorq
whether in the form of a scientific publication, a dataset, or an idea does not become a
knowledge-based form of human capital until it is absorbed, intelpreted and
understood. Differentiated learning processes are the catalysts through which
information is turned into a knowledge form of human capital. A key constraint to
341
innovation in New Zealand occurs on the absorptive side in industry where, because
of a lack of human capital, information is inadequately understood and applied. While
R&D is only one form of learning, it not only creates new knowledge but also builds
up a firm's human capital and web of interactions needed to assimilate and exploit
existing knowledge from external sources (see Cohen & Levinthal, 1989).
When information becomes knowledge it is still initially a disembodied form of human
capital. This knowledge may be very specialised or may involve indivisibilities in
learning and give rise to economies of scope and generic applications (see Dosi,
l98S). Through technological innovation human capital then becomes productive
when it is embodied in new products, processes or services. When human capital is
embodied, the dynamics of significant new technology induce further learning
processes and help shape the course of further human capital development and
pathways of learning. Knowledge, human capital and complementary assets such as
desigrq marketing and production technology inputs are therefore synthesised by
social processes into new and advanced forms of human capital and significant new
technology. Social processes are really the informal structures and people
relationships that provide a framework for learning, and therefore for human capital
creation, to occur. And underlying social processes are individuals whose creativity,
commitment and motivations are key drivers, but whose abilities need to be harnessed
through team-based and social processes to deliver innovative outcomes.
The outputs of the innovation process are new products and processes delivering new
functional properties and performance characteristics. These products and processes
produce more output with fixed inputs, include non-rival technology, create technical
platforms for future innovation, and shift the technological possibility frontier
outwards, thus making long-run economic growth possible. These products and
processes embody sufticient asset specificity, embedded uniqueness, or other barriers
to competitive entry to allow a firm to earn premiums and a stream of profits that can
finance future innovation, which in turn can shift the technological possibility frontier
further outwards.
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Because of non-rivalry, technical platform effects, the "leakiness" of intellectual
property, and incomplete appropriability, significant new technology delivers social
returns beyond those that can be privately captured. Investment in such technology
may therefore be irrational from the point of view of the privately appropriable gains
that can be captured in the short-term. However, the innovation leader often has a
value system higher than his narrow material interests and will give expression to it in
his behaviour and in his ability to articulate and communicate a vision. The attitudes,
values and vision of an innovation leader will be permeated in an organisation and be
perceived by others in an innovation tearq who then subsume their individual interests
into that of the wider group. This then makes teamwork and the 'extra mile"
demanded in innovation possible, since the team as a whole focuses to a significant
extent on collective goals and values higher than themselves.
Implications for Business Managers
The implications of this thesis for business managers centre on the importance of
technological innovation to creating competitive advantage. To create competitive
advantage through technological innovation managers must address the firm's
strategy, structure, and ownership, human capital-related assets, social processes, and
technological learning strategies.
Strateey. Structure and Ownership of the Firm
Technological innovation is the key to creating a competitive advantage for a firm
because it allows firms to earn premiums through new products, processes and
services with improved functional properties and performance characteristics.
Technological innovation must form part of a wider business strategy that aims to
create and sustain competitive advantage in the market. Innovation does not finish
with a product launch but requires ongoing servicing to sustain that product and the
competitive edge that it embodies in the market. Firms must therefore strategically
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manage innovation as a core part of business strategy and as a continuous process
over time.
Significant new technological innovations allow competitive advantage to be sustained
over time because they draw on skills and technology that can only be built up over
time, and because such innovations are difficult for competitors to imitate. Managers
need to recognise that technological innovation is a cumulative investment that
requires a tong-term focus within a tightly defined market or set of technological
competencies. For New Zealand firms this often involves competing in niche markets
that are too small to attract competition from major overseas corporations, but where
the technology is specialised and diffcult for others to imitate. These markets often
require customised tailoring of the technology to users and flexible production runs.
Successful commercialisation requires that firms must not only be able to create,
exploit or extend ideas and technologies, but also embody them in new products,
processes or services that are traded. Firms that are essentially R&D laboratories are
rarely successful in growing through technological innovation. While they can create
knowledge they lack the complementary and downstream assets to fully embody it,
and to prototype, trial and commercialise new innovations. Above all, they lack the
ability to earn premiums and capture the commercial benefits of innovation through
control over production, branding, marketing, distribution, and intellectual property
protection.
Technological innovation requires strategic management that encompasses
interactions between the firm and its external environment and the strategic fit
between external opportunities and the in-house competencies of the firm,
Technological innovation requires the strategic integration of internal and external
knowledge, skills and competencies, typically involving cross-functional project
management, and embedding design, R&D, quality management and distribution and
servicing considerations in the innovation process.
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Firms must have a long-term outlook grounded in a clear strategic vision and value
system, and be willing to sacrifice short-term returns to achieve long-term gains.
There must be a strong strategic fit between a firm or innovator's value system and
motivations, the innovations aimed for, and organisational ownership and structure.
Innovative firms should have an institutional framework based around a longer term
competitive strategy and the ability to vertically integrate so that it can innovate,
manufacture, market, distribute and service, and allow it to capture the benefits of
innovation. Private ownership of firms, or unlisted public businesses owned by
shareholders with long term innovation-oriented goals and value systems, lends itself
to success in innovation. Listed public businesses will typically be able to mobilise the
capital needed for larger scale and more ambitious innovations, but their innovative
performance will often be severely constrained by shareholder demands for annual
dividends, and by the unwieldiness of many large-scale bureaucracies.
Innovative firms will in many cases be New Zealand-owned and controlled.
Subsidiaries of overseas-owned firms in New Zealand will often be marketing and
distribution agencies, or involved in adaptations to existing product lines. Rarely will
overseas-owned businesses have a significant R&D and innovative capacity located
fully onshore in New Zealand. A New Zealand-owned firm that controls its long-term
vision and strategy and locates its R&D effort within New Zealand will be well
positioned to vertically integrate, exercise control over its marketing and distribution,
and create barriers to competitors eroding its innovation-based premiums. It will also
tend to create positive externalities for the domestic economy in the form of
knowledge and human capital creation that leads to benefits wider than the firm.
Human Capital-Related Assets in the Firm
The key asset base of a firm is its human capital. Skills and knowledge are needed for
innovation within the firm, to search for, interpret and adopt external sources of ideas
and new technology, and they are at the heart of a firm's competencies in
technological learning and knowledge application.
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A firm needs staff at all levels with a high degree of scientific and technological
competency. These competencies will include both generic skills and those more
specialised to the firm's core business, and will encompass codified and tacit
knowledge and the skills and know-how that comes from past experience in other
firms, and in many cases, other industries and countries.
Firms need the ability to integrate multi-disciplinary skills within a strategic
framework that focuses those skills on technological and commercial opportunities.
Firms also need the strategic management that allows their competencies to be applied
to long-term opportunities in conditions of uncertainty, and the business management
competencies to ensure the fit between technological opportunity and economic and
commercial reality.
A firm needs the ability to produce tangible samples of products or prototypes
internally, and this implies not only in-house engineering and production and
instrumentation equipment but a "technical toolbox" of such skills as objective
measurement techniques and tooling technology. A firm's strengths in product
innovation will be complemented by substantial investments in enhancing the
production technology and total quality management needed to get per unit costs
down and quality standards up.
Firms need to decide what skills and competencies must be maintained within the firm
and what should be accessed externally. All firms make use of external sources of
learning (see Kleinknecht & Reijneq 1992). Where a firm lacks a required internal
skill or knowledge base it will depend heavily on external sources (Senker &
Faulkner, 1992). A firm should maintain internally a broad based and multi-
disciplinary skill base, but with strong core competencies clustered around its key
technologies and markets. These core competencies will interact with and
complement each other, and allow economies of scope to be created and exploited.
Core competencies will include tacit and uncodified knowledge that is difficult for
competitors to replicate and which therefore allows differentiation and the earning of
premiums. A firm should also have the staff continuity and in-house learning
346
processes that will allow core competencies to be communicated over time. Firms
will maintain a tight focus within their technological and market paradigm and
diversify only from the building block of that paradigm.
At the same time a firm will have strong "learning to learn" abilities, and be able to
forecast and create competencies in new technologies that will be important in the
future. Typically this will require external networking and interactions, and the ability
to draw on external sources of ideas, technology and specialised skills that it would
not be feasible to internalise. Firms should also be able to track and interpret changes
in the external scientific, technological and market dynamics that are important to
their business and be flexible enough to adapt to them.
A firm should recognise the long-term and cumulative nature of the development of
human capital-related competencies, and that generic and more specialised
technologies should be managed differently. Generic competencies in a firm and
competencies related to homogeneous industries and to volume or commodity
markets can be mobile through a range of different organisations. This mobility can
be an effective means of facilitating the adoption of new technology. However, firms
will also recognise that there are very specialised competencies needed in
differentiated markets that should be centralised and allowed to cumulate and be
retained in a firm over a long time-frame. Firms must also recognise the dependence
of innovation on past R&D and cumulative competencies which lay a technical
platform for further innovation. They should recognise that innovation must be
continuous, that one innovation will often give rise to new ones, and that innovations
should be designed with the "flexible architecture" and "robust designs" that allow
later redevelopments and downstream innovations.
Social Processes within the Firm
To create competitive advantage, managers must ensure that the organisational
structure, leadership, team-based project management and the people relationships are
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in place that will foster the social processes needed for effective technological
innovation.
An innovative firm should have an organisational structure that is suited to the
dynamic, adaptive, integrative and information-intensive nature of technological
innovation. The firm should have a flat organisational structure with substantial
devolution to cross-functional project teams that include the researctr, desigrq
engineering and marketing functions. As far as possible, firms should be vertically
integrated to enhance information flows through the marketing, distributioq
production, design, R&D and other links in a firm's value chain. These information
flows should facilitate interactive learning by the firm from both external and internal
sources.
Leadership is needed for the effective management of innovation. A firm must ensure
that innovative projects are led by a topJevel sponsor or product champion such as a
chief executive or other senior figure. This innovation leader must be effective at
lobbying for resources, managing external relationships, and protecting the project
team from undue external interference. He will have the overarching responsibility,
power, autonomy and financial resources to carry a project through to successful
commercialisation.
The innovation leader's behaviour must set a standard for the team by focusing on
higher order innovation goals. An innovation leader must understand his innermost
nature, values and motivations and act in accord with them. Innovation leadership
rests on reputation that both results from and perpetuates the trust needed in
innovation. The innovation leader should have a reputation and mana that builds
trust. This emboldens the commitment of others by countering the uncertainty and
potential for personal loss that is otherwise associated with demanding innovation
processes. Innovation leaders need a complete overview of the innovation project.
Their commitment to the project will involve their own irreversible investment and
personal risk, and their belief in it will build confidence and create enthusiasm in those
around them.
348
Teamwork in innovation is vital to facilitate the cross-functional integration of
different skills, technologies and learning processes around a common innovation
goal. Teams should be organised so that all the key sources of knowledge and
expertise needed for the successful development, commercialisatiorq marketing and
servicing of the innovation are represented on the team. The team members must be
empowered to provide their specialised knowledge and expertise interactively
throughout the innovation process. For example, it is unacceptable for a technologist
to develop a product in isolation, only to find later from an engineer that it is too
expensive to produce, or from a service technician that it is impossible to service in
the field. This means that input from all key team members should be provided in
parallel, so that interactive learning occurs in real-time and is integrated and woven
together throughout the innovation process.
Teams need strong and unambiguous project management. Project teams should have
discretionary resources or seed funds at the early stages of an innovatiorq and funds
for trialing and problem solving at a more advanced stage. Teams need to be adaptive
and flexible and have the ability to respond dynamically to the different challenges
posed throughout the innovation process. While key strategic decisions in innovation
must be made early, researchers and project teams need tactical discretion to change
direction as circumstances require. They must not be too constrained by rigid
contracts or immutable project plans.
Innovation teams should be made up of people who can work effectively together and
complement each other. Allthe key players in the innovation should be involved early
in the innovation process and continue their involvement all the way through, whether
they be the team members within the firm, suppliers, customers, or key people
involved in other firms or institutes. For example, customers and suppliers should
provide key input into an innovation before specifications are locked i4 and they
should be involved in trialing at an advanced stage. Scientists and technologists
involved in technical work early in the process should continue to be involved right
through to trialing, fine-tuning, marketing and servicing in the field.
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Innovation demands respect and trust between all those involved in the innovation
process, In respecting and trusting each other people involved in innovation will
listen to and draw on the advice and perspectives of others. Communication must be
completely open and timely throughout the innovation process. This in turn will
foster a sense of ownership by people in an innovation process and its outcomes.
Open communication and ownership must be present at all levels in an organisation.
Top management ownership without support from less senior staffis as self-defeating
as intrapreneurship within an organisation that founders due to the lack of topJevel
support.
Technological Learnine Strategies
Learning is critical to both technological innovation and to the ongoing renewal and
upgrading that is needed to stay in business in the long term.
Accelerating the rate and effectiveness of learning requires managers to recognise that
learning processes are not generic across all types of firms, industries or technologies,
but are differentiated and need to be tailored accordingly. While R&D is only one
form of learning, in most cases firms should have a strong in-house R&D capability.
However, in many cases this R&D capability will be more focused on allowing firms
to search for, interpret and adopt external (including international) sources of ideas
and technologies rather than on in-house product and process development per se.
Managers must ensure that the necessary conditions of technological innovation
relating to the dynamics of significant new technology, human capital and social
processes are effectively marshalled, and that the type and form of tearning occurs
withh a domain, rather than through, for example, "blue skies" research or random
information collection.
To create a competitive advantage a firm must achieve a congruence between its
existing core competencies and the ability to apply them interactively to external
opportunities. A key element in this will be learning based on external interactions at
both the domestic and international levels. Hakannsson (1989) and Porter (1990)
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argue that domestic market competition is a critical stimulus to innovation and
business performance. However, for small open economies such as New Zealand the
export and international markets are key sources of technological learning and market
opportunity, and this is borne out in case studies such as the ASDi, Greenweld and
Treotek.
A firm should therefore treat the international environment as a source of markets and
above all of the world's stock of ideas, basic scientific knowledge and technologies
that help enrich the firm's selection environment. The limits of the selection
environment for the firm should be on the outer edge of the technologtcal possibility
frontier of best-practice firms competing in similar markets internationally. Firms
must network internationally to access new ideas, markets and sources of technology
and to exploit complementary skill-bases. A firm must aim at achieving a good
understanding of the international knowledge and technology available in a field. This
should not be restricted to a passive or desk-bound search for codified knowledge but
should involve interaction and active learning from users, customers and suppliers.
These interactions and learning processes must be at several levels, with production
engineers, designers and R&D staff as well as marketers interacting with customers
and suppliers and informing their efforts with an awareness of their needs. The
interaction between firms, research institutes and the market should be based on a
shared level of technical understanding, and this may require "educating the customers
or the providers". Customer interaction can, for example, involve technically
demanding lead users forcing a "ratcheting up" of the performance standards of the
firm and its technology, and acting as prestigious "flagships" for the business. A firm
needs the ability to verify to external parties its quality and performance standards by
meeting or exceeding ISO and other objective quality standards.
A firm must aim to deliver what the customer wants, and in some cases anticipate
future needs. This may involve anticipating a future customer need for a technology
that is "on the shelf' but whose time is yet to come. This requires a focus on the
fitness for purpose of a technology, and a tight strategic fit between the innovation
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and customer needs. This in turn normatly means that an innovation must aim to do
one quite narrow, specific and tangible thing, not aim at the grandiose
"revolutionisation of a whole industry".
Firms need to exercise leverage over key parts of their external environment for
example by vertical integration, controlling their marketing and distributioq and
avoiding distributors who are also marketing competing product lines. Firms need to
capture the benefits of their innovation through embedding uniqueness or difficult to
imitate technical features in them, by influencing technical and regulatory standards,
staying ahead of the competition through continuous improvement and innovatioq
and through branding, intellectual property protection and other strategies.
A firm's ability to interpret and exploit external sources of stimulus, ideas and
technologies is shaped by its in-house competencies and knowledge bases. However,
an innovative firm should ensure that the evolution of its in-house competencies and
attitudes will be driven by the long-term needs and opportunities of the external
environment rather than by the defensive protection of its internal capabilities. While
the technology base of an innovative firm should be at the core of its business strategy
and be its key competitive weapon, the technology base must always be a means of
fulfilling the overarching vision or mission of the firm, not its raison d'etre. An
innovative firm must constantly expose its technology base to pressures to evolve.
This may be through the recruitment of new technologists, often from outside the
industry, links with sources of new ideas and stimulus, accessing new forms of human
capital, and active networking.
Networks between firms encompass partnerships, joint ventures, and many other
forms of shared or collective learning relationships. Japan's ability to catch up with
and finally outstrip Western competitors in the post-World War tr period resulted to a
great extent from the emergence of interrelated networks in Japan, which far more
efficiently use information flows than would be achievable through the competitive
strategies of firms acting in isolation. These intenelated networks were
complemented by horizontal information flows, interactions with external userg
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organisational and management innovations such as JIT, concurrent engineering,
long-term equity, and cooperation between government and industry.
Managers therefore need to develop learning strategies for the individual firm and also
strategies that allow the firm to access external ideas and technology and to network
with other businesses and institutes to exploit collective learning opportunities. In an
economy such as New Zealand, this should have a strong international focus, but
firms should also form part of domestic clusters to allow access to complementary
skills, shared generic technology bases, and specialised production technology. These
clusters will include public research institutes, universities and polytechnics that help
stretch the frontiers around the firm, inject new ideas, and provide a stream of human
capital.
Implications for Policy Managers
The importance of technological learning to a country's economic performance is
fundamental, and Fagerberg (1995) argues that a country's long-run competitive
advantage will be in areas where its rate of learning is higher than that of competing
countries. Arising from the research in this thesis are the following more specific
implications for policy managers:
International Trade. Technolosical and Market Environment
Innovative countries and firms should be outward-looking and intemational in focus.
For countries, active engagement in international trade, a willingness to learn from
other countries, and a technostructure linked into overseas sources of science and
technology is critical.
Innovation in a country will be fostered by an outward-looking trade policy, primarily
because it accelerates the rate of learning at the level of the firm. An outwardlooking
trade policy allows innovators to exploit international sources of science, technology
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and new ideas, expanding the selection environment or "neighbourhood of
opportunity" from which they can draw ideas, and thereby exploit a wider choice of
technological and market opportunities. The international economy also raises the
sights and stretches the frontiers of innovative firms because they and their
innovations are judged by the highest or best-practice world standards rather than by
the standards of the domestic market.
A firm's interaction with international customers and sources of technology will be
essential to the continuous enhancement of its performance. Because of the
fundamental importance of externally-driven technological learning, it is argued that
these international learning interactions are more important to firms than the vigorous
damestic competition and the interactions within industry clusters highlighted by
Porter (1990).
This does not imply a total reliance on international competition or a completely open
trade policy. Open trade policies can hamper the emergence of start-up businesses
which cannot initially compete against imported products from overseas competitors.
The difficulties faced by start-up and emerging firms need to be addressed by a
supportive domestic environment and targeted microeconomic interventions. These
policies will deliver support in the form of intangible assets such as human capital,
knowledge and advisory services, assistance in overseas marketing, supplemented by
public agencies acting as "demand side" leading-edge purchasers of technology-based
products. These policies will encourage the start-up and emergence of firms to the
stage where they are generating the cashflow and have the products on the market
that can form a basis for future growth and export performance.
In the recent Uruguay GATT round the TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual Property)
agreement aimed to tighten up intellectual property protection. The increasingly
restrictive approach to intellectual property protection has significant implications for
small, open trading economies in the future, and could imply a need for active
govemment interventions to access overseas technology and intellectual property.
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Domestic Economic. Policlr and Cultural Environment
Macroeconomic stability and conservative fiscal policies will increase stability and
reduce the uncertainty in which firms operate. This will assist innovative firms that
already face high technological uncertainty. Low real interest rates and high domestic
savings rates will assist the venture financing of technology-based businesses, and a
neutral or positive tal( treatment for R&D and other innovative investments will also
foster innovation. Macroeconomic stability should be complemented by
microeconomic flexibility and workplace reform. Labour market flexibility should be
a core part of this, but with a focus on the worldorce being a resource to develop and
make flexible, multi-skilled and productive rather than being a cost to minimise.
Small firms are to a great extent dependent for their learning on external sources of
ideas and on links with other firms. Therefore, a country such as New Zealand with
an industry structure dominated by smallfirms is exceptionally dependent on networks
between firms, and links between firms and the public technostructure. These should
be actively fostered.
Innovation will be encouraged by a cultural environment that fosters achievement,
entrepreneurship and risk taking. This supportive environment may include business-
linked entrepreneurship programmes from school level on, sponsored awards and
honours for innovators, and high prestige being accorded to technological innovators.
Innovation will also be fostered by a high trust business environment and a low
tolerance for fraud, misappropriation of funds, breach of tacit and unwritten codes of
conduct, and other business behaviour that erodes the trusting relationships that are
crucialfor innovation.
Public Technostructure
The public technostructure of educational, research, property rights and technical
institutions forms a systemic part of a country's national system of innovation. It
therefore helps underpin a country's ability to learn and innovate, and helps provide or
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foster those intangible assets that are not created by the free workings of markets.
Key contributions of the public technostructure will therefore be the intangible assets
resulting from human capitd creation and R&D.
Human capital creation at all levels of an economy is a fundamental condition of
technological innovation. Countries should invest heavily in education throughout all
age groups and produce large numbers of science, engineering and technology
graduates from universities and polytechnics. The education and training system
should foster a spirit of enquiry and a critical questioning of incumbent ideas and ways
of doing things. Education and training should be imbued in people as a lifetime
habit, not treated as a one-off investment early in life. Human capital should be
mobile between and among the public research and technological infrastructure and
firms, and in the international and domestic economies. The quality, quantity and
mobility of this human capital, and its location within strategic governance structures
that can focus it and make it productive, will be recognised as of the highest
importance to a country's economic performance.
Publicly-funded R&D creates the "co-produced goods" of human capital and
knowledge. Many studies suggest that the main economic benefits of more basic
publicly-funded research result from the creation of skills, human capital and networks
rather than from the creation of published scientific results (see lrvine & Martin,
1980; Nelson & Levin, 1986; Pavitt, l99l; Rosenberg & Nelson, 1992; Senker &
Faulkner, 1992).
Publicly-funded R&D needs to be undertaken within domains in which a country has,
or can create a competitive advantage. Research institutes conducting this research
should have an intimate knowledge of the industry serviced, commercial powers and
stnrctures, and the ability to present to industry comprehensive and integrated
technology packages rather than "disembodied ideas", Links between researchers and
industry should be interactive and exploit two-way learning processes.
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Publicly-funded R&D should also link into and exploit R&D and technological
development undertaken overseas. Public investment in research and in
technostructure is partly designed to buy entry into international networks that feed
into, augment, and exercise a multiplier effect on domestic research and technological
competencies. R&D is therefore essential to reduce transaction costs at a country as
well as a firm level, to reduce R&D redundancy, and to better exploit overs€as
sources of ideas and technologies. Overseas and domestic R&D are complements and
not substitutes, and the interaction between them is synergistic and involves
economies of scope rather than being additive. As Coe & Helpman (1993, p. l) point
out:
..own [domesticl R&D enhances a counry's benefits from foreign teclrnicd advances, and
the better a country takes advantage of technological advances in the rest of the world the
more productive it becomes.
The public R&D effort also interacts synergistically with that of the private sector.
Leyden & Link (1991, p. 1680) argue that:
...governmental R&D directly stimulates private R&D. Moreover, governmental R&D also
stimulates sharing [of informationl, which in turn stimulates private R&D.
Leyden et al (1989) argue that governmental R&D not only stimulates private sector
R&D but also spurs industry R&D laboratories towards greater sharing of their
innovation-related knowledge. Networking and porous boundaries between public
research institutes and firms, and mobility of people between public research,
educational and other institutes and the business sector, therefore needs to be strongly
encouraged to enhance interactive learning and the difRrsion of knowledge and human
capital throughout the economy.
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Further Research
This thesis has argued that difrerentiated learning is at the heart of technological
innovation. Further research could well develop a ta:ronomy of differentiated learning
in the New Zealand economy, encompassing the type and source of learning
characteristics of industries including firm size and market structure, and the nature
and dynamics of technology. This til(onomy could allow policy and business
managers to better tailor their interventions, R&D, search and learning strategies to
the particular features of different firms and industry groups.
Conclusion
This chapter summarised the results of the thesis and gave expression to them in the
form of a model of technological innovation. The chapter set out the implications of
this thesis for business and for policy managers, and then made suggestions for further
research.
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ANNEX 1: DATABASE OF INNOVATIONS
Introduction
The database of innovations from l98l-1993 was assembled by the author primuily
by scanning a very comprehensive number of trade journals and other literature. The
major sources are listed in Annex 1.1 of this furnex. The "raw database" recorded the
name (descriptive title) of the innovation, the brand name (if applicable), a short
description, and the reference citation. In most cases the raw database recorded basic
information on the innovating organisation, when the innovation was launched on the
market, and in some cases, information such as on patenting of the innovation. A
more in-depth understanding of many of the innovations was obtained from the
written literature on the innovations, and from other enquiries made directly to
relevant firms and innovators.
The innovations for in-depth case study were selected from this database using the
criteria $et out in the Methodology chapter. The database was used only as a basis to
select innovations for detailed case study and no attempt was made by the author to
further classify or analyse the database. However, on her request, the database was
made available to a masterate student in economics, Wilhelmina Eveleens.
Acknowledgment of this assistance is recorded in Annex 1.2 attached. Wilhelmina
classified the data on a sectoral basis and the results of her work are recorded in
Tables Al and A2 below.
Classification of the Innovations
The database of innovations was, as far as possible, classified using the NZSIC
sectoral codes, covering both where the innovation was produced and the main sector
of use. Difficulties in the classification of innovations between sectors are discussed
in Eveleens (1995). The sectoral distribution of the innovations is set out in Table Al
below:
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and related Mineral Products
Basic Metal Industries
Manufactu re of Fab ricated
Metal Products, Machinery
and Equipment
Electricity, Gas and Water
Construction
















































































A more detailed breakdown at the 4 digit NZSIC level is set out in Table A2 below.





































Logging and Other Timber Felling






















































Enraction of Crude Petroleum
and Natural Gas
Ironsand Mining




Slaughtering and Meat Processing
Dairy Products
Processing ofFruit and Vegetables
Fish and Shellfish Processing








Textiles, Fibre and Textile Processing
Made-up Textile Goods Except Clothing
Carpets and Rugs
Cordage, Rope and Twine
Clothing


















































Sawmills, Planning and Other
Wood Mills
Manufacture of Wooden and
Cane Containers
Manufacture of Cork and
Wood Products nec
Pulp, Paper and Paperboard
Paper and Paperboard Containers
Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Articles




Synthetic Resins, Plastic Materials etc
Paints, Varnishes and Lacquers
Drugs and Medicines
Soap and Cleaning Preparations,







Pottery, China and Earthenware











































Furniture and Fixtures Primarily of Metal 4
Structural Metal Products
Household and Kitchen Utensils, General 42
Hardware and Fabricated Metal Products n.e.c.
Cement, Lime and Plaster
Non-metallic Mineral Products n.e.c,
Iron and Steel Basic Industries





Wireworking, Nail and Fastener
Manufacturing etc.
Manufacture and Reconditioning of
Engines and Turbines
Agricultural Machinery and Equipment
Tool, Die and Jig Making and
Manufacture of Metal and
Woodworking Machinery
Office, Computing and Accounting
Machinery
Industrial Machinery and Equipment
Electrical Industrial Machinery
and Apparatus 186
Radio, Television and Communication



























Electrical Apparatus and Supplies n.e.c.



















Professional and Scientific, Measuring
and Controlling Equipment
Photographic and Optical Goods
























Electricity Generation and Distribution
Gas Treatment and Distribution














General Wholesale and Retail
Fresh Fruit and Vegetables
Fuel and Transport Vehicle
Repair Garages
General Transport and Storage
Railway Transport
Other Road Passenger Transport
Freight Transport by Road
















General Real Estate and Business Services
Accounting, Auditing and Bookkeeping
Services
Software Development etc L52
Engineering, Architectural and
Technical Services 8

























Sanitary and Garbage Disposal Services
Education Services
Research and Scientific Institutes
Medical, Health Services
Libraries, Museums etc
Racing and Associated Services
Sport and Recreation
(including professionals)
Amusement and Recreational Services

















ANNEX 1.1: LITERATURE AND SOURCES TO IDENTIFY
POPULATION OF INNOVATIONS
The following are sources that were used by the author to identify and assemble the
population of technological innovations for the study.











Dairy Board Annual Reports
Dairying Today
Dairyman
Dairy Research Institute News











Apple and Pear Marketing Board
Annual Reports
Arable Farming













Chemistry, Industry and Laboratory
Management
Chemistry in New Zealand
Commercial Fishing
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Energy Management Yearbook Journal of the NZ Institute of
Energy R&D News Mechanical Engineers
Exporteq The Kiwifood
ExportNews LaboratoryNews
Farm Equipment News Live Lines
Fibre News Logging Industries
Fishing Industry Board Bulletin Management
Fishing Industry Board Newsletter Manufacturer
Fletcher Challenge News Materials Handling and Logistics
Focus on Science Management
Food Industry News Meat Directory
Food Processing Product News Meat News
Food Technologist, The Mechanical Engineering Digest
Food Technology in NZ Medical Equipment Digest
Freshwater Catch Metal
FRI Annual Research Report Mlk Industry Bulletin
FRI News MIRINZ Annual Research Reports
Gas News Motor Industry News
Graphix National Business Review
Growing Today New Electronics
Heating and Ventilating Engineer, The NZ Agrichemicals Manual
(later renamed IRHACE) NZ Beekeeper
Horticulture in New Zealand NZ Cement and Concrete Information
Horticulture News Bulletins
Horticulture Today NZ Coal
Imprint NZ Commercial Grower
Industrial Business Magazine NZ Computer Interface
Industrial Equipment News NZ Computer Reviews
International Business (NZ) NZ Computer Scene
IPENZ Yearbook NZ Concrete Construction
IPENZ: Technical Group Proceedings NZ Concrete lndustry Guide


















NZ Interface and NZ Computer
Interface
NZ Journal of Agricultural Research
NZ Journal of Agriculture
NZ Journal of Computing
NZ Journal of Crop and Horticultural
Science
NZ Journal ofDairy Science and
Technology
NZ Journal of Environmental Health
NZ Journal of Forestry
NZ Journal of Forestry Science
NZ Journal of Medical Laboratorv
Technology









NZ Motor Industry News
NZ Pharmacy
NZ Poultry Industry Review
NZ Printer
NZ Professional Fisherman































All University Research Reports
All Annual Reports and Research
Reports of Research Associations
Annual reports of companies
DSIR Annual Reports
MAF AnnualReports
Mnistry ofForestry Annual RePorts
Newspaper and magazine articles-
miscellaneous unpublished reports etc.
Patent OfEce data
Plant Variety Rights Office data
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I acknowledge the receip of the database of innovations, 1980-1992, which you have
collated. I intend to further dwelop the database by classifying the innovations to the NZSIC
categories, to feed into the analytical part of my thesis. I will cite your wort as the sontoe




t0th Floor, Reserve Bank 2 The Terrace PO Box 5336 Wellington New Zealand Telephone (M) 4726li0iJ Fa:t (0{) 4717?f4
AITINEX 2: SAMPLES OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CASE
RESEARCH
Introduction
This annex provides samples of documents used in the counte of the case study
research. The documents attached are as follows:
Annex 2.1. An outline format for the case research interviews. This format was
given to each person interviewed before the interview.
Annex 2.2. Copy of confidentiality agreement.
Annex 2.3. List of people interviewed in the case studies.
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ANNEX 2.1: FORMAT FOR CASE STTJDY INTERVIEWS
The key people associated with the innovation will be interviewed for around an hour.
The interview results will be written up and circulated to the participants, who can
then ask for any erors or misinterpretations to be corrected. Follow up interviews
will be undertaken where necessary to ampli$ points or veri$ interpretations.
The interview format will be kept very open, allowing the information collection to be
driven by the participants rather than by the interviewer. The aim is to avoid biases or
preconceptions of the interviewer distorting the data collection.
The interviews will focus on the following broad areas:
1. The origins of the innovation (encompassing the initial idea, "trigger event" or
stimulus, as well as the sources of the key technologies)'
2. External influences (a very broad area enoompassing market influences,
changes in economic conditions or government policy, external joint ventures
and networking etc).
3. The background, past experience, education etc. ofthe key players.
4. The motivations of the key players.
5. Dynamic processes over time, including the roles and interrelationships
between the key players, and organisational behaviour.
It is stressed that the above 5 broad areas are not intended to be restrictive. They are
rather intended as "prompts" and to provide a focus for the interview. The emphasis
glven to particular areas will obviously vary according to whether the participant is a
technologist, marketer, business manager etc.
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am a PhD candidate undertaking research forming part of the New Zealand
Innovation Project within the Faculty of Commerce and Administration at Victoria
university, wellington.
In undertaking this research, I acknowledge that I may become prily to commercially
sensitive or confidential information revealed by companies, Research Institutes or
other parties.
In respect of such commercially sensitive or confidential information, I undertake:
(a) not to use such information for the purposes of any competitive business
operation;
(b) not to use it in any way which could reasonably be expected to be detrimental
to the business or other interests of the person or persons from whom it was
received.








ANNEX 2.31 LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN CASE
STUDIES
The following people were interviewed in the course of the case study research-
ASDi Variable Speed Drive
Keith Valentine, Vectron Teohnologies Ltd, Napier
Murray Porteous, PDL Electronics, Napier
Dr Simon Waltoru PDL Electronics, Napier
Professor John Boys, Dept of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, AucHand
University, Auckland
Kiwifruit Wine
Dr David Heatherbell, Lincoln University, Lincoln
Norman Lodge, HortResearch Institute, Mt Albert Research Centre, Auckland
Warren Preston, Preston's Kiwifiruit Winery, Tauranga
Ruakura Milk Hanester
Bill Thompsoq InterAg Ltd, Hamilton
Dr Ken Jury, Dairying Research Corporation, Ruakura Agricultural Centre, Hamilton
Dr Murray Woolford, Dairying Research Corporation, Ruakura Agricultural Research
Centre, Hamilton
Dr Robert Sherlock, Dairying Research Corporation, Ruakura Agricultural Centre,
Hamilton
Graham Duirs, AgResearch Head Office, Hamilton
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FP4000 Intelligent Fire Alarm
Richard Cree, Vigilant Fire and Evacuation Systems, Cl'uistchurch
David Sharp, Vigilant Fire and Evacuation Systems, Ch'ristchurch
Mke Holdaway, Vigilant Fire and Evacuation Systems, Christchurch
Alatal 821 Milk Product
Dr Robin Fenwiclg Protein Division, NZ Dairy Board, Wellington
Andrew Revfeim, Whey Products NZ Ltd, Wellington
Marsha Swarta NZ Mlk Products, Santa Rosq California
Dr Chao Wu, NZ Milk Products, Santa Rosa, California
Neal Van Degrift, NZ Milk Products, Santa Rosa, California
Rob Boswell, Anchor Products, Hautapu
Julie O'sullivan, NZDRI, Palmerston North
Kevin Oliver, Protein Division, NZ Dairy Board, Wellington
Loin Boner
Gordon Wickham, MIRINZ, Hamilton
Weng Ng, MIRINZ, Hamilton
Dr Doug Wright, retired director of MIRINZ, Hamilton
Alan Dean, Richmonds Ltd, Otaki
Treotek Spinning Technology
Dr Garth Carnaby, WRONZ, Lincoln
Jack Watt, WRONZ, Lincoln
Stuart Hammer, Alliance Telciles Ltd, Mosgiel
Alistair Coleman, Alliance Textiles Ltd, Timaru
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GS 2085 Apple Variety
Allan White, HortResearctq Havelock North Research Orchard, HavelockNorth
Dr lohn Field-Dodgsorq NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board, Hastings
Dr Geisla Ahlbor4 NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board, Hastings
David Cranwell, NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board, Hastings
XAB-17 Beacon
John Rochfort, Vega Ltd, Porirua
Martyn Cooh Vega Ltd, Porirua (telephone interview only)
Greenweld
Dr lustin Williamsoru NZ Forest Research Institute, Rotorua
Jeremy Taylor, NZ ForestResearch Institute, Rotorua
Dr John Butcher, NZ Forest Research Institute, Rotorua
Dr Russell Burton, NZ Forest Research Institute, Rotorua
JeffParker, NZ Forest Research Institute, Rotorua
Dr Terry Lomax, Ministry of Researctr, Science and Technology, Wellington
Dual Fuel Kit
George Jones, Solid State Ltd, Lower Hutt
Harvey Poletti, Solid State Ltd, Lower Hutt
Harvey Reid, DieselGas Ltd, Lower Hutt
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AhINEX 3: OPEN CODED VARIABLES BY BROAD AREA AI\[D
AXIAL CATEGORY
The following lists open coded variables grouped for convenience within the broad
areas and organised by a,xial categories. Annex 3.1 attached provides an example of
the information recorded on an open coded card. furnex 3.2 attached provides an
example ofthe information recorded on an axial coded card.
l. Broad Area: Origins of Innovation






Innovations draw on antecedent technology
Platform of knowledge
Technical platform
Technical platforms in relation to expandable/extendable innovation
Evolutionary adoption of radical new technologies but within same core
business
R&D based innovations depend on antecedent R&D
Innovations as part of an on-going continuum
Product variants from robust designs
Invention is the "mother of necessity''
Transmission of tacit technology over extended time-frames
Additional benefits result from research subsequent to an innovation
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One innovation witl spawn another or loosely related one




Ideas coming from overseas
Japanese companies using NZ companies to commercialise their patents
Ihternational databases and external sources of technology
Involvement of international technical people
International links reducing R&D redundancy
Combination ofNZ and overseas technology
3. Published Sources of Ideas and Technologies
Variables:
Published conference results
Importance of technical trade journals
Published scientific papers as a major stimulus to innovation





Research institutes providing a secondary input into an industry-driven
innovation
Intellectual freedom in DSIR and universities
Technology transfer seminars and promotions
University-based innovation
University research underpinning industry R&D
AcademicVscientists generating new ideas
University involvement
Public researchers aiming to be ahead of industry
Public research institutes often aren't doing research in areas relevant to
companies
Public research institutes following rather than leading private sector
innovation
Links with industry by Research Institutes
Public research institutes used to provide a very specialised technical input
Fundamental skills and knowledge from universities
Companies manufacturing inventions from public research institutes
University/industry j oint proj ects
Long-term alliances with universities
Research institutes needing an intimate knowledge of industry
Supportive public infrastructure
Industry-sponsored, university-conducted innovation
Information exchanges between universities/institutes and companies
CRI involvement
Innovative output of graduate student-level research
Research institutes providing a key technical input of technology unavailable
to the innovator
Innovations do come from "public good" research
380
Companies leading institutes in innovation
Lack of sophisticated technostructure
5. MarkeVCustomer Orieins of Innovation
Customer contact or problem solving directly stimulates innovation
Business or commercial person spotting potential of technology
Ideas generated for research institutes by commercial clients
Development of an innovation to meet a very specific tender
Industry/marketing person isolating potential of a technology that was
otherwise seen as a failure
"Impossible" outside specification as stimulus to innovation
Innovat ion focused o n real market problems/oppo rtunities
6. Formal Idea Generatinq Processes
Variables:
Brain-storming sessions
Systematic method of scanning for external sources of technology
"Creative swiping"
Formal searching for external technology
Formal process of identifying opportunities
7. Other External Orieins of Innovation
Variables:
Interaction with ideas generated by others, especially external ideas
Recruitment of external personnel
Innovators often come from outside the commercialising company
Students finishing offor doing their degrees in companies
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Innovative companies spinning offfrom existing companies
Benefits of external critiques of innovation
Use of external technical consultants
8. Comition- and Informal Creative and Idea Generatine Processes and
Activities
Variables:
Good ideas come from actively doing things, not sitting at a desk or 'Just
thinking"
Dreaming
Luck favours a prepared mind
Pattern recognition ability
Free interchange of scientific ideas among scientists
Lateral thinking
Open and free exchange of ideas
Good ideas come from the factory floor
Flash of insight or understanding
Openness and exposure to new ideas is associated with rapid technological
advances




Accident and chance events
"Shock of recognition"
Ability to recognise and see the significance of an unexpected result
*Kiwi ingenuity''
Time needed for in-depth, reflective thinking
Analytical convergent thinking
Making connections between unrelated things
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Key ideas of innovators stimutated by other people with different experiences
9. Formal R&D
Existence of structured R&D
Scale ofR&D needed to be competitive may be increasing
Some companies do strategic research
Companies supporting PhD research
Companies that are wholly or partly R&D contract labs
World-olass research on industry problems
PhD research can be of direct commercial benefit to companies
Importance of basic science input from outside the core innovation field
Understanding of the theoretical base or basic science underlying an
innovation
Basic science
Basic research knowledge resulting from focused research
10. Family Origins of Innovation
Variables:
Innovative families
Technological interests and competencies transmitted from parent to child
Same family maintains an interest in the same technology over several
generations
ll. NZ's Specific Resource Endowments and ProblemdOpportunities
Variables:
Dependence on biologically-based industries
Resource endowments
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High health status ofNZ biological products
Non-uniformity of biological materials
Perishability
Weakness of a raw material may turn out to be an exploitable strength
Upgrading low value waste products
Extracting value from a waste product
Biological lag times
Shortage of raw materials or resources as a spur to innovation
Specific problems of uniqueNZ materials
Availability of raw materials
Changing or exploiting a weakness in an NZ product
Control over key raw materials
Adding value to NZ raw materials
Technical or functional characteristics of a product or raw material determines
innovative potential
Demand for innovation driven by core industries
Many NZ innovations are inputs, ingredients or production equipment
Frustrating farm problems as a source of innovation
12. Nature of the Technoloey
Variables:
Electronics
Technolory as a lifeline to a company
Technological paradigm shift
Objective measurement technology
Importance of computer software
Embedded software
Tacitness
Key scientists/engineers have an input into a wide range of innovations by
others
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Availability of radical new technologies
Sensory science
Flexible production technology
Tracking and identifi cation technology
New fu nctional properties
Embedded uniqueness
Multiplier effects of systemic innovation
Inherent functional properties of a product allow differentiation
Advanced technologies involve specific problems which are themselves
valuable learning experiences
Technology push
Strong commitment and "sunk costs" in existing incumbent technologies or
skill-bases
Engine and automotive innovations loom large
Very good ideas and technologies tend to always be successfully
commercialised in the end; inept implementation will delay but not stop them
Innovations succeed in different uses
Embedded software as specific rather than generic technology
Specifi city of innovation
Producer Boards moving from generic promotion to specific innovation
Production technology that is both an input and an output
Skills applied to quite different technologies
Specific innovation creates generic platform
Innovation often blends applied technology and basic understanding
Major "cross overs" of science from other fields
Move from products to complete systems
Enabling technology embedded in an existing product
Innovative technology is often new to New Zealand but not to the world
Technologies emerge from one part of a field, such as electronics, but are then
adopted more widely
Innovations traverse industries
Opportunities exploited often differ from the original goal of the innovation
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Process innovation to produce a new product
Early stages of innovation are 'thing oriented", later stages are people
oriented
Systems with common features but with specific tailoring to particular clients
Versatility and adaptability of NZ technologists
Planting rates and biological lag-times allow future to be predicted
Nature of the technology has to be appropriate to its market
Intangibility of competencies and skills make them difhcult to borrow against
Satisficing rather than optimising technology
Some types of academic science lend themselves to commercial interaction
Niche innovation
Generic technology applied to a totally different purpose
Generic technology created by focusing on real problems
Innovations that are one-offor design solutions to specific problems
13. Cost. Production Labour or Technical Problems as Oriein oflnnovation
Variables:
Pro duction manu facturing costs and reliabil ity
Cost as a pressure for innovation
Cost reducing process innovation that also improves quality or functional
performance
Innovation as a simplification of design
Need to simplify things in general, especially production
Innovation resulting from frustrating technical problems
Concentration on reducing costs of manufacture
Unreliability of labour
Innovation to deal with a bottleneck
Process quality to reduce waste and reworking
Increasing external pressure for safety, purity and QA
Svstemic bottlenecks
14. New Combinations. Competitions or Inter-Relationships Between TechnolosY
as Oriqins of Innovation
Variables:
Innovation results from new combinations of existing technology
Systemic innovation
Intertwining of hardware and software
Willingness to exploit new disciplines or complementary skillbases
Advanced technological development on technological frontiers requires
comptementary "lower tech" or supportive R&D
Contribution from other innovations
Competing theories aimed at same goal
Multi-disciplinary research
Innovation as the putting together of new combinations
Hardware built around software to make software productive
Clusters of innovation in the same field
Clusters of innovation in the same field produced by quite different people
Convergent technologies
2. Broad Area: Dynamic Processes
Axial Categories within Broad Area
l. Capturine Benefits from Innovation
Variables:
Importance of early and attractive branding
Need to differentiate rather than be imitative
Identify the right market, not the obvious market
Competition in several markets using same core technology
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Differentiation by the difficulty of the technology or process
In differentiated, specialised niche markets skills should be retained in one




Testing procedures as a "locking in" mechanism
Diversification
Intensively sales-engineered products
Strategy of moving away from commodities to added value
Economies of scope
Manner in which something is produced does itself oapture premiums
Flexible production runs to earn premiums
Innovations marred by distributors with competing product lines
The "currency of technology"
Leverage created through distribution networks
History of innovation in a market sets regulatory standards
Many companies don't patent
Balance needs to be maintained between confidentiality and openness
Control over transport
Specifications developed around the product
Control over distribution
Process innovation may confer a new competitive edge on an existing product
Diversification
Trademarking
Good returns depend on embodied technology
Branding
Copyrights
Intellectual property as a major asset
Increasing returns to specialisation
Commercial confi dentiality
Royalties from licensed technology are quite modest
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Sowing a minefield of patents
Too much differentiation can be a problem in the market
Patenting
Fast followers rather than the initial innovators often capture most of the
benefits
Speed to the market
Specialised intellectual property management skills
Being first with a new innovation
Desire to have a differentiating feature
Importance of consolidating and channelling first sales of an innovation back
into the business rather than into consumption
Overseas standards designed around NZ innovations
2. Time
Variables:
Industry is short-term in its view of R&D
Time-frame for a protob/pe is much shorter than time-frame to commercialise
Technology's time often comes in the flrture
Time-scales in relation to industry
Lack of time and moneY for research
Long term stable focus on a defined area





2-4 yearsto develop an innovation is typical
Continuity
Fast response times for customers
Long-term financial struggle before success is achieved
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Product life cycles of 4-5 years
Some innovations overtaken by more advanced technology
Need to speed up the product development cycle
3. Oreanisational Structural Aspects of Innovation
Variables:
Teamwork: innovation as a team/group rather than individual phenomenon
"Rugby approach" to innovation
Concurrent engineering
Devolution to a taskforce
Workplace reform
Technological innovators should interact across disciplines and specialities and
not be segmented
Management or social innovation as a key to success
Innovative teams of around 4-8 people




lnnovation forces companies to change stntcture and workplace organisation
Absence of rigidly formal and hierarchal structures
Organi sational structure
Devolution and decentralisation of technical servicing and QA functions
Flexible institutional arrangements for R&D and technological innovation
Innovative company and business based around innovation
Backyard or garage level start-ups
"Footloose" companies
Research Institute limits to how far they can go with commercialisation
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Belief that a company should make a positive contribution to society
Family atmosphere
Toleration of the "oddball"
Great attention to detail
Institutionalising attitudinal change, eg. for continuous improvement










Clear Go: No Go criteria
Written business plan or strategy
Absence of business plan analysis
Written mission statement
Cost benefit analysis




Performance targets need to be specified
Need for focus early on
Key commercial decisions in an innovation being made early
Lack of rigorous market analysis and reliance on instinct
Innovation must be directed to an end purpose
Advanced processes to enhance innovative management in a computy
"Imagineering"
Technology-based companies often lack basic administrative and commercial
skills
Quality management
Importance of good record keePing
Importance of design
Innovation associated with strategic changes within companies
Quality control and practical operational problems
NZ companies need their own marketing and technical staffoverseas
Product and process-specific marketing often required
Vigorous internal and external promotion of innovation
Science provider strategy a crucial variable
6. Resourcine of Innovation
Variables:
Availability of existing plant and competencies
Minimum critical mass of resources needed for innovation
Innovations funded out of turnover
Willingness to spend large sums of money
Discretionary funds available to, or withirq research institutes
Reluctance to borrow
Bootlegging of internal resources




Redundancy money and superannuation
Flexibility in R&D tunding
Smallness and inability ofNZ companies to support large-scale innovation
Availability of adequate financial and other resources
Large personal fi nancial commitments
R&D and innovation investment is pervasive and integral rather than
separately budgeted and structured
Offshore R&D money
Research Institute capitalisation
Ability for risk to be borne by a company or other risk pooling device rather
than by an individual
Continuous process innovation
Motivation of getting volume up to justify R&D levels
7. Networkine. Technical Alliances and Partnerships with Other Organisations
Variables:
Long term strategic relationships with component suppliers
Technical partnerships between companies
Use of other companies or contraclors
Technology-based companies often work together
Technical assistance through networking
Research institutes having a commercial partner
Solo innovators teaming up with a company to commercialise innovations
Joint public/private sector ventures resulting from science reforms
Research institutes and companies at similar technical levels
Research institutes need commercial partners to provide tooling, trialing
production technolory etc.




Company-specific contractyrelationships of Research Institutes
Close, long-term strategic relationships with customers
Licensed manufacture of innovations
International technical alliances
closg interactive, and long-term relationships with suppliers
Need for companies to interactpositively with other competing companies
Networking strategically externally
Networking and technical oooperation between non-competing NZ companies
Ecological oooperation
Ventures with larger companies to avoid being quashed
Solo innovators who get a large company to make the product
8. Key Roles in Innovation
Variables:
Product champion
People complementing each other
Business financier
Role of manager
Business innovator and Chief Executive tend to complement technical
innovator and product chamPion
TopJevel sponsor
Specialisation of roles rather than'Jack of all trades" approach












People in an innovative team getting on well together
Mutual respect
Friendship and personal relationships
Personal rapport




Letting everybody have their saY
Need to manage upwards as well as downwards
Key people must be involved early, preferably at inception
Creative people stifled or unrewarded
Mentoring and other means of fostering innovators
Management by walking around
Innovative people are difficult to manage
Product development is different to research and must be managed differently
Leading visibly from in front
Communication
Open communication with no hidden agendas
Secrecy from other keY PeoPle
39s
Open exchange of information
Good communication between top management and the innovative team
Abilrty of scientists/technologists to gommunicate with workers
Willingness to listen to others
Staffstability
Worker "buy in" to an innovation at an early stage
Innovation causes fnrstration and anguish
Passion for the vision
One manager must have the overview
AII key players are employers/managers rather than consultants
Leadership by example rather than decree
Empowerment of and communication with the staff
"Loose cannons'' on deck have to be controlled
Organisational slack
New management
Focus on people's strengths to make their weaknesses irrelevant
Innovation is making ideas haPPen
Need for clear lines of decision making
Bureaucratic stifling of innovation
Balance between R&D, production and applications must be maintained
Key scientists and technologists must be involved all the way through
Intrapreneurship
I l. Asset Specificity
Variables:
Embedded uniqueness
Asset specificity as tool to capture benefits
Asset specifi city (general)
Asset specificity of food ingredient formulas
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Specialised capital equipment to earn premiums through low marginal cost
production
12. Dvnamic Change and Adaptiveness and its Manaeement in Imovation
Variables:
Organisational fl exibility and adaptability
Innovations must have the flexibility to allow later extension or reinnovation
Avoidance of "locking in" designs, software structure etc too early
Maintain core focus and avoid branching out into the wrong field
Key people doing the whote job, including R&D, marketing, servicing etc
Interactive feedback from users/industry while R&D is underway
Engineers and innovators interacting closely with customers
Flexibility
Uncertainty
As technology grows in complexity there is a need for companies to
increasingly rely on external sources of expertise
Key innovators involved across the basic research to applied technology
perspective
Innovators in existing companies spinning off and setting up their own
companies
Companies adopting and transferring human capital rather than disembodied
technology
The act of innovation itself builds up expertise, skills and human capital as
spin-offs
Need to ensure "performance in peripheral matters"
"Do it once and do it right"
Innovation must be continuous
Reinnovation
Ability to recognise and avoid or withdraw from "blind alleys"
Internal competition between competing technologies
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Flexibility to change course and direction during the course of the R&D
Most innovation costs and efforts are development rather than research
Enormous gulf betrveen what works at protoqpe level and what can be
successfully marketed
Innovations not "one off': Got to keep others on the go
KISS
Learning on the job and learning by doing
Movement of people as technology transfer
Follow-on products
13. The Effects. Consequences and Benefits of Innovation
Yariables:
User satisfaction
Innovation as a "door opene/'tO new markets and new technologies
Unexpected technical and commercial benefits of an innovation
Mondprofit is always the consequence or the spin-ofi, not the primary goal
Innovation as a catalyst for new plant investment
Technical success is more likely than commercial success
Innovation has to be adopted or supported by multiple players to be a success
in an integrated industry
Success with applied product development can stimulate more basic scientific
work
Success breeds further success
14. Cost Variables in Innovation
Variables:
Problem of cost of production
Development cost$ far exceed research costs
39E
Importance ofgetting product price down
Per unit costs drop dramatically over produa life
Research institute cost control
Problem of lack of efficiency and QA in manufacturing
15. SciencdTechnoloey Push Versus Market Pull
Variables:
Technologyled developments failing or getting into difficulties
"Technology push" by scientists creates an innovative success
Science/technology push
Technology that is "too clever by half'
lnnovations from an institute or university need additional commercial features
Identifying a customer need before a customer can articulate it
16. Prototyping and Trialing
Variables:
Trialing in industry
Input needed to overcome difficulties in getting the technology working in
industry
Trialing as an integral part of research
Provision of technical servicing and back-up
Need for eorly testing, trialing and evaluation
Research scientists assisting in ongoing trialing and problem solving
In-house prototyping by providers
Technology that works in a lab having problems in an industrial or'nreal life"
setting
Tradeoffs needed in innovation
In-house engineering and prototyping ability
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Trial and error
3. Broad Area: Background/Past Experience of Key Players
Axiel Categories within Broad Area
l. Past Experience
Variables:
Research institute staffwith private sector experience
Rich and diverse background experience
Innovators cover a range oftasks
Mobility between the university and research institute sectors
Academics with an industry background
Immigrants
Key people in an innovation from outside the industry
International experience
Innovators with a broad based academic background
Experience in overseas research institutes
Technical people mobile through an industry
Diverse work experience at a number of levels
Strong background in the field/industry
Innovators from Defence, Post office and DsIR backgrounds
Innovati ons arisi ng fr om recreational interests





3. Broad Area: Background/Tast Experience of Key Players
Arial Crtegories within Broad Area
l. Past Experience
Variables:
Research institute staffwith private sector experience
Rich and diverse background experience
Innovators cover a range oftasks
Mobility between the university and research institute sectors
Academics with an industry background
Immigrants
Key people in an innovation from outside the industry
International experience
Innovators with a broad based academic baokground
Experience in overseas research institutes
Technical people mobile through an industry
Diverse work experience at a number of levels
Strong background in the field/industry
Innovators from Defence, Post Office and DSIR backgrounds
Innovations arising from recreational interests








Innovators coming from several generation in same industry
Childhood hobbies and "tinkering"
3. Formal Education and Training
Variables:
Skill levels in companies
Skills in analytical techniques
Food scienoe background
Multi-disciplinary scientific and technical skills of individuals
Formal technical training and technician-level qualifi cations
Multi-disciplinary staff complement
Commercial skills in research institutes
Technicians and instrument makers
Generic industry-wide technical training
Formal human capital creation
NZ engineers and innovators with very practical, versatile skills
Trained staffin companies adopting an innovation
Knowledge and experience
Large number of innovators at BE, BSc level or lower
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4. Broad Area: Motivations
Ar.ial Categories within Broad Arce
l. Nature and Characteristics oflnnovators
Variables:
Gender
Mature men needing a challenge
Age




Ignorant of how hard the innovation process will be
Success with first risk or first innovation led to much greater confidence later
"Blind faith"
Innovators go on to new innovations
People, not technologies, are innovators
E*raordinary scientific achievement of individuals
Innovators often wouldn't do it agairq if they had their time over
Really great innovators tend to have several patents to their credit
Influence of younger PeoPle
Innovators are oPtimists
Visionary CEOs
Ability to sell ideas
Good social, political and networking skills
Passion for the vision








Bright young technologist as a "transformef'
Strong drive to turn ideas into practice
Hard work over long hours
Personality
Determination




Self motivation and drive
Faith
Feeling of certainty about innovation
Prima donnas
Inspirational professors and supervisors
People behaving in accord with their nature
fnitial loneliness of an innovator
Willingness to be different
Self-reliant personalities
High self-esteem
Craftsmanship and love of craft
Involvement of a "maniad'
Idiosyncrasy
Willingness to live on very little money
Charisma
Fanatical belief in a technologY
Intelligence
Innovators have a strong desire to do what they feel is right
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2. How Innovators Lead and Motivate Others
Variables:
Patriarchal figures
Perceived expertise leads to confidence
Infallible persona
Caring attitude to staff
Culture, values, belief systems offounder pervades firm after his departure
Putting wellbeing of staffahead ofyour own
All staffrecognise the company CEO or owner
Vision about company's future
Innovation leader must be able to explain things clearly and communicate the
vision
Knowledge that a patriarchal or charismatic figure will look after staff is a
"glue that binds"
Sticking to an innovation because of the technical knowledge to know that
things are going well
One person knows all parts of a project and has the overview




When trust has been well placed, tested and proverL then those who have
trusted give a great deal back (loyalty, personal favours etc)
Reputation
Very explicit value system of key people
Sense of duty or ethic
3,
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Love as an analogue of innovation
Loyalty and commitment resulting from observing innovators trying to create
and build something bigger than their own material interests








Good relationships in technological innovation minimise need for prescriptive
contracts
4. Financial and Material Motivations for an Innovation
Variables:
Money
Lack of financial incentives for research institute scientists
Profitability
Reward systems for innovators
People forced by material circumstance to take a risk
The expense of particular types of academic research forces academics to go
to industry for funding
Lack of funding forcing academics to earn research funding from industry




Goal must be the innovation or the business, not money
Ownership and control of the business
Desire to help the industry or company
Innovations as "babies"
Innovation as a means of "passing on genes and achieving immortality''
Extremely strong emotional commitment to an innovation
"Innovation becomes mY life"
Publication ethos as a demotivator for innovation
Altruism and public spiritedness
Belief in a technology or an innovation
Technological satisficing rather than optimising behaviour
Strong emotional commitment to innovation by other than the key
innovator(s)
People emotionally attached to a specific technology or technical solution and
ignoring other options
Sense and feeling of ownership by the innovators
Emotional involvement in an innovation but without control over the key
variables
Scientific prestige and mana as a motivation
Intellectual freedom
Innovators like to control own business and not be controlled by bosses
Organisational culture
Academic and other intellectual leaders knowing when to "let go"
Interest in the subject or innovation as a motivator
Lifestyle variable
6. Motivations Retatinq to the Innovation Process Itself
Variables:
Journey more fun than arriving
Motivation from challenge of solving the problem
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Missionary zeal and feeling of "us against the world"
Drive to understand the science underpinning the technology
High degfee of freedom to work on areas of greatest interest
Feeling of "ownership" by customers in the design and development of a new
product
Enthusiasm
Innovation induces a euphoric high
Teamwork itself as a motivation
Scientists love research - and they get paid as well
Innovators often see jobs as paid hobbies
People innovate because its interesting, not because its a rational investment
Having a go
Fun
Innovators enjoy the exPerience
Empowerment resulting from surviving crises
Too much success can stifle innovation
Success builds confidence
Sense of ownership of how (rather than why) innovations are to be developed
5. Broad Area: External Influences
Axial Categories within Broad Area










Flexible R&D funding mechanisms such as PRCS
Public R&D tunding
13G
Government as the main customer for innovation
Export incentives
Tradenz
2. Industrv Structure and Organisation
Variables:
Industry structure
NZ has a good cross section of industry
Arrogance by large companies against smaller companies
Existence of a clear industry structure
Importance of trade shows
Producer Boards
Restriction in competition due to industry structure
Vertical integration from production to market as an innovation stimulus
Centralised coordination of R&D
pressures to benefit the whole industry especiatly through generic technology
Industry Associations
Industry-wide awards
Industry associations giving a lead








4. Economic and Resulatory Reforms and Environment
Variables:
Economic reforms in the 1980s
Open trade policy




Establishment of CRIs with full commercial powers
CRI establishment means that indMduals as well as institutes behave more
commercially
Science reforms
Commercial structures, powers and incentives for CRIs
Dependence of a research institute on a company or industry surviving
Transfer of Q.A. and other technical servicing functions from government to
industry
CRI establishment and science reforms leads to short termism
Import controls as a stimulus to innovation
Comfort from a protected market stifles innovation
Competition
Trade unions
External economic debate and criticism of an industry
Economic bad times are a spur to innovation
5. Resulatory and Leeal Factors
Variables:
Existence of regulatory standards
Barrier of overseas regulations
ISO 9000
Country by country diflerences in technical and regulatory standards
Liability issues
External standards drive specifi cations
Market access barriers to added value products
Overseas regulatory standards as a barrier to NZ innovation
Regulatory barriers can create opportunities
6. Nature and Ownership of a Company
Variables






Innovative companies tend to be unlisted
Partnerships
Privatisation
Subsidiaries hide R&D from the Head Office parent company




7. Customer and Market Influences
Variables
Market-driven innovation
Customer and market influences
Customer-driven specifi cations
Local market is a microcosm of world market
Lead users
Response to health concerns
Health barriers to innovation
OOS stimulus to innovation
Innovation is intensely needs driven
Pressures to get onto the market before the competition
Desire for practical functionality in a commercial environment
Belief by customers in health properties of a food
Exceptionally high quality requirements force companies to "raise their act"
Defence innovations associated with shrinking defence budgets
Need for direct link with consumers, not just customers and distributors
Customers often not consumers
Interactive dialogue with customers
Existence of a discerning customer
Clear and explicit specification of a need
Customer-driven innovation
Use of market stepPing stones
Niche market that allows multiple variants and type specffications
Customers, especially overseas customers, that signify to other customers the
prestige and credibility of a product
Niche markets
Sensitivity and responsiveness towards market and business trends
4ll
Sudden change in the market
Unexpected and non-traditional markets
Changing fashions
Specialist innovators have at least some customer contact
Consumers concerned with ethics/safety/purity/sustainability of production
processes, as well as with the product consumed
Food health and safety
Lifestyle changes






Treaty of Waitangi issues
"Invented here" syndrome
Cultural affinities with some overseas markets






Isolation of many NZ industries increases eagerness to discuss and adopt new
ideas
Geographic closeness of institutes or innovators and adopters of technology
4t2
Geographic bufFer to comPetition
10. Overseas and International Influences
Variables:
International trade fairs crucial launching platform for overseas sales
Innovations developed for offshore clients
overseas sales establish credibility of an innovation in NZ
NZ's image overseas
International markets force a higher level of technological development and
innovation than domestic markets
Overseas companies as first adopters of innovation
Company with a global Presence
Adaptation to foreign tastes
Overseas visits, offices and secondments to do market research etc
Export market
International marketing
Importance of international scientific and technical conferences
LDCs providing niche markets
I l. External People and Ideas
Variables:
Lack of external stimulus means people bec,ome clones of each other and
innovation is stifled
E:Cernal consultants can be disastrous
Good value from external consultants
Immigrants
External consultants without "ownershiy'' can be dangerous
Technically literate external director
4t3
Need for access to specialised external expertise and sources of help
Exposure to new ideas from new people from outside
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AI{NEX 3.1: AN EXAMPLE OF THE INFORMATION
RECORDED ON AN OPEN CODED CARI)
Open Coded Variable: Trust
Occurs
It occurs in a positive or negative sense in most cases, but especially strongly in the
Ruakura Milk Harvester, Greenweld and DieselGas cases. Strong variable in
secondary data sources (eg. Tait Electronics).
Taxonomic Description
A belief in how others behave that cannot be objectively verified or contracted for.
An assumption about how things will be in conditions of uncertainty, based on
observed behaviour.
Comment
Technological innovation is a process subject to uncertainty. It depends on behaviour
which is diffficult to contract for and is subject to measureability problems and
problems of opportunism. Trust therefore emerges to address these problems of
uncertainty and lack of measureability, and to allow business to be transacted and
innovation to occur.
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ANNEX 3.22 AN EXAMPLE OF THE INFORMATION
RECORDED ON AN AXIAL CODED CARD
Axial Categoqy: Evolutionary Origins
Causal Conditions
Key cagsal condition is that "things come from somewhere". Also, the concepts of
the genotype and phenotype, punctuated equilibrium, selection environments,
irreversibility and cumulativeness, technical platform effects, non-rival goods, path-
dependency and trajectories. Causal conditions include the struggle to survive, or at
least to get better, and also how agents/firms etc. impact on and shape their
environment.
Properties
properties include the concepts of change and serendipity, cumulativeness, and
sometimes suboptimality (due to "Mathew Effect" etc.). Properties include time, the
tacit transmission of ideas and technologies through time, and the embodied as well as
disembodied properties of technology (see for example robust, evolutionary designs).
Properties of evolutionary-related variables include the tendencies for improvement
due to selection pressures and "survival of the fittest".
Context
Bounded by the past but also by the limits of a company's resources, skills, in-house
competencies and the limits of the selection environment. But it can be radically
changed by basic scientific breakthroughs and punctuated equilibrium-type effects.
Variables exist in an interdependent context. Innovations exist in relation to other
innovations and are not divisible. Relationship between extent of technical platform
and non-rival effects and the embodimen/disembodiment of technology'
4t6
Dyrnmic Processes
Innovations interast with each other, spawn new ones' and compete against each
other, including in "idea space". The engine of change and dynamics of how things
respond to and interact with ercernal stimuli. The outcome of this is "more from
less".
Links and Relationships within Categories
All variables are linked by the role of time, the ef[ects of the past, interaction with the
external environment, and above all by the concept of something (eg. a "meme") that
flows like an immortal river through a series of mortal vessels. Also, innovations and
different variables interact with each other.
Tentative Lintswith Existing Theory, Other Knoutledge andData
Very strong links to evolutionary economics and to a lesser extent neo-schumpeterian
perspectives. Links with the ideas impticit in new growth theory, though these links
are not let explicit in new growth literature.
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ANNEX 4: CORE CATEGORY VARIABLES
Introduction
This annex sets out the core categories developed through a:rial and seleotive coding
and lists the variables encompassed within each core category' In some csses' one
variable encompasses or merges several closely related variables generated through
opencoding. Annex 4.1 attached provides an example of the information resulting
from selective coding that is recorded on a core category card'
core category: Dynamics of significant New Technolory
Brief Description
The nature of significant new technology, defined as technology that embodies new
functional properties or technical characteristics that deliver improved quality,
performance or "fitness for purpose" which is objectively measurable, and the




Innovations draw on antecedent technology
Technical platforms
Invention as the "mother of necessity"
Transmission of tacit technology over time
Additional benefits subsequent to an innovation
One innovation gives rise to another or related one
International databases and external sources oftechnology
International links reducing R&D redundancy
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Published scientific paPers
Extremely demanding outside specifications as stimulus to innovation
Recruitment of external Personnel
Formal R&D
Basic science (including that resulting from focused or applied research)
Technological interests and competencies transmitted from parent to child
Specific problems ofNew Zealand materials
Technological paradigm shift
Tacitness
Availability of radical new technologies
New functional properties
Embedded uniqueness
Multiplier effects of systemic innovation
lnherent functional properties of a product allow differentiation
Strong commitment and sunk costs in existing incumbent technologies or skill-bases
Advanced technologies involve specific problems which are themselves valuable
learning experiences
Very good ideas/technologies tend to be successfully commercialised eventually; inept
implementation will delay but not stop them
Specifi city of innovation
Specific innovation creates generic platforms
Intangibility of competencies and skills makes them difficult to bonow against
Clusters of innovation
Economies of scope
History of innovation sets regulatory standards
Asset specificity
Uncertainty
Satisficing rather than optimising technology
Innovation as "new combinations"
Technical or functional characteristics of a product determines innovative potential
4t9
Core Category: Human Capital
Brief Description
The intangible assets of peoples' skills, experience and education, ideas, information
and knowledge, including their creation.
Variables
Overseas ideas, technologies and stimulus
Overseas databases









Links with industry and university research
Alliances by companies with universities and research institutes
Information exchange between universitieVinstitutes and companies
Innovative output ofgraduate student level research
Companies leading institutes in innovation
Market/customer origins of innovation
Customer contact or problem solving stimulates innovation
Innovation is focused on real problemVopportunities
Innovation to meet a very specific tender
Formal idea generating processes
Brainstorming sessions
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Systematic scanning for external sources of technology
"Creative swiping"
Formal searching for opportunities
Recruitment of external PeoPle
Interaction with ideas generated by others
Students doing research in companies
Companies spinning offfrom existing companies
External critique of innovation
Free exchange of scientific ideas




Luck favours a prepared mind











Key ideas often stimulated by people with quite different experience
Ideas spin-off orthogonally from focused development
Ideas from factory floor
Formal R&D
Companies doing strategic research
Companies as R&D labs
Companies supporting PhD research
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Companies doing world-class research
Basic science input from outside core innovation field
Family origins of innovation
Human capital transmitted through families
Tacit technology
'Nature of technology'' variables
Access to specialised external people
External people and ideas
Core Category: Social Processes
Brief Description
The informal relationships and interactions between people, grounded in their
perceptions of and feelings towards each other, and the voluntary, informal "implicit
contracts", shared values and beliefs that drive behaviour among people.
Variables
Brainstorming sessions
Interaction with ideas generated by others, especially external ideas
Free exchange of ideas among scientists
Key ideas of innovators stimulated by other people with different experiences
Teamwork; innovation as a team/group rather than individual phenomenon
"Rugby approach" to innovation
Company culture
An enabling culture
Beliefthat a company should make a positive contribution to society
Family atmosphere









People in an innovation team getting on well together
Mutual respect




Letting people have their saY
Need to manage upwards as well as downwards
Mentoring and other means of fostering innovators
Innovative people are diffrcult to manage
Leading visibly from in front
Communication
Ability of scientists and technologists to communicate with workers
Willingness to listen to others
Worker "buy in" to an innovation at an early stage
One manager must have the overview
Leadership by example rather than decree
"Loose cannons on deck" must be controlled
Focus on peoples' strengths to make their weaknesses irrelevant
Key scientists and technologists must be involved all the way through
Success breeds further success
Perceived expertise leads to confidence
Culture, values, belief systems of founder pervades firms after his departure
All staffrecognise the company CEO or owner
Innovation leader must be able to explain things clearly and communicate the vision
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Very explicit value system ofkey people





Relationship between trust and risk
Sooial ethics
Loyalty and commitment resulting from obsenring innovators trying to build and
create something bigger than their material interests
Teamwork itself as a motivation
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AhINEX 4.L: AN EXAMPLE OF THE INFORMATION
RECORDED ON A CORE CATEGORY CARD
Core CategorT: Dynamics of Signilicant New Technolory
Brief Description
The nature of significant new technology, defined as technology that embodies new
functional properties or technical characteristics that deliver improved quality,
performance or "fitness for purpose" which is objectively measurable, and the
dynamics of technology over time.
Key Variables/Categories of Variables Making up the Core Category
Invention is ineversible/]vlemes/Innovations draw on antecedent technology/Technical
platforms/Inventions as the "mother of necessity''/Transmission of tacit technology
over time/Additional benefits subsequent to an innovation/One innovation gives rise
to another or related one/International databases and external sources oftechnology/
International links reducing R&D redundancy/Published scientific papers/Extremely
demanding outside specifications as stimulus to innovation/Recruitment of external
personnel/Formal R&DlBasic science (including that resulting from focused or
applied research)/Technological interests and competencies transmitted from parent to
child/Specific problems of New Zealand materials/Technological paradigm
shiff/Tacitness/Availability of radical new technologies/l.,lew functional
properties/Embedded uniqueness/lVlultiplier effects of systemic innovatior/Inherent
functional properties of a product allow differentiation/Strong commitment and sunk
costs in existing incumbent technologies or skill-baseVAdvanced technologies involve
specific problems which are themselves valuable learning experiencesA/ery good
ideaVtechnologies tend to be successfully commercialised eventually; inept
implementation will delay but not stop them/Specificity of innovation/Specific
innovation creates generic platforms/Intangibility of competencies and skills makes
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them difficult to borrow againsVClusters of innovation/Economies of scope/flistory of
innovation sets regulatory standards/Asset specificity/[Jncertainty/Satisficing rather
than optimising technology/Innovation as "new combinations"/Technical or functional
characteristics of a product determines innovative potential
Observations/Descriptions/D iscassion of Data within Core Category
The core category encompasses several different sub-categories of variables. One
type of sub-category (eg. non-rival attributes, asset specificity, path-dependency) is
made up of variables that are major drivers of other variables or sub-categories of
variables. Other sub-categories of variables are essentially to do with how significant
new technology is an expression or manifestation of other variables (eg. how
significant new technology is the outcome of pattern recognition ability). Another
sub-category of variables relates to the behavioural dynamics of technology over time.
O b s ema t i ons/D e scr i p t i on s/D i scu s s i on of N a tu r e of Data/Re I at i ons h ip s b e tw e en C ore
Category and Other Variables
This core category combines the nature of significant new technology with variables
relating to evolutionary perspectives, and the dynamic behaviour of technolory over
time. It is closely associated with the origins of innovation variables, such as
cognitive processes, with human capital creation, and with formal R&D. It is partly
the end product of other variables and exists in relation to them. It is especially
associated with the Nature of Innovatoru category [an interim core category later
absorbed into Social Processes), in the sense that without human creativity, cognitive
processes etc. significant new technology would not be created.
It is a core category and driver in the sense that significant new technology causes
things to happen - eg. by its non-rivalry, technical platform, path-dependency and
technological trajectory effects.
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ANNEX 5: VARIABLES RELATING TO TECHNOLOGICAL
LEARNING
This annex lists variables relating to learning processes in innovatiorq illustrating how
differentiated learning processes provide a uniffing thread across core categories. It
includes both learning-related variables that are integral to core categories, and also
variables from other axial categories that are linked or associated with core
categories.
The learning-related variables are organised by the core category they are part of or
are associated with. Where they do not easily fall within a core category they are
listed under the category "Other Learning-Related Variables".
Dynamics of Significant New Technology Core Category
Innovations draw on antecedent technology
Failed research leads to success
Availability of radical new technologies
Advanced technologies involve specific problems which are themselves valuable
learning experiences
Innovation often blends applied technology and basic understanding
Major "cross overs" of science from other fields
Learning from failure
Avoidance of "locking in" designs, software structure etc. too early
As technology grows in complexity there is a need for companies to increasingly rely
on external sources ofexpertise
Success with applied product development can stimulate more basic scientific work
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Human Capital Core Category
Fundamental skills and knowledge from universities
Recruitment of external personnel
Serendipity
Intuitive thinking
Same family maintains an interest in the same technology over several generations
Technological interests and competencies transmitted from parent to child
"Shock of recognition"
Ability to recognise and see the significance of an unexpected result
"Kiwi ingenuity"
Luck favours a prepared mind
Good ideas come from actively doing things, not sitting as a desk or'Just thinking"
Flash of insight or understanding
Openness and exposure to new ideas is associated with rapid technological advances




Innovators often come from outside the commercialising company
Students finishing offor doing their degrees in companies
Innovative companies spinning offfrom existing companies
Key scientists/engineers have an input into a wide range of innovations by others
The act of innovation itself builds up expertise, skills and human capital as spin-offs
Movement of people as technology transfer
Research institute staffwith private sector experience
Rich and diverse background experience
Mobility between the university and research institute sectors
Academics with an industry background
Innovators with a broad-based academic background
Experience in overseas research institutes
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Long-serving staff
Social Processes Core Category
Customer contact or problem-solving directly stimulates innovation
Industry/marketing person isolating potential of a technology that was otherwise seen
as a failure
Key ideas of innovators stimulated by other people with different experiences
Good ideas come from the factory floor
Brain storming sessions
Free exchange of scientific ideas among scientists
Open and free exchange of ideas
Ideas generated for research institutes by company clients
Key ideas of innovators stimulated by other people with different experiences
Teamwork: innovation as a team/group rather than individual phenomenon





Innovation forces companies to change structure and workplace organisation
Personal interrelatibnships
People in an innovative team getting on well together
Mutual respect
Friendship and personal relationships
Personal rapport
Key people must be involved early, preferably at inception
Communication
Open communication with no hidden agendas
Open exchange of information
Good communication between top management and the innovative team
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Ability of scientists/technologists to communicate with workers
Willingness to listen to others
Key people doing the whole job, including R&D, marketing, servicing etc
Interactive feedback from users/industry while R&D is underway
Engineers and innovators interacting closely with customers
Other Lea rning-Related Va riables
Ideas coming from overseas
Imitation
International databases and external sources of technology
Involvement of international technical people
International links reducing R&D redundancy
Published conference results
Importance of technical trade journals
Published scientific papers as a major stimulus to innovation
Publication of new ideas is underrated as technology transfer
Patents
Research institutes providing a secondary input into an industry-driven innovation
Intellectual freedom in DSIR and universities
Technology transfer seminars and promotions
University-based innovation
University research underpinning industry R&D
AcademicVscientists generating new ideas
Public research institutes used to provide a very specialised technical input
University/industry joint proj ects
Long-term alliances with universities
Research institutes needing an intimate knowledge of industry
Supportive public infrastructure
Industry-sponsored, university-conducted research
Information exchanges between universities/institutes and companies
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Research institutes providing a key technical input of technology unavailable to the
innovator
Innovations do come from "public good" research
Development of an innovation to meet a very specific tender
Impossible outside specification as stimulus to innovation
Systematic method of scanning for external sources of technology
Creative swiping
Formal searching for external technology
Formal process of identifying opportunities
Interaction with ideas identified by others, especially external ideas
Benefits of external critiques of innovation
Use of external technical consultants
Analytical convergent thinking
Making connections between unrelated things
Accident and chance events
Time needed for in-depth, reflective thinking
Existence of structured R&D
Some companies do strategic research
Companies supporting PhD research
Companies that are wholly or partly R&D contract labs
World-class research on industry problems
PhD research can be of direct commercial benefit to companies
Importance of basic science input from outside the core innovation field
Understanding of the theoretical base or basic science underlying an innovation
Basic research knowledge resulting from focused research
Frustrating farm problems as a source of innovation
Innovation resulting from frustrating technical problem s
Innovation to deal with a bottleneck
Increasing external pressure for safety, purity and QA
Technological innovators should interact across disciplines and specialities and not be
segmented
Need for focus earlY on
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Innovation must be directed to an end purpose
Long term strategic relationships with component suppliers
Technical partnerships between companies
Technology-based companies oft en work together
Technical assistance through networking
Research institutes having a commercial partner
Cooperative or collaborative technological links with other companies in the same
group
International coll aboration
Close, interactive and long-term relationships with suppliers
Need for companies to interactpositively with other competing companies
Networking strategically externally
Networking and technical cooperation between non-competing NZ companies
Ability to recognise and avoid or withdraw from "blind alleys"
Learning on the job and learning by doing
Technical people mobile through an industry
Key people in an innovation from outside an industry
Strong background in the field/industry
Innovators from Defence, Post office and DSIR backgrounds
Innovations arising from recreational interests
Family background
Childhood hobbies and "tinkering"
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